


*SANITIZED COPY -*

(2)

COMMANDER UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM



AD-A955 105

# COMMAND HISTORY

## VOLUME II

### 1967

DTIC  
ELECTE  
JUN 16 1986  
S D  
B

DTIC FILE COPY

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**  
Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

Prepared by the Military History Branch  
Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff  
Headquarters, USMACV, APO San Francisco 96222  
Saigon, Vietnam  
1968

UNCLASSIFIED

RECORDED / INDEXED  
16715 111  
3 - 0 1 0 1

86 6 9 028

*-SANITIZED COPY-*



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER Volume II, HQ USMACV COMMAND HISTORY, 1967	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <b>AD-A955105</b>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) <b>Command History, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM 1967 VOLUME II</b>	5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final - 1967	
7. AUTHOR(s) History Branch, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff, MACV	6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER None	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) ---	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Hq Department of the Army (DAIM-FAR-AD) Information Management Support Agency Alexandria, VA 22331-0301	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS None	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Records Access & Release Division Information Access Branch (DAIM-FAR-AI) Alexandria, VA 22331-0301	12. REPORT DATE 1967	13. NUMBER OF PAGES 510 of 1340 & 7 index pages
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. A Classified Version of this document has been accessioned into DTIC . Under AD #	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED	
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited.	18a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE None	
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This is the Second Volume of the 1967 USMACV Annual Command History, fourth in a series of Histories covering the years 1964 thru March 1973, prepared IAW CINCPAC Instructions for Unified Commands.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) US PSYOP Organization, Enemy Reaction, PSYOP Campaigns, Supply, Maintenance, Research & Development, Special Problem Areas, Morale, Discipline, Pre. , POW's, Security, Contingency Plans, Country Mission Stabilization Program <i>Contents of this volume include:</i>		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This Chapter II, Command History, 1967, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains Letter of Promulgation, Title Page, and Table of Contents (7 Index pages). Follow are: Chapter VI - Pacification and Nation Building, (Page 559-632), Chapter VII - Psychological Operations, (Page 633-706), Chapter VIII - Logistics (Page 707-860), Chapter IX - Research & Development, (Page 861-896), Chapter X - Special Problem Areas. (Page 897-1020),		



# UNCLASSIFIED

MACI031

SUBJECT: Promulgation of the USMACV 1967 Command History  
Volume II

<u>DISTRIBUTION:</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER(S)</u>	
	<u>Command History</u>	<u>Annex G</u>
CINCPAC	1 thru 20	16 thru 20
JCS		1 thru 5
OSD		8 & 9
DEPT OF THE ARMY	21 thru 30	12 & 13
DEPT OF THE NAVY	31 thru 40	6 & 7
DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE	41 thru 50	14 & 15
COMMANDANT, USMC	51 thru 55	10 & 11
COMMANDANT, USCG	56, 57	
CINCEUR	58	
CINCISO	59	
CINCSTRIKE	60	
CINCOSAC	61	
COMUS JAPAN	62	
COMUS KOREA	63	
COMUSMACTHAI	64	
CINCUSARPAC	65	
CINCPACFLT	66	
CINCPACAF	67	
CG FMFPAC	68	
COMSEVENTHFLT	69	
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE	70	
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES	71	
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE	72	
US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE	73	
AIR UNIVERSITY	74	
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE	75	
USA CGSC	76	
USMC C&SC	77	
USMA	78	
USAFA	79	
AMEMB, SAIGON	80	

Continued

ii

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

MACJ031  
SUBJECT: Promulgation of the USMACV 1967 Command History  
Volume II

<u>DISTRIBUTION:</u>	COPY NUMBER(S)	
	<u>Command History</u>	<u>Annex G</u>
CDR, 7TH AF	81	
CG, USARV	82 thru 85	
COMNAVFORV	86	
CG, III MAF	87	
CG, I FFORCEV	88	
CG, II FFORCEV	89	
SA IV CORPS	90	
<u>MACV STAFF:</u>		
MACJ03	91	
MACJ2	92, 93	
MACJ3	94, 95	
MACJ4	96	
MACJ5	97	21
MACJ6	98	
MACCORDS	99	
MACMD	100	
MACCOO	101, 102	
MACPD	103	
MACSOG	104	22 thru 34
MACJ031 (Military History Branch)	105 thru 125	

# UNCLASSIFIED

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Volume II)

	Page
Letter of Promulgation . . . . .	i
Title Page . . . . .	v
Table of Contents . . . . .	vii
List of Illustrations . . . . .	ix
Chapter	
VI. PACIFICATION AND NATION BUILDING . . . . .	559
VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS	
The US PSYOP Organization . . . . .	633
The Enemy Reaction . . . . .	647
PSYOP and Leaflet Campaigns . . . . .	656
PSYOP Campaigns Within GVN. . . . .	674
Novel Ideas and Innovations. . . . .	688
Civic Action Programs . . . . .	690
VIII. LOGISTICS	
Refining the Logistical Base . . . . .	707
Supply . . . . .	724
Services . . . . .	755
Maintenance . . . . .	759
Transportation and Lines of Communication . . . . .	762
Communications . . . . .	775
Medical Activities . . . . .	798
Port Development . . . . .	807
Construction . . . . .	839
IX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	
Organizational Structure . . . . .	861
Programs . . . . .	867

Chapter	Page
X. SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS	
Morale and Welfare . . . . .	897
Discipline, Law and Order . . . . .	948
Press and Public Opinion . . . . .	959
Prisoners of War . . . . .	970
Security . . . . .	994
XI. CONTINGENCY PLANS AND MACJ5 STUDIES . . . .	1021
XII. ECONOMIC AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS	
Country Mission Stabilization Program . . . . .	1035
MACV Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program . . . . .	1046
Wage Adjustment Program . . . . .	1055

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (Volume II)


<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
VI-1	CORDS STAFF ORGANIZATION	588
VI-2	CORDS FIELD ORGANIZATION	589
VI-3	THE 59-MAN RDC TEAM	608
VI-4	ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE	618
VII-1	MACV PSYOP ORGANIZATION	640
VII-2	A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER'S POEM TO HIS MOTHER	658
VIII-1	M16 RIFLE TIPS	742 & 743
VIII-2	I WCS PHASE I	777
VIII-3	I WCS PHASE II	778
VIII-4	I WCS PHASE III	781
VIII-5	PROJECT 439-L	782
VIII-6	DIAL CENTRAL OFFICES	786
VIII-7	COMMON USER-LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE PLAN	787
VIII-8	AFVN RADIO AND TV FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	791
VIII-9	MARS STATIONS TRAFFIC 1967	797
VIII-10	SAIGON PORT	809
VIII-11	SAIGON PORT	810
VIII-12	CUA VIET-DONG HA	820
VIII-13	HUE - PHU BAI - TAN MY	821
VIII-14	DANANG	822
VIII-15	CHU LAI	823
VIII-16	CAM RANH BAY	826
VIII-17	NHA TRANG	827
VIII-18	QUI NHON	828
VIII-19	PHAN RANG	829
VIII-20	TUY HOA - VUNG RO	830
VIII-21	VUNG TAU	834
VIII-22	DONG TAM	836
XII-1	THE GI DOLLAR	1049

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAPTER VI

PACIFICATION AND NATION-BUILDING

INTRODUCTION



(C) 1967 was a year of change across the entire spectrum of Revolutionary Development (RD). Previous efforts were closely studied in hopes that past errors and weaknesses could be improved upon and that good, strong ideas could be carried forward into 1967 and 1968. The Thieu-Ky government, established during an earlier coup, was showing promising signs of becoming stable. This Regime, in power for an unprecedented length of time as 1967 began, reviewed and assessed its organization to accomplish the challenging task of pacifying the RVN and made changes. Most important among these was the creation of the Minister of RD (MRD). The USG, principal advisor to the GVN, reevaluated its task-organization, and it, too, made sweeping changes. National elections were held (see Annex D) resulting in a popular mandate for Thieu and Ky to continue as the nation's leaders.

(U) Within the framework of so much activity, RD progressed. Together, both the GVN and the US agreed upon new concepts within which pacification would be pushed forward. From these concepts joint and combined plans were born. The roles and missions of the various military and civilian agencies were established, and concerted efforts were made to start each down its separate, but parallel, paths-- these paths to converge at the end goal, a unified, democratic Republic of Vietnam.

(U) Of greatest impact upon COMUSMACV during the year was the decision to place the responsibility for a combined civil/military pacification advisory effort under his supervision. To supervise this monumental task, he organized a "J" level staff section called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). To assist COMUSMACV, Special Presidential Assistant Robert W. Komer was sent to Vietnam and designated DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS. Under his direction CORDS revamped RD mission priorities and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

established Project TAKEOFF as a management tool to accomplish the RD support mission.

## BACKGROUND

(U) Beginning in 1954, pacification programs in the Republic of Vietnam had gone through many stages before the term Revolutionary Development was adopted in early 1966. The term "pacification" described the broad range of activities aimed at bringing to the nation a state of economic, political, and sociological viability. The program encompassed not only building modern power sources and industrial plants, but also improving living conditions and work methods for all of the people. It included training teachers, building schools, publishing books, developing civil administrators for the hamlets and villages and public servants for the cities, and establishing government systems under which all could work efficiently. It meant generating public attitudes which were at once appreciative and respectful of the central government and cooperative and democratic at the local level. Pacification, under various names, was to mould a proud, courageous, and individualistic people into a modern cohesive, free, and self-governing nation. The problems of pacification had been recognized for years, but little success had been achieved by the Diem regime and its successors until mid-1966.

### The Diem Regime

(U) During the early part of the Diem regime, pacification was conducted in roughly two phases. The first effort, 1954-1956, was directed towards reoccupation of former Viet Minh territory with limited attempts to identify and destroy Communist infrastructure and initiate constructive government programs. The GVN human and material resources were inadequate, and US and FW assistance was marginal. During the second phase, the GVN launched its first coherent pacification program, one designed to secure specific strategic objectives. These plans were essentially Vietnamese in both concept

# UNCLASSIFIED

and execution. They were relatively selective and were carried out during the incipient stages of the insurgency. US assistance included some technical advice, but it consisted mostly of increased material support. The plans failed primarily because they offered nothing positive in terms of social justice and opportunity. They were partial and disjointed attempts, poorly planned and lacking in resources.

(U) The Strategic Hamlet Program (1962-1963) was the first national program which involved relatively heavy US advice and support. It was initiated when the dangers, though not the extent, of the insurgency were clear to everyone. The US provided commodities, some civil field personnel, and \$10 million in piasters, together with armaments, barrier materials, radios, and other counterinsurgency tools to support the strategic hamlet. However, the program was still essentially Vietnamese, and Diem gave his regime's full political direction and leadership to it. This was the program's great strength, but central control and measures introduced by Diem to modify local governmental institutions resulted in weak local leadership and a general breakdown of local government.

(U) Many reasons were cited for the downfall of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Among these were corruption, overly ambitious implementation which resulted in "paper pacification," false reporting, and forcing the peasants into artificial communities which aroused their resentment. In the main, the Strategic Hamlet Program failed because it bore little relationship to the military situation and was being implemented at a time when the military balance was going against the GVN and security could not be established. Enemy infiltration mounted, and enemy forces overran isolated hamlets which could not withstand the impact.

(U) After the November 1963 coup toppled the Diem regime, the successor government completely swept out Diem's appointees in the provinces. Consequently, an entirely new governmental structure had to be rebuilt from top to bottom. This process took more than 12 months, and the results were tenuous, at best.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chien Thang Rural Construction

(U) After the November 1963 coup toppled the Diem regime, several successor pacification programs were adopted. In February 1964 the GVN published its Chien Thang (Victory) National Pacification Plan which established the "spreading oil spot" concept in two phases--restoration of security and development--and outlined military support for the 1964 pacification effort. But the overall military and civil aspects of the plan lacked coordination, and many of the definitions lacked the necessary clarity and detail to spell out the roles and missions of the various forces involved. The 1965 pacification plan corrected some of the weaknesses of the Chien Thang program. In an attempt to define the program more clearly, the term "pacification" was changed to "rural reconstruction" in April 1965 and to "rural construction" (RC) at the end of July. The death of the Minister of Rural Construction in August was a set-back to the program, but it was also the indirect cause of revitalization of the whole RC process. The Ky government, recognizing the enormity of the problem, if not all of its ramifications, appointed the talented and energetic Major General Nguyen Duc Thang as the new Minister of RC.

(C) General Thang proved a fortunate choice, for under his direction the RC program came to life. He made efforts to extend the philosophy of the program into every province and down to every village and hamlet in government controlled areas. The path was by no means smooth. The Vietnamese peasant had seen similar programs before and recalled all too clearly the fate of many such efforts under the Diem regime. It was apparent that nothing could be accomplished in any area or on any level until enemy military forces were defeated and driven off. Adequate local security had to be established and the remaining VC guerrilla threat had to be neutralized.

(C) The last quarter of 1965 saw considerable progress. GVN officials analyzed the many factors that had impeded progress in the past and devised plans to insure greater progress during the coming year. Pacification during 1965 on a nationwide basis made very little tangible progress primarily because GVN leadership never became interested in or really supported the pacification strategy. There was considerable justification for its not doing so. After the November 1963 coup had toppled the Diem regime, the succeeding governments were extremely unstable until the Thieu-Ky government became firmly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

entrenched at the end of 1966. In addition, there was a stigma associated with pacification because it had been initiated by the Diem regime. Pacification was a strategy which could be carried out only from a position of strength, and the total military situation had continuously deteriorated and was saved only by the introduction of US combat troops in late 1965.

(U) By 1966 the military situation had changed sufficiently to permit a new pacification strategy. The Vietnamese once more began to respond to a pacification program called Revolutionary Development (RD). The 1966 program was planned hurriedly, and General Thang took over the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MRD) when planning was already in process. Financial and budgeting procedures were still developing, and the US planning effort was not coordinated. With US assistance, however, the budget was approved and funds released in January of 1966 for the first time in the history of pacification in the RVN. The concept of pacification had been refined to the point that, by 1966, sound theories were incorporated into the RD program. There remained, however, little relationship between concept and execution. The latter focused primarily on a wide range of physical improvements and gave little attention to the more important but intangible aspects of promoting social cohesion and local government. Not until planning for the 1967 program was begun were concepts of social and economic reform included in the program.

(U) The 1966 RD program had few resources and only the beginning of some cohesion around the newly-conceived 59-man RD teams. Military support was included in planning although security generally was inadequate throughout the year. 1966 plans, perhaps because they were loosely conceived and developed, were far too ambitious. This was aggravated by terrific pressure from Saigon to show demonstrable results. The net effect was an upsurge in activity toward the end of the fiscal year which resulted in the obligation of much more money than could be used and the starting of many more projects than could be finished prior to the end of the year. Consequently, a considerable portion of the effort expended in the first quarter of 1967 was on completing the 1966 program. The 1966 achievement of 444 new hamlets was only 24 percent of the goal of 1,830.<sup>1</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## GVN ORGANIZATION FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

(U) As a result of the reorganization of the War Cabinet on 12 July 1966, General Thang's title was elevated to that of Commissioner General of RD. This position gave him direct supervision over the Ministries of RD, Youth, Agriculture, and Public Works, and the Commissariat for Administrative Affairs. He then was responsible for coordinating and integrating civil and military RD activities at all echelons of the GVN. In addition, the MRD was reorganized along more functional lines on 31 December 1966. A key change involved the increasing importance placed on the Inspection Directorate, an agency tasked to improve evaluation of RD progress at the national level.

(C) The use of different terms to describe essentially similar geographical or political/military areas of interest was sometimes confusing. The term "region," a civil designation, corresponded to JGS's Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The military corps commander was, in addition to being the senior military commander, the senior GVN delegate to the political region subdivision. Not only did the CTZ commander control all military units in his corps, but he also supervised the province and district chiefs within the region. Province was the next political level below region. A military term connoting the same geographical area as province was "sector." The province or sector chief, a military appointee, commanded Regional Forces within his sector. Next came the political subdivision of district, which, for military purposes, was termed "sub-sector." The subsector or district chief, also a military appointee, normally commanded all Popular Forces within his district. From the above, it is clear that there was no clear-cut line dividing civilian from military functions throughout the GVN.

(C) On the civil side, RD Councils, the administrative elements for the civil aspects of RD, were created in an unbroken chain from national level through corps, division/special zone and province, to district. The Chairman at each echelon was a member of the council at the next higher level. This arrangement enhanced continuity of effort and improved administration within the RD structure. The Commissioner General for RD was also the Secretary General of the Central RD Council (CRDC), and his MRD served as the CRDC's executive

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

civilian side, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was formed to bring the multifaceted civilian aspects of RD support under one manager.

#### Revolutionary Development Support Directorate

(C) For most of 1966 the MACV staff supervision of support for the GVN pacification program had been exercised by the Revolutionary Development Division (J33). By the latter part of the year, however, it became apparent that the expanding activities of the MRD, and the appointment of General Thang as Commissioner General of RD, would require a parallel expansion in MACV. This would not only add stature to the office but, more practically, would cope with the increasing scope of RD operations. It had become clear by mid-summer of 1966, for example, that the requirements for liaison visits, inspection trips and subsequent trip reports had placed a severe strain on the resources of J33. Consequently, the J3 and other interested agencies recommended to COMUSMACV that a separate staff directorate, parallel to PSYOP and Training, should be created within the MACV staff.

(U) COMUSMACV accepted this thinking, and, on 7 November 1966, directed the establishment of the MACV Revolutionary Development support Directorate (RDSD) under the staff supervision of the J3. The increased importance of the RD support program was recognized by establishing the head of the RDSD as a general officer position. Newly-promoted BG W. A. Knowlton, former MACV Secretary to the Joint Staff, was appointed as its Director. In the interest of parallel staff terminology, the RD functions in the G3 sections of subordinate commands were similarly redesignated.<sup>3</sup>

#### Office of Civil Operations

(U) On 21 November 1966 Ambassador Lodge announced the formation of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO). OCO was organized to obtain a fully integrated, improved, and intensified US civil contribution to the GVN's RD efforts at all levels. This office, under the direct control of the Deputy Ambassador and his Deputy for RD, implemented a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

agency. The councils at lower echelons had permanent bureaus as their executive agencies.

(C) Significant support for RD developed on the military side during the latter half of 1966 and early 1967. On 23 September 1966, the Commissioner General for RD was appointed concurrently to the newly created position of Assistant to the Chief JGS for Territorial Affairs and Pacification. Among the key functions of this position were the development of policies and concepts for military activities in support of RD, inspection of RVNAF units assigned RD missions, and supervision of the employment and training of the RF/PF. The staff responsible for executing these functions was established on 14 January 1967. General Thang appointed Brigadier General Ngo Dzu to the full-time duty of maintaining that office. General Dzu was instructed to maintain daily contact with MACV. MACV subsequently placed an officer on full-time duty in that office at JGS. The primary function of this new position was to form inspection teams and to conduct inspections covering the employment of ARVN and RF/PF in support of RD.<sup>2</sup>

USG ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT OF  
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

(C) Until late 1966, the USG organization in Vietnam was somewhat fractionalized. The US Ambassador was the overall chief and principal director of several independent sub-agencies. These were the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Office of the Special Advisor (OSA), and MACV. All except MACV were essentially civilian--oriented and maintained numerous contacts and liaison with the GVN. As with MACV, the funds which supported the activities came from their separate offices in Washington, D. C. In spite of this, they were all answerable to the US Ambassador.

(U) As 1966 drew to a close, however, reorganization of both the civilian and military facets was underway. Within MACV, staff supervision of military support for RD had been exercised by a sub-division of J3. This function was upgraded to a full directorate within J3--the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate (RDSD). On the

PAGE 565 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

single-manager concept for all RD civil activities at the Saigon level and all civil activities at region, division/special zone, province, and district levels. The OCO was responsible for the US Mission's civil support of RD and was charged with providing integrated, united direction of all US civil operations and personnel in the regions, provinces, and districts. It was headed by a Director, and staffed at all levels by personnel detailed by the US Mission civilian agencies (USAID, JUSPAO, and OSA) as appropriate to their programs. Activities for which OCO was responsible were programmed and funded by the appropriate US Mission agency. Excerpts from the OCO terms of reference, published 1 December 1966, were of particular interest to COMUSMACV and the military RD support effort:

## ORGANIZATION

1. The Director: The Director of the Office of Civil Operations . . . will attend meetings of the Mission Council, but not be a member. The Director of Civil Operations will direct and command all personnel and projects within his office and in the field, to include the Regional Directors and Province Representatives.

2. Region and Province: The Director of Civil Operations will be represented in the four regions by Regional Directors. They will be selected by the Director with the approval of the Deputy Ambassador. The Regional Directors will be responsible to the Director of Civil Operations for the direction of all U. S. civilian activities and personnel in the Regions and Provinces.

There will be a Provincial Representative in each Province responsible to the Regional Director. He will be designated by the Regional Director in consultation with the Director of Civil Operations. He will be responsible for all U. S. civilian activities and personnel in the province. Until Province Representatives are designated, individual agency Province personnel will continue to perform their assigned duties. . . .<sup>4</sup>

~~SECRET~~

(S) In early December 1966 AMB Lodge notified COMUSMACV that he had appointed the four Regional Directors. COMUSMACV in turn notified and requested that CGs III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, and SA IV Corps give all necessary assistance to these Directors. One of the basic problems facing all elements of the Mission was the advisory situation at sector and subsector level. As COMUSMACV pointed out in a memorandum to MACV subsector advisors, MACV advisors were the only US personnel actually residing at the district level, and the only advisors in constant contact with the district chief on RD team matters. He went on to task each advisor to review and continuously evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and accomplishments of RD programs.

(S) The other Mission elements, JUSPAO, USAID, and OSA, turned to their Washington agencies for increased personnel to staff the lower levels of the OCO, but it became evident that their personnel requirements could not be met either quickly or easily. SECSTATE advised Saigon that top priority would be given to OCO personnel needs and that he was confident the Washington agencies would make the maximum effort,

. . . but realism indicates that, for early results all of us desire, main reliance must be on reorganizing staff and reassigning officers now in-country. They have experience and will benefit by new supervisory arrangements and pinpointed responsibilities. But above all, they are there. Even if new candidates can be found in numbers desired, transfer problems and lack of current familiarity with Vietnam would mean loss of momentum in many cases in early months [of] their new tours.<sup>5</sup>

#### JOINT US/GVN PLANNING

##### Early Efforts

(C) The outlook for pacification in early 1965 was not favorable. This was so in spite of the fact that JGS had accepted nearly all US

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

suggestions pertaining to how the RVNAF could be employed to improve pacification and in spite of having published their implementing directive, Campaign Plan AB 139. It was evident that the situation was static; plans were announced but not implemented. Political jockeying diverted the attention of officials and military commanders, and instability was worsened by riots and demonstrations of religious groups and students. The Hop Tac (Working Together) Program, the special pacification program for the areas around Saigon-Cholon in the III CTZ, was at a standstill. When a stopgap allocation of three million piasters per province was made pending release of the regular funds, province chiefs were reluctant to spend the funds. They wanted specific authorization and direction from higher authorities.

(S) These trends were not at all surprising to US authorities in the RVN. As early as November 1964, COMUSMACV had agreed with the US ambassador that the pacification program was not progressing "at all well under the present form of organizational and conceptual direction." COMUSMACV felt there was an urgent need to consider major changes that could "drastically stiffen the GVN and give forward momentum to pacification projects." However, COMUSMACV also saw the dangers of exerting influence over the GVN which might be interpreted as excessive and which might boomerang on US interests.

(C) At a special US Mission Council meeting on 20 January 1965, discussion on the concept of pacification revealed that various representatives had differing viewpoints. They resolved their differences and drafted basic definitions acceptable to all. However, in early March, they were still trying to develop a meaningful doctrine for village/hamlet security. At a 2 April 1965 Joint US Mission Council/GVN Internal Security Council meeting, changes in the GVN pacification organization were approved.

(C) GVN authorities thought that "rural reconstruction" more accurately portrayed the intent of the program which was to gain popular support through positive social and economic projects while providing the necessary security to ensure project completion. The reorganization provided for better coordination and direction at the national level and defined the responsibilities of corps and division tactical commanders in support of provincial reconstruction activities. A Joint Mission Directive, "The Concept of Rural Reconstruction and Certain Definitions and Procedures," of 10 April 1965 paralleled GVN changes. It was essentially a revision of a basic document prepared jointly by USAID, USIS, and USMACV on 1 February.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) In March 1965, a JGS military plan, Campaign Plan AB 139 was prepared in direct support of the Chien Thang Pacification Program. The program, already cited as initiated in February 1964, continued in effect during 1965. With the decision to commit US combat forces in the RVN in early 1965, modified plans were necessary. On a joint basis, MACV/JGS modifications to the basic plan continued during the first half of the year as adjustments to the changing situation became necessary. However, in mid-1965, with the impending massive buildup of US forces in the RVN, it became necessary to formulate an overall plan which would clarify the missions and deployment of the various forces. In response to this need, the "USMACV Concept of Operations" was prepared and published on 30 August 1965. This overall plan, in conjunction with the RVNAF Plan AB 139, provided the basic strategy for defeating the enemy.

(C) A milestone in joint military planning was reached in December 1965. JGS published Plan AB 140, basically a revision of AB 139, to support the GVN's new rural construction program. Immediately thereafter, a combined US/RVNAF Plan AB 141 was published on 31 December. AB 141 was the first US/GVN venture into combined planning and it set the stage for the military campaign in the year that lay ahead.<sup>6</sup>

#### Concepts and Planning for 1967

(C) Past experience, trial and error, and the learning process provided the environment for a meaningful joint US/GVN dialogue to establish the parameters for the 1967 pacification effort. Both establishments recognized that the requirement to define clearly the tasks ahead must precede actual planning. Within this framework, they first established the concepts for RD and then drafted supporting directives.

#### Concepts

(S) Establishing concrete concepts for RD necessitated first defining what the term should encompass, who would be involved, and where and in what order the process would be undertaken. Within this

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

matrix, RD was defined as the integrated military and civil process to restore, consolidate, and expand GVN control so that nation building could progress throughout the RVN. By joint agreement the process was to include:

- Coordinating military and civil actions to liberate the people from VC control.
- Restoring public security.
- Initiating political, economic, and social developments.
- Extending effective GVN authority.
- Winning the willing support of the people.

(C) Revolutionary Development would be aimed at transforming hamlets not under government control first into secured hamlets, and then into Real New Life Hamlets (Ap Doi Moi) where a new life would be developed for the people within a secure environment and with improved standards of living for all. The ultimate goal of RD would be to secure and develop sufficient hamlet and village areas throughout the RVN so that Communist influence could no longer thrive or pose a threat to the GVN's efforts to build a viable, free nation.

(S) The role of the military forces in RD would be to attain a requisite level of security in and around selected hamlet and village areas so that RD civil actions and nation building could proceed. Within areas selected for RD, military forces would conduct clearing and securing operations to rid the area of VC/NVA main forces and establish and maintain local security. Concurrently, other military forces would deploy in the surrounding areas to establish a protective screen against the VC/NVA forces that sought to penetrate the areas where RD was in progress.

(S) The role of the GVN civil elements would be to initiate political, economic, and social development within hamlets and villages. This would establish firm government control and satisfy the legitimate basic aspirations of the people. Civil activities would be conducted by RD teams that would work initially in one or two hamlets. These activities would be expanded to include additional hamlets, and subsequently, an entire village.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) Having prescribed broad concepts for RD, the planners agreed that the RD process would be conducted in three phases--clearing, securing, and developing.

PHASE I--Clearing. The clearing phase would rid the area of organized VC/NVA main forces and permanently eliminate the threat of overt VC interference with RD actions to follow. By clearing a relatively large zone surrounding the hamlet and village areas, a defense in depth could be established. As a guide, an area would be considered cleared when VC/NVA main forces of company-size or larger had been destroyed or ejected. Clearing operations would be conducted by saturating the area with mobile military forces for an extended period. Emphasis would be placed on small-unit patrolling, hamlet searches, offensive ambushes, and quick reaction by large units to exploit intelligence or initial contact. Extensive operations were to be employed to "take the night away from the VC" and make it unsafe for VC to enter hamlets at night.

(S) Clearing operations would employ a multitude of forces. ARVN regular forces, augmented by RF when available, would have the primary responsibility for clearing operations. These forces normally would be employed in direct support of the provincial RD effort; however, when required to achieve unity of effort and agreed in advance between the division and sector commanders concerned, sector commanders would exercise operational control over ARVN units. US/FWMAF units would also engage in clearing operations within their tactical areas of responsibility. National Police Field Forces would assist and support the military effort within their capabilities, particularly by supplying intelligence and, in close coordination with military authorities, taking custody of and interrogating VC suspects. Where appropriate, joint military-civil operations would be aimed at eliminating the VC infrastructure and local guerrillas.

(S) In clearing operations the government's interest in, and concern for, the people would be emphasized through simple and tangible actions such as medical treatment and distribution of relief supplies. In this respect, US/FWMAF would conduct civic action in such a manner as to insure that maximum credit went to the GVN.

(S) Concurrently, psychological operations (PSYOP) would be directed at the VC and uncommitted people in the area. Against the VC, the object would be to sow dissension and to demoralize and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

confuse the enemy. Efforts would be made to communicate to the individual VC the hopelessness of his cause and persuade him to rally through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program. However, the primary objective of PSYOP would be to dissuade the population from supporting the VC. To this end, disciplined, well-behaved military forces should show a friendly, sincere interest in the people, and they must respect individual rights and property in order to exert a major psychological impact on the population.

PHASE II--Securing. The goal of this phase would be to eliminate the remaining Communist influence, establish local protection against its return, and constitute an initial local government at the hamlet level so that material and lasting development projects could be initiated. An area would be considered secured when all hamlets within the area met a six-point criteria for a secured hamlet. Sufficient military forces would have to be made available to prevent the VC from conducting operations beyond individual acts of terrorism and sabotage.

(S) Military forces would conduct operations adjacent to and within an area to provide a military secure climate for accomplishing civil activities. ARVN regular forces and/or US/FWMAF were to operate aggressively on the periphery with RD actions within the area. RF and PF would replace the regular forces within the area and assume primary responsibility for security operations. Under the control of the sector commander, the RF would actively seek out and destroy the VC guerrillas and protect the sensitive areas and critical lines of communication. The PF, under the control of the subsector commander, would provide local security for the villages and hamlets and perform other local static-security tasks.

(S) Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) teams, a specially trained 59-man VN group composed predominantly of civilian technicians, would be injected into hamlets and villages as soon as the requisite security was established. Those personnel were, and would continue to be, trained at a National Training Center at Vung Tau under the supervision of the MRD. These teams would operate under the control of the district chiefs, principally within hamlets, to establish initial government administration, organize the people for self-defense, assist in gathering and reporting information on the VC infrastructure, and initiate simple economic and social development projects to win the confidence and loyalty of the people.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) People's self-defense forces, made up of able-bodied people in the hamlets, would be organized and trained to give warning in case of VC attack. Although some members of these forces would be armed, they would not have the capability of resisting an organized VC attack without outside assistance.

(S) The National Police would increase population and resources control, maintain law and order, and prevent and control riots and sabotage against the public. In conjunction with the military forces and RDC, they would intensify their efforts to identify and eliminate the VC infra-structure.

(S) The planners went on to agree that the information and PSYOP program would have to be directed at the entire population. Actions and intentions of the government would be explained, and legitimate aspirations and grievances of the people determined and satisfied. Information to publicize the Chieu Hoi program would be aimed at families that had relatives with the VC.

PHASE III--Developing. The goal of the developing phase would be to create developed hamlets (also termed Real New Life Hamlets--Ap Doi Moi), establish permanent hamlet and village governmental administration, and expand civil authority throughout the area. An area would be considered developed when all hamlets within the area had been transformed in Ap Doi Moi, hamlet and village government administrations had been organized by democratic process and were functioning effectively, and GVN civil elements had assumed overall control of local security and maintenance of law and order in hamlet and village areas.

(S) Completion of the developing process would be considered accomplished when the National Police (NP) forces had relieved the RF/PF and regular forces of the responsibility for local security. Further, the NP were to have secured sensitive areas and LOCs. These conditions, however, did not mean that the RDCs' tasks in an area were complete. It would continue to function and would assist the people to form local government administration and strengthen people's self-defense forces. It would also continue to promote health and medical programs, agricultural improvements, land reform and road construction.

(S) ARVN regular forces and/or US/FWMAF would continue to conduct clearing or search-and-destroy operations in adjacent areas to prevent VC/NVA main forces from penetrating the area under

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

development. After an area achieved the developed status, it would enter the nation-building program, an almost purely civil operation.

### Planning

(C) On 11 May 1966, representatives of the MRD, JGS and MACV met in a preliminary planning session. They discussed the selection of National Priority Areas (NPA) where the pacification effort would focus, and military resources would be required for support. Shortly thereafter, a joint civil/military US planning group (JPG) was formed with the approval of the US Mission. Additionally, the US Mission organized a Mission Liaison Group (MLG), which was to work closely with MACV and perform formal liaison with the GVN.

(C) In June 1966, MACV presented its tentative 1967 RD plans to the MLG. Following this, all agencies began the task of preparing their estimate for the coming year. Concurrently, the Minister of RD and members of his staff began visiting each province to gain better understanding of their problems. In July, a group from JGS, accompanied by MACV and USAID representatives, visited each corps to discuss military planning.

(C) The JPG selected its recommended NPAs which were approved by the MLG on 8 August for submission to the Ministry of RD. On 10 August the Ministry and JGS approved them along with the recommended guidelines which provided the basis for planning by individual provinces. The 1967 NPAs were generally the same as for 1966, although slightly expanded.

(C) In the latter half of August during a briefing to the Mission Council, the MACV J3 outlined the basic philosophy of the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan AB 142. Generally, ARVN would be given the primary mission of providing security for RD while US and FWMAF would continue efforts to destroy VC/NVA main forces and base areas. In the three northern CTZs, ARVN would devote at least half of its effort to support RD, but in IV CTZ it might have to devote up to 75 percent of its effort to offensive operations. US/FW forces were to support RD by providing security in their TAORs and base areas; they would also contribute implicit aid to RD and to the resurgence of the RVN economy as a by-product of normal operations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(C) The MRD had made considerable progress in developing the guidelines for the provinces, but involvement in the national elections of 11 September delayed publication of the guidelines until 8 October 1966. Shortly thereafter, teams from both US and GVN agencies visited each Corps headquarters to present detailed briefings on the documents and on the requirements they generated.

(C) In early November the Ministry again sent teams out to assist the provinces in developing their plans. Between 14 November 1966 and 9 January 1967, General Thang had a combined US/GVN team review and approve province plans. Appropriate ARVN corps and division commanders were required to indorse the plans to signify that they understood and concurred with them and that they could provide the necessary military support.

(C) Concurrent with the development of the RD plan, the military plan, AB 142, Combined Campaign Plan, 1967 was nearing completion. COMUSMACV insured that the basic concept for RD was included in it. On 7 November 1966, AB 142 was jointly signed by COMUSMACV and Chief JGS. On 29 December 1966, COMUSMACV signed a combined MACV/JGS directive requiring the preparation of sector security plans with provided coordinated military support for provincial RD activities. This directive was forwarded to the Chief JGS for the signature at the end of the year. <sup>8</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF THE RVNAF

(S) By early 1967 the buildup of US/FW forces and their successes against VC/NVA forces permitted a substantial part of ARVN (53 battalions as of 31 May) to be employed in direct support of RD. In addition, a number of US/FW and ARVN units supported RD indirectly. Nevertheless, the diversion of US forces from II and III CTZs to meet the enemy main force threat in I CTZ lessened this indirect support significantly. Were the enemy to continue to step up his main-force effort, it would be necessary to withdraw some ARVN forces from a direct support role. There were sufficient military forces to permit pacification progress in some areas, but overall it was questionable whether the military forces were adequate to support an aggressive pacification effort. <sup>9</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The published accounts of the division of responsibility between the ARVN and the FWMAF tended to oversimplify the arrangement and created the impression that most of the fighting was to be accomplished by the FWMAF while the ARVN merely guarded the area seized and provided local security. Some GVN leaders were sensitive to this misinterpretation of the "clear and hold" function assigned to the Vietnamese forces, though it actually broadened the ARVN role in RD. In numerous public statements, Chief of State Thiệu and Premier Ky put this mission into perspective by explaining that the ARVN role was agreed upon at Vietnamese initiative. It was further pointed out that only ARVN, an indigenous force, was capable of continuous communications with the peasantry and had the area knowledge and skills essential to the success of RD. The US fully shared this view and realized that the broadening of ARVN responsibilities in securing the countryside and working with the civil authorities in the villages and hamlets was of the first order of importance. They also recognized that this called for new sacrifices, high motivation, discipline, and skills from the Vietnamese citizen soldier. Premier Ky commented on the RD Program at Canberra, Australia on 19 January 1967:

Greater numbers of our Armed Forces are broadening their roles beyond the mere military to aid in this vital task of Revolutionary Development. We are not deluding ourselves that this will be an easy job for the Vietnamese soldier... Our forces recognize the sober fact that we may take more casualties in this combined military-psychological role than we would in a purely military situation. But we also recognize that it is necessary if we are to be successful in this complicated task to entrust the task to Vietnamese men and women who have the special qualities and virtues which this special situation calls for: discipline, endurance, bravery under fire, belief in the fighting ideal, experience in training others, inspiring by example. I am confident that our military will distinguish themselves in carrying out this added responsibility in waging this other war...<sup>10</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) As a result of COMUSMACV's counseling on 5 January 1967, the Ministry of Defense published a directive entitled "Military Support of Revolutionary Development" which provided detailed guidance on the control of units assigned an RD mission. Essentially, the instructions stated that ARVN units employed in support of RD would operate under the operational control of either the division commander or sector chief as appropriate. Whoever exercised control would designate a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) for the unit which had to be approved by Corps. Units would not be withdrawn from their TAOR without prior approval of the Corps commander. In an emergency the unit would assist a friendly force that came under attack suddenly. Further, the unit might be used outside the TAOR for a period not to exceed six hours provided that other local resources were committed already, and that a minimum security force remained in the TAOR while the unit was absent. The directive conformed to the provisions of AB 142 and offered a flexible approach to the problem of control over units assigned an RD mission. Subsequent field inspections revealed that there was general agreement with this approach by both the ARVN field and sector commanders. 11

(C) The beginning of 1967 was characterized by an influx of RVNAF battalions into the role of direct support of the RD program. Of 120 ARVN infantry battalions assigned to ten division tactical areas and two special zones, 43 were in position performing missions in direct support of RD by the end of January. In addition to these, three Ranger, one Marine, and three airborne battalions were assigned the same role. To assist the RVNAF, eight US and 15 FWMAF battalions contributed directly to the RD mission. During the succeeding three-month period the ARVN infantry battalions were increased to 53 and by 30 April, one additional Ranger and one RF battalion provided direct support to the RD effort. The optimum number by the end of 1967 was a minimum of 51 battalions.

(C) The training of 21 VNAF battalions in the tactics and techniques for their special new role in the RD program was a continuous process. All infantry battalions were scheduled to complete their training late in the year. By the latter part of April, 67 maneuver battalions had completed the RD training. In addition, three combat support and four combat service support battalions had also completed this training. 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) On 3 February the MRD and the Ministry of Defense published a joint circular outlining a new policy of using RVNAF units and RVN civilian personnel to supplement the activities of the RD. These forces were to work only in Ap Cung Co (Consolidation) hamlets and Ap Binh Dinh (Pacification) hamlets; RD teams would remain the sole developers of Ap Doi Moi (Real New Life) Hamlets, but would, based on their capabilities, continue to operate in the other hamlets. The primary reason for using these new manpower resources for RD was the anticipated requests from the provinces for the consolidation and pacification of additional hamlets not originally forecasted in the 1967 provincial RD plans. These additional hamlets were in areas close to friendly base camps and lines of communications and in areas newly cleared by friendly military successes. The Province Chief was responsible for supervising the RD activities of the RVNAF units and civilian personnel and insuring that these activities were integrated with his provincial RD plan.<sup>13</sup>

(C) The RD program required close coordination between military, RD teams, and administrative personnel at all levels. However, early in 1967, in many local areas this coordination was loose and operating efforts were not yet concentrated. Therefore, on 1 April an inter-ministerial directive was distributed to establish procedures for unifying command and uniting the efforts of the military, RD teams, and administrative personnel in priority RD areas. The provinces were to organize "RD Campaigns" in the priority area. The inter-ministerial directive was not intended to change current directives in any way as far as the organization and management of the RD teams were concerned. According to the status of the facilities and the number of RD teams and attached regular force units, a province could organize one or more RD campaigns. In any priority RD area where more than three RD teams operated, the province would organize an RD campaign. The campaign began from the clearing phase and continued until the RD task was completed. The limits of the RD campaign would encompass the priority RD areas and the local security areas necessary for the security of the priority area. The limits would be recommended by the province chief/sector commander and approved by the special zone or division commander concerned. It would then be communicated for information to the appropriate CTZ, the Chief JGS, and the MRD. Each RD campaign required the participation of the following military, RDC, and administrative elements:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1) Attached regular force units in support of the RD campaign.
- 2) RF/PF units.
- 3) Police field forces (if any).
- 4) RD teams.
- 5) Armed People's groups (if any).
- 6) Personnel of regional military agencies.
- 7) Administrative, police, and technical personnel belonging to the services and offices in the province.<sup>14</sup>

(C) New GVN decrees led to the development of hamlet militia forces to operate below the PF level--a concept which had not worked well in the past. A series of laws and decrees promulgated on 24 December 1966 and 9 January 1967 restored an elected village council with authority over budget, taxes, land transfers, public services, and internal village legal matters. As initially drafted, the decrees subordinated the local PF commander and his troops to the village chief; however, reportedly under pressure from former Defense Minister Co and others, the language was changed in the final decree to give the village chief the authority only to request PF support. This effectively denied the village chief the direct control of forces needed to secure his village area. In late February 1967, the MRD appeared to have gotten around this barrier for military protection by sponsoring the enactment of a law creating "People's Self Defense Forces." This authorized a hamlet militia, trained and equipped by the RD teams, to provide security in hamlet/village complexes where no PF were available or where the local military commander was uncooperative. The effectiveness of this type of force was questionable, and it added one more uncoordinated security force to the many already in RVN.<sup>15</sup>

(C) It appeared that both the GVN and ARVN showed new vitality during the months of February and March. GVN ministries were showing signs of recognizing that mutual cooperation and coordination were prerequisites for success. By March, the GVN and ARVN had made progress in weeding out ineffectives on their payrolls, and ARVN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

had improved its RD support training. There were those who speculated that this renewed vigor was caused by a high level GVN/US conference to be held on Guam during the closing days of March. Progress, regardless of its catalyst, was still progress, and it elicited attention from high levels in Washington.

(C) On 17 March, SECSTATE sent guidelines to the AMEMB in hopes that the momentum would be maintained. In part, he said that the GVN should be encouraged to make every effort to seek out and make the best officers commanders of units assigned RD support missions. Conversely, commanders who fail to act in the best interests of the RD program should be relieved and publicly rebuked. Further, selected officers who have been successful should be rewarded and promoted. SECSTATE went on to point out that the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program should be supported to the absolute hilt, even over-funded. He felt that, in terms of returns, the program was cheap at five times its present costs. Most importantly, though, he stressed the importance of working out better integrated civil/military plans for the remainder of 1967 and 1968.<sup>16</sup>

(C) The Guam conference was held on 20 March. The entire spectrum of participation and RD was the focal point and of primary concern to both the US and GVN conferees. The US position was that the military successes of 1966 and early 1967 provided the greatest opportunities for success of RD, and that the GVN must be impressed with the necessity of not letting the program falter. The role of ARVN was again stressed, and in recognition of the all-important aspect, Premier Ky addressed the conferees:

What I have to say concerns the role of the Vietnamese Army. Our army will more and more support the Revolutionary Development effort by furnishing the necessary security in areas where hamlets have been liberated and in areas where new hamlets are to be constructed. The Revolutionary Development teams, who are increasingly becoming the target of the Viet Cong and are high on the priority list for assassination. Last week, of the 103 civilians executed by the VC, twenty-four were Revolutionary Development cadres.

PAGE 581 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is a grim fact that we can measure the success of the Revolutionary Development cadres by the uneasiness they cause the Viet Cong. But such is the case. The Revolutionary Development program has had considerable difficulty and we made many mistakes, but now we are beginning to get results. We look forward to greater results now that our RD teams are going to work closely with units of our Army.

Vietnamese Army units will also be used to pacify other hamlets so as to widen the perimeters of government controlled areas.

This, in effect, will leave the Allied forces, with their superior means of transportation, more effective weapons, heavier fire-power and advanced communications systems, to root out unit-sized enemy groups and destroy them and to block infiltration of regular troops from the north.

Now, some people have said that this means the Vietnamese soldier is taking the passive role and is satisfied with it, and that the fighting is being left to the Americans and other Allies.

... You here in the meeting know this is not the situation. But I want to use this occasion to say that, with the changing pattern of our fight against aggression the role of the Vietnamese Armed Forces is now becoming more vital. I foresee a situation where if this struggle continues, there will be more guerrilla action than before. I foresee a situation where the Viet Cong under greater pressure than ever to secure food and supplies from the hamlets will be forced to come back to the hamlets, and thus will have to engage our troops. So, for a while, Vietnamese troops may take more casualties than before. I hope this will not be the case, but nevertheless we are prepared to make this sacrifice.

As to its mission, the Armed Forces have accepted their new responsibility in the spirit of dedication and discipline. 17

(C) The tone of the RVNAF role in support of RD was not clear, and attention was redirected toward training VN forces to fulfill the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

role effectively. Since COMUSMACV's February assessment, already mentioned, significant progress had been made. In early April, COMUSMACV again addressed General Vien. In this communication COMUSMACV not only praised the progress of training, but also expanded the list of training subjects. 18

#### COMUSMACV ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR RD SUPPORT

(C) Thus, as the first five months of 1967 were drawing to a close, it seemed as if the wheels of progress were gaining momentum. Past lessons were being reviewed and improved upon; the superstructures of both the GVN and US organizations were re-tooling to better enable them to accomplish the monumental tasks ahead: the heretofore obscure parts of the puzzle were now beginning to fall into place--tasks, missions and roles were becoming clear. In Washington, D.C., however, a serious look had been, and was being given to the adequacy and efficiency of the US in-country organization to support the GVN pacification program.

#### Civil-Military Interchanges

(C) During the last few months of 1966, rumors persisted at all levels that the President was dissatisfied with the progress of the pacification program in RVN, and particularly with the US Mission's organization for RD support. True or not, these rumors were renewed with each succeeding reorganization of Mission elements and reached a crescendo with the November 1966 formation of OCO. The "word" was soon being passed that OCO had six months--three months, some said--to produce effective RD support, the alternative being "abdication" of responsibility to the military. It was possible that behind most of these unfortunate and divisive

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

rumors lay a distorted understanding of the reasons for the US Army's contingency study known as PROVN.\*

(C) Although PROVN was essentially a basic DA plan for assumption of pacification responsibilities in RVN, it did not necessarily seek such responsibilities nor recommend that they be sought. PROVN was not an OSD-approved document, and as 1966 closed, it appeared that it would remain strictly a uni-service contingency study requiring no further action. Rather, it would serve as a valuable foundation for further study and actions.

(S) At the beginning of 1967, as the knowledge of PROVN's existence became more widespread, rumors of civil-military rivalry and a military takeover of RD in Vietnam began to circulate. While PROVN did examine the desirability of bringing the civilian and military pacification efforts under one single manager, and ostensibly that manager would be military, it fell far short of amounting to a "military takeover." Quite to the contrary, it prescribed the appointment of civilian senior US Representatives (SUSREP) at regional level with nearly autonomous control over all resources within the region.

(S) In late March 1967, COMUSMACV thoroughly reviewed PROVN and had many reservations about it. He observed that it had been written based on the experience of those who had served in Vietnam in 1964 and 65 and consequently ignored the Field Force Commanders whose headquarters were just coming into existence. He further observed that PROVN ignored the newly-acquired skills of the ARVN division commanders by assuming that they knew little, and cared less, about RD. Thus it could be said that the entire military community was hardly in total favor of PROVN.<sup>19</sup>

#### A Change in Leadership

(U) On 25 April AMB Lodge departed Saigon after a 20-month second tour, and the same day Ellsworth Bunker arrived to assume

\*A study titled "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (S) (Short Title: PROVN). This study is also cited in the Section on Advisory Effort, Chapter III, and was discussed in the MACV 1966 Command History.

PAGE 584 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

his duties as US Ambassador and Chief of Mission to RVN. A few days later Eugene M. Locke arrived to become Deputy Ambassador replacing William Porter, who became Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Arriving in RVN at the same time was Presidential Assistant Robert W. Komer, White House pacification expert, whose presence brought forth a good deal of speculation in the US press. Typical was the reaction of the Washington Post:

There is considerable speculation and uneasiness in Saigon over what officials here regard as an unusual delay by the White House in spelling out the duties of Locke and Komer.

The assumption is that Komer will assume primary responsibility for revolutionary development (elsewhere called pacification) and that Locke will run the American Mission, leaving Bunker free to pursue high-level contracts with the Vietnamese....

It is not known whether Komer will receive a new title, or retain his present one. It is thought he will divide his time between Saigon and Washington, with the emphasis on Saigon. 20

(U) Uncertainty as to the direction and control of RD support in RVN was dispelled on 11 May 1967. AMB Bunker called a press conference that day to announce that the US Mission's responsibility for RD was being integrated under a single-management concept, and that COMUSMACV would be charged with that responsibility under the overall authority of the Ambassador as Chief of Mission. Reflecting decisions made at the Guam Conference, AMB Bunker's full statement outlined an impending reorganization of the existing civil and military organizations for RD support:

As senior American official in Vietnam, I have concluded that the U.S. advisory and supporting role in Revolutionary Development can be made more effective by unifying its civil and military aspects under a single management concept. Unified management, a single chain of command, and a more closely dovetailed

# UNCLASSIFIED

advisory effort will in my opinion greatly improve U.S. support of the vital RD program.

Therefore, I am giving General Westmoreland the responsibility for the performance of our U.S. Mission field programs in support of Revolutionary Development. To assist him in performing this function, I am assigning Mr. Robert Komer to his headquarters to be designated as Deputy for Revolutionary Development to COMUSMACV with personal rank of Ambassador.

I have two basic reasons for giving this responsibility to General Westmoreland. In the first place, the indispensable first stage of pacification is providing continuous local security, a function primarily of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, in which the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam performs a supporting advisory role. In the second place, the greater part of the US advisory and logistic assets involved in support of Revolutionary Development belong to MACV. If unified management of US Mission assets support of the Vietnamese program is desirable, COMUSMACV is the logical choice.

I have directed that a single chain of responsibility for advice and support of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Development program be instituted from Saigon down to the district level. Just as Mr. Komer will supervise the US advisory role at the Saigon level as Deputy to General Westmoreland, so will the present OCO Regional Directors serve as deputies to the US Senior Advisors to the Vietnamese Corps/Region Commanders.

At the province level, a senior advisor will be designated either civilian or military, following analysis of the local situation.

While management will thus be unified, the integrity of the Office of Civil Operations will be preserved. It will continue to perform the same functions as before, and will continue to have direct communication on technical matters with its field echelons. The recent Revolutionary

# UNCLASSIFIED

Development Support Division of MACV will be integrated into OCO, and its chief will serve as Deputy to the Director of OCO.

. . . I am simply having this advisory effort report to me through COMUSMACV rather than through two channels as in the past. I intend to . . . hold frequent meetings with General Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer for the purpose of formulating policy.

Such a unified civil/military US advisory effort in the vital field of Revolutionary Development is unprecedented. But so too is the situation which we confront. RD is in my view neither civil nor military but a unique merging of both to meet a unique wartime need. Thus my solution is to have US civilian and military officials work together as one team in order to more effectively support our Vietnamese allies.<sup>21</sup>

(U) In implementing the Ambassador's directive, COMUSMACV directed the MACV staff to study the problem of merging the US Missions's Office of Civil Operations and MACV's RD Support Directorate into a single MACV staff agency. Based upon staff recommendations, COMUSMACV directed the establishment of a seventh Joint Staff section-- referred to during the planning phase as J7--and as of 28 May RDSD was upgraded to Joint Staff level and redesignated the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Effective 28 May, AMB Robert W. Komer was announced as Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS. At the same time, Mr. L. Wade Latham, former Director of OCO, was announced as Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS with BG W. A. Knowlton, former Director of RDSD, as Deputy ACofS for CORDS.<sup>22</sup>

(U) The organizational structure which resulted is shown at Figure VI-1 (CORDS Staff Organization) and Figure VI-2 (CORDS Field Organization).

UNCLASSIFIED

## CORDS STAFF ORGANIZATION





Figure VI-1

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CORDS FIELD ORGANIZATION



- - x - - Coordination - Military and CORDS Matters  
 - - - - - Operational Control when Unit Assigned an RD Direct Support Mission

Figure VI-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### The CORDS Advisory Effort

(U) During the several years of US involvement in Vietnam prior to the organization of CORDS, the total US Advisory effort in support of pacification was clearly divided into civilian and military categories. With the reorganization, however, came the requirement of integrating the two. COMUSMACV appointed AMB Komer to head a steering group which was to study and make recommendations for the reorganization of the many separate US civilian and military support agencies throughout RVN. The group was to focus its attention on determining which advisory positions, at which levels, should be civilian and which should be military; the possibility of a mix, (i. e., some Province Senior Advisors (PSA) might be civilian and some military) would also be addressed. 23

(C) As the group began its study, it found that the OCO advisory effort comprised approximately 970 advisors and that MACV had nearly 2,260 advisors. When OCO and MACV merged, the figure jumped to a total of 3,653, of which 2,413 were military and 1,240 were civilian. This increase was explained by both the arrival of new personnel and redesignating others as advisors who heretofore had not been so designated. The study proved to be a continuing project, and recommendations were acted upon as they developed. 24

(C) On 25 May 1967, a review of the ratio of US Advisors to RF/PF was conducted by the Dep to COMUSMACV for CORDS. He found that there was only 1 per 929 RF/PF which compared most unfavorably with the ratio to ARVN, which was 1 US Advisor to every 23. He pointed out that even though he recognized that the Subsector Advisory Team (2 Off, 2 EM) worked part time with RF/PF, there was a notable discrepancy in the two efforts. He went on to say that it was anticipated that RF/PF were to participate more actively in the pacification role and their effectiveness would develop in direct proportion to the advisory effort provided. At the time of this review, the RF/PF advisory effort consisted of 109 personnel authorized to PF Training Centers and 32 to RF camps.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) New requirements reflected a need for 2,243 advisors to RF companies. This marked a dramatic increase which had to be accomplished by reprogramming under restraints imposed by Program 5 force ceilings. Since considerable delay could be expected in acquiring fill from CONUS resources, an experimental concept using Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) was tried in IV CTZ. In October 1967 19 such teams, consisting of five US personnel and one Vietnamese interpreter, were deployed to IV Corps. They were deployed one to a province and one to each ARVN division. Their primary mission was to train RF and PF forces. They were to instruct in small unit tactics, emphasizing night operations and conduct of ambushes and patrols, field fortifications, barrier systems, requesting and adjusting indirect fire support, weapons employment and care, employment of small boats in tactical operations, and other pertinent subjects. USARV was given the mission of providing the personnel from among those who had been in-country with tactical units. One-third were to have been in-country for five months, one-third for six months, and one-third for seven months.<sup>25</sup>

(C) Results of the MAT experiment were gratifying and provided an economy of force measure. Deployment was planned for one MAT per RF/PF Group Headquarters for the 177 headquarters programmed for activation. Other MATs would be deployed to districts according to the density of RF/PF units and priority of effort. The total MAT planning figure was 354. The US composition remained at five, but one Vietnamese officer was added.

(C) The Mobile Advisory Logistics Team (MALT), designed along much the same line as the MAT, was conceptualized to upgrade logistics deficiencies. Allocation of MALTs would be one to each area logistical command (ALC). An additional team would go to each of the III and IV Corps ALCs to support the higher density troop populations. Thus a total of seven teams, each consisting of seven personnel, was programmed. The missions of the MALT included assisting and training in supply and maintenance problems, locating and eliminating existing critical emergency logistical problems, and supervising maintenance work.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

(C) To further enhance RF/PF logistical activities, the Administrative and Direct Support Logistics (A&DSL) Advisor Section at each Province Advisory Team would be increased to provide a total of nine advisors for each of the 44 provinces. 26

(S) The increased emphasis on the entire advisory spectrum, but especially that in direct support of pacification, focused attention on the quality and training, as well as DA selection, of key advisors. In late September 1967, COMUSMACV informed his Corps Senior Advisors (SA) that DA was developing a plan which addressed not only the selection, training, and use of outstanding officers to serve as Province Senior Advisors (PSA), but also the provision of substantial incentives to them and their families. Included in the DA studies were tour lengths, selection procedures, qualifications for advisors, tour overlaps between incoming and outgoing advisors, language training, incentives and/or options to selected officers, pre-deployment training, care of officer's family, and intra-theater recruitment. Initially, DA planned for the program to be limited to the 44 PSAs.

(S) DA prepared an outline and sent it to COMUSMACV for comment. The outline, in summary, proposed: (1) tour length--eighteen months (normal tour plus six months voluntary extension); (2) qualifications--the officer should be outstanding and have had combat and battalion command experience. He must have served, or be serving, in Vietnam, and he must be a combat arms officer able to speak, or have the aptitude to learn, Vietnamese; (3) training--the officer would be trained at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) under a common program of instruction called the CORDS Training Course; (4) options/incentives--the officer would receive a personal letter from the CSA informing him of his selection. The officer's preference for a certain location in RVN would be honored, and he would receive credit for joint/combined staff duty. His family would be quartered at a CONUS post of his choosing or at Clark Field (Philippines), Hawaii, or Guam. He would be granted two weeks leave with his family in Hawaii, and his dependents would be transported there at government expense and receive a substantial family allowance during the vacation period. After twelve months in-country, the officer would receive a thirty-day leave authorized by DA Circular 630-2. The officer would be afforded the opportunity to select his next assignment, which would be honored if possible. He would have a brief visit with COMUSMACV and/or the Ambassador,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

or their deputy, upon arrival in Vietnam. Finally, the plan stated that the officer would visit the CSA during his training period and his family would accompany him to his training station provided the training period was in excess of 20 weeks.

(S) In his reply, COMUSMACV pointed out that of the 44 PSAs, 23 were military and 21 were civilian. In the 21 cases, the deputies were military. COMUSMACV desired that both military categories be included in the plan. Regarding tour length, COMUSMACV recommended two years instead of eighteen months. This would provide the continuity desired as a program objective and was consistent with an OSD approved program for voluntary extension of key selected officers who accepted the Philippines housing option. He agreed with the qualifications providing that completion of the Command General Staff College was implicit. He concurred in the training concept but suggested that the training course be called the "MACV Province Senior Advisor Training Course" because the overall effort is a MACV one and should be so identified. COMUSMACV disagreed with the idea of giving the officer joint/combined staff credit since the nature of the tour assignment was not similar to that type of staff duty, and the officer himself may suffer from lack of experience in a future joint/combined staff assignment. COMUSMACV concurred in the CONUS, Clark Field, Hawaii, Okinawa, Guam housing options but thought the final plan should spell out, in detail, options regarding availability of government housing.

(S) COMUSMACV went on to point out his desired phasing for DA fill and stated the optimum grade structures. He thought that in view of the liberal options and incentives offered, that intra-theatre recruiting prospects were good and recommended that a twelve month extension be set in order to qualify for the program. 27

(S) CSA approved the plan on 29 November 1967. As approved, it contained all of the recommendations submitted by COMUSMACV except that officers selected from other than in-country would be committed to an eighteen month tour with a six month extension option while those in-country had to extend for an additional twelve months to qualify for the housing option. 28

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Project TAKEOFF

(S) Prior to his 28 May appointment as Dep to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Ambassador Komer had been President Johnson's Special Advisor for pacification in Vietnam. His experience and familiarity with RD problems enabled him to come to Vietnam with some already formulated ideas to enhance the program. He divided his ideas into two broad categories--unilateral actions which the US could take without active GVN participation, and actions requiring GVN participation after US advice and pressure. The first category had three sub-areas:

- 1) Selectively increase critical US advisory positions.
- 2) Revamp US efforts against the VC infrastructure.
- 3) Provide US province representatives with an un-restricted, unilateral fund.

(S) The second category, by its very nature, was far more complicated and extensive. It had nine sub-areas:

- 1) Put major emphasis on anti-infrastructure activities.
- 2) Intensify the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) effort.
- 3) Develop a general sequence for pacifying a hamlet.
- 4) Assure continuous local security in pacification target areas.
- 5) Open roads and canals.
- 6) Improve village and hamlet governments.
- 7) Begin appointing civilian province/district chiefs.
- 8) Expand civil/military pacification teams.
- 9) Concentrate on training the leaders of RD teams.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) On 8 May Ambassador Komer forwarded his ideas to Ambassador Bunker. These ideas, together with an overall assessment of pacification, formed the framework for Project TAKEOFF, a management tool used by CORDS to bring maximum RD assets to bear on the most important problems.<sup>29</sup>

(C) Project TAKEOFF's goals were twofold: (1) accelerate pacification momentum gained through May 1967, and (2) sustain the increased rate through the coming national elections and into 1968. Within these goals, seven objectives were announced:

- 1) Focus and coordinate GVN/US pacification efforts on key programs.
- 2) Attack known deficiencies and exploit opportunities for stepped-up pacification.
- 3) Develop a management system for better use of the considerable US/GVN resources available for pacification, and tap an increasing portion of other potentially available resources.
- 4) Improve integrating and coordinating civil/military actions necessary for pacification.
- 5) Commit the GVN, at all levels, to the same or similar action programs.
- 6) Design procedures to review and analyze RD progress to assist in indicating problem areas.
- 7) Meet 1967 GVN RD program goal--pacifying 1,103 hamlets.

(C) In early July COMUSMACV approved proposals to launch Project TAKEOFF. In its initial form, there were nine proposals, but two were subsequently deleted or modified. A program to address land reform was removed from Project TAKEOFF, and a program to improve territorial security was absorbed into programs to improve the RVNAF support to RD and a program dealing with Revolutionary Development Cadre. In its final form, TAKEOFF included seven action programs:<sup>30</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1) Improve 1968 pacification planning.
- 2) Accelerate the Chieu Hoi program.
- 3) Mount an attack on the VC infrastructure.
- 4) Expand and improve the RVNAF support to pacification.
- 5) Expand and supplement the Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) effort.
- 6) Increase the capability of handling refugees.
- 7) Increase Public Safety.

Action Program to Improve 1968 Pacification Planning

(C) The goals to this action program were ninefold:

- 1) Integrate and improve 1968 civil/military pacification planning at all levels more effectively for 1968 than it was in 1966-67.
- 2) Press for more effective concentration of effort.
- 3) Set specific time-phased goals. Develop an improved system for monitoring progress and discovering potential bottlenecks early.
- 4) Plan for extensive use of local civil/military pacification teams to supplement RD teams and increase pacification momentum.
- 5) Insist on joint project agreements to increase leverage and ensure GVN involvement.
- 6) Include security plans and other measures in 1968 to prevent regression in 1967 RD areas.
- 7) Prepare plans for a post-RD phase incorporating a continued local security net under the aegis of village committees.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8) Take steps to give district and province officials a greater sense of personal commitment to the pacification process.

9) Convince the GVN to streamline budget procedures for release of funds.

(C) Pacification planning had improved for 1967, but still it was not conducted as a unified effort. RD Guidelines and the 44 province plans were coordinated only partly with Campaign Plan 1967--AB 142 and its supporting plans. Neither civil nor military plans provided for allocating resources in advance so that provinces could develop detailed plans. A single pacification concept was lacking, and, except for the MRD, there was no active involvement of GVN ministries with the RD planning.

(C) The immediate effect of Project TAKEOFF was that it coordinated US civil/military planning more closely and resulted in better coordinated GVN planning. Three integrated planning programs for 1968 were initially visualized: the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968, the USAID Country Assistance Program (CAP)\*, and the MRD Guidelines. CORDS was involved in all three and acted as a "bridge" among them to insure proper coordination.

(C) A basic assumption was that the 1968 RD program would be a modified and more effectively integrated continuation of the 1967 program. A smooth transition from 1967 to 1968 was sought to maintain, and then increase, the momentum of 1967. This pointed up the need for multi-year planning, and techniques for this form of planning had to be developed, in conjunction with USAID, wherever possible for a three to five-year plan.

\*The USAID CAP supported US objectives in Vietnam in four principal ways: (1) combatted the inflationary tendencies of the war-torn economy by providing commodity assistance and financial advisory services; (2) supported the GVN pacification program in the countryside through political and rural development and Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) programs; (3) ameliorated the effects of the war on the population by expanding medical facilities and providing relief assistance to refugees; and (4) contributed to the general economic and social development of the country and the effectiveness of the GVN through programs of assistance in agriculture, public works, public administration, and education.

PAGE 597 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) An important aim of planning was to resolve how, where, and when available resources could be concentrated for maximum results, National Priority Areas (NPA) (See Figure IV-1); Priority Provinces, and RD campaigns were used to focus RD resources in 1967. It was decided that RD campaigns would be continued in 1968, but the NPA and 26 priority provinces did not produce demonstrable progress in sizeable areas. Therefore, a new effort was required to concentrate resources in carefully chosen areas which met criteria for current progress plus the capacity to achieve greater results with more resources. Priority provinces were selected primarily because of their relative importance to the overall pacification effort, and, secondarily, because of the quality of the province plan and leadership. In priority provinces where the existing plan was weak, or the leadership poor, action was taken to correct the deficiencies rather than deny resources to the provinces. Within the provinces, specific priority areas were selected to focus resources for a given period of time. 31

(C) This action program developed along the lines envisioned in Project TAKEOFF. Unprecedented energy and effort were directed toward developing a fully integrated plan through which pacification could be accomplished. From the time planning began in August 1967, efforts to maintain a totally coordinated configuration were repeatedly frustrated by the chronic inability of the GVN ministries to make decisions or coordinate even minimally with one another. US pressure resulted in the establishment, in November, of a Central RD Council and councils at corps and province levels, but few of them were functioning satisfactorily by the end of the year.

(C) In spite of repeated frustration, US pressures on the GVN resulted in the MRD's publishing the 1968 RD Planning Guidelines in September 1967. Close US-GVN coordination prior to publication of these guidelines kept them in consonance with the overall campaign plan concepts. Major CORDS efforts went into reviewing and revising the AID CAP to insure its compatibility with pacification plans. However, there was marked lack of GVN response to CORDS planning overtures at that time due to preoccupation with the post-election activities of forming a new government.

(C) On 11 November, tangible results of the combined efforts of all were realized when both COMUSMACV and Chief JGS signed AB 143-Combined Campaign Plan, 1968. AB 143 contained the first

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

fully integrated treatment of pacification within the framework of a campaign plan. The AID CAP was completely reconciled, and, as far as US planning was concerned, success was attained. The planning effort for 1968 culminated in the production of province pacification plans which were being reviewed as 1967 ended.

(C) At the end of 1967 there still was no integrated management of pacification similar to CORDS on the GVN side. RD councils existed essentially in theory only, and the GVN ministries continued to develop their programs independently from MRD planning. Without unanimity and greater pacification emphasis at top GVN levels, there could be no coordinated planning at subordinate levels. The early involvement of the GVN at the highest level was mandatory if total success was to be attained.<sup>32</sup>

#### Chieu Hoi Action Program

(C) The purpose of the Chieu Hoi program was to encourage VC/NVA personnel to defect to the GVN. It included receiving, quartering, training, indoctrinating, motivating, and, in some cases, employing those who did defect. An individual who came over to the GVN under this program was called a Hoi Chanh (one who has returned to the path of right).

(C) The goal of this program was to attain a minimum returnee rate of 45,000 for 1967; however, it was initially thought that this number could be exceeded by as much as 50,000 if the program were properly administered. Thus, initially, an ambitious goal of 95,000 was set for the year.

(C) The Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (MICH) was the principal GVN agency tasked to manage this program. The Chieu Hoi Division (CHD) of CORDS assisted, supported, and advised MICH in all matters of the program.

(C) In June 1967, CORDS contracted a US commercial firm to study the Chieu Hoi effort. The resulting study showed that the full potential of the program was not being exploited. One of the reasons given was that command and management attention, both GVN and US,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

was not being focused on the problem; this situation was most acute on the GVN side. Consequently, in mid-June the CHD, in coordination with the MACV staff, conferred with MICH to identify and correct significant problem areas. The conferees agreed upon ten high impact actions which needed to be taken:

- 1) Establish a Chieu Hoi contingency fund of ten million piasters under the control of the US program manager.
  - 2) Accelerate the construction of adequate Chieu Hoi centers.
  - 3) Increase by ten the number of US Chieu Hoi advisors (Provincial and Regional) by July, and by more thereafter as needed.
  - 4) Support MRD plans to use Hoi Chanh in the RD program-- both as 59-man RDC teams and as individual members of RDC teams.
  - 5) Increase CORDS PSYOP advisory personnel to at least one US per province, and assign one additional advisor to operations in each of twenty priority provinces.
  - 6) Emphazise a Chieu Hoi vocational training program to include supporting it with US-furnished tools and equipment when necessary.
  - 7) By the end of FY68, increase the use of Hoi Chanh as Kit Carson Scouts (Hoi Chanh attached to US units as guides) from an original planning figure of 450 to 1,800.
  - 8) Sustain PSYOP support of the program at an earlier high level attained during the previous Tet period, and start a new program keyed to the approaching national elections.
  - 9) Increase the GVN program staff in both quality and quantity by persuading JGS to assign at least fifty good-quality ARVN officers to MICH.
  - 10) Develop a greater quick-reaction PSYOP capability.
- (C) By September 1967 the Chieu Hoi rate had fallen far short of expectations, and a revised 1967 goal of 34,000, or 24 percent of the original, was announced.

PAGE 600 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Many reasons for this short-fall were proposed, but the actual cause remained somewhat a mystery. Some thought that nearly all those VC/NVA who were immediately susceptible had become Hoi Chanh, leaving mostly hard-core, dedicated VC/NVA. The VC threatened severe penalties to the families of those who did defect, and this, together with other vigorous countermeasures, discouraged many from joining the program. Results of interrogations revealed that the VC had organized into a number of 3-man cells. Each member was to observe the other two under all circumstances, and relatives of members of cells were allowed to visit only in the presence of the entire cell. If one member defected, the remaining two were considered accomplices and were severely punished.

(C) The GVN was not blameless for the short-fall. Although it had demonstrated a gradual improvement in attitude toward the program, its support continued to be less than enthusiastic. The staffing of their bureaus remained inadequate in nearly every respect. In spite of previous agreements, they failed to provide sufficient impetus to their PSYOP effort, a function of the Vietnam Information Service (VIS).

(C) Convincing the GVN to provide high standard facilities for the reception and retraining of Hoi Chanh proved difficult, and this remained a problem throughout the year. One of the most serious problems facing the GVN was the continued lack of flexible funding procedures. Because of this, they were unable to respond rapidly to problems or to Chieu Hoi targets of opportunity. With such targets, the USC pointed out, immediate reaction was essential, and money was no object. The US went on to say that any reasonable expense would be supported, if not with GVN funds, then with US funds.<sup>33</sup>

(C) As the year wore on, the same nagging problems remained in spite of concerted advisory pressures at all levels. No effective means were found to goad the GVN into hastening construction of Chieu Hoi centers, and only 20 of 53 projects were completed by the end of the year. To partially overcome this, an effort was made to have those Hoi Chanh involved in vocational training perform some of the construction. While this was promising, it bogged down because of GVN indifference. It was hampered further because of a lack of sufficient tools.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Hoi Chanh vocational rehabilitation, resettlement ID cards, and social reintegration were problems of the first rank, largely ignored by the GVN and growing beyond the capabilities of Chieu Hoi advisors who were preoccupied with simple care and feeding of these people. Had MICH and the Province Chiefs made aggressive use of program resources, a favorable Chieu Hoi rate might have been maintained.

(C) One of the most significant lessons learned during 1967 by both the MICH and the CHD was that time and success shifted the Chieu Hoi program's central problem from one of receiving the Hoi Chanh to that of his care, training, and rehabilitation.

(C) Although the number of 1967 returnees--27,178--exceeded that of 1966--20,242, it fell far short of the program's original goal of 95,000. All agencies involved learned from their failures, however, and 1968 would provide another opportunity for achievement.<sup>34</sup>

Action Program for Attack on the VC Infrastructure.

(C) The purpose of this action program was to coordinate and increase the efforts of both the GVN and US in identifying and capturing, or eliminating, the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) throughout the nation. While the overall goal was the ultimate elimination of the VCI, implied within the goal was the requirement to exploit all information gathered from individual VCI members to assist in conducting lucrative operations against the VCI organization.

(C) This effort was one of the highest priority programs of Project TAKEOFF. It was to provide for a combined system of US/GVN intelligence gathering and collating agencies from the national level at Saigon down through corps, province, and district levels. Properly handled, the information gathered would serve to identify hard-core Communist and VC agents operating at hamlet and village levels. Once identified, they could be eliminated by agencies of the National Police (NP) forces, and, once eliminated, they would no longer wield any influence over the population.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) On 16 June 1967 COMUSMACV approved a CORDS proposal to coordinate and manage a US joint civil/military program to attack the VCI. The program would use intelligence gathering elements of both the US and the GVN already in being, but it provided for an additional system of coordinating committees and centers at all levels.

(C) The process of the program was termed "Infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation" (ICEX), and the whole action program came to be called the ICEX program. At the highest US level a US ICEX committee was formed consisting of a chairman, the Dep to COMUSMACV for CORDS, and four members - the Special Assistant to the Ambassador, the MACV J2 and J3, and the CORDS Chief of Revolutionary Development Division.

(C) Since the actual work of identifying and eliminating the infrastructure was to be done by Vietnamese police agencies, it was necessary to convince GVN officialdom of the program's value. Consequently, as the ICEX committee was forming, the Ambassador's Special Assistant was making overtures to the GVN Director General of National Police, Brigadier General Loan, to impress him with the importance and value of a combined, coordinated effort. Since Brigadier General Loan commanded both the NP and National Police Field Forces (NPF), the ultimate action agencies, he was considered to be the best high level GVN official to get the program moving on the Vietnamese side. Brigadier General Loan agreed that the program had merit, but his reaction was somewhat short of enthusiastic. It was this lack of enthusiasm and the resulting absence of coordinated NP participation that proved to be the paramount problem throughout the remainder of the year.<sup>35</sup>

(C) Undaunted, CORDS pressed on with the program. Corps Senior Advisors were briefed and Corps US Advisory ICEX committees were formed. Ultimate success of the ICEX program, however, had to be at province and district levels where raw information was gathered. US advisors urged province chiefs to form Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Committees (PICC) and Provincial Interrogation Centers (PIC). At district level, advisors pressed for District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC).

(C) The DOICC normally consisted of representatives from the various military, paramilitary, and GVN civilian agencies operating within the district. As a general pattern, this included RF/PF, NP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and NFFF, ARVN, and any other special reconnaissance or intelligence agencies. Ideally, each DOICC had its own US military Intelligence Officer as an advisor, but frequently the assistant district advisor performed this function.

(C) Organizing these centers and committees proved to be slow and frustrating because of a lack of positive GVN support at national level. Some aggressive province and district chiefs did establish these agencies, but the majority stolidly refused to act in the absence of positive orders from their superiors. The 1967 goal for DOICCs was set at 74. By year's end, though this goal was surpassed by 29--103 centers were organized and beginning operations by 31 December in spite of the complacency at national level.

(C) Not until December did the GVN finally take positive action to officially sanction the ICEX program. The Prime Minister assigned the mission of eliminating the VC infrastructure to the NP. The mission assignment provided for committees at all levels and intelligence collating centers at province and district levels.

(C) At the end of 1967, there were clear indications that the program would be successful. Though slow getting started, its momentum was increasing, and reticent GVN officials were beginning to show genuine interest and support in the ICEX concept.<sup>36</sup>

#### Action Program to Expand and Improve RVNAF Support for Pacification

(C) This program had as its stated goal to expand and improve Vietnamese military support to the overall RD effort. The concept included a qualitative improvement of RVNAF - directed primarily at ARVN, RF, and PF - as well as an increase in the actual numbers of units directly participating in RD. Such improvements, it was hoped, would accelerate the progress of pacification by more rapidly clearing and securing the countryside and providing an umbrella under which village and hamlet development could take place.

(C) Because qualitative improvement dealt essentially with training, and quantitative RVNAF increases involved force structures, and dispositions, the MACV J3 was designated as the manager for this action program. Numerous RVNAF improvement programs were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

were already in being (see RVNAF, Chapter III), and it was thought that these would contribute significantly to the Project TAKEOFF program goal. 37

(U) As a first requirement, the J3 had to define the missions of those forces most closely associated with RD support. The following mission concepts resulted:

PF: The PF would provide local security for hamlets and villages by conducting, primarily at night, ambushes, patrols, and other anti-guerilla tactics. They should also conduct limited daytime operations against VC tax collection points as well as continuous reconnaissance activities in their immediate area. Their primary target, however, would be the VC hamlet squad and village platoon.

RF: The RF would provide territorial security for hamlets, between hamlets, and between villages. They would employ tactics similar to the PF, also emphasizing night operations. Whereas the PF were to operate in and around hamlets, the RF would operate in a zone or belt contiguous to a PF area, but at a greater range from the hamlet. Principally, the RF would target against the VC village platoons and district companies. RF also would be prepared to support and reinforce PF when required.

ARVN: Regular ARVN units assigned an RD support mission would complement the RF and PF in their security role. They would extend the area of security by conducting combat operations throughout their tactical area of responsibility. They would target their operations against local VC forces as well as against VC/NVA main force units which might be operating in the ARVN tactical area. ARVN units would complement the RF/PF security belt at a further distance from villages and hamlets.

(U) Within the above mission concepts, stress would be placed on the fact that security must not be static; it must be active and mobile and operate when the VC were most active - at night. Stress would also be placed on conducting security operations in wide areas around RDC team locations. 38

(C) The massive influx of US forces in 1965-66 permitted an increase in commitment of ARVN battalions in support of pacification.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In January 1967, only 38 battalions were so assigned, but by June 1967 the total had increased to 53. Because of the existing tactical situation, which remained relatively constant for the remainder of the year, the number fluctuated closely about this level. 39

(C) Because the major emphasis on increasing RVNAF strengths had been directed toward ARVN regular strengths throughout 1966 and the first half of 1967, RF/PF strengths remained fairly steady throughout 1967. RF experienced a negligible increase--from 149,844 at the beginning of the year to 151,376 at the end, or a total increase of 1,532. PF, on the other hand, dropped from 150,096 as of 1 January 1967 to 148,789, a net decrease of 1,307 or .9 percent as of 31 December 1967. While the respective changes were nearly equal, they were unrelated. The fact is that both RF and PF were hard put to maintain the strengths that they did in the face of ARVN regular force acquisitions. 40

(C) The MACV J3 had long been studying techniques to improve the effectiveness of RVNAF. To reorient ARVN into its increased role in support of RD amounted to modifying already existing programs discussed in Chapter III.

(C) At the beginning of 1967, COMUSMACV and CJGS jointly initiated an RD-oriented training program. It consisted of experimentally creating 14 Vietnamese Revolutionary Development Mobile Training Teams (RD MTT). These teams were to move among ARVN battalions and conduct a 2-week training session for each battalion. Training was to focus on small unit night patrol and ambush tactics and daylight combat operations. A major portion of the two-week training period was to be devoted to teaching the ARVN soldier how to get along with the VN populace, a skill heretofore conspicuously lacking. Each of the 14 teams were to train two battalions, after which the program would be further evaluated. 41

(U) On 2 February, COMUSMACV reviewed the progress of the RD MTT concept and was displeased to find a notable shortfall in the immediately desired goal of training 28 battalions prior to Tet. In this regard, COMUSMACV informed CJGS:

I have just reviewed the progress of the ARVN Revolutionary Development Mobile Training Team Program during its [Pre-Tet] phase and am

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sincerely disappointed in the results. The goal for this phase, established by your headquarters, was to train two battalions with each of the 14 RDMTTs prior to Tet (for a total of 28 battalions). It came as something of a surprise to me to find that only 24 maneuver battalions (plus 1/3 of two different signal battalions) will meet the specified schedule. Even among these 24 battalions, there are some which, while completing the training, did so in a less than satisfactory manner.

.....  
..... There is still an apparent lack of command understanding and emphasis in support of the program. General Thieu, General Ky, and yourself have agreed that Revolutionary Development is a matter of highest priority. Unfortunately, your understanding of the importance and urgency of this program has not yet been fully communicated to and accepted by the Corps and division echelons.

I have pledged to you my full support in this most important undertaking. We cannot afford to carry out the RD orientation of ARVN forces in other than a most proficient manner... 42

(C) The remainder of the year was marked by a noteworthy increase not only in the quality of RD MTT training, but also in the tactical commanders' attitude toward the RD support mission as well. 93 percent of all ARVN battalions had successfully completed RD mobile training by year's end, and most of these had undergone 1-week's retraining as well. The program had definitely paid its own way, with interest. 43

(C) The RD MTT program produced side benefits which led the way to improving the effectiveness of RF/PF. The mobile team concept proved valuable in training many widespread units using minimum training cadre. This led to the development of the MAT and MALT concept discussed previously.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE 59-MAN RDC TEAM




Figure VI-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action Program to Expand and Supplement the Revolutionary Development Cadre Effort:

(U) Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) were Vietnamese nationals who were trained at the Revolutionary Cadre Training School at Vung Tau and became members of 59-man teams. The RDC teams were sent out into the countryside to live in the hamlets and villages to train and gain support of the rural people in favor of the Saigon government. The team organization is shown at Figure VI-3.

(U) It had been known, for a long time, that the VC had political cadre, sometimes called infrastructure, whose mission was to gain the confidence and support of the rural population. Only with such support could the VC survive in the countryside and attain their goals.

(U) In late 1966, the GVN realized that it, too, must have effective political action cadre living and working with the people. Only in this way could the people be made aware of the aims and sincerity of the central government to help the populace, identify their aspirations, and solve their problems.

(U) By the end of 1966, just over 21,300 cadre had been graduated from the school at Vung Tau which meant that 361 teams were in operation as 1967 began.

(C) So successful was the initial experiment, that the GVN emphasized the program and set as its 1967 goal the recruiting, training and fielding of 35,000 cadre, or more than 590 teams.<sup>44</sup>

(U) To prepare the cadre for their demanding duties in the countryside, the Vung Tau school conducted three-month courses, each attended by 5,000 students. The course consisted of political training (100 hours), paramilitary training (244 hours), administration (18 hours), civil affairs training (80 hours), new life development training (40 hours), motivation (22 hours), and a people's common activities course (144 hours).

(U) A GVN official, the director of the Vung Tau school described the job of the RDC as ". . . building each hamlet into a responsible community and meshing these communities into a responsible nation." To do these, he went on, five steps must be accomplished:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

- 1) Eliminate VC elements and sympathizers.
- 2) Eliminate internal corruption.
- 3) Develop community spirit.
- 4) Hold free elections.
- 5) Organize the people to protect themselves by forming a people's militia.

(U) After graduating from the school and moving into a hamlet, a 59-man team, with the Civic Action Team as its heart, began its work. First the Census Grievance Unit made a census of the hamlet's population. This served two purposes, it provided the team with a ready checklist of hamlet residents to assist in recognizing outsiders and in noting the absence of residents, and it provided the machinery for the individual hamlet resident to voice his own desires, or "aspirations" as they were frequently called. This was done in a private session so that the individual could speak freely. In this same session, the individual's legitimate grievances were solicited. Such aspirations and grievances as might exist were then tabulated for later reference.

(U) Next, the Administration Unit assayed the hamlet government and assisted the citizens to improve it, or establish a new one if that were necessary.

(U) The Development Team then translated the grievances and aspirations of the people, tabulated earlier, into programs and specific projects by putting into effect six more vital aspects of their work. These were:

- 1) Public Health--Help the people improve their living conditions and lay a foundation for a better life for the present and coming generations.
- 2) Education--Teach the people how to adapt to new and progressive ways of life and consolidate the best aspects of both their old and new lives.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3) Land Reform-- Teach the people how best to use their land and develop community projects to get the most from their land and efforts.

4) Family Cooperatives-- Help organize the people into associations to progress, produce, and earn more.

5) Animal Husbandry and Handicraft-- Teach the people and encourage them in the ways of handicrafts and new projects to make money and have a better life through their earnings.

6) Reconstruction-- Inform the people that-- if they will help-- they can have new roads, homes, schools, communications systems, dams and other improvements in their hamlets through the use of government materials and technical assistance. Show the people how to get these projects started.

(U) The number of RDC teams to begin operating in any particular province depended on how many individuals were recruited from the province. If two teams initiated the program, two hamlets in a village began development. Normally, the RDC operated about three months in a particular hamlet. At the end of this period, and with the injection of a newly trained third team, the original two would move on to two new hamlets, and the third new team would target on a third new hamlet. Thus, at the end of three months, two hamlets would be undergoing development, and at the end of six months, five hamlets would be completed. This concept would continue to operate until the entire province had undergone the process.

(C) As this concept was applied, it was noted that the RDC team's departure from a hamlet, and particularly a village, created a vacuum into which the VC attempted to re-infiltrate. As 1967 ended, means were being investigated to prevent regression of hamlets in which development had already begun.<sup>45</sup>

(C) CORDS, in conjunction with the MRD, studied the inherent problems of this action program and arrived at several implied tasks which would be necessary if the program were to improve qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Of primary importance, every effort had to be made to provide adequate security from the VC in areas where RDC teams were to operate. Inadequate security in the past had prevented the program from becoming as popular as might be hoped. The VC made the RDC special targets for terrorism (see Chapter II) which made recruiting for the program quite difficult. Thus, territorial security (and the action program to improve RVNAF RD support) became a prime aspect for enhancing attitudes toward RDC work.

(C) The GVN was encouraged to conduct a vigorous PSYOPS campaign to popularize the program. This campaign had a dual function. First, it was to pave the way for RDC teams about to go into a hamlet. Second, it was designed to interest possible recruits to join the program as RDC.

(C) To augment recruiting efforts in the hamlets, Hoi Chanh ralliers were encouraged to become individual members of RDC teams, and to operate as integral teams. This aspect proved a boon to the RDC program and assisted in relieving the problems created by competition for manpower among the various GVN agencies.

(C) One of the major weaknesses facing the RDC program was the lack of leadership of many RDC teams. There was a recognized need to select more experienced and mature men in each province as team leaders. To strengthen the leadership program, a 12-week leadership course was established at Vung Tau in January 1967. By the end of the year, more than 1,700 leaders had been trained. 46

(C) As 1967 ended, the year's RDC team goal of 590 teams was short by only 35 teams. In the four Corps there were 555 teams operating. The school had provided more than enough graduates, but attrition had taken a greater toll than expected. The table below recapitulates the losses for the year. 47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDC LOSSES

1967

<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
KIA	720
Captured	122
Resigned	1,127
Discharged and Retired	1,856
Deserted	<u>4,020</u>
Total	7,845

(U) In spite of the high attrition rate, this action program proved to be the most promising facet of the entire GVN pacification program. Cadre members, in the main, were dedicated and sincere. The technical skills which they brought with them to the hamlets and villages were a sharp contrast to the terrorism and hostilities which had preceded. The rural populace responded enthusiastically to the efforts of the RDC, and this heralded the first real, tangible evidence of mutual cooperation between the central government and the nation's rural dwellers.

Action Program to Increase the Capability of Handling Refugees

(U) The refugee situation in Vietnam reached major proportions in 1964-65 when a combination of severe flooding and increased military action in the northern and central parts of the country uprooted thousands of families. The first official estimates of the refugee population, made in early 1965, revealed that about 300,000 people had left their homes to seek shelter and security in district and province capitals. By the end of 1965, nearly one million had been displaced from their homes.

(C) Until February 1966, there was no central GVN agency to oversee the caring for refugees. Responsibility was divided between the GVN Ministry for Social Welfare, which provided temporary assistance to refugees, and the Ministry of Rural Construction (now MRD), which was responsible for refugee resettlement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Interface between the two ministries was nearly non-existent, and, consequently, the program was ineffective.

(U) In February 1966, the Special Commissariat for Refugees (SCR) was created. Under this organization progress was noteworthy. Emergency relief funds were made available to refugees, and sanitation and medical standards were established in refugee camps. Construction of new shelters was undertaken to replace the poorest refugee housing and classrooms were built for refugee children who were unable to continue regular schooling.<sup>48</sup>

(U) As 1967 began, there were a total of 810,000 refugees in camps. The GVN, based on past experience, estimated that approximately 41,000 new refugees would be generated each month. SCR, then, estimated that during 1967, it would have to receive, care for, and resettle or return to their homes nearly 500,000 refugees; this in addition to those already in existence as the year began.<sup>49</sup>

(U) In May, OCO, the US organization responsible for providing assistance and advice to the GVN for refugee affairs during the first five months of 1967, yielded its functions to CORDS. Using the ground work that OCO had already laid, CORDS studied the refugee problem and integrated it into Project TAKEOFF. The formal action program did not evolve as a finished product until mid-June. The SCR, however, continued its work while the transition was taking place on the US side; consequently, the overall program was not interrupted severely.

(U) The Refugee Division of CORDS was tasked to study the problem, and develop specific program goals to use as a basis for advising the SCR. In its final report, the Division established that the objective of the action program would be to increase the influence and enhance the prestige of the GVN by encouraging, facilitating, and assisting it to provide generous assistance to refugees.

(U) Within its stated objectives, the Refugee Division established 13 sub-program goals:

- 1) Increase the Refugee Division staff to provide adequate supervision and support of the refugee program at all levels.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2) Increase SCR staff at province level through training projects, closer liaison, and advisory activities by US personnel.
- 3) Provide adequate funds and personnel for an effective political and psychological orientation program for refugees.
- 4) Start a comprehensive program to improve, coordinate, and increase commodity and logistic support for the refugee program.
- 5) Coordinate refugee program planning at all levels, military and civil, and develop refined tactical evacuation and resettlement policies, plans, and programs. Accord refugee programs a priority commensurate with their importance to the military and pacification efforts.
- 6) Improve GVN and US reporting and statistical procedures so that accurate and timely information would be available for program management.
- 7) Encourage the formation of local defense forces and coordinate the deployment of GVN army units to provide reasonable security to refugees so that they could return to their original homes or resettle in new hamlets.
- 8) Coordinate, wherever feasible, the refugee and Chieu Hoi programs and intelligence gathering activities to take maximum advantage of contacts refugees had with VC family members and friends.
- 9) Expand and improve vocational training for refugees.
- 10) Encourage the GVN resettlement program by providing technical advice, assistance, and support in the selection and preparation of sites and construction of homes and auxiliary facilities. Emphasis would be placed on inter-provincial resettlement and on increased financial assistance to refugees.
- 11) Provide technical guidance in the fields of self-help programs, cottage industries, and the formation of cooperatives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12) Encourage expanded participation of voluntary agencies in the refugee program, and provide support to these agencies so that they could operate efficiently.

13) Intensify assistance to and encouragement of a SCR youth education program.<sup>50</sup>

(C) At the end of June the refugee program was faced with a complex of serious problems. Field staff strength stood at less than half the authorized level, new resettlement construction lagged seriously, and temporary resettlement centers were overcrowded. New refugees were being supported in interim camps or were straggling back to their hamlets of origin. Secure land for refugee re-establishment was not always available, particularly in I Corps, and administrative control of temporarily resettled refugees did not meet the standards established by the Commissioner for Refugees.

(C) The factors involved in the mid-year refugee situation were the lack of program priority, weak GVN refugee field administrators, the absence of job opportunities, and lack of secure land for reestablishment of refugees. Project TAKEOFF turned management attention to these areas of weakness and almost immediately was able to establish a higher priority for the refugee program.

(C) Increased US and GVN emphasis on the program manifested itself in improved performance by field staff and by having several GVN refugee officials removed for ineffectiveness. CORDS initiatives spurred recruitment for refugee advisors with specific effort aimed at end-of-tour Peace Corps volunteers.<sup>51</sup>

(U) On 9 November 1967, the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare and the SCR combined to form the Ministry of Social Welfare-Refugees (MSWR). This action heralded a victory for the USG. The USG Saigon-level advisors had been pressuring the GVN to upgrade the SCR to ministerial level for some time. Dr. Nguyen Phuc Que, former Commissioner for SCR, was selected to head the new ministry. The USG considered him a fortunate selection as he had proved himself to be a dedicated, conscientious, public official.<sup>52</sup>

(C) The GVN estimate of how many new refugees would be generated in 1967 was surprisingly accurate. Of 500,000 estimated,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

436,108 were actually generated. Even more surprising was the fact that more refugees--452,120--were resettled than were generated. This resulted in a decline of 16,000 in the total number requiring care. The end-of-year number of refugees requiring further care and resettlement was 793,944.

(C) While the performance for 1967 was gratifying, and the future outlook good, most of the sub-program goals had not been attained. The MSWR, at the end of the year, was still getting a grip on the problem and its overall effectiveness had yet to reach its apex. The experience gained by both CORDS and the MSWR promised to play an important part in even greater success in 1968.<sup>53</sup>

#### Action Program to Improve Public Safety

(C) In June 1967, the CORDS Public Safety Division (PSD) was assigned the mission of supporting and advising the GVN in its effort to establish standards of public safety and control. Prior to the formation of CORDS, USAID was the agency responsible for this effort, and actually this did not change. USAID personnel continued to staff the US activity, but CORDS exercised operational control and management.

(C) In this program, the USG concerned itself with two GVN activities, the RVN National Police (NP) and the nation's non-military prisons and detention facilities. Considerable upgrading and improvement was needed in both.

#### National Police Improvement


(C) The NP (see Organizational Chart--Figure VI-4) was a relatively new organization. Established by Presidential Decree in June 1962, it combined the National Surete and several provincial police organizations and had a total strength of 19,000.<sup>54</sup>

(C) PSD, already well aware of the major problems in the NP, quickly established the action program's objectives--to increase the effectiveness of the NP and raise its professional level. Within these objectives, ten sub-action goals were established; these were to:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE \*



\* AS OF JUNE 1967

Figure VI-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1) Intensify the effort to augment the force level of the NP from 66,000, its 1 January 1967 strength, to a year-end goal of 74,000. Of this force level, 15,000 should be National Police Field Forces (NPF).

2) Re-target the NPF to attack the VC infrastructure.

3) Revise and improve the resources control operation, and re-orient toward a mobile, area control concept.

4) Begin a foolproof identify card system on 11 September and issue cards to 600,000 by the end of 1967.

5) Construct new facilities and renovate those already existing to support the increase in personnel.

6) Combat corruption in the NP.

7) Increase career prospects of the police and reverse the trend toward militarization.

8) Increase the police budget.

9) Train 3,600 police leaders.

10) Increase the US advisor staff by 75%, from 195 to 259.<sup>55</sup>

(C) In August 1967 it appeared that the NP year-end force goal of 74,000 could not be met. At that time recruitment was barely offsetting attrition. In October, however, the picture improved vastly. NP salaries and emoluments were increased in response to US pressure. The raises were conservative and were expected to have only minor impact on recruiting. But their coincidence with the enactment of a National Mobilization Decree, which, in fact, provided only for an extension of ARVN conscription, sharply increased recruitment nearly tenfold in November. By the end of the year, NP strength stood at 73,371; a very successful showing in view of earlier expectations.

(C) In August, a new NPF SOP was published which redirected the NPF into an anti-infrastructure role. During October and November,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the NPFF, with 69 companies operational, increased its activities against the VC in villages and hamlets. While the goal had not been attained by the end of the year, the redirection of effort, where accomplished, produced encouraging results.<sup>56</sup>

(C) The resources control program was devised to control the movement of commodities and people in an effort to sever the links between insurgents and the population. The program involved both the NP, as its enforcer on land, and the Marine Police on the waterways. The program became a source of graft and corruption because enforcement agencies were using it as a means to collect bribe fees as an inducement not to delay carriers. In December 1967, to counter these corrupt practices the Resources Control Bloc was reduced to a Service within the Directorate of Uniformed Police, and major attention shifted from the movement of foodstuffs to that of war related materials. As the year ended, it was hoped that stopping the abuses perpetrated in the name of resources control would loosen constraints on the movement of legitimate cargo and raise public esteem toward the NP.

(C) The identity card program was designed as a means to establish a foolproof system of individual identification. The previous system was unsatisfactory because, (1) the cards were easily forged; (2) it was possible for an individual to obtain more than one card under different names; and (3) it covered only 19-year-olds and older. The new system covered all 15-year-olds and above and also corrected the other deficiencies. This program stalled when the new cards were found to be unsuitable and remained motionless for the remainder of the year.

(C) The facilities construction and renovation program made a poor showing in 1967. GVN complacency in this regard resulted in funds not being released and contracts not being let.

(C) Corruption, like that discussed in relation to resources control, was widespread throughout the NP structure. Action, however slow, was being taken. During the second half of 1967, 13 provincial police chiefs were replaced for corruption or inefficiency, or both. In May the DGNP reorganized and increased his Internal Security Bureau to investigate and act against corrupt police practices. The problem of low salaries, which increased

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the tendency toward corruption, was partially corrected by the conservative wage increases in October.

(C) The GVN took some action to enhance the police career prospects when it increased salaries, but this sub-program had far to go to accomplish anything noteworthy.

(C) GVN militarization of the NP command structure increased throughout the year. This practice caused a lack of continuity of command and administration and a growing tendency to apply military solutions to civilian police problems. Throughout the year, lack of an adequate police leadership pool hampered arriving at a solution to this problem.

(C) Budgetary support for the NP had never been adequate. For 1967, the DGNP had requested a fund allocation to support a 90,000 man force, but the Budget and Fiscal Affairs Directorate allocated funds sufficient to sustain a force of only 69,000. At the urging of PSD, a supplemental budget request to support an additional 5,000 NPF was submitted by the DGNP which ultimately was approved by the Prime Minister.

(C) The effort to train more police leaders required considerable off-shore schooling for varying periods of time. While it was anticipated that this would be highly successful, it had to await further evaluation when 1967 ended.

(C) At the beginning of 1967, there were 155 advisors on post, and by the end of 1967 nearly 2,220 had arrived. The goal of 2,590 advisors by July 1968 will probably be attained.

#### Prison and Detention Facilities Improvement

(C) The US aim in support of the GVN prison and detention facilities improvement program was to establish a penal system capable of providing sufficient, appropriate facilities for confinement and retraining. To achieve this end, PSD provided technical assistance and limited commodity support. Emphasis was placed on supplying equipment for prisoner vocational training.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) The program was plagued with overcrowded facilities. The rated capacity of 41 provincial and national prisons was 20,400 inmates, but as of the end of June, there were 35,000 confined. Through August and September new detention facility construction stalled for lack of funds. Money for construction and salary increases for detention staff was refused--again by the Budget and Fiscal Affairs Directorate. Planning continued, however, in the hope that the situation would ease.

(C) In November US efforts to get new construction underway finally bore fruit. A flurry of new invitations to bid were sent out, and several bids were accepted. By the end of December, the net result was a 2,500 inmate capacity increase in Binh Dinh Province in II CTZ. 57

### Measuring the Progress of Pacification

(U) In October 1966, the Secretary of Defense initiated a program to measure progress of RD. The concept was revised by US Mission agencies in Vietnam and field tested by selected subsector advisors in November and December 1966.

(U) Upon approval of the system by the US Mission Council on 13 December 1966, the implementing forms, instructions and guidance were prepared by RDSD. During the first week of January 1967, briefings were held for corps, division and sector advisors and OCO personnel. The purpose of the briefings was to instruct and inform attendees of the purpose, composition and mechanics of the system. In addition, the briefings explained the role of the sector and subsector advisors.


(U) The hamlet evaluation system (HES), as the measurement process was called, was designed to develop and maintain data which would effectively measure pacification progress at hamlet level. The specific evaluations would be made by the subsector advisor who would use a standard worksheet having 18 indicators and eight problem areas. The PSA would be required to review his subsector advisors' evaluations.

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Numerical values were assigned to each indicator, and the data was computerized which permitted a vast amount of material to be stored. When printouts were desired, this system permitted detailed analysis of comparisons, changes, and quantifications.

(U) On 1 January 1967 the system was fully implemented, and initial evaluations covered every hamlet in SVN, exclusive of those under VC control. Subsequent monthly inputs were made by indicating changes on the data processing printouts which were furnished to subsector and provincial advisors.

(U) The system was to be revised as experience was gained. Though minor revisions were made, the HES system, as originally conceived remained valid. Hamlets were categorized into three main components, secure or GVN controlled, contested, and VC controlled. As a further refinement of these categories, letter designators were applied throughout the spectrum as shown below:



(U) Each letter designation had a narrative description to assist in understanding the graduations. These were:

- A HAMLET - A "super" hamlet. Just about everything going right in both security and development.
- B HAMLET - High-grade hamlet. Effective 24-hour security. Adequate development. Has elected officials, operating school, effective medical help, etc. No VC presence or activity.
- C HAMLET - VC military control broken. Relatively secure day and night. Most of VC infrastructure identified. No overt VC incidents - VC taxation may continue. Hamlet officials usually stay at night. Primary education program going on in permanent classrooms. Economic improvement programs underway. Definitely counted on GVN side.

# UNCLASSIFIED

D HAMLET - VC activities in vicinity reduced. There may be terrorism and taxation. Local security forces present. Local participation in hamlet management has begun. A census grievance program has started. Some medical teams visit periodically. There is a beginning at hamlet education and welfare activity. Although contested, it is more in GVN than VC camp.

E HAMLET - Lowest category with some GVN presence. VC frequently enter or harass at night. VC infrastructure largely intact. GVN program just beginning. Strictly contested.

VC HAMLET - Definitely under VC control. Local GVN officials and our advisors do not enter except on military operation. Most of population willingly or unwillingly support VC.

(U) One of the most important refinements made to the HES was a provision for separate expression of population security. The RSDS recognized that, as such, this system measured the relative security of a piece of terrain - a hamlet. More important was the requirement to measure the security of its population. While most of the population lived in hamlets, it would be more valuable to have a total security rating of the population as a correlating value. Thus, after refinement, the population, as well as the hamlets, were surveyed. The reporting system and categories for the population remained the same as for hamlets.

(U) Using the HES automated measurements, comparative Hamlet Population data for the year 1967 was produced and is shown below:

## POPULATION SECURITY\* (in thousands)

	A	B	C	D	E	VC
1 January 1967	385.0	2526.4	4122.3	2262.7	503.2	3011.2
31 December 1967	695.0	3481.3	4279.1	2157.7	318.6	2748.5

\* Comparison does not reflect non-hamlet population.

PAGE 624 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) The HES automated data method proved its worth during 1967. As technicians eliminated biases, the results became more valid. The overall worth of the system was highly touted, and as the year ended, further application of the automated data process was under study. 58

#### Year-end Progress

(C) A restraint on the rate of progress in pacification was GVN acceptance. Although the MACV advisory staff developed a number of programs to assist in pacification and provided many recommendations to their counterparts, the implementation and success of the programs in the final analysis devolved upon the GVN. GVN acceptance of MACV's efforts was sometimes less than wholehearted, and vigorous execution was frequently lacking. However, at year's end measurable, although perhaps not spectacular, progress was being made. Although at provincial level the pacification situation varied widely and sometimes differed from the general picture portrayed at national level, the overall progress at the year's end was evaluated by Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS as follows:

The end of 1967 lends itself to a broader look at the results of our pacification efforts. A quick reading of events indicates that much has been accomplished, though less than we would have hoped. Population in secure areas increased from 56% to 67% (approximately 1.3 million people); secure hamlets increased by 638 from 4,702 at the beginning of the year to 5,340 at the end of December. 27,178 Hoi Chanh (including 17,671 military returnees, or the equivalent of two enemy divisions) rallied to the GVN, compared to 20,240 in 1966 as a result of the Manila commitment (October 1966), the number of ARVN battalions assigned to direct support of RD went from zero to 55 battalions by the end of the year. 93% of all ARVN battalions and 84% of all RF companies were given special RD training by Mobile Training Teams;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

successful village and hamlet elections were held in more than 5,000 hamlets and 1,000 villages; positive action began against corruption, leading to the relief of at least six province chiefs and 13 police chiefs for malfeasance or inefficiency; the Central Revolutionary Council (CRDC) was reinstated as the top-level GVN coordination mechanism; an integrated US organization for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support reaching from Saigon to District level was set up under COMUSMACV; Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 (AB 143), containing fully integrated treatment of pacification, was approved on 11 November 1967; collection and use of land traces was returned to village control by Decree 0141/67, 18 October; RF/PF were given proper recognition as a result of the first step in RVNAF reorganization which established General Thang as Vice Chief of the JGS in charge of territorial security; and the rice paddy price to the farmer was approximately doubled, marking a significant shift in terms of trade in favor of the countryside.

On the other hand, the GVN has yet to invest itself with the image of social revolution and a dynamic alternative to the NLF. Although badly mauled in 1967, the enemy retained a considerable capability to disrupt the pacification effort. On a security rating basis alone, only 268 additional hamlets were upgraded to the relatively secure category between 31 Jan and 31 Dec 67. Since many more hamlets worked by RD teams were upgraded to secure status during the year, it appears there was a regression of security in a considerable number of previously secure hamlets. While ARVN support of pacification increased greatly, ARVN battalions in direct support of RD were employed largely in static defensive roles which limited their effectiveness. The infrastructure,

PAGE 626 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

though weakened, remains intact and effective in large areas. Corruption, exacerbated by the inflation and political turmoil of recent years, remained a pervasive and corrosive problem.

To expedite action, Program Mangers and an overall Project Manager were designated within MACV. A similar organizational arrangement was established at each Corps. The total management system was codenamed Project TAKEOFF. Sub-programs within each TAKEOFF program set forth detailed goals and tasks. TAKEOFF programs have comprised the primary guidance for CORDS activities since July 1967.

In sum, much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. Nonetheless the greater resources, greater experience and improved organization generated during 1967 provides a solid base from which to achieve greater results in 1968.<sup>59</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER VI

### Footnotes

1. Rpt (S), MACCORDS, 17 Jun 67, Subj: Assessment of Pacification in South Vietnam as of 31 May 67 (U); MACV/RVNAF 1967 Combined Campaign Plan (S), 7 Nov 66; USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.
2. Fact Sheet (U), MACRDS, 20 Feb 67. Subj: GVN Organization for Revolutionary Development (RD); DF (TS); MACJ3, 21 Feb 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Jan 67 (U).
3. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.
4. Fact Sheet (U), MACRDS, 15 Mar 67, Subj: Organization of the Office of Civil Operations.
5. Msg (S), SECSTATE, 97845, 272300Z Dec 66.
6. USMACV Command History (TS), 1965 and 1966.
7. MACV/RVNAF 1967 Combined Campaign Plan (S), 7 Nov 66.
8. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.
9. JUSPAO Guidance No. 30 (U), 5 May 67, Subj: The New ARVN Role in Winning the War. Rpt (S), MACCORDS, 17 Jun 67, Subj: Assessment of Pacification in South Vietnam as of 31 May 67 (U).
10. JUSPAO Guidance No. 30 (U), 5 May 67, Subj: The New ARVN Role in Winning the War.
11. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 100125Z Feb 67, Subj: Military Plans and Progress in SVN (U); DF (TS), MACJ3, 21 Feb 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

12. DFs (TS), MACJ34-- 17 Feb, 21 Mar, 21 Apr and 24 May 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary (U); Fact Sheet (S), MACRDS, 5 Apr 67, Subj: Military Support for RD (U); Fact Sheet (C), MACT, 16 Apr 67, Subj: ARVN RD MTT Program (U).
13. DF (TS), MACJ341, 21 Mar 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Feb 67 (U).
14. Embtel (S), Saigon, 23661, 21 Apr 67, Subj: Inter-Ministerial Directive--Organization of "Revolutionary Development Campaign" in the Province.
15. Rpt (S), OASD (SA), Mar 67, Subj: Southeast Asia Analysis Report (U).
16. Msg (C), SECSTATE, 157261, 17 Mar 67.
17. Rpt (U), Office of the White House Secretary, Guam, 20 Mar 67.
18. Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to CJGS, n. d. (Apr 67).
19. Memo (S), MACRDS to CofS, 28 Mar 67, Subj: Future Organization of Revolutionary Development Support (U).
20. Article Ward Just, "Lodge Leaving Saigon Post," Washington Post, 25 Apr 67.
21. Administrative Operations Notice No. 473 (U), AMEMB Saigon, 11 May 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 141130Z May 67.
22. GO No. 1055 (U), HQ USMACV, 1 Jun 67.
23. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 091235Z Jun 67, Subj: Military Planning and Progress in SVN (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 21425, 29 Jun 67, Subj: Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Against VC Infrastructure (U).
24. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 11040Z Feb 68, Subj: Congressional Inquiry on RD.

# UNCLASSIFIED

25. Memo (C), MACJOIR, 26 May 67, Subj: RF/PF Advisory Effort; Ltr (C), MACT, 19 Aug 67, Subj: Study of MACV Advisory Effort; Msg (C), MACJ311, 120613Z Oct 67, Subj: MAT Requirements IV Corps.
26. Msg (C), MACJ311, 270825Z Nov 67, Subj: FY68 RF/PF Advisor Concept (U); Msg (C), MACJ311, 290155Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
27. Msg (C), MACJ1, 281107Z Sep 67, Subj: Improvement of Advisory Effort; Msg (S), DA, 031518Z Oct 67, Subj: Army Advisor Effort; Msg (S), MACJO2, 131202Z Oct 67, Subj: Ibid.
28. Msg (FOUO), DA, 292234Z Nov 67, Subj: Army Advisory Efforts (TS).
29. Memo (S), AMB Komer to AMB Bunker, 8 May 67, Subj: Project TAKEOFF--Giving Pacification a New Thrust (U).
30. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 110847Z Jul 67, Subj: Military Planning and Progress in SVN (U); Memo (S), MACCORDS-PP, 11 Aug 67, Subj: Project TAKEOFF (U), (Vol II Assessment of Pacification); Ltr (C), MACJO14, 19 Jul 67, Subj: Project TAKEOFF (U), MEMO (S), MACCORDS-PP, 30 Aug 67, Subj: Project TAKEOFF (U), (Vol I, Summary).
31. Memo (C), MACCORDS-PP, 22 Aug 67, Subj: Action Program to Improve 1968 Pacification Planning (U).
32. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam during 1967.
33. Memo (C), MACCORDS-CH, n.d., Subj: Chieu Hoi Action Program for Jul - Dec 67 (U); Ltr (C), AVIB-B (6th PSYOPs Bn), Subj: Viet Cong Countermeasures to the Chieu Hoi Program (U), 1 Oct 1967.
34. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967.

# UNCLASSIFIED

35. Memo (C), MACCORDS, n. d., Subj: Action Program for Attack on VC Infrastructure, 1967 - 1968 (U).
36. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 091235Z Jun 67, Subj: Military Planning and Progress in SVN (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 21425, 29 Jun 67, Subj: Intelligence Collection and Exploitation Against VC Infrastructure (U). Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam in 1967 (U). Rpt (S-Limdis) MACJ341, Subj: Year-End Wrap-Up Report, CY 1967 (U), 3 Feb 68.
37. Memo (C), MACJ311, 9 Oct 67, Subj: Action Program to Expand and Improve RVNAF Support for Pacification (U).
38. TALKING PAPER (U), MACJOIR, 18 Aug 67.
39. Memo (S), MACCORDS-RD, Subj: Project TAKEOFF, Vol II, Assessment of Pacification, 11 Aug 67.
40. MACJ14 Fact Book (S), 1967 Analysis (filed at MAC J14). Ltr (C), MACJ14, Subj: Selected RVNAF Personnel Data (U), 7 Feb 67.
41. Briefing (C), MACCORDS, Subj: Status of Military Support for Revolutionary Development, 29 Jun 67.
42. Ltr, MACJOO to CJGS, 2 Feb 67.
43. Msg, (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967.
44. Memo (C), MACCORDS-RDC, 28 Jul 67, Subj: RD Cadre Action Program for Jul - Dec 67 (U).
45. Pamphlet (U), MACOI, Revolutionary Development, Feb 67. Briefing (U), CORDS, Subj: RD Planning, 24 Jun 67.
46. Memo (C), MACCORDS-RDC, 28 Jul 67, Subj: RD Cadre Action.
47. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967.(U).

PAGE 631 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

48. Backgrounder Series on Vietnam (U), JUSPAO, 14 Dec 67.
49. Briefing (U), MACCORDS, Subj: Refugee Program 29 Jun 67.
50. Memo (U), MACCORDS-R&F, Subj: Project TAKEOFF Refugee Action Programs, 13 Sep 67.
51. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967 (U).
52. Station Report (U), CORDS/R&F, Dec 67.
53. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967 (U).
54. Briefing (C), MACCORDS-PS, Subj: GVN National Police and Public Safety Division (U) 29 Jun 67.
55. Memo (C), MACCORDS, Subj: Action Program Goals to Revamp the National Police and NFFF (U), FY 1968.
56. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967 (U).
57. Ibid., Briefing (C), MACCORDS-PS, Subj: GVN National Police and Public Safety Division (U), 29 Jun 67.
58. Newsletter (U), RDSD, Subj: Revolutionary Development Support, 31 Jan 67. Report (U), MACJ341, Subj: Year-End Wrap-Up Report for C 67, 12 Feb 68.
59. Msg (C), MACJOIR, 030250Z Feb 68, Subj: Pacification in South Vietnam During 1967 (U).

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER VII

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

THE US PSYOP ORGANIZATION

Background

(S) During 1966 the buildup of US forces had evoked changes in MACV and its operations in almost every sphere, including Psychological Operations (PSYOP). In early 1966 the 6th PSYOP Bn had arrived to fulfill the Command's initial requirement for PSYOP support. Although this unit contributed immeasurably to the PSYOP posture, the demand for PSYOP support from combat commanders and advisors still far exceeded the overall capability of the PSYOP support in-country. To remedy this lack of support, personnel and resource augmentations were requested to beef up the overall PSYOP support capability in 1967. Tactical psychological campaigns had been greatly expanded in 1966, and were highlighted by the new Chieu Hoi Program (January), the B-52 Strike Campaign (February), the Trail Campaign (February), the NVA Campaign (April), and the TALLY-HO Campaign (July); complementing all these PSYOP activities was the greatly-expanded Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP). The goals of these programs were to improve the living conditions of the people so as to remove one of the underlying causes of the insurgency, to gain and maintain the support of the people for the GVN, and to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. While it was impossible to establish concrete factors which would measure the effectiveness of PSYOP, there were indications that the overall program had assisted the GVN in gaining support and in the ultimate goal of building a nation. 1

(C) At the beginning of 1967 the prospects for PSYOP in Vietnam were bright. Receipt of additional assets requested in 1966 appeared to insure that sufficient resources would be available to provide responsive PSYOP support to all US/FW/RVN forces and US advisors. Leaflet production and dissemination by combined in-country and out-of-country resources was projected to approximately 400,000,000 leaflets per month.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Continued expansion of PSYOP and military civic action (MILCAP) activities, coupled with the increasing tempo of military operations, was planned to erode the confidence of the VC/NVA forces in ultimate victory and to enhance the confidence of the Vietnamese people in their government. Plans were made for changing the major emphasis of the PSYOP effort to support of RVNAF efforts, to increase and retain the support of the people for the GVN, and for the Revolutionary Development (RD) program in particular. PSYOP and MILCAP had proven extremely effective in the counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam, and upon receipt of the requested manpower and equipment resources, an even greater PSYOP effort was forecast for support of combat operations and the advisory effort during 1967.<sup>2</sup>

#### PSYOP Structure

(U) The Director of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was assigned responsibility for developing US PSYOP policy in Vietnam, for supervising and coordinating all US PSYOP in RVN, and for advising and assisting the GVN Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (MICH). In the field of policies, JUSPAO provided necessary guidance to MACV agencies to insure consistency with US national objectives. Within this policy there were three major psychological objectives that formed the basis for support of the GVN:

- 1) Increase the Vietnamese People's participation with their government in the war against communist subversion and aggression.
- 2) Increase the Vietnamese people's participation with their government in developing Vietnam's social and economic progress and its units as a nation within the FW community, including acquainting the Vietnamese with the American society.
- 3) Increase other nation's sympathy and assistance to the cause of RVN.

While high-level direction of PSYOP in RVN was provided by the Mission Council, which was the primary instrument for integrating Mission action, MACV conducted PSYOP in support of the US/FW/RVN military operations and in other areas as agreed to by COMUSMACV and Director JUSPAO within the context of JUSPAO's guidance and directives.<sup>3</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The MACV Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD) functioning as a quasi-independent staff section under COMUSMACV, in coordination with MACCORDS-POD and JUSPAO, exercised principal staff supervision over all matters pertaining to PSYOP in RVN. The MACPD functions included preparation of US PSYOP contingency plans; supervision of US military PSYOP units; coordination in procuring military equipment; recommendations for and initiation of PSYOP programs; and monitoring of the staffing of US and Vietnamese military POLWAR elements. Its advisory role with the RVNAF included political warfare planning, organization, and control; propaganda production and dissemination; indoctrination and motivation; POLWAR curricula and programs of instructions; POLWAR training; social services activities and chaplain affairs; POLWAR program and budget; military civic action and military aspects of the Chieu Hoi Program. The Director MACPD, acted as principal advisor to COMUSMACV and the MACV staff on all matters pertaining to PSYOP connected with military operations and military civic action conducted in support of tactical and security operations. 4

(U) Until late May the Psychological Operations Division (POD) of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) carried out the US Mission's responsibility for PSYOP. POD representatives were assigned to regions and provinces for the purpose of coordinating PSYOP, and served principally as advisors to appropriate GVN agencies. At this level they advised on US policy, and also provided direction, technical guidance, and support to all US PSYOP efforts to insure that these operations were in harmony and mutually supporting. While MACPD PSYOP supported military operations, POD focused its attention on PSYOP in support of the RD program and RD related programs, such as the Chieu Hoi and refugee programs. On 28 May OCO was integrated with the MACV Directorate of Revolutionary Development Support (RDSD) and redesignated the MACV Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS). (See Chapter VI). Under the new organization the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, assumed responsibility for supervising the formulation and execution of all plans, policies, and programs--military and civilian--which supported the GVN's RD program. The organization of CORDS did not immediately bring about any changes in the PSYOP Division (POD) of MACCORDS, nor in the PSYOP advisory organization, and the role of POD remained the same: to serve as the PSYOP advisor to Deputy COMUSMACV for CORDS and the ACofS, CORDS to develop PSYOP programs to support the MACCORDS role in pacification and revolutionary development; to supervise, and provide technical guidance to, and technical support for MACCORDS-POD field representatives. 5

PAGE 635 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

(S) In July a PSYOP Subcommittee of the CORDS Organization Steering Group met to study the functions, responsibilities, and relationships of the various US Mission agencies engaged in PSYOP operations, and to recommend realignment of functions, responsibilities, and relationships as a result of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 362, which provided that "US civil/military responsibilities for support of pacification revolutionary development in Vietnam will be integrated under a single-manager concept to provide added thrust forward in this critical field"--this necessitated a long, hard look at military/civilian PSYOP activities. The committee was concerned primarily with the relationship and areas of responsibility between MACV and JUSPAO, and between MACPD and MACCORDS in the field of PSYOP. The existing organization had evolved early in 1965 when JUSPAO was assigned the responsibility for the direction of US psychological and information programs in RVN; this action had been taken to intensify and expand PSYOP in RVN. At the time, however, MACV had lacked the facilities and personnel to undertake such operations, and the USIA, because it had the greatest reservoir of trained PSYWAR personnel, had formed the nucleus of the PSYOP team. In 1966 a Memorandum of Agreement signed by COMUSMACV agreed that JUSPAO would provide overall policy guidance, functioning primarily in civil/political areas of PSYOP (i.e., provide advice and assistance to MICH, and supervise, direct, and support all Mission elements involved in PSYOP), and MACV would conduct PSYOP in support of US/FW/RVN military operations. However, in light of the military/civilian reorganization of MACCORDS and the increased magnitude of the US military and civilian effort in PSYOP, the necessity to evaluate the existing division of PSYOP responsibilities of the various agencies to insure maximum PSYOP effectiveness became evident. In June Mr. Barry Zorthian, Director of JUSPAO, pointed out that "the size and magnitude of our military effort have raised requirements for psychological support to such a level that some of the existing divisions of operational responsibilities are no longer valid. Moreover, as a result of the organization evolution within the Mission, we have a number of anomalies and inconsistencies which should be examined and sorted out."<sup>6</sup>

(C) In order to examine fully the PSYOP structure, the Study Group developed criteria for analyzing alternatives to the assignment of functions and responsibilities, and the responsibilities and relationships of

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the US Mission agencies engaged in PSYOP. Some of these were included in the original terms of reference, and others were developed during the conduct of the study. Included in this criterion of analysis were the requirements to provide for:

- 1) More effective direction of the civil and military PSYOP efforts, and for improved operating results at the earliest possible date.
- 2) Operation of economies with minimum manning levels necessary to accomplish the mission, including maximum consolidation of facilities and equipment to eliminate duplication.
- 3) Minimum disruption of on-going activities.
- 4) Consolidation of funding under a single-manager concept where feasible or practical.
- 5) Solutions for maximum number of existing problems while creating a minimum number of new ones.
- 6) Maximum responsiveness to the requirements of the overall program.

The development of alternatives was based on the existing PSYOP effort, through an analysis of those functions and responsibilities of each of the PSYOP agencies (JUSPAO, MACPD, and MACCORDS [POD]), the resources available and expected in the future, existing programs, and the major problem areas. These alternatives include functions, responsibilities, relationships, and organization, and were developed within the entire range of feasible structures that would accomplish the mission, improve the PSYOP effort, and resolve the problem areas. Of five alternatives evaluated, the Study Group Chairman (Director MACPD) considered as the most favorable one which would result in dissolving JUSPAO and placing all PSYOP responsibility in SEASIA in the hands of MACV. Functions performed by the personnel of the Field Development Division, North Vietnamese Division, and the Policy Planning Office also would be assumed by MACV. The remaining JUSPAO functions would be incorporated into a USIS post to provide advice and assistance to the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) of MICH and to perform its current information and cultural functions. In addition to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the above, the following recommendations were forwarded to COMUSMACV for consideration:

- 1) That all PSYOP responsibility in HQ MACV be assigned to one staff element.
- 2) That the organization for PSYOP in the field be examined by a separate study at an early date.
- 3) That action be taken to transfer military JUSPAO personnel and spaces conducting PSYOP in the field, working under the operational control of MACCORDS, from the JUSPAO JTD to MACV.
- 4) That policy action be taken to provide for the transfer of responsibility for securing imprest funds directly to MACV (MACCORDS).
- 5) That upon approval of these recommendations, the PSYOP sub-committee to the Organization Steering Group be tasked to prepare a draft NSAM, for approval by the appropriate authority, redefining the responsibilities for PSYOP in Vietnam resulting from this study. The study recommendations, concurred in neither by JUSPAO nor MACCORDS, were forwarded to COMUSMACV on 1 September.

(U) After a complete review of the study recommendations COMUSMACV informed Ambassador Bunker that:

MACV and JUSPAO have agreed on a plan which we think meets the needs of all Mission agencies, and which causes minimum disruption. I approve the plan, as does Mr. Zorthian and now seek your approval.

The Key features are relatively simple.  
JUSPAO retains responsibility for policy guidance and coordination to give direction to the psyops effort. JUSPAO will also provide the psyops direction and support for national programs such as elections which involve the national media and heavy participation by the Ministry of Information. Because the real professionals are in JUSPAO, because all US agencies have a stake in psyops policy, and because the job is being adequately

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

accomplished, I see no reason for changing existing policy formulation arrangements.

MACV will be responsible for execution of psyvops operations in the field. Essentially, this represents no change in the present method of operating. However, JUSPAO and MACV have agreed that MACV will take over printing of all tactical leaflets, including those used for the campaign against North Vietnam. The contents of leaflets used against NVN will be subject to approval by the present MACV/Embassy/JUSPAO policy committee. JUSPAO will continue to produce tactical tapes for loudspeaker use in support of military operations and Chieu Hoi programs.

Within MACV, the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD) will concentrate on tactical psychological warfare in support of military operations against enemy units, including support to the Chieu Hoi program. The ACofS, CORDS, using the existing Psychological Operations Division, will focus on psychological operations in support of pacification and national development activities.

JUSPAO will continue to provide funds, materials and some personnel to support psychological operations that are carried out under the direction of ACofS CORDS. In addition, JUSPAO will be responsible for obtaining Ministry of Information support for these programs at the national level. The program will be jointly developed by JUSPAO and MACV in coordination with GVN.

While not all the issues were covered in this plan, COMUSMACV believed that any additional issues could be resolved between MACV and JUSPAO once the major policy was approved.<sup>8</sup>

(C) On 23 October Ambassador Bunker approved the plan. He stated that, "It seems. . . that the procedures outlined should result in a more efficient and effective prosecution of psychological operations within the US Mission."<sup>9</sup>

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

## US PSYOP Support Posture

(S) In late 1966 COMUSMACV became concerned over the possibility that the 1966 PSYOP posture would be unable to support the planned increased tempo of military operations in 1967. PSYOP field units were understaffed and were barely able to support their own requirements, without considering an expanded program. In order to remedy the shortage of PSYOP support in RVN, COMUSMACV requested a modification to the existing 6th PSYOP Bn which would convert the battalion to a group, and increase the original battalion to four battalions, one to be stationed in each CTZ.<sup>10</sup>

(S) As a result of earlier-approved PSYOP augmentation, the 9th Air Commando Sq, with six C-47s, and 18 O-2Bs, was programmed to begin arriving in-country in mid-January. The first elements arrived in-country from CONUS as scheduled, and the six loudspeaker-equipped C-47s were based at Pleiku. Modification of the C-47 aircraft had been completed in CONUS in order to tailor them for their RVN mission. The remainder of the personnel and aircraft (O-2Bs) were scheduled to arrive in-country in July; the O-2B aircraft was a twin-engine, night-and-all-weather-capable aircraft equipped with new and more powerful loud-speaker systems plus a leaflet-drop capability.<sup>11</sup>

(S) In April COMUSMACV pointed out that three major problem areas were impeding the Command's PSYOP program. The first of these problems was the delay in approval of the MTO&E 33-500F which would expand the 6th PSYOP Bn to a group. In order to expedite approval COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that the request for modification of the TO&E be removed from the SECDEF Program 4 forces and be handled as a separate item. The second problem was the critical shortage of trained and experienced personnel: COMUSMACV noted that less than half of the authorized PSYOP positions were held by school trained personnel. The third problem was the shortage of equipment: COMUSMACV pointed out that equipment was nonstandard and required special attention for all requisitions. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that he intended to discuss these items on his May trip to Washington. In August DA approved and JCS validated COMUSMACV's request for the expansion of the 6th PSYOP Bn to a group. This approved expansion increased the total authorized strength of the group by 451 spaces, thus, providing a PSYOP structure capable of supporting new and on-going tactical and RD operations. To

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

insure timely implementation of the MTO&E, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC's assistance in the procurement of equipment and development of PSYOP personnel by the desired closure date in November. CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV that the JCS Program 5 refined troop list reflected an availability date of March 1968 and a projected close date of April 1968 for the PSYOP personnel. <sup>12</sup>

(U) On 4 December 1967 the 6th PSYOP Bn was expanded to become the 4th PSYOP Gp. The battalion's four subordinate PSYOP companies-- the 19th, 244th, 245th, and 246th-- were redesignated as the 10th, 7th 8th, 6th PSYOP Bns. They continued to operate in the IV, I, II, and III CTZs, respectively. <sup>13</sup>

(S) In April COMUSMACV directed J5 to conduct a study of the effectiveness of MACV's PSYOP program. After an extensive study J5 concluded: "The stated objectives of the various MACV programs reflect and are consistent with the broader national objectives. Within this framework there is sufficient latitude for a wide variety of approaches and goals. Program content has few limitations other than those resulting from lack of creativeness and ingenuity. The MACV organization is designed and functions to provide centralized control and decentralized execution." The study went on to point out that the major weakness was the lack of research and analysis capability, which was a result of personnel shortages prevalent throughout the entire command. The shortage of personnel with critical skills and expertise was quite evident but future prospects indicated that more highly-trained personnel were to be injected into the Vietnam pipeline and a quantum improvement in PSYOP could be expected. <sup>14</sup>

(S) In late April COMUSMACV, in a letter to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, indicated a need for an overall appraisal of the PSYOP effort in Vietnam. He suggested that a study be undertaken by DOD's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), with the following objectives:

- 1) To formulate accurate parameters for measuring campaign effectiveness.
- 2) To determine the vulnerabilities of target audiences.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3) To provide detailed examples of how the vulnerabilities identified in the study might be exploited.

Accordingly, in early April ARPA undertook such a study, which was expected to take about six months.<sup>15</sup>

(U) In June the activation of the Research and Analysis Branch within the PSYOP Directorate was expected to contribute significantly to the MACV PSYOP posture. The functions of this branch included the requirement to:

1) Analyze the susceptibilities of target audiences to PSYOP in light of current intelligence, research reports, environmental influences, and operational requirements.

2) Analyze enemy propaganda for the purpose of estimating its influence on target audiences, determining enemy vulnerabilities, and recommending counteraction.

3) Maintain a current commander's estimate of the PSYOP situation and formulate PSYOP intelligence and research requirements.

4) Evaluate the psychological effects on target audiences of current and proposed MACV military operations and policies.

These functions were analytical for the most part, and were to be responsive to the operational situation. To assist in this analytical mission, plans called for the use of a computer system to assess properly the effect of the PSYOP effort. With the computer system the Research and Analysis Branch could program long-range research so as to develop a body of scientific knowledge to improve propaganda and propagandizing methods.<sup>16</sup>

(C) At the 5 July Command/Staff Conference, COMUSMACV directed MACPD to "study methods of presenting PSYOP performance in more meaningful terms, emphasizing the tangible results achieved rather than leaflets, broadcasts, and similar statistics." The overall objective of the study was to develop a way to depict, in chart form, PSYOP effectiveness against the intensity of the effort. As a result of a 13 August briefing to the CofS and J3 it was concluded that there was only one meaningful measurement of PSYOP effectiveness--the number of returnees under the Chieu Hoi Program. While these Hoi Chanhs represented the most significant measurement of PSYOP effectiveness,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There were other indicators available such as PW interrogation reports and captured documents; the Hoi Chanh represented a quantitative factor, while the latter were qualitative. The establishment and development of the Research and Analysis Branch was expected to provide, in the future, added dimension to qualitative measurement and analysis of PSYOP in RVN. 17

(S) In July and August COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC approve two additional PSYOP studies by ARPA. The purpose of the first study was to develop and evaluate novel approaches to be used in PSYOP, and involved consultation by a panel of Vietnamese and American scholars, who were familiar with the Vietnamese culture, and who would attempt to develop ways to exploit potential folklore and superstitions. CINCPAC approved this study on 11 August. The second project was requested in August to study methods of pretesting leaflets and other communications directed towards target audiences, and to develop techniques for use in operational situations for pretests. 18

(S) In October J5 conducted a study to reevaluate the overall effectiveness of PSYOP in Vietnam. This study included evaluations of PSYOP conducted by MACV in terms of coordination of effort, adequacy and utilization of personnel and equipment, and balance between tactical and strategic programs. The evaluation was based on input data from component commands and field forces, interviews with key PSYOP personnel at all levels, and limited observation of PSYOP in the field. The October study also reassessed the significant weakness discussed in the April study by J5; these were: the lack of research and analysis capability for PSYOP within MACV and a lack of responsiveness of logistics support for PSYOP equipment; a critical need for additional operational support as promoted by the 6th PSYOP Bn; equipment shortages in the 6th PSYOP Bn and tactical units; and a serious shortage of trained PSYOP personnel and authorized positions for PSYOP staff officers at liaison and brigade/regimental levels.

(S) The J5 appraisal noted that there was a marked improvement in personnel and equipment resources for PSYOP. Although there had been substantial improvement, there was an existing shortage of trained personnel sufficient to fill all positions. Equipment shortages among tactical units was evident; this was attributed to long procurement times. The J5 study pointed out that the logistics support for PSYOP equipment had made satisfactory progress and that elimination of existing supply

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and maintenance difficulties would result in a more effective system in the future.

(S) The J5 study identified additional PSYOP problems one of which was the complexity of the MACV PSYOP program. This problem resulted from two separate staff sections within HQ MACV (MAC PD and MACCORDS) providing contact with JUSPAO, disseminating guidance, and supervising the field effort. The study pointed out that the field structure, with two advisory channels, created problems of coordination of effort and exchange of information. The J5 study went on to say, "This cumbersome structure hampers: dissemination of instructions and information; collection and distribution of PSYOP-related intelligence; efficient handling of requests and distribution of materials; and improvement of expertise and knowledge of the program through schools and conferences."

(S) Another important area discussed in the study was the procedures for interrogating the processing the PSYOP potential of PWs and returnees for intelligence information. J5 stressed the importance of PSYOP personnel effecting timely interrogation of PWs or Hoi Chanhs. Past exploitation of cooperative PWs and returnees; especially in person-to-person contact, had been one of the most productive aspects of the PSYOP effort.

(S) The J5 study recommended to COMUSMACV that:

- 1) The ARPA report on PSYOP when received be submitted to J5 for review in conjunction with this report submission of appropriate recommendations to COMUSMACV relative to the PSYOP organization.
- 2) The MACV Dir 10-1, Organization and Functions-- Psychological Operations, which was currently being revised, specifically address the study conclusions.
- 3) MACPD in conjunction with ACofS J2, determine steps to incorporate PSYOP needs during interrogation, to expedite processing and reporting of PWs and returnees, and to develop appropriate combined procedures with ARVN.
- 4) ACofS, J4, and MACPD initiate a staff review on or about 1 February 1968 to determine the effectiveness at operating level of

PAGE 645 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

supply and maintenance support for PSYOP equipment, to include US, ARVN, ROK and THAI forces.

5) DA be advised through CINCPAC of the urgent need for expediting expansion of the 6th PSYOP Bn to group size and be further requested to furnish a time schedule for implementation (USARV /J1 action).

6) MACPD determine the validity of the proposed equipment needs and take follow-up action as appropriate.

7) ACofS J1 continue the development of a comprehensive program to focus command interest at all levels upon the urgent necessity of assuring troop conformance to proper standards of military conduct and discipline, and additionally, that J1 encourage the increased indoctrination of US troops in the background religious, culture, and customs of the Vietnamese.

8) ACofS conduct follow-on appraisals of PSYOP semiannually, as of 1 May and 1 November each year for the previous six-months period and, further, that this function be included in the MACV Organization and Functions Manual.

(S) COMUSMACV approved the study recommendations in November, 19

# CONFIDENTIAL

## THE ENEMY REACTION

### VC/NVA Sensitivity to US/FW/GVN PSYOP

#### NVN Reaction

(U) On 22 October 1966 Ho Chi Minh, in a speech to the NVN Congress of People's Security Forces, warned: "In combination with their military activities, the enemy will intensify their intelligence and spying activities, boost their psychological warfare, and smuggle more spy-commandos into North Vietnam. . . . To foil all schemes of the enemy's war of destruction, we must further heighten our determination to smash all spying and psychological war activities of the enemy, check and smash, in time, all maneuvers of the reactionaries and maintain public order and security in North Vietnam." Ho Chi Minh's reference to the enemy's "psychological warfare" and "psychological war activities" indicates his concern over the US/FW/GVN PSYOP activities and attests to its effectiveness. 20

(U) The NVA Daily Quan Do Nhan Dan of 27 November 1966 was even more explicit in expressing alarm over the effectiveness of the PSYWAR directed against the north: ". . . the US imperialists have stepped up their psychological and espionage warfare to an extremely vigorous degree. . . they have launched many deceitful 'peace negotiations,' propaganda campaigns and resort to other dirty psychological warfare tricks. On the one hand they seek every means to stir the reactionary elements to oppose our regime in an attempt to create troubles in our rear base, and on the other hand, they use material means to buy certain elements along with spreading groundless rumors and putting forward hypocritical sugar coated arguments. All of the enemy's tricks have the dark aim of paralyzing our army and peoples' vigilance and shaking our determination to fight." This article at least confirmed the assumption that the overall PSYOP program was effective: if nothing else, it was a source of irritation for the NVN government. 21

(C) Several captured documents gave even greater insight into PSYOP effectiveness. A document captured on 25 February by the US 25th Inf Div was a survey of the US PSYWAR activities prepared by COSVN's Political Staff Department. The document indicated that many

# SECRET

shortcomings existed in VC counter-PSYWAR efforts, including permitting VC troops to read PSYWAR publications printed by the FWMAF and to listen to radio broadcasts. The effects of these media were underestimated by the VC, and had resulted in a high desertion rate and many compromises of VC operations. The document described the Chieu Hoi Program as "a political trick [which] constitutes the national policy of the neo-colonialist." "The plots and tricks in current PSYWAR activity are many," the document concluded: "basically, they are deceptive, demagogic, subversive, and coercive and are intended to deal a blow to our morale, ideology and ranks." The initial reaction on the part of the VC to the FWMAF's successes was typical, but they failed to recognize it as a weakness in their own cause. In order to stem the trend of defection from the ranks, the VC instituted an orientation and indoctrination program. Action under the program required that:

- 1) The VC be familiar with and understand the enemy PSYWAR and Chieu Hoi Programs.
- 2) Regular propaganda and indoctrination be used to increase the resentment against the enemy and uphold the belief in victory of the revolution.
- 3) Indoctrination of cadres and soldiers concerning the maintenance of security be intensified.
- 4) The effects of enemy PSYWAR and Chieu Hoi efforts be investigated and studied, and counter plans developed.
- 5) There be close coordination with local areas in the struggle against enemy PSYWAR and Chieu Hoi activities. <sup>22</sup>

## VC/NVA Propaganda

(S) Propaganda and propagandizing techniques were used effectively not alone by FW forces, but also by the enemy. The VC/NVA forces were equally interested in gaining the support of the native population, for only in this way could they achieve their military and political goals. The major propaganda effort of the VC/NVA were based on vilification of the US and proselytization of the Vietnamese:

# SECRET

the theme of imminent victory, primarily oriented against the US, was used throughout all CTZs. The appeal supporting the anti-US themes was the idea of opposing the US as an aggressor, and its troops as imperialists or colonialists. The effectiveness of this appeal was probably primarily responsible for the maintenance of a fighting spirit among the VC and the NVA troops. Proselyting themes--as well as the threat of physical violence--were used in recruiting by the VC. The victory theme was used most predominantly in III CTZ; this theme frequently exploited the VC-claimed victories, and also the claim that they could attack anywhere at will--in some instances people were actually warned to evacuate an area because the VC planned to attack. In some areas the VC claimed that the Americans were tiring of the war and the VC would win just as they did over the French. 23

## VC Propaganda Against Introduction of US Troops in the Delta

(S) An excellent example of VC propaganda was that used in the Delta, prior to the employment of US troops there. The propaganda attempted to create a division between FW forces and the Vietnamese people. Major themes included:

- 1) Why do the American imperialists come to Vietnam in greater and greater numbers?
- 2) Why do the American troops move from central Vietnam to the Delta?
- 3) The people should demand that the US troops withdraw from the Delta and turn it over to RVNAF.

(S) Many of the VC propaganda efforts were designed to create in the mind of the local RVN populace the image of US forces as "American rapists and robbers," thus reinforcing a natural antipathy to strangers, particularly Americans. One such plan was the "beautiful-girl scheme." This involved VC recruitment of attractive girls to work in urban area bars frequented by Americans. The purpose was to elicit information and to become indoctrinated in the mores and habits of Americans who patronized such establishments. After a suitable period the girls were to be ordered to return to rural areas under VC control in order to disrupt, where possible, US and FW combat operations being conducted in those areas. The plan was to solicit sexual advances from Allied troops and, where successful, clutch the man tightly, call for help, and

# SECRET

thus expose the "American rapist" to the people. Another plan, which was to be implemented after a US combat operation, was for the VC to send security cadre to search houses of the local inhabitants to steal precious items. Then they would gather the people and ask if anything was missing. Of course the property would be missing, and the VC would then announce that the US/FW forces had stolen the property of the people.

(U) One VC pamphlet that appeared in the Delta during late 1966 and early 1967 was entitled "RISE UP WITH THE PEOPLE TO FIGHT U. S. AGGRESSORS," the text of which is quoted below:

During 1966, over 400,000 US aggressive troops and their lackeys have trod upon our country day and night, caused many tyrannical and bloody crimes to our people.

The more US aggressors pour in, the more they become "masters" of our country. They blatantly massacre and rape our people regardless of old and young, male or female. They publicly despise, ill-treat you; encroach upon your authority, discredit your dignity, dishonor your families, wives and children, regardless of general, field-grade officers, officers or enlisted men. In addition, they also break customs, habits, religions, feelings, traditions of our people and usurp our national sovereignty.

They are attempting to send thousands of more US troops, and hastily draft thousands of our youths to reinforce their ranks and extend their aggressive war.

These are barbarous crimes of US aggressors that you have witnessed and you yourselves at times have been direct victims and have many times been forced to do them.

During this past year, hundreds of thousands of your comrades-in-arms were killed undeservedly on the battlefield or became disabled for life. Thousands of other comrades of yours were annihilated by US bombs and ammunition. Happiness of thousands of families of yours, due to US aggressors, was ruined; widowhood and orphans and other social evils, due to US invaders, overgrow in a very tragic manner in towns they have occupied.

# UNCLASSIFIED

In view of aggressive conspiracy and very serious crimes of US invaders, can you shut your eyes?

Can their deceitful propagandas "Aggressive North Vietnam" or "Aggressive Communist China" be fabricated to deceive you forever?

Can you have the heart to assist the clique of the US/THEIU-KY, invaders and betrayers to fight against our nation and people and constitute hatred and bloodshed with our 14 million people forever?

It is time for you to think it over to determine a definite way for yourselves and adopt positive and necessary actions of patriotism.

Leave the US/THEIU-KY ranks to return to our country and homes, and join with the people to fight against the US to save our country.

(U) In order to counter the VC propaganda activities, MICH directed the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) to develop a counter-propaganda campaign consistent with the following guidance:

To give people a good impression of the US troops and an understanding of the reasons for their presence.

To explain that the Allied Forces recently reinforced or to be reinforced in IV CTZ will only be stationed at critical locations to fight communists so that the VC propaganda themes concerning social problems caused by the presence of Allied Forces can be countered.

To publicize the social warfare, public health, construction and relief activities which have been carried out by Allied Forces to help local inhabitants in order to promote cooperation and friendship, and so that the anti-communist war can quickly succeed and our nation can be rebuilt.

(U) In compliance with MICH guidance, VIS actively initiated campaigns against the VC propaganda, using the various PSYWAR media-- broadcasting, whispering, indoctrination seminars, propaganda leaflets, and the press. For example, VIS publicized the reason for the US presence by explaining that:

# UNCLASSIFIED

Any nation in the World has the right to defend itself against aggression and barbarous terrorist activities, which are directed from anywhere, in order to preserve its freedom. If in self-defense, anti-aggression forces are badly threatened, the invaded nation has the right to appeal for UN intervention or request assistance from Allied Nations. The fact that the US and Allied countries such as Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the Philippines have sent troops to assist the Republic of Vietnam in halting aggression from Communist North Vietnam is in keeping with international laws, displays friendship and respects the freedom of Democratic progressive countries.

.....

The US Forces have come to the Western area [the Delta area] of Vietnam to assist us in fighting armed forces of the Viet-Cong which are threatening and exploiting our people in rural areas, and to improve our living conditions. As you know, the VC Armed Forces are exercising pressure in rural areas and threatening the security of the people so that their cadre can forcibly seize the paddy, foodstuff and money of the people. So, the US Forces need to assist the RVNAF in driving out VC political and finance cadre who are harassing hamlets and villages. US Forces not only come to the Western area of Vietnam for the above objective, but also to help this area in the social improvement task.

The US troops have come here in answer to the appeal of the Government, representing the people of the Republic of Vietnam in order to halt communist aggression and to assist the Vietnamese people in freeing themselves from under-development and sufferings caused by war. To carry out this noble mission, both the Vietnam and U.S. Governments pledged in the Honolulu Conference that: "We must carry out a true social revolution and build a modern society in which everybody knows that he has a future, he is respected and has personal dignity, and he and his children will live in an atmosphere without discontent, despair and affliction, and they will have occasions to develop their talents and realize their aspirations."

# SECRET

The effect of the GVN PSYOP campaign was quite successful in terms of populace reaction. MICH pointed out in its evaluation: "Since the time campaigns were initiated to explain the presence of the Allied Forces in Vietnam, . . . rural inhabitants showed sympathy, and friendship toward Allied Forces. In many areas, inhabitants have invited Allied troops for cordial dinner at their homes in addition to their visits to frontline units or wounded and sick soldiers at station hospitals, etc. Inhabitants have clearly understood that all stories concerning U.S. troops fabricated by the Viet Cong, such as rape, killing, robbery, etc., were completely untrue. U.S. troops in general have completely won the confidence and sympathy of the rural inhabitants through their actions and behavior." MICH went on to point out that ". . . before our counterpropaganda campaign, the presence of Americans in local areas not only did not upset the situation but brought about many advantageous works; rural inhabitants understood well-fabricated stories of the VC, therefore, they did not listen to them. The VC also realized this fact, therefore they are not so impetuous in fabricating propaganda as before, and are confused because they cannot find logical reasons to distort the truth again, and therefore the intensity of their distorted propaganda is decreasing gradually."24

## Other Enemy Propaganda Efforts

(S) One of the most interesting areas of NVN/VC psychological activities was that of claims to military victories. Radio Hanoi and the VC Liberation Radio repeatedly broadcasted stories about great "victories" by VC/NVA units, in which great losses were inflicted on US/FW forces. Victories were claimed by the VC in two of the largest battles of the war--CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY--both of which were overwhelming victories for the FW forces. In May the Washington Post noted that top VC leaders in RVN had informed Hanoi that during the first nine months of 1966, 88,000 Americans had been killed by the VC. The article went on to point out that these figures represented over one-fourth of the total of 311,000 US troops in Vietnam in September 1966. However, DOD figures showed that 3,558 Americans were killed during this period, while 40,000 communist soldiers had fallen. Whether or not Hanoi has recognized the erroneous casualty figures reported from its commanders in RVN, for both the FW and VC/NVA forces, is not yet certain. Presentation of the true picture of relative casualties

# SECRET

to the NVN people would undoubtedly have a sobering effect, and might, in the future, cause the VC/NVA leaders to become victims of their own propaganda.<sup>25</sup>

(U) Another target of VC/NVA propaganda was the home front (the US and the homelands of the other FW forces fighting in Vietnam), as extracts from a captured enemy document indicated:<sup>26</sup> "In capitalist countries, such as the United States, we always keep abreast of the American people's opinions and try to motivate youths, intellectuals, and religious sects to protest the war of aggression waged by their government in Vietnam. At the same time, we motivate families of the US troops dispatched to Vietnam to protest this sending of troops. In addition, we actively support the anti-American movement in US satellite countries which also have troops in SVN, such as the Philippines, South Korea, etc. . . ." On the international front their goals were even broader: "The world peoples' anti-US Front has taken shape, aimed at mobilizing the mass movements for support to Vietnam in every country, and aimed at isolating the US imperialists to a high degree. Concentrate all efforts on denouncing the US aggression in Vietnam. Denounce the inhumane acts perpetrated by the Americans, such as the use of chemicals, gas, artillery, and air strikes to decimate our people. Lay bare the US deceitful peace offensive. Play up our just cause and the prospect of inevitable victory. Enlist the sympathy and support of the socialist camp, the people of the world, including the people of the United States of America. Isolate the Americans and their lackeys."

(U) Direct efforts were made by the VC and NVA propaganda structure actually to influence the US fighting man in the field. Metal and wooden signs, written in English, appeared throughout the CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY operations areas, encouraging the American soldier to resist and not to support the imperialist policies of the US government. Enemy propaganda leaflets were found in I CTZ and the DMZ. An advisor of the 9th ARVN Abn Bn found propaganda leaflets scattered all along Highway 19, and literally stacks of leaflets were left in areas of the DMZ. Two of the leaflets found in the DMZ were entitled, You are not Alone in Hating This War! and Hang on to Your Head. The first leaflet pictured three US servicemen who had refused to go to Vietnam, and a crowd demonstrating against the war in Vietnam, with the final message, "And ordinary people everywhere march in protest, joining the worldwide cry 'Vietnam for the Vietnamese!'" The

# UNCLASSIFIED

latter leaflet pictured a helmet with a large hole in it, through which a daisy was growing. Its message was:

GI's in Vietnam now number over 400,000.

GI's killed, maimed, or missing--more than 131,000.

Lots of soldiers-

Lots of money-

Lots of hardware-

Lots of coffins!

. . . Why die for their pie?

Better make it out --before you're pushing up daisies, too.

Go home--alive!

How effective such VC/NVA propaganda is, directed against relatively sophisticated US troops, is difficult to assess, but they keep trying.<sup>27</sup>

~~SECRET~~

## PSYOP AND LEAFLET CAMPAIGNS

(U) In early 1967 PSYOP kept pace with the tempo of military operations, although the multi-mission requirements to support the various MACV/JUSPAO activities fully tested the total PSYOP machinery. Among these important activities were the leaflet and fact sheet campaigns cosponsored by the US/GVN (these campaigns will be covered in further detail in this chapter), as well as support of the refugee program, RD, MEDCAP, and MILCAP activities. While there were no direct methods by which to measure results accurately, there was evidence that these activities were affecting the enemy and the indigenous population in the desired manner.

### TET-Spring Reunion Campaign

(S) In January the National TET Campaign got under way very slowly because of delay in development of GVN directives. However, on 10 January MICH formed a Joint TET/Chieu Hoi Campaign Task Force, and on 11 January campaign plans were issued to the regional and provincial chiefs of the Chieu Hoi Service and the VIS. The idea of the TET program was to take advantage of any special psychological mood induced by the holiday period. The main objective was to induce the maximum number of VC/NVA defections by the use of large-scale leaflet drops and aerial loudspeaker broadcasts. The actual TET campaign was broken down into four phases. The first was the softening-up process designed to create unrest and dissatisfaction; themes suggested that the GVN was building a promising future through its progress in recent successful elections, and in the economic and social areas, and that the VC were losing the war through continual defeats. The second phase covered the first seven days in February, during which a series of hard-hitting emotional appeals for defection was emphasized. The third phase covered the TET holidays and was restricted to TET greeting and the distribution of safe-conduct passes. The fourth phase covered the last two weeks in February and concentrated on instructions to the enemy on how to defect. Over 300 million leaflets were dropped during the campaign; they were

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

supplemented by loudspeakers with an assortment of over 2,000 tapes, and by radio and TV broadcasts. During February the number of ralliers (Hoi Chanhs) reached a new high of 2,917; while the TET campaign was not solely responsible for all of these returnees, it appeared that the returnees constituted one measurement that attested to the effectiveness of the campaign. In March emphasis was placed on the Spring Reunion Campaign, an extension of the 1967 TET Campaign. While no direct factors were established to measure the results accurately, it appeared that the operation was effective. There was a dramatic increase in Chieu Hoi returnees during this period, attributable at least in part to the extensive PSYOP campaign. In March a total of 3,557 Hoi Chanhs returned to the GVN, as compared to 2,917 for the month of February. Over 114 million leaflets were dropped in support of the campaign--87 million Spring Reunion leaflets and 27 million safe-conduct passes. 28


#### Leaflets and Fact Sheets Campaign Against NVN

- (S) In January over 59 million leaflets were dropped over North Vietnam and the Laotian Panhandle as part of the Trail, TALLY HO, and Fact Sheet Campaigns. This was a sizeable monthly increase in leaflets dropped over the north and coincided with stepped-up bombing of supply and infiltration routes leading into RVN. In an attempt to evaluate the success of these leaflet campaigns, several NVN defectors and NVA soldiers were interviewed. They stated that the People's Security Forces tried to prevent the people (NVN citizens) from reading leaflets; these soldiers would go into an area after a leaflet drop and police up every leaflet they could find. The defectors stated that this did not prevent the people from reading the leaflets. Understandably, those people in NVN who read the leaflets were unwilling to discuss them with their fellow countrymen or fellow soldiers, so it was very difficult to evaluate accurately or reach any valid conclusions as to just how effective the NVN campaign really was. 29

(S) Of all leaflets dropped either in NVN or on the Trail, a northern soldier's poem to his mother (Leaflet No. 29) seemed to have had the most impact. It is still being used in the leaflet campaigns in- and out-of-country. (See Figure VII-2) A number of captured NVA soldiers have said that this leaflet had a definite effect on their morale. Many ralliers and PWs interviewed also verified the

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED



## A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER'S POEM TO HIS MOTHER

From the day I left you, mother, to follow my companions on the trip to Central Vietnam through Laos, I have endured the hardships of climbing up the green mountains and marching through rain and shine. Although with my young age life should blossom like a flower. For the sake of Peace, I don't mind enduring hardships and dangers. For several months, I marched during the day and rested at night. My shoes' heels have worn out and my jacket's shoulders were rubbed thin through which the cold sits in. When evening comes, besieged by loneliness in the heart of the Truong Son range, O mother, I miss our home, I miss the blue smoke, the gourd arbor, the little butterflies, the old temple roof, O how I miss them all. So I am here on strangers' soil but the south is also our country. Here, I saw the same green-leafed coconut trees, the same roads perfumed with the scent of rice paddies, the same blue smoke filling the evening sky, the buffalo returning to its shelter, the sound of the flute which makes one feel homesick. As I got over my feeling of estrangement I began to look around and wondered what there was here to liberate? The market was crowded with people in gay mood, the rice field was green with paddies. From a curve-roofed pagoda came the sounds of a worship bell. The classrooms were full of cheerful children singing a song in chorus. And in a plot of garden the small butterflies were busy on the yellow cabbage flowers. Peace and happiness reigned throughout the country. But why "they ordered me to burn the villages, destroy the bridges, explode the mines and sow death around? After my hand trembled when I had to lay a mine only to later witness people blown up and blood sprayed around. Whose blood it was? It was the blood of people like you, mother, and myself. That night, my eyes were filled with tears and my sleep was interrupted by nightmares.



Figure VII-2

**SECRET**

effectiveness of the bomb-warning leaflets. They said that the leaflet encouraged people to try to leave an area, and they resented it when authorities would not permit evacuation. 30

(S) In 1967 the safe-conduct pass leaflets dropped in the Laos Corridor were expanded to include Laotian support of the defector program. Arrangements were worked out with the Laotian authorities to receive defectors who desired to turn themselves in. In addition to the safe-conduct pass (written in both Vietnamese and Laotian), a map leaflet was devised which gave directions to safe government areas and detailed instructions on how the potential defector was to turn himself over to the Laotian government. 31

(C) Other leaflets used listed the names of NVA PWs who had been repatriated, including photographs of some of these soldiers. These leaflets were expected to be psychologically effective since it was believed that the repatriated PWs had not been returned to their families, nor had there been any news coverage of their release in the north. Another version of the leaflet pictured healthy PWs enjoying good treatment in the PW camps in RVN, which refuted the Communist propaganda that PWs were tormented and killed. 32

(U) One of the most politically significant leaflets dropped over NVN was a quoted statement signed by US Senate "Doves:"

LOOK AT THE FACTS

We, the undersigned members of the U.S. Senate usually exercise caution when we speak of the U.S. role in the Vietnam conflict. We wholeheartedly support any plausible effort to bring an honorable end to the war. We continue to hope that the government in Hanoi will open one of the many doors available to them in order to bring both sides to the conference table.

This conflict is beginning to reach a critical stage. It could be tragic if Hanoi misunderstood the gravity of the situation concerning the political stand of the U.S. We believe that a necessary condition in the search for real peace, is that Hanoi must recognize the true nature of the positions of our country concerning criticisms of government policies on the Vietnam problem.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Those whose signatures appear on this declaration are members of both the Republic and Democratic parties, and all share the belief that the tragic war in Vietnam must be ended by a conference or by mutual agreement. Nevertheless, until an agreement has been reached, we will firmly oppose the withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam. We maintain this standpoint, because although there are differences in our parties, we believe that this standpoint is the only correct one. Further, we are convinced that the vast majority of the American public also maintain this standpoint.

Though many Americans share our fears of the continuing increase of American participation in the Vietnam War, many others completely agree with the policies of the South Vietnamese Government, or urge an even stronger military policy in Vietnam.

We hope that this declaration will be accepted in the same spirit in which it was written, a determined effort to show the main attitudes of Americans toward the War in Vietnam. If we are lucky, this show of attitude may contribute toward a peace brought by conference, a conference without which the war will expand and continue to be prolonged.

(S) In December 1966 COMUSMACV had considered a project to introduce a single-channel or double-channel miniature radio receiver into PSYOP target areas. These mini-radios with preset frequencies would receive only PSYWAR broadcasts oriented toward reducing the VC/NVA morale and will to fight. In mid-March tentative plans for a radio operation was submitted to COMUSMACV. The concept of operation was to conduct a limited test program for six months, starting in July, to determine the effectiveness of such an approach and the desirability of continued or expanded use. Although no preset frequency had been selected, it was believed desirable to have the frequency close to but not on the frequency of Radio Hanoi. This would allow Radio Hanoi to be heard when the batteries were strong, but not when they were weak, and might give Hanoi a reason for leaving the radios in the hands of the troops, give cover to those with tuneable sets, and provide access to Radio Hanoi for only a short period of time. In finalizing plans for the operation, J3 requested that J2 provide information on VC/NVA troop concentrations in western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces and

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

appropriate drop zones for the aerial delivery of the radio receiver within the enemy troop concentrations. Since the success of the PSYOP project depended upon the VC/NVA soldiers recovering the radios, it was very important that they be placed in the target areas. The operation was planned for execution in October with air dropping of receivers into target areas and the concurrent initiation of propaganda broadcast from a 50-KW transmitter at Pleiku.<sup>33</sup>

(S) One of the most important NVN leaflet operations was the Trail Campaign, initiated in early 1966. The Trail leaflets were targeted against infiltrators using way stations, staging and supply areas, and infiltration routes and trails leading from NVN through Laos and Cambodia into RVN. The Trail Campaign's principal objectives were to plant doubt in the minds of the NVA infiltrators about the prospects of survival, to convince them that their mission was hopeless, and to encourage them to rally when they were sent south. In early 1967 there was indication of increasing numbers of northern soldiers rallying and the most prevalent cause seemed to be the influence of the leaflets. To combat the Trail leaflets, NVA cadres were sent ahead of the infiltrating units to tear up leaflets found on the trails, but this tactic was not entirely successful, for according to PWs and ralliers interviewed, many leaflets were picked up and read by the infiltrators. The most effective leaflet against the infiltrator was the safe-conduct pass, which was considered a kind of insurance. The campaign was best evaluated by the number of NVA soldiers persuaded to rally or accept capture rather than be killed. Some of these were probably influenced by the successful leaflet, "Born in the North to Die in the South." The number of ralliers and PWs rose sharply in 1967, but other factors, especially hardships, danger, and possible death, played an important if not a decisive role in the results of the campaign.<sup>34</sup>

(S) On 7 August the Mission Council approved a JUSPAO six-month plan (1 July - 31 December 1967) for leaflet drops in Laos. The purpose of these leaflet drops was to supplement, reinforce, and advance the national policy objectives aimed at a successful conclusion of the Vietnam conflict by applying various overt techniques of PSYWAR against the North Vietnamese enemy. The objectives of the plan were:

- 1) Establish in the minds of the civilian population of NVN that the Lao Dong Party and the Hanoi authorities are responsible for

# SECRET

the war, its continuation, their present miserable situation, and the fate of their relatives and friends in the NVA in order to lower morale, foster war weariness, increase disaffection with the Party and the Hanoi authorities, and encourage passive resistance to the regime's demands--without, however, urging, even by inference, overthrow of the Hanoi regime.

2) Demonstrate to the civilian population of NVN that RVN is a peaceful and prosperous place in contrast to the poverty, want, and danger with which they live, and that RVN has achieved a popular, democratic political base upon which to build future progress.

3) Motivate the NVN population to return US evaders or PWs unharmed to US authorities.

4) Create doubts and fears in the minds of NVA troops about their chances of survival, about the dangers of injury and disease, about burial in unmarked graves, about the hopelessness of their situation, about the fate of their relatives and friends in NVN, and about the competence and good faith of their commanders, the Hanoi authorities, and the Lao Dong Party in an effort to lower morale, decrease combat effectiveness, increase disaffection with the military leadership, the Party and the Hanoi authorities, and foster defections and surrenders. 35

(S) In September JCS stated that a review of the plan found it to be a logical extension and improvement of prior plans. However, the JCS questioned whether the approach taken by the plan fully exploited all of the PSYWAR possibilities. In pursuing the discussion of the plan, the JCS pointed out that: "in addition to physical destruction achieved by bombing, we should be sure that we have taken every opportunity to realign the motivation of the people--particularly the people who are personally involved in operating the infiltration system, reconstructing damaged LOCs, and operating various military and industrial facilities.... Experience in South Vietnam clearly indicates the PSYOPs are the most effective when their timing and content can be directly related to military action. There would appear to be similar opportunities with respect to the air campaign in NVN which are not being exploited now. Obviously, more generalized approaches should be continued along lines indicated in the plan. However, recommend you consider leaflet drops for selected targets--during or after the strike--aimed specifically at the population of workers in the

# SECRET

immediate target area." To clarify his idea CJCS gave three examples of how leaflets could be used effectively with bombing raids over NVN. One example suggested was: "Thai Nguyen Steel Plant - Warn populace in vicinity of Thai Nguyen Steel Plant that, when repaired, the plant will be bombed again because it supports war effort against SVN. Since there is no desire to kill workmen at plant or people living in vicinity, workmen should refuse to work at plant. Alternatively, explain that if workmen delay or do not make repairs on plant that bombing will be less frequent, or even better, there will be no bombing at all if the plant is not rebuilt."<sup>36</sup>

(S) In an August message to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV indicated his concern over the effectiveness of the Fact Sheet Campaign over NVN. COMUSMACV stated that low leaflet delivery rates over NVN and particularly in the area of the Red River Delta had been caused by unfavorable weather, inherent limitations of an F-4C aircraft as a leaflet carrier, and the increase number of SAM sites with subsequent reduction of safe corridors for the F-4Cs into the target areas. In order to increase the effectiveness of the Fact Sheet Campaign, COMUSMACV suggested that more emphasis be placed on targeting of heavily populated areas of Hanoi and Haiphong, and that leaflets dropped in the Red River Delta be increased to 60 million to overcome the large percentage lost due to terrain, water, and weather.<sup>37</sup>

(S) To assist COMUSMACV, CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF place sufficient priority on leaflet delivery operations to insure a substantial increase in the number of leaflets reaching critical PSYWAR targets in the Red River Delta area. CINCPAC pointed out that:

The ROLLING THUNDER Program is continuing to take the war to the enemy and to disrupt North Vietnam's war supporting resources. Collaterally, it is important that psychological operations aimed at NVN continue at a similarly aggressive pace. One of the available possibilities for increasing the effectiveness of the air campaign lies in the field of an effective, integrated psychological warfare effort; if the PSYWAR effort is well conceived and executed, it can support the air effort and help achieve the tasks that we seek to carry out in NVN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Although the total number of PSYWAR leaflets disseminated in NVN has remained fairly constant, there has been a sharp decline in the volume of leaflets reaching one of the most important PSYWAR target areas--the Red River Delta, and Hanoi and Haiphong in particular.

As a part of an effort to increase the effectiveness of the leaflet campaign over NVN, CINCPAC granted the AMEMB Saigon, in coordination with COMUSMACV, the authority to conduct a continuing program of frequent overt leaflet operations over NVN. The purpose of the leaflet operation was to reinforce the effects of air strikes and to accomplish psychological objectives not necessarily related to air strikes. This operation was designated FRANTIC GOAT and replaced the Fact Sheet Program.<sup>38</sup>

#### Cambodian PSYWAR Campaign

(TS) An intensive PSYWAR campaign was conducted against NVA units located in and along the Cambodian border during late 1966 and 1967. The objective was to reduce the NVA forces' effectiveness prior to their commitment to major operations in RVN. In order not to violate Cambodian air space the "wind drift" method of dissemination of leaflets was used, by which aircraft flying along the Cambodian/Vietnam border used favorable winds to carry leaflets 15-20 km inside Cambodia.<sup>39</sup>

(TS) In January COMUSMACV requested that CG I FFORCEV evaluate the overall effectiveness of the campaign. CG I FFORCEV indicated that interrogation reports revealed that NVA soldiers had seen and read these leaflets while infiltrating into RVN through Laos and Cambodia, but that there was no means available to measure the effectiveness of the leaflets. He went on to say that reports did reveal that the "wind drift" dissemination techniques and targeting had been effective, for the leaflets had gotten into the hands of the infiltrating NVA soldiers.<sup>40</sup>

(TS) In order to improve the Cambodian campaign, COMUSMACV considered the possibility of overflights of Cambodian territory. In April COMUSMACV indicated to CINCPAC the desirability of overflights

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

of Cambodia at night to a depth of 20 km for the purpose of dropping leaflets. The major argument against the "wind drift" method was its dependence upon favorable winds and the fact that it would not allow the quick reaction needed to carry on the program effectively. To conduct an effective year-round PSYWAR campaign against the NVA infiltrators in Cambodia, shallow overflights of Cambodia territory were needed; these would greatly enhance the accuracy of deliveries over relatively small isolated targets. <sup>41</sup>

(TS) On 13 March JCS approved overflights of Cambodia in the border area known as the Dorsal Fin for a six-month trial period. JCS further stipulated that:

- 1) Leaflet delivery by overflight of the Cambodian border would be accomplished by cargo-type aircraft, at night, and at an altitude ranging from 6,000 to 10,000 feet.
- 2) Aircraft would penetrate Cambodia only to the depth necessary to disseminate leaflets on enemy forces and not more than 20 km.
- 3) A maximum of four overflight sorties per week was authorized.
- 4) Leaflets would be in the Vietnamese language only and in the thematic content as authorized against VC/NVA forces. <sup>42</sup>

(TS) On 8 April COMUSMACV, based on CINCPAC and JCS policies, provided guidance to subordinate commanders on the conduct of future leaflet operations over Cambodia, but withheld approval of actual execution. The mission was to conduct leaflet operations against VC/NVA forces using Cambodia territory as a sanctuary and as routes of infiltration into RVN. These operations were to consist of leaflet efforts designed to lower the morale of the enemy forces; create friction between cadres and soldiers; encourage malingering, desertion, or defection of enemy personnel--and thereby create a spoiling effect on impending operations--and correct Hanoi's claims of VC/NVA "victories" and "liberation" of large portions of RVN. On 8 May COMUSMACV gave the Field Force commanders the authority to conduct flights over Cambodia. <sup>43</sup>

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) On 9 June CINCPAC recommended that COMUSMACV consider an expansion of the PSYOP campaign inside the Cambodian border. The objective of the campaign, as stated by CINCPAC, would be "to encourage Cambodia in its efforts to resist the Communist takeover, to raise Cambodia's value as an asset to the Free World through Cambodia's relationship with Thailand and RVN, to encourage Cambodian participation in regional cooperative projects and to cause Cambodia to eject the Communist forces who use her territory as a sanctuary." CINCPAC envisioned the use of leaflet and news sheet techniques to reach the people, as well as radio and other agent-delivered propaganda within MACV capabilities. CINCPAC pointed out that the PSYOP campaign that was initiated by COMUSMACV in April was restricted to the Vietnamese language and thematic content and targeted toward the VC/NVA forces, and therefore did not reach the Cambodian audience. The thematic content of the propaganda recommended by CINCPAC was geared to support Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to show:

- 1) The US determination and capability of defending our Asian allies against the Communists.
- 2) The continuing victories of the RVN and her allies over the Communists.
- 3) The adoption of a constitution and the successful elections conducted by RVN.
- 4) The necessity for Cambodia to deny the use of her territory to the Communists.
- 5) The increasing economic stability in RVN.
- 6) The necessity for Cambodia to stop the sale of food and supplies to the Communists.
- 7) The advantages of accelerating the progress of the Mekong River Development Project.
- 8) The mere advantage of being a true neutral nation or supporting the US and the other FW nations.<sup>44</sup>

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) On 17 June COMUSMACV, expressing the joint view of the Mission and MACV, indicated that national interest would not be served by instituting leaflet campaigns in the Cambodian language directed at the population, because such activity would probably be interpreted by Sihanouk as interference in the internal affairs of Cambodia. The delicate and tenuous relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos could not help but be further exacerbated if material were drifted into Cambodia from their respective territories. Thus, the program might tend to drive Sihanouk further into the Communist camp, and could provide profitable material for the enemy to employ in arousing world opinion. 45

(TS) In July a three-month analysis of the Cambodian campaign showed that target-area coverage was adequate except for the latter part of the period when leaflet drops were adversely affected by prevailing wind conditions. The penetration depth and minimum altitude restrictions on overflights and the prevailing winds would have caused the dropped leaflets to drift into RVN and, therefore, many flights were cancelled. Quantitative analysis of rallier figures showed no significant increase in returnees. However, interrogation reports from Hoi Chanhs and PWs indicated that the leaflets were an influencing factor in their decision to rally. These same reports revealed that leaflets were read by other members of VC/NVA units and that cadre had taken punitive measures against those individuals caught with leaflets in their possession. The paucity of information precluded any strong statement as to the effectiveness of the campaign; however, based on the information available, a tentative assessment concluded that the leaflets were effective. 46

(TS) COMUSMACV's six-month analysis of the Cambodian Campaign indicated no increase in defection rates in the CTZs, however, ralliers did state that the leaflet messages were an influencing factor in their decision to rally. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that, qualitative analysis did not support conclusive results as to the effectiveness of the program. COMUSMACV noted that additional time might indicate the cumulative effects of the campaign; therefore, on 5 October he requested that the campaign be continued for an indefinite period with MACV submitting six-month evaluation reports on the effectiveness of the program. On 3 November CINCPAC approved COMUSMACV's recommendation. 47

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) In late November and early December, COMUSMACV established Operation CAMEL PATH. Its mission was to conduct leaflet operations against the VC and NVA forces using Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and routes of infiltration into RVN. This effort was designed to lower the morale of enemy forces; create friction between cadre and soldiers; encourage malingering, desertion, or defection of enemy personnel, thereby to create a spoiling effect on impending enemy operations; and counter Hanoi's claims of VC/NVA "victories" and "liberation" of large portions of RVN. The Cmrdr 7AF was tasked with the responsibility of carrying out the leaflet drops for which the CGs I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV, and SA IV CTZ, determined requirements.

(TS) Dissemination of the PSYWAR leaflets were authorized by the "wind drift" method into Cambodia from the geographical point where the common Cambodian/Laotian border intersects the RVN border southward to a point 10 degrees 32 minutes north latitude--104 degrees 45 minutes east longitude. Overflight of Cambodian air space was authorized only to a depth necessary to drop the leaflets on enemy forces, but not more than 20 km, from the geographical point on the RVN border at 12 degrees north latitude, northward along the border to the point where the common Cambodian/Laotian border intersects the RVN border. Overflights were not permitted during periods of adverse wind conditions. Flights were to be accomplished by cargo aircraft and at night only. Initially no more than four overflights per week was authorized.

(TS) In addition to stipulating the manner in which Operation CAMEL PATH was to be executed, COMUSMACV reiterated the public affairs guidance concerning this operation which was furnished by the SECDEF:

Under no circumstances will anyone having knowledge about these operations acknowledge that leaflet drops are being conducted over Cambodia. Public comments on this subject, whether on background, off the record or any other basis are prohibited. Following line, not to be volunteered, should be used in Saigon (and will be followed in Washington) in answering any press queries on a

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

background basis: "We have for sometimes been dropping leaflets in South Vietnamese border area. Given wind drift, we assume some of these have been falling inside Cambodia. Leaflets are directed at Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces, encouraging their defection by explaining the GVN Chieu Hoi Program and providing safe conduct passes." In the event of incidents involving loss of US personnel or aircraft, official spokesman will respond to public on the following basis: If inquiry arises from a story or accusation from Communist source, decline comment; in response to other inquiries spokesman may acknowledge possibility of inadvertent entry into Cambodian air space by elements operating in SVN as a result of navigational error.

(TS) In an effort to determine the effectiveness of Operation CAMEL PATH, 7AF was tasked with a monthly report of missions flown and the three component chiefs involved were required to submit a biannual evaluation of the program based on interviews with ralliers and PWs, examination of captured enemy documents, or any other indication of enemy response or countermeasures. Evaluation of the program will carry on into 1968.<sup>48</sup>

#### The Saga of Nguyen Van Be

(U) In 1966 the Hanoi radio and press had sung the praises of a heroic member of the NLF, one Nguyen Van Be. The detailed story appeared in the Hanoi Phu Loi on the morning of 30 May 1966:

. . . . [ Nguyen Van Be with ] two cells of the Transport Unit were assigned with the mission to convey arms and ammunitions to the front. As they were approaching the Beo Canal of My An village, My An District in Kien-Giang Province, they were encircled by a convoy of 49 enemy armored cars.

PAGE 669 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

Following a fierce fighting with the enemy, Nguyen Van Be was captured by them. Afterwards, he was subjected to the most savage torture, and yet they were unable to get anything from him. Finally, they took him along with the captured arms to My An District where they resumed the torture and forced him to explain the handling of various sorts of mines which he had transported. Be pretended to comply with the order and set about a demonstration session. Suddenly, he seized a mine weighing 10 kilos and shouted: 'Long live the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, down with the American Imperialists.' As he said these words, he rushed like a thunderbolt at a nearest M-118 tank and banged the mine against it.

The explosion set off by the 10 kilos mine triggered a series of explosions as the pile of mines captured by the enemy were ignited and went off. By this act of heroism, Nguyen Van Be sacrificed himself but he had destroyed a M-118 tank and heavily damaged two M-113 tanks, killed and wounded 64 enemies, among them 12 Americans.

The validity of this story came under close scrutiny in early 1967, when a Vietnamese guard thought he recognized Be's picture. Upon completion of an extensive investigation, it was verified that a VC prisoner in the Mekong jail was none other than the heroic Be himself, who had become a "legend in his own time."

(U) On 13 March the US/GVN initiated a tremendous counter-campaign in which Nguyen Van Be leaflets and posters were disseminated in large numbers throughout RVN, and leaflets dropped over the north. The purpose of the campaign was to prove that Nguyen Van Be was alive, and thus to discredit the Communists' propaganda apparatus and weaken the NVN/NLF use of the hero emulation as a means of inspiring young men in NVN and in VC-held areas of RVN to become heroic fighters for the VC/NLF cause. In addition to the dissemination of leaflets and posters, the GVN made ample use of radio and TV networks to broadcast

# UNCLASSIFIED

plays, songs, and other documentaries telling the true story about Be.

(U) The immediate Hanoi reaction was to charge Saigon with a "tricking strategem," and on 16 March one Hanoi broadcast commented that:

During the last few days, the psychological warfare organs of the Americans and their lackeys in Saigon employed every propaganda trick to invent a story of the appearance of Hero Nguyen Van Be in their prison before they released the news that Nguyen Van Be had been arrested and is living safe in their claws, without being tortured. The Thieu-Ky clique's psychological warfare minister held a press conference during which a Nguyen Van Be appeared before journalists, who questioned him.

There is nothing new in this sensational farce. Any conjuring trick of the Americans and their lackeys is only a repetition of the ridiculous comedy they played when they invented the story of Tran Van Van's assassin, one-eyed man who professed to be a Viet Cong. . . .

Taking this experience into account, this time they picked out an intact, good-looking man. They also taught him what to say. They plotted to use time to blur the hero's image so that they could easily deceive the public. But 10 months [lapsed since Be's reputed death] not only have lessened the noise of the Nguyen Van Be bomb, but made it resound more.

Brother Be's image has been carved increasingly deeply into the hearts of millions of people. . . . It is necessary to warn [the Americans] that their trick about Hero Nguyen Van Be is an insolent offense to all the Vietnamese people. They dared offend an outstanding anti-US national salvation generation. Southern compatriots, southern youths, and especially, liberation combatants, comrades of Hero Nguyen Van Be, will surely not forgive them and will punish them severely.

## UNCLASSIFIED

(U) To prove that Be was still alive the GVN made arrangements to present him to the people of his own hamlet. On the day of Be's planned return to the village of My An, villagers, reporters, photographers, and television crews were assembled awaiting his arrival. With the stage set, hero Nguyen Van Be arrived by helicopter at mid-day with his parents and younger brothers. After getting out of the aircraft Be said, "I am glad to be home amongst you. I am not dead." The villagers looked very puzzled and when asked to stand up if they recognized Be, none did. Much to the chagrin of the US and GVN officials, through a map error, Be had been taken to the wrong hamlet--2.5 km from his real home. Realizing the mistake the officials summoned a helicopter and flew Be back to Saigon--leaving the villagers looking on in bewilderment.<sup>49</sup>

(U) In late May the Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan called the Be creation a "Hollywood technique of selecting actors and the medical art of changing facial traits as applied in Hong Kong and Japan." VC and NVA counter-propaganda was not limited to newspaper articles and radio broadcasts, but included the use of terror in Be's home in Dinh Tuong Province. Several persons having first-hand knowledge that Be was alive were kidnapped by the VC, while other individuals were on VC wanted-lists for having said that they had seen Be alive. One report revealed that the VC demanded that anyone who said or was accused of saying that Be was alive must put it in writing; if he refused, he was shot on the spot.<sup>50</sup>

(U) While Be had proven a valuable PSYOP asset, the Director of MACPD warned:

The plan for further exploitation of Nguyen Van Be appears quite ambitious and thorough; however, it is not without risks. It should be noted, for example, that one of the effects of our expose of the Nguyen Van Be lie has been to stimulate the Communists to step up the Be emulation campaign, which is not to our advantage. There is, also, some danger in taking "a peasant lad with no particular skills" and publicizing him as if he were an important person. With both sides launching all-out Nguyen Van Be campaigns, this untutored farm boy stands a good chance of becoming the top celebrity in Vietnam. Of course, the Communists run less risk of creating a

# UNCLASSIFIED

a monster because their manufactured hero is dead. Ours is alive and we may be stuck with him for a long time.

It must be remembered that the purpose of the campaign for exploiting the Nguyen Van Be case is to discredit the enemy's emulation campaign in particular and in general their entire propaganda campaign. For this reason MACPD does not concur in the plan to concentrate future actions on Be "doing things and things being done for him and his family," especially the latter. Any attempts to lionize this former VC PW could be counterproductive by stirring resentment among loyal Vietnamese troops and civilians. It must not be forgotten that Be is in no way a hero. He has no true attributes that are deserving of emulation, and we question presenting him as a lecturer or seeking his advice or opinions, or arranging for him to visit high ranking officials, ARVN units, attend meetings or be visited by school children, further, we can find no justification for providing him with special benefits or status that are not available to all citizens. It would seem that his value to the GVN will be exhausted when it has been generally accepted that he is alive and the Communists fabricated the story of his heroic act.

As long as the NVN and NLF radio and press reacted to the expose' campaign, this was sufficient evidence that the Communist leaders were concerned about the effectiveness of the US/GVN campaign. The intent of the campaign was not to make Be a hero, but simply to undermine the NVN/NLF use of "Martyr Be" as a major basis for their morale-building and indoctrination training. The US plan is to continue the PSYOP campaign as long as there is an operational potential to prove that the "dead VC hero" lives.<sup>51</sup>

~~SECRET~~

## PSYOP CAMPAIGNS WITHIN GVN

### National Reconciliation

(S) During the 1966 Manila Summit Conference the GVN announced that it was preparing a program of national reconciliation. The GVN declared its determination to open all doors to those Viet Cong who desired to return to the GVN, and to allow them to participate as free men in national life with total amnesty. In January 1967 the GVN started plans for the National Reconciliation Program which envisioned a dynamic nationwide effort to exploit VC morale and military weaknesses and to reintegrate VC returnees at all levels into the main stream of South Vietnamese society through an offer of civil and political rights to all who renounced violence. Supported by an intensive inducement through psychological persuasion and the promise of employment for defectors, the program was to include the regular Chieu Hoi effort (see below) and would be broadened to include special targeting of middle- and high-level hardcore VC cadres. Although the GVN was officially committed to the program, the US Mission officials were not sure that the RVN was ready to accept such a full-scale program. Deputy Ambassador Porter indicated that the GVN was not psychologically prepared to make public an offer guaranteeing comparable careers to the middle- or high-level VC upon return to the GVN. There were some GVN officials who were unquestionably apprehensive about the US-supported program; one of their apprehensions may have been prompted by the suspicion that the US was trying to maneuver the GVN toward a coalition government with the VC. 52

(C) In January, US military and civilian representatives in the field were alerted to the program and requested to initiate informal and discreet preparations with their GVN counterparts in order to be ready for the start of the program. At the discretion of the field advisors the following preparations were suggested:

- 1) As the occasion presents itself, undertake informal discussions with Vietnamese civilian counterparts to develop comprehensive plans and gain support of Vietnamese.
- 2) Make informal surveys of local employment possibilities for VC defectors at all levels, which could provide a basis for specific job offers.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3) Develop, in coordination with local security and census grievance committees, lists of potential defectors who may be individually contacted by letter or messenger.

4) Undertake discussions with the local officials in American communities to acquaint every member with the concept. 53

(C) On 22 February Chief of State Thieu met with Mission representatives to discuss in detail the National Reconciliation Campaign. The Director JUSPAO pointed out to General Thieu that favorable trends in political, economic, and military spheres provided a psychological opportunity for a major campaign to attract both the soft outer ring of the VC membership and the inner hardcore members who had developed doubts and despair about VC prospects. Although General Thieu seemed to favor the program, he stated that there were many problems to be anticipated and resolved if the Reconciliation Campaign was to be successful, particularly temporary resettlement facilities. He went on to say that he realized that the Americans felt the GVN had not moved quickly enough on its Manila commitment, but he pointed out that the GVN had not made necessary preparations for the campaign at the time. 54

(U) Through a major GVN effort, plans for the Reconciliation Campaign were put in final form in late March. Initially the GVN had considered making the reconciliation pronouncement at the occasion of the proclamation of the new Constitution, but this was changed because it was felt that the reconciliation pronouncement would detract from the importance of the constitutional proclamation. On 19 April Premier Ky announced the GVN's National Reconciliation policy--Doan Ket:

Today on Hung Vuong day when the entire nation is reminded of its origins, the Government solemnly announces its course of action and its policy concerning the National Reconciliation Program to be put into effect throughout the country.

With the Constitution as a base, the National Reconciliation Program is a part of a campaign for the attainment of our national objective. This objective is to accomplish reforms within the framework of historical continuity to liberate the nation and to free the people. The three guiding principles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

of the National Reconciliation Program are National Community, National Concord and National Progress.

The principle of National Community is based on the fact that our ties of blood demand us to have tolerance rather than hatred. This principle aims at bringing together all the Vietnamese spiritual heritage bequeathed on us by our forefathers, and at the same time to strive and keep us with the rate of progress of mankind in this second half of the twentieth century. This principle requires that we reject the communist proposed divorce with our traditions. For indeed this denial of the past will bring the nation and the individual's into the pit of extermination and slavery.

The principle of National Concord, which aims at restoring the life of harmony that had been worked out by our ancestors after so much hardship, will establish the foundation of our democratic regime. In an atmosphere of peace and harmony, all disagreements and differences will be expressed, not through the use of steel and not at the cost of bloodshed, but rather through democratic procedures.

The principle of National Progress will guide our people to move forward in freedom and with greater expectations. Based on this principle, the social revolution which is being carried out by the Republic will bring about progress and social justice.

He stated that these principles would strengthen unity within a framework of national union, and thus would engender the essential atmosphere in which the Vietnamese people could build their own destiny. The GVN and the people, he said, had three ways to implement the National Reconciliation Program:

- 1) All those who decided to leave the ranks of the communists and to turn themselves in to the national community would be welcomed back as full-fledged citizens. All returnees would be protected by the GVN, and would receive facilities to rebuild their lives. In other words, all citizens who abandoned the communist ranks would enjoy all those rights set forth in the Constitution, including the right of freedom, the right to life, property, and honor protected by law; the right to take part in elections; the right to rejoin their family;

~~SECRET~~

the right to choose a place to settle; and the right to enjoy the national assistance toward improving the standard of living.

2) All citizens who rallied to the national cause could be employed by the GVN in accordance with their ability. All Vietnamese without distinction would have the opportunity to contribute positively to the construction and development of their fatherland.

3) All citizens who rallied to the national cause, but who had committed crimes under pressure from the communists, whether convicted or not, would be allowed to enjoy the guarantee set forth in the Constitution. The nation would accept them and enable them to make the most of their ability and devotion to duty, and they would be permitted to sweep their mistakes into the past.<sup>55</sup>

#### The Chieu Hoi Program

(U) By the GVN adoption of National Reconciliation, the Chieu Hoi Program became part of a truly national policy. The theme of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program was implicit in its name-- those disillusioned with the communist cause and ready to join the Vietnamese majority under the Republic's banner would be welcomed back with "open arms." The Hoi Chanh (rallier to the GVN) was no PW, nor prisoner of any kind; he was issued new identity papers as a full-fledged citizen of the land. The Chieu Hoi Program had tactical as well as social and political objectives, and was designed to induce VC defections in order to weaken the enemy forces through loss of personnel, to produce valuable intelligence information about the enemy to provide valid material for propaganda exploitation, and to cause dissension and create distrust of one another within the enemy ranks.<sup>56</sup>

(S) The Chieu Hoi Program was a vital part of the counter-insurgency effort, particularly military, for returnees were often bearers of intelligence information and usually could be exploited to lower the morale of their former units. Experience showed that Hoi Chanhs defecting on the battlefield were susceptible to interrogation; a good example of this intelligence exploitation took place

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

during Operation CEDAR FALLS (as told by a US advisor): "[A Hoi Chanh] located a very large arms cache that we had missed. We would never have found it. It was in a plowed field with a stake sticking up. He took us right to the stake and said, 'It's under there, and it was. It was a large cache of rifles and ammunition and grenades, a really large cache.'" Many Hoi Chanhs were used successfully to guide friendly troops to VC areas, to uncover significant quantities of VC war materials, and to identify VC agents in GVN-controlled areas. 57

(C) Many returnees took the opportunity to return to GVN control during large military operations, particularly CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY. While the action of the combat situation offered the prospective returnee the opportunity to leave the ranks of the VC, it likewise gave the hardcore VC the chance to escape detection rather than being killed or becoming a PW. As a result, it was difficult to determine which among the enemy were returnees or PWs. As defined by MACV, a Hoi Chanh was an individual who returned voluntarily to GVN control after having supported the VC actively in some form, either militarily or politically. COMUSMACV's guidance was that all individuals who professed a desire to defect from the VC or NVA and return to the GVN would be given the opportunity to do so. However, he pointed out, those VC or NVA personnel who had committed belligerent acts while engaged in combat and who surrendered on the battlefield were to be treated as PWs. Those VC or NVA personnel who professed a desire to return while on the battlefield, and who had not committed conclusively belligerent acts, would be treated as returnees. Possession of a Chieu Hoi safe-conduct pass was an indication of an individual's intention to return through the Chieu Hoi Program, but was not considered as conclusive evidence. In most cases where there was doubt as to the sincerity of a returnee, he was given an opportunity to prove himself by cooperating voluntarily with the friendly forces. 58

(U) The US Mission noted the major factors contributing to the VC coming in under the Chieu Hoi Program:

1) Hardships--physical danger, illness, homesickness, separation from family, lack of food, fatigue, and exposure.

2) Dissension Within the VC Ranks--mistreatment by superior, failure of the VC to carry out promises or make good on their propaganda.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3) Growing Disillusionment--the VC were not winning the war. More and more VC were feeling that they were on the losing side.

4) Reputation of the Chieu Hoi Centers--although VC Propaganda stressed that returnees would be mistreated, insulted, etc., the Chieu Hoi Program continued to demonstrate that returnees were well taken care of and treated with consideration.

While these factors were important contributors to returnee rates, it was clear that the rates were also very closely related to the tempo of US/FW/RVN forces' military operations.<sup>59</sup>

(U) Statistically, the Chieu Hoi returnee rate showed an upward trend since 1965. Of particular interest is the comparison of 1967 figures with those for the same period in 1966:

<u>MONTHS</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Jan	446	406	1,103	2,272
Feb	740	467	2,082	2,917
Mar	588	489	2,336	5,557
Apr	671	532	1,510	2,805
May	429	1,015	1,454	2,624
Jun	432	1,089	1,314	1,970
Jul	534	688	1,178	1,864
Aug	458	1,571	1,257	2,131
Sep	257	1,068	885	1,448
Oct	252	1,211	2,062	1,741
Nov	287	1,482	2,505	960
Dec	<u>333</u>	<u>1,106</u>	<u>2,516</u>	<u>889</u>
TOTAL:	5,417	11,124	20,242	27,178

PAGE 679 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) The total number of Chieu Hoi returnees in 1967 showed an increase of 34 percent over 1966. Of the 1967 total of 27,178, military returnees totalled 17,671, or the equivalent of two enemy divisions. This number also equals approximately one-fifth of the number of VC/NVA killed or captured by the Allied forces in Vietnam (91,595). The political category of returnees totalled 7,886, of whom 4,731 were classified as infrastructure cadre or party organizers. Other civilian elements totalled 1,621. 60

(U) While these figures were encouraging, they were not considered a sign of general weakening of the VC infrastructure or a decline in morale. The vast majority of the returnees were farmers and low-level NLF members forced into service by the VC, while the hard core VC remained loyal to the Front. The low-level cadres and members of the NLF were less committed to VC goals and were more easily swayed by family sentiment and the local population. On the other hand, the mid-level cadres had made a cleaner break with their past environment and were more devoted to VC programs and were more resistant to appeals to family sentiment and personal hardships. The high-level cadres had made the cleanest break with the past and generally rejected all information which did not come from communist sources. While the middle- and upper-level cadres were hard to reach, the development of a research and analysis capability might provide vital points of entry for penetrating the hard-core VC protective armor. 61.

(FOUO) While the total 1967 statistics showed a marked increase over previous years, figures from mid-year on reflected a sharp decrease over previous months. The most important factors that influenced the decline in returnee rates were: the decline in military operations like IRVING, CEDAR FALLS, and JUNCTION CITY which had penetrated traditional VC sanctuaries; the VC development of countermeasures against the Chieu Hoi effort; the heightened political tensions of the Vietnamese elections (the would-be defector trend to sit on the fence awaiting the results of the election); and the seasonal and cyclical conditions, i. e., Tet increase and post-Tet decrease, both in 1966 and 1967. As a result of this rapid decline, the Chieu Hoi Program came under close scrutiny of MACV/JUSPAO/CORDS. A discussion of the program took place in late August at the monthly Commander's Conference in which CORDS presented a plan to increase the returnee rate. In introducing the plan, CORDS stressed the importance of the Chieu Hoi Program saying:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In 1966 all of the friendly Armed Forces in Vietnam together killed or captured 67,406 Viet Cong and NVA. During the same time, 20,242 additional Viet Cong and NVA came in under the Chieu Hoi Program without loss of lives on either side. Of these 20,242 returnees, 13,000 were military VC whose elimination on the battlefield would have cost us more than 3,000 dead.

CORDS then suggested the following remedial actions:

- 1) That new military operations strike traditional VC sanctuaries.
- 2) That all military and civil operations consider a Chieu Hoi effort in the planning stage, and that these operations be vigorously executed.
- 3) That PSYOP receive a higher priority in all operations.
- 4) That the Chieu Hoi concept receive more emphasis in US troop information and education programs (emphasizing the Hoi Chanh as an important aspect of the war effort.).
- 5) That sufficient job opportunities be made available to provide gainful employment for returnees.
- 6) That the Armed Propaganda Team (APT) be sufficiently armed to defend themselves while on operations (missions involving face-to-face contact with VC families to persuade them to return to the GVN and Chieu Hoi Center defense).
- 7) That utilization of Hoi Chanhs in the Kit Carson Program be increased.
- 8) That rewards and inducements be increased to make them more inviting to the VC.
- 9) That staffing of the Chieu Hoi Centers be improved by placing better GVN personnel in staff positions.

The CORDS plan, a part of Project TAKEOFF (see Chapter VI ), offered a firm foundation for future improvement in the Chieu Hoi effort. 62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PWs as Hoi Chanhs

(C) In September the GVN MOD expanded the Chieu Hoi Program to include conversion of PWs to Hoi Chanhs. This extension of the Chieu Hoi and National Reconciliation Programs provided for the transfer of PWs to a Hoi Chanh status, if two conditions were met: (1) that the PW volunteer to change, and (2) that he be recommended by a GVN administrative agency. The release publicity of the GVN regulation caught MACV and Mission officials completely by surprise since there was no forewarning that the GVN planned to implement such a policy action. Thinking that the GVN PW Policy conflicted with the Geneva Convention, SECSTATE requested that the AMEMB urge the GVN Defense Ministry to cease further public releases on the matter until discussion between the US and GVN could be conducted. In answer to SECSTATE's statement, the AMEMB commented that "Although we realize the regulations may appear to conflict with the Geneva Convention, we favor the program generally, and believe it is fully defensible from a humanitarian point of view and desirable from a GVN domestic political point of view. In practical terms, Chieu Hoi status is greatly superior to that of PW." 63

(C) On 19 October SECSTATE indicated that the USG was sympathetic with the intent of the GVN policy, however, it was more concerned that the policy not violate the Geneva Convention. The SECSTATE stated that this conversion could be accomplished without violation of the Geneva Convention as long as it was limited to southern PWs. There were two ways that this could be accomplished--first, to convert the PW to an outright Hoi Chanh and, secondly, to parole the PW into the Chieu Hoi Program and release him when the Chieu Hoi training was finished, with the status of a full Hoi Chanh. In summing up the US position, SECSTATE pointed out the difficulty of explaining any effort that encouraged defection of NVA personnel in light of the Geneva Convention. NVA exclusion from the program would not only be consistent with the Geneva Convention, but would effectively refute the NVN denial that their forces were in RVN. Lastly, the purpose of the Chieu Hoi Program was to enable southerners to return to the GVN. 64

(C) Contrary to SECSTATE's position, the AMEMB stated that the "outright release [of PWs] its preferable to parole." The AMEMB believed that the parole would leave the PW status in doubt and would result in difficulties in future PW exchange negotiations. As to the exclusion of negotiations from the conversion program, the AMEMB commented that:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Although we recognize that there are some possible distinctions between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese PWs, we believe the legal justification for enabling South Vietnamese PWs to enter the Chieu Hoi Program could be applied equally to North Vietnamese.

. . . We have treated North Vietnamese Army personnel surrendering under the Chieu Hoi Program as Hoi Chanhs for years and no one has objected (although it could be argued that the Geneva Convention required them to be treated as PWs). Although the numbers of North Vietnamese soldiers responding have been small (less than 200 this year) in comparison with South Vietnamese, they are nonetheless of psychological importance. If the Chieu Hoi Program is to be extended to South Vietnamese among the PWs, we see no reason to deny it to the North Vietnamese PWs.

The GVN, many of whose officials are northerners, has decided to include the North Vietnamese, and it would be difficult, to say the least, to alter that decision. This issue can raise heated nationalist feeling, as evidenced by Korean President Rhee's breach of our operational control of his troops, on this issue, on the eve of the Korean Armistice.

We believe that including North Vietnamese PWs in the Chieu Hoi Program improves rather than impairs prospects for obtaining the repatriation of US PWs. The principle of voluntary or "non-forcible" repatriation was established in the Korean War, and is respected by the ICRC here (e. g., in the repatriation of seriously sick and wounded). Many of the North Vietnamese PWs will probably refuse repatriation, although most will probably wish to return to their homes and family. If the refusal of many to be repatriated emerges as we are discussing a general exchange of prisoners, it is likely to complicate the negotiations greatly, as in the Korean War. We believe that to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

permit North Vietnamese PWs to enter the Chieu Hoi Program now would largely dispose of this difficulty. The North Vietnamese cannot very well protest against it while they do not admit their personnel are fighting in South Vietnam. Any protest they might make later, if they admit their activities in South Vietnam, would not be very effective.

In light of the above, the AMEMB recommended that SECSTATE support its position: that GVN be informed of the US concern about the possible conflict of their policy with the Geneva Convention; and that, with GVN concurrence, a joint approach be made to the International Committee Red Cross (ICRC) to discuss the concept of out-right release of PWs. <sup>65</sup>

(C) The SECSTATE, on 9 November, accepted the AMEMB recommendation that VC be released outright (not paroled) into the Chieu Hoi Program; however, in regards to the NVA, he stated:

We agree that NVA soldiers may become Hoi Chanhs directly if they have not been PWs. However, we remain unwilling to approve inclusion of NVA PWs in the Chieu Hoi Program. (Assume we are speaking here of regular military forces of North Vietnam). We have the impression that numbers of regular NVA PWs who would want to enter Chieu Hoi would not be large, so excluding them from eligibility for this program, should not amount to much in practice. We do, however, consider this to be an important point of principle and law as well as public relations, in the interest of our PWs in the North, and in relation to Hanoi's fundamental responsibility for this war, and believe we have the obligation to so advise the GVN.

The SECSTATE requested that the AMEMB discuss the subject with the GVN, stating that the USG disapproves inclusion of NVA PWs in the Chieu Hoi Program. <sup>66</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

The Fall Chieu Hoi Campaign

(U) The 1967 fall PSYOP campaign was developed to attack Hoi Chanhs by using the strength, confidence, and buoyancy of the GVN as an appeal, and to revive the mid-year slump in the returnee rate. The political evolution of the RVN, evidenced by the successful presidential and senate elections, and successful village/hamlet elections earlier in the year, provided an excellent opportunity to concentrate on the viability of the GVN in the defection appeals to the VC/NVA. The campaign was broken down into three phases: the first, scheduled for the period 4-30 September, was to stress the progress made toward the development of a democratic representative government as a result of the 3 September elections; the second, scheduled for the period 1-22 October, was the same as the first, but was also to publicize the election of the Lower House of the National Assembly; and the third, scheduled for 22 October - 30 November, was to "wrap up" the campaign in an all-out attempt to convince members of the VC/NVA that the government created by the popular elections was permanent, and that it offered the best opportunity for self-advancement and self esteem. 67

(C) COMUSMACV's guidance for the exploitations of the election results was that "emphasis should be placed on personalities elected to office, but the fact that people in Free Vietnam participated in free elections to select their representatives in a democratic government." This guidance also included the need to point out that the enemy's effort to prevent the people from voting had failed, that the people had registered their desire for democracy and had rejected communism, and that all VC were welcome to rejoin the GVN in a great social revolution under the provisions of the Chieu Hoi/Doan Ketas full citizens of the Republic of Vietnam. 68

Chieu Hoi Problems

(S) The GVN support of the Chieu Hoi Program lacked 100 percent participation on the part of GVN officials, for many believed that too much was being done for the Hoi Chanhs. A characteristic remark was: "They were the enemy once. When they return they were not sent to prison, but were even allowed to return to their families." As DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS pointed out, "Obviously it is difficult to sell, during the very midst of a domestic war, a program

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

involving generosity toward the enemy. Many Province Chiefs are quite simply against Chieu Hoi and will pay lip-service to national policy while dragging their feet at the province level. Other Vietnamese point out the apparent difficulty of maintaining an aggressive attitude in the GVN Armed Forces against the Viet Cong, on the one hand, and a lenient policy toward returnees, on the other. "This a continual process of education is required." Even the GVN commitment to Doan Ket was far from encouraging. By late July promotional efforts had not progressed beyond the scope of the Chieu Hoi Program. This progress reflected, to some degree, the lack of total commitment on the part of the GVN, but increased effort to educate GVN officials to the benefits of the reconciliation was expected to increase support of the program. Another factor that impacted on the program's progress was the GVN preoccupation with the national election campaign. Throughout the initial phase of Doan Ket it was evident that the GVN was particularly careful to avoid any suggestion that the Doan Ket concept implied possible or potential reconciliation with the VC as a political entity. 69

(U) By mid-1967 the following major problems were isolated in connection with the administration of the Chieu Hoi Program:

- 1) Making funds available for construction of Chieu Hoi housing.
- 2) Issuance of ID cards to returnees.
- 3) Vocational training of returnees.
- 4) Use of returnees by military tactical units.
- 5) Development of availability on the part of the regions and provinces to respond rapidly to emergency situations.
- 6) Utilization of returnees to alleviate overall manpower problems in RVN.

Construction of housing facilities was a particularly important point, as several provinces had experienced such high returnee rates that the Chieu Hoi Centers were swamped. Action was taken in response to a requirement for additional temporary quarters to house the returnees, but this met with little success. US representatives attempted to purchase unilaterally construction materials, but this attempt to short

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cut the GVN administrative maze was to no avail. Under the existing system the US was not responsive to emergency conditions, and the GVN to normal efficient functioning. To relieve this problem the US Mission employed an expeditor whose full-time job was to visit the provincial officials to secure rapid approval of necessary construction. Even so, without basic changes in procedures and GVN pressure on local officials, construction of centers, judging from past experience, would not be achieved. The problem of employment was also intensified by the influx of returnees. Failure on the part of the GVN to place returnees in jobs where they could earn a decent living for themselves and their families had seriously affected the Chieu Hoi Program. This was determined by interviews with Hoi Chanhs who stated that many other VC who wished to come in to the GVN hesitated to do so because they had heard that they would experience extreme difficulty in finding a means of earning a living. To rectify this problem CORDS regional directors and provincial representatives helped organize employment programs and systems for job placement for Hoi Chanhs and ex-Hoi Chanhs.<sup>70</sup>

#### KIT CARSON

(C) In April MACV provided guidance for the employment of Chieu Hoi returnees in US military units. US units were given the authority to hire selected Chieu Hoi returnees on a full-time basis to assist in military operations when such individuals, familiar with an area of operation and/or with VC activities, could contribute to the accomplishment of the counterinsurgency mission. The new MACV policy would not only provide dividends of a military nature, but would assist in reducing employment problems described above. The implementation of this policy was called the KIT CARSON Program, and was based on a pilot group of returnees used by the 1st Mar Div beginning in October 1966. The CG III MAF planned to employ 100 additional returnees utilizing 50 per Marine division. It was estimated that a maximum of 450 would be employed by the end of FY68. A more rapid acceleration of the program was limited by the process of locating, observing, screening, and training suitable returnees.<sup>71</sup>

PAGE 687 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### NOVEL IDEAS AND INNOVATIONS

(C) During early 1967, while on a cordon-and-search operation, the 4th Inf Div developed a novel PSYOP device for detecting VC which was called the "Magic Eye." It consisted of two boxes which were equipped with impressive dials, gauges, colored lights, horns, and an antenna. The people in several highland communities were told that the device would reveal anyone who was a VC, and those who confessed to being VC would not be mistreated. When known VC entered the area between the two boxes, a hidden observer activated a switch which caused lights to flash and horns to sound. In one community three VC confessed before reaching the "Magic Eye." 72

(C) Many other novel ideas were considered as possible methods of propagandizing the enemy: these included the use of cigarettes, beer cans, image projection into the clouds, and skywriting as media for spreading propaganda. Even though these ideas remained in the evaluating and testing stages, they nevertheless reflected two desirable qualities necessary to the PSYOP effort--imagination and creativity. A simple, common, ordinary empty beer can, when discarded by the US forces, became a very useful item to the Vietnamese. Aluminum beer cans used by the Vietnamese for drinking cups, candle holders, and as patching material could provide a simple means of propaganda dissemination by the placement of a PSYOP campaign slogan or message on the can. Cigarettes as a PSYOP media offered some potential advantages in that they would be sought by the target audience and would offer evidence of the growing economy of RVN, but no reliable method of air delivery was available to insure effective dissemination. Printing of PSYOP messages on individual cigarettes and packages could be a useful media for hand to hand dissemination of propaganda. Future development of these ideas and many others may prove to be valuable assets to the propaganda effort. 73

(C) In early 1967 there was much discussion in regards to the possible use of artillery, mortars, and naval five-inch guns as a means for dissemination of PSYOP leaflets. The biggest problem in the use of these weapons was the availability of the rounds designed for this purpose: it was expected that these leaflet rounds would be used in Vietnam in a PSYOP supporting role as they became available through supply channels. The leaflet rounds would be employed against known enemy locations which were not accessible to US leaflet dropping

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

aircraft. These rounds would offer increased effectiveness over air delivery because targets could be hit with pinpoint accuracy under all weather conditions, either day or night. 74

(U) In late 1966 COMUSMACV directed that MACPD conduct a study to determine the feasibility of procuring lightweight printing presses for US, FW, and ARVN units (divisions, separate brigades, and regiments) in the field for quick reaction leaflet production. As a result of the study, the MACPD recommended the procurement of a Multilith Offset Duplicator Press, Model 85, which could produce 5,000 leaflets an hour. Included with the proposed printing press packet were press, platemaker, paper cutter, polaroid camera, Vietnamese typewriter, and repair parts. On 18 October 1966 COMUSMACV approved the plan for procurement of the presses. The 85 Press was expected to provide the units in the field with the following advantages: (1) a quick reaction printing capability; (2) economical operation with high quality results; and (3) a versatile duplicating capability; i. e., ability to print type, handwriting, photographs, and drawings. It was expected that these presses would be fully operational by 31 December, thus providing quick reaction printing capability for the timely production of leaflets that could be used against lucrative psychological targets. 75

(C) In September the 9th Inf Div developed a hard-hitting PSYOP plan to be used with the "People Sniffer," a human detection device mounted on a helicopter. Once the enemy elements are located by the "People Sniffer," leaflets were dropped and loudspeakers used to warn the enemy that an air or artillery attack was imminent. Following the offensive action, the enemy was reminded again by leaflets and loudspeakers of the destruction that could be brought upon them, and urged to rally to the GVN. Maximum psychological impact could be gained by locating the enemy in an area he thought was safe, by warning him of the destruction that was going to be brought to bear, and by following up with an appeal for him to rally to avoid future attacks. 76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

(U) While the counterinsurgency effort in RVN was aimed at providing the Vietnamese people with adequate security and separating the VC from their source of support--the people--it was very necessary for the military forces to consider the political, psychological, and economic conditions of the people in order to win their support. One of the most important methods of winning this support from the people was an off-shoot of PSYOP--the military-sponsored civic action programs. The goal of these civic action programs was to enhance the status of the GVN among the people and to develop favorable attitudes toward the RVNAF and Allied forces. The economic and social benefits of these programs were important in that they assisted in the removal of one of the major causes of insurgency--dissatisfaction. While the accomplishments of these programs and projects by Allied armed forces benefited the Vietnamese people materially, they also showed the people that the GVN had interest in their welfare. 77

### Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP)

(U) MILCAP involved the participation of US/FW/RVN forces in useful programs for economic and sociological development for local populations at all levels. The US program included short-term but high-impact projects in the fields of education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, etc. These activities embraced two areas of particular importance--local civil affairs and RD. Civil affairs projects were sponsored by units and commands to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and the people in friendly communities, with particular emphasis on aid toward economic and social betterment of the local population. Civic action in support of RD, on the other hand, encompassed military, political, economic, social, and psychological programs and projects designed to liberate the people from VC control, restore local government, maintain public security, and win the support of the people for the government. These military civic actions were complementary to and in support of the RD program and, therefore, required close coordination and planning with province officials prior to implementation. The participation of the local populace in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

planning and the actual construction was an essential element of the program, for the end result had to reflect a community effort and not solely that of the US/FW or RVN forces. 78

(C) One of the most important activities of MILCAP was the monetary indemnification to Vietnamese civilians for injury, death, or property damage suffered as a result of combat operations of Allied forces. The purpose of this activity was to alleviate the adverse psychological effects and show the people that the Allied armed forces and GVN were concerned about the peoples' welfare and well being. A good example of MILCAP indemnification took place following a 2 March raid by two US aircraft on the village of Lang Vei which resulted in many civilians killed and injured and 150 houses destroyed. Immediate action by the US and GVN military agencies brought extensive relief and support to the disaster area. Assistance in the form of civic action projects included evacuation of seriously wounded, providing food and supplies, and undertaking clean-up and rebuilding operations. These compensatory actions could not repay the Vietnamese people for the loss of their loved ones, but did go a long way toward easing their hardship. 79

(U) On 6 September RVNAF revised its MILCAP plan for the promotion of friendship between the people and the Army. This plan superseded the 1966 MILCAP. This new program provided for financial assistance to RVN citizens who have suffered bodily injury, death or property damage caused by combat operations or activities of RVNAF or FW forces and for herbicide operations. The new plan stressed financial assistance oriented towards assisting victims and not full indemnification or reparation for property damages. The intent of the plan was to improve the efficiency of processing claims and speeding up payment of financial assistance in an effort to show the people of RVN that the Army was sincerely concerned about their welfare and thereby achieving the desired impact on the people. 80

(U) Logistically, the civic action programs were supported by US military/Mission/civilian funds and materials. The greatest portion of this support came from USAID's provincial representatives, who had access to provincial warehouses and supplies, including such items as corrugated roofing, cement, bulgar wheat, and cooking oils. US/FW forces obtained supplies and assistance in development of civic action programs from USAID by coordinating with the USAID provincial representatives in their respective areas. Advisors

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

obtained the same commodities to support RVNAF civic action by establishing the same coordination. Other sources of funds and materials were the international voluntary agencies (e. g., the Catholic Relief Service and the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE)), MACV Action Fund, US/FWMA Forces Civic Action Fund, and Provincial Revolutionary Development Funds. <sup>81</sup>

(C) In August the contents of a CORDS' Hamlet Security Study revealed that US combat units were devoting considerable attention to a variety of civic action projects ranging from MEDCAP to elaborate construction efforts.

These activities have been undertaken in hopes that they will create a favorable impression upon the local population and help win their allegiance, for it is agreed that the support and cooperation of the people are invaluable to efforts to destroy the local guerrilla. While no one questions that the civic action efforts of both US and Vietnamese units have had a salutary impact upon the local population, the hard question must be raised as to what the "opportunity costs" of this good will are and whether the results are worth the investment. Our civic action projects have not generally produced an attitude wherein the local people provide us information which enables us to intercept and destroy the guerrillas.

It was apparent that the military intent of the civic action program had not been completely successful. It was also evident that the military program was encroaching upon CORDS' civic action responsibilities, i. e., civic action in support of RD. <sup>82</sup>

(U) In order to bring civic action responsibilities more in line with activities supported, COMUSMACV directed that CORDS take over the civic action program, effective 1 September, from MACPD. The assumption of this responsibility included the following functions:

1) Exercise staff supervision of the MACV Military Civic Action Program, including preparation of plans and guidance to subordinate commands, coordination with appropriate FWMAF, GVN, and US governmental and private agencies, provision of means, evaluation of performance, and supervision of execution.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2) Monitor the employment of the MACV Civic Action Fund in coordination with appropriate private agencies and the US/FWMA Forces Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund, the MACV Comptroller, and the MACV Dir of PSYOP.

3) Exercise staff supervision of MACV support of the US Mission Leadership and Youth Program.

4) Exercise staff supervision of MACV assistance to the Vietnam Boy Scout Association, in coordination with appropriate US and Vietnamese governmental and private agencies and FWMAF. It was believed that the realignment of the civic action program would result in a better coordinated effort in support of RD as well as military related projects. <sup>83</sup>

(C) In implementing the 1967 MACV Military Civic Action Program, commanders of the component services exercised a wide latitude of initiative. This permitted the development of high impact civic action projects specifically designed to fit the environment in which projects were undertaken, i. e., to provide the kind of help which was needed when and where it was needed. Local civic action programs usually consisted of three elements: (1) Military Civic Action, (2) Community Relations, and, (3) Humanitarian Activities. Projects undertaken through the use of U.S. and ARVN military forces were categorized as Military Civic Action. Wherever possible, the civic action projects were carried out together with Vietnamese forces or governmental agencies. Community Relations projects were those designed to enhance mutual respect and confidence between military forces and the civilian population. Humanitarian Activities involved the direct donation of money, food, clothing, etc., by military and civilian individuals or groups to needy Vietnamese institutions. Distribution was accomplished through military channels. Command emphasis at all echelons contributed to the effectiveness of the 1967 Civic Action Program. It was supported actively and effectively by all services; Army, Navy, Air Force and the Marine Corps; however, the Navy "Seabee" Civic Action teams, especially trained in civic action construction techniques, made a most significant contribution. In December JCS directed the Chief of Naval Operations to deploy seven additional "Seabee" teams to support the Vietnam civic action program, bringing the total of fifteen teams operating in-country. The following is an indication of the magnitude of the civic action accomplishments of US/FWMAF in 1967:<sup>84</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1) Schools

Construction	341	Repair	302
Joint w/RVNAF	433	Repair	306

2) Dispensaries:

Construction	141	Repair	306
Joint w/RVNAF	152	Repair	83

3) Hospitals

Construction	25	Repair	64
Joint w/RVNAF	26	Repair	22

4) Bridges:

Construction	413	Repair	436
Joint w/RVNAF	370	Repair	77

5) Wells

Construction	387	Repair	218
Joint w/RVNAF	389	Repair	36

MEDCAP I and II

(U) In June 1967 the MACV directive governing the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) by US/FW forces was updated and republished. The MEDCAP directive spelled out the following goals:

1) To establish a spirit of mutual respect and cooperation among and between the civilian population, GVN civilian officials, and the RVNAF.

2) To support RD by improving the health environment of RVN civilians through the commitment of military medical resources to the extent permitted by operational requirements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The MEDCAP activities were divided into two categories, MEDCAP I and MEDCAP II. MEDCAP I was care and treatment of RVN civilians by RVNAF medical personnel, while MEDCAP II was care and treatment of RVN civilians by US and FW medical personnel. These medical activities were directed toward improving existing health environment of the RVN population. They were conducted at a level of commitment that permitted regularly scheduled participation, and at a level of professional capability that could be reasonably sustained by local GVN health resources upon eventual withdrawal of the military elements concerned. Although MEDCAP activities were oriented toward the betterment of the welfare of the population, their underlying interest was to gain support for the GVN. Significant attempts by the VC to degrade or sabotage these and other programs attested to their effectiveness and importance. <sup>85</sup>

(U) While many of the MEDCAP activities were much like sick call at US military dispensaries, others involved major surgical operations requiring extensive hospitalization. The story of 13-year-old Huynh Tri Ut of Gia Rai was a good example. An Australian doctor performed an operation for congenital hare lip that allowed the young girl to face the future with a smile. In August COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker intervened in the case of LT Tran Thanh Quang, an ARVN officer whose hand had been amputated following severe injury in the premature explosion of a grenade. As the GVN did not have the capability of replacing LT Quang's hand, nor of training him to use an artificial one, arrangements were made to send him to Walter Reed for necessary medical attention. <sup>86</sup>

(U) Closely allied to MEDCAP was the Military Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP). MILPHAP had the dual objectives of providing direct medical care and health services to Vietnamese civilians and working with Vietnamese medical and health personnel to augment, develop, and expand Vietnamese capabilities in clinical health care and public programs. While the US military provided the medical expertise, USAID and DOD agencies provided the logistical support. Actual funding was provided by the military with USAID reimbursing the military for 50 percent of the actual cost of medical supplies utilized. This arrangement was accomplished under the AID/DOD program realignments, FY67. <sup>87</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Refugees

(U) The term "refugee" was used in RVN to mean a person displaced from his normal home by VC harassment, military action or the threat of military action or terror, and seeking sanctuary in territory controlled by the GVN. These refugees were important to the GVN because they represented a significant percentage of the total population; they had come from rural areas where VC activity had been strongest and they would probably return to these homes or be resettled in areas which were still vulnerable to the VC appeal. By virtue of their numbers, their recognizable identity as a disadvantaged and compassionate group, and most importantly, their family and village ties in contested and VC areas, the refugees presented a regularly and readily exploitable opportunity to increase popular support of the GVN within RVN and abroad.

(U) The GVN's Special Commissariat for Refugees was established in early 1966 to administer to the refugees displaced as a result of the war. The actual program sought to absorb the maximum number of refugees in the shortest possible time into productive society, preferably resettling them securely in the communities whence they came. When these people could not return to native villages, the GVN relocated them in new and secured communities. A corollary aim of this program was to deny the VC use of the rural population as a support and supply base. OCO/MACCORDS' 1967 plan for the refugee program was guided by the following goals:<sup>88</sup>

- 1) To assist 500,000 new refugees.
- 2) To provide training for 3,200 refugees in local province schools.
- 3) To construct 120 new temporary centers.
- 4) To resettle 41,400 families in 200 resettlement hamlets.

During the first eight months the program fell behind planned goals. The refugee program suffered from the usual GVN problems: poor logistic support, unavailability of secure sites for resettlement, operational ineffectiveness at province and district levels, poor coordination between field and central offices, and insufficient GVN

# UNCLASSIFIED

concern and motivation to do something at the province level. Corrective actions taken on the part of MACCORDS was oriented toward:

- 1) Increasing US influence over Vietnamese performance.
- 2) Improving civil/military coordination to assure adequate preparation for refugees generated by US/FW military operations.
- 3) Improving GVN and US program management.
- 4) Increasing the professional and motivational training programs for Special Commissariat field employees.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER VII

### Footnotes

1. DF (S), MACPD, 23 Mar 67, Subj: Summary of PSYOP in Vietnam--1966 (U).
2. DF (C), MACPD, 24 Mar 67, Subj: Input for 1966 MACV History (U).
3. MACV Dir No. 10-1 (U), MACPD, Subj: Organization and Functions-- PSYOP; Pamphlet (U), JUSPAO, Mar 67, Subj: General Briefing Book (U).
4. Ibid.
5. MACV Dir No. 10-12 (U), MACCORDS, 28 May 67, Subj: Organization and Functions for Civil Operators and RD Support; DF (U), MACCORDS-POD, n. c., Subj: CORDS Briefing for CofS (U).
6. Memo (S), MACJO3, 24 Jun 67, Subj: Terms of Reference, PSYOP Subcommittee (U); Memo (S), MACPD, 1 Sep 67, Subj: PSYOP Subcommittee Study (U).
7. Ibid.
8. Memo (U), COMUSMACV to AMEMB, 12 Oct 67, Subj: Psychological Operations in the US Mission (U).
9. Memo (C), AMB to COMUSMACV, 23 Oct 67, Subj: Ibid.
10. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 030412Z Mar 67, Subj: MTO&E for Sixth PSYOP Bn (U).
11. Msg (S), CSAF to TAC, 302005Z Dec 66, Subj: Deployment of AF PSYOP Activities to SVN (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

12. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151405Z Apr 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140840Z Sep 67, Subj: Implementation of MTO&E for 6th PSYOP Bn (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 192335Z Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.
13. Credibilis (U), Vol II, No. 12, 4th PSYOP Gp, 10 Dec 67 (U).
14. Study (S), MACJS, Apr 67, Subj: Assessment of the MACV PSYOP Program (U); Monthly Historical Report (TS), MACJ5, 20 May 67.
15. Ltr (S), DA, 20 Mar 67, Subj: PSYOP Info Newsletter (U).
16. PSYOP Newsletter (U), MACPD, 19 Jun 67; DF (U), MACPD, 14 Jun 67, Subj: Request for Comptroller Comment; Ltr (U), MACPD, 4 Feb 67, Subj: Project Proposed--The Development and Application for Propaganda Analysis System for RVN.
17. Memo (C), MACJO3, 12 Jul 67, Subj: Command/Staff Conference Action Memo No. 67-52 (U).
18. Ltr (S), MACJO2, 27 Jul 67, Subj: R&D of PSYWAR Weapons (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 110148Z Aug 67, Subj: Proposed R&D of PSYWAR Weapons (U); Ltr (U), MACJO2, 21 Aug 67, Subj: Leaflet Pretesting Study (U).
19. Study (S), MACJ5, 18 Nov 67, Subj: Appraisal of MACV Psychological Operations (U).
20. PSYOP Newsletter (U), MACPD, 7 Mar 67.
21. Ibid.
22. Embtel (C), Saigon, 29 Mar 67, Subj: Viet Cong Document on Countermeasures to Chieu Hoi Program (U); Rpt (C), MACCOC, 270844Z Mar 67, Subj: SPHINX.
23. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG II FFORCEV, 311157Z Dec 66, Subj: JUSPAO Guidance on Introduction of US Forces into New Areas (U); Memo (U), JUSPAO, 15 Feb 67, Subj: Analysis of Enemy Propaganda in Vietnam.

# UNCLASSIFIED

24. MACAG Translations of GVN Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi Documents: Msg (MAT), MICH, 15 Dec 66, Subj: Countermeasures Against VC Slandorous Propaganda Themes Directed at US and Allied Armed Forces (U); Pamphlet (U), MICH, n. d., Subj: Why are the US Forces Present in the Western Area?; Captured Pamphlet issued by Propaganda Agency of Cau Mau Province Front Committee, Subj: Rise up with the People to Fight US Aggressors; Rpt (U) MICH, n. d., Subj: Observation of Effects of Campaigns Against Viet Cong Anti-American Propaganda in the Western Region (U); MICH Pamphlet (U), n. c., Subj: Frustrating the VC Anti-American Campaign.
25. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 182205Z Apr 67, Subj: Psychological Operations (U); Washington Post, 9 May 67.
26. JUSPAO Release (U), 14 Apr 67, Subj: Report on Propaganda and Foreign Affairs (trans of VC document).
27. VC/NVA leaflets furnished by CPT W. P. Burrier, advisor to 9th ARVN Abn Bn.
28. Mission Council Memo (S), MACJO3, 10 Feb 67; MONEVALs (S), MACJ341, Jan/Feb/Mar 67; J2 Historical Summary (S), 21 Apr 67.
29. MONEVAL (S), MACJ341, Jan 67.
30. Ltr (S), MACPD, 20 Dec 66, Subj: NVN Leaflet Operations (U).
31. Memo (S), MACPD, 16 Aug 67, Subj: Analysis of the Psychological Vulnerabilities of NVA Soldiers (U).
32. Ltr (C), MACPD, 10 Feb 67, Subj: Leaflets Against NVA Forces in SVN (U).
33. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 171100Z Aug 67, Subj: Air Drops of Fixed Frequency Transistor Receivers over NVN (C); Ltr (C), GEN Westmoreland to General Vien, 8 Feb 67, Subj: Not Stated; Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 31 Mar 67, Subj: Radio Broadcasts (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

34. Ltr (S), MACPD, 20 Dec 66, Subj: NVN Leaflet Operations (U); MACV Command History (TS), 1966.
35. Msg (S), JUSPAO to USIS, 9 Aug 67, Subj: Six-Month Plan (1 Jul - 31 Dec 67) for Leaflet Drops in NVN.
36. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 261404Z Sep 67, Subj: PSYWAR Leaflet Program for NVN (U).
37. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 180046Z Aug 67, Subj: Fact Sheet (U).
38. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 110303Z Oct 67, Subj: PSYOP Against NVN (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 202213Z Sep 67, Subj: Operations Order: FRANTIC GOAT (U).
39. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 19115Z Dec 66, Subj: PSYOP During Truce Period (U).
40. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CG I FFORCEV, 121148Z Jan 67, Subj: PSYWAR Campaign (U); Msg (TS), CG I FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 161050Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.
41. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 251321Z Apr 67, Subj: PSYOP Effort Against NVA Personnel in Cambodia (TS); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 152031Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.
42. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 132211Z Mar 67, Subj: PSYOP Plan for Use Against NVA/VC Forces in Cambodia (TS); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 210152Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.
43. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CGs I & II FFORCEV/SA II & III Corps, 080520Z Apr 67, Subj: PSYWAR Campaign (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CGs I & II FFORCEV/SA II & III Corps, 081055Z May 67, Subj: Ibid.
44. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 090511Z Jun 67, Subj: PSYOP (U).
45. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 171205Z Jun 67, Subj: Ibid.

# UNCLASSIFIED

46. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 311014Z Jul 67, Subj: PSYOP Plan for Use Against NVA/VC Forces in Cambodia (TS).
47. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 291431Z Jul 67, Subj: Reward Program and PSYOP Program Against NVA/VC in Cambodia (TS); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 050017Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051141Z Oct 67, Subj: PSYWAR Campaign; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 031911Z Nov 67, Subj: PSYOP Against NVA/VC Forces in Cambodia (TS).
43. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CGs II FFORCEV & III FFORCEV, SA IV FFORCEV, 7AF, 170205Z Nov 67, Subj: Operations Order: CAMEL PATH (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CGs II FFORCEV & III FFORCEV, SA IV FFORCEV, 7AF, 020720Z Dec 67, Subj: COMUSMACV Operations Order: CAMEL PATH (RCS: MACPD-07) (U).
49. Booklet (U), NLF, Nov 66, Subj: Vietnam Youth; Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 24 Jul 67; Washington Post, 22 Apr 67.
50. DF (U), MACPD, 26 Jun 67, Subj: Status of the Nguyen Van Be PSYOP Campaign.
51. Memo (U), MACPD, 14 Jul 67, Subj: PSYOP Policy Further Exploitation of the Nguyen Van Be Case.
52. Embtel (S), AMEMB Saigon 15753 to SECSTATE, 16 Jan 67, Msg (S), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 291145Z Jan 67, Subj: National Reconciliation Program (U).
53. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 291145A Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.
54. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 18722 to SECSTATE, 23 Feb 67.
55. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 23376 to SECSTATE, 18 Apr 67, Subj: National Reconciliation (U); Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon 23757 to SECSTATE, 23 Apr 67, Subj: Doan Ket (National Reconciliation).

# UNCLASSIFIED

56. Pamphlet (U), JUSPAO, n. d., Subj: New Life for Hoi Chanh.
57. Ltr (U), MACPD, 3 Dec 66, Subj: Civic Action Support of Chieu Hoi Centers; DF (S), MACJ13, 8 Jul 67, Subj: Debriefing of Key Intelligence Personnel (U).
58. MONEVALs (S), MACJ341, Jan/Feb 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 280110Z Feb 67, Subj: Identification of Chieu Hoi Returnees on the Battlefield (U).
59. Fact Sheet (U), OCO, n. d., Subj: Some Salient Facts About the Chieu Hoi Program
60. Rpt (C), AMEMB Saigon to Deputy for CORDS, Subj: Mission Weekly--1-6 Jan 68, dtd 9 Jan 68.
61. Fact Sheet (U), OCO, n. d., Subj: Some Salient Facts About the Chieu Hoi Program; JUSPAO Memo No. 39 (U), 30 Jun 67, Subj: Viet Cong Cadre Vulnerabilities.
62. Briefing (FOUO), MACCORDS, 27 Aug 67, Subj: The Chieu Hoi Program.
63. Memo (U), MACCORDS, 7 Sep 67, Subj: PWs Achieving Hoi Chanh Status; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 28 Sep 67, Subj: PWs in Chie Hoi; Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 2 Oct 67, Subj: PWs in Chieu Hoi.
64. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 19 Oct 67, Subj: PWs in Chieu Hoi.
65. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 28 Oct 67, Subj: PWs in the Chieu Hoi Program.
66. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
67. Policy Guidance No. 43 (U), JUSPAO, 17 Aug 67, Subj: 1967 Chieu Hoi Fall Campaign.
68. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to III MAF and FFORCES, 060123Z Sep 67, Subj: PSYOP Exploitation of Election Results (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

69. Mission Weekly Report (S), Saigon, 10 Jan 67; Briefing (S), MACCORDS, 29 Aug 67; SECDEF Briefing, OASD/SA, 22 Jul 67.
70. Public Administration Bulletin Booklet (U), USAID, 1 May 67; Memo (C); OCO, Apr 67, Subj: Summary of Proceedings of OCO Planning Conference (U).
71. Memo (C), COMUSMACV to Dir OCO, 8 May 67, Subj: KIT CARSON Program (U); Ltr (U), MACJ264, 29 Apr 67, Subj: Chieu Hoi Returnees in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations (C).
72. Msg (C), MACPD to VMAC, 291715Z Apr 67, Subj: PSYOP.
73. Msg (C), MACPD, 29 Apr 67, Subj: PSYOP; Ltr w/1st Ind (U), US Coast Guard, 10 Aug 67, Subj: Use of Beer and Soft Drink Cans as Propaganda Vehicles; Ltr (U) MACPD, 17 Sep 67, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), USARV to COMUSMACV, 19 Aug 67, Subj: PSYWAR Cigarettes (U); Ltr (C), MACPD, 5 Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.; DF (C), MACPD, 18 Sep 67, Subj: Image Projection (U).
74. PSYOP Newsletter (U), MACPD, 4 May 67; DF (C), MACPD, 13 Oct 67, Subj: Artillery Leaflet Rounds (U).
75. DF (U), MACPD, 11 Oct 66, Subj: Provision of PSYOP Printing Equipment to Divisions and Separate Brigades (U); Memo (U), MACPD, 23 Jun 67, Subj: Advantages and Disadvantages of Quick Reaction Press, Model 85 (U); Memo (U), MACPD, 5 Oct 67, Subj: Quick Reaction Press Set Project (Project 85) (U); PSYOP Newsletter (U), MACPD, 12 Oct 67.
76. Monthly Historical Report (C), MACPD, 12 Sep 67.
77. MACPD Briefing to Newcomers (U), 1967.
78. MACV Dir No. 515-2 (U), MACPD, 30 Apr 66, Subj: Military Civic Action; MACV Dir No. 515-3 (U), MACJ33, 6 Jun 66, Subj: Civil Affairs.

# UNCLASSIFIED

79. DF (C), MACPD, 7 Mar 67, Subj: Lang Vei Incident (U).
80. Historical Report (TS), MACJ341, 19 Nov 67.
81. Ltr (U), MACPD, 27 Jan 67, Subj: Supplies for US/RVN/FWMA Forces Military Civic Action.
82. Study (C), MACCORDS-PP, Aug 67, Subj: Hamlet Security Study (U).
83. DF (U), J3 to CofS, 30 Aug 67, Subj: Transfer of Civic Action Program (U).
84. US Naval Forces, Vietnam, Monthly Historical Supplement (C), December 1967; MACCORDS-NLD, 1967 Year-end Civic Action Wrap-UP (U).
85. MACV Dir No. 40-9, MACMD, 22 Jun 67, Subj: Medical Civic Action Program (U).
86. Pamphlet (U), JUSPAO, n.d., Subj: Catalogue of Leaflets and Posters; Ltr (U), COMUSMACV (MACMD) to AMB Bunker, 9 Aug 67.
87. MACV Dir No. 2-67, MACMD, 21 Jun 67, Subj: Military Provincial Health Assistance Program; Memorandum (U), Memorandum of Understanding Between DA and USAID, 25 May 67.
88. Booklet (U), OCO, 29 Jun 67, Subj: Refugee Program.

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE NOT USED

PAGE 706 OF 1340 PAGES  
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER VIII

LOGISTICS

REFINING THE LOGISTICAL BASE

The Situation at Year's Beginning

From the point of view of logistics, it is impossible to divide the country [Vietnam] into the normal Combat Zones and Communications Zones: The entire area is a combat zone and many logistic installations normally sited in safe rear areas are "in the front line."<sup>1</sup>

(S) In retrospect, the logistical activities of 1966 have been aptly described as "broadening the logistical base." With the increase in the US/FWMA forces there were demands for increased logistical support activities: a substantial increase in airlift and sealift capabilities, expansion of ports (sea and air), construction of housing for troops, and construction of storage and maintenance facilities. During 1966 the increase in deep draft ports from two to five and jet-capable airfields from three to eight substantially augmented the logistical freight throughput capability in Vietnam; the monthly throughput was increased from 375,000 STON in December 1965 to 870,000 STON in December 1966. The SEA Airlift System supported passenger movement at the rate of 125,000 passengers per month and cargo at 47,000 STON per month. The expansion of air passenger service through the Military Airlift Command (MAC) from CONUS to RVN was to be increased substantially with the opening of additional air passenger terminals in January 1967. During 1966 ground LOCs had left much to be desired, with little improvement in railroad and highway systems, but ground-work had been laid for extensive renovation and restoration of these LOCs in 1967. The innovation of the Common Supply System and the "Red Ball Express" played important roles in the Command's supply and maintenance fields, and offered even greater prospects for success in 1967. The overall logistical posture in 1966 adequately supported the mission demands.<sup>2</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In 1967 plans to augment US forces and to increase the intensity of operations, and the continued requirement for heavy use of munitions, aircraft fuel, and construction materials, among others, were expected to place massive demands on the logistical system. These demands were to be met by the expanded and improved ports (water and air), storage complexes, and extensive improvement and upgrading of other LOCs (railroads and highways). The improvement of these facilities was to be complemented by refinement of the existing supply system. Lower stockage objectives were expected to reduce storage requirements as the resupply pipeline became more effective. As customer fill rates improved, backlog supply actions were reduced. These logistical activities were expected to reach a logistical support plateau, such that the supply system would be able to handle adequately the consumer demands.<sup>3</sup>

## Organization and Responsibilities

(U) Logistical support in RVN was based on the major logistics facilities that had been established with the available air, land, and sea transportation. Logistics support of US forces was organized essentially on an area basis, as prescribed in JCS Publication 3 and implemented by MACV directives. US forces in I CTZ were provided common item support by NAVFORV, the Navy Supply Activity (NAVSUPPACT) Da Nang being established as the wholesale supplier of common item supplies for units located in I CTZ. US forces located in II, III, and IV CTZs were provided common item support by USARV. The 1st Log Crnd, with headquarters in Saigon, was charged with the Army's logistical responsibility, and exercised command over three major support commands at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. The support commands and the NAVSUPPACT Da Nang operated major depot complexes to provide wholesale organizational support level supplies, maintenance, and services in its assigned area. In addition, group level support had been established at key locations to provide retail or direct support level supplies, maintenance, and services in areas of major troop population. Support for items limited to units of a particular Service was provided by the Service involved. MACV Directives 10-1, 405-1, and 405-3 assigned and delineated logistical tasks in RVN as follows:

~~SECRET~~

COMNAVFORV: For US military logistics support operations at ports and beaches in I CTZ; for common item support, base development, (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF) and real estate services to US/FWMA forces in I CTZ; and for Navy peculiar support to US Navy and Coast Guard units throughout RVN.

CG USARV: For common supply and common service support to all US/FWMA forces in II, III, and IV CTZs; for base development (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF) and real estate services in these CTZs; and for Army peculiar supply support throughout RVN.

Cmdr 7AF: For service peculiar support throughout RVN and base development and real estate services at air bases where USAF had primary responsibility.

CG III MAF: For service peculiar support throughout RVN.

(U) The US provided combat service support to FWMAF in accordance with bilateral arrangements. The responsibility for providing such support rested with the US component commanders in whose area these forces were operating. MACV Directive 701-9 established logistical responsibility for NAVFORV and USARV for support of US/FW forces as defined and outlined below:

Common Items: Class I, III, and selected II and IV items as agreed upon by the component commanders concerned as common items.

Service Peculiar: All items required by a Service not agreed upon by the component commanders concerned as common items.

Redeployment: Movement of a unit from its original deployed area; this included units diverted prior to arrival in-country as well as the units moved within country. Procedures were established for support of US/FW forces which were redeployed between NAVFORV and USARV support areas on permanent basis or when redeployment was for contingency operations and the unit was to be returned to home base after operations are terminated.<sup>4</sup>

(S) After the 1966 reorganization of the RVN supply support system, the necessity for refinement and improvement continued. On 12 December 1966 SECDEF had provided specific guidance for expansion and operation of the RVN system: to add immediately a full range of medical supplies to the system and expand the system into I CTZ, then

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

under the Navy, not later than 1 April 1967, the Navy was to continue to be responsible for the development and maintenance of a common supply support capability in I CTZ until the assignment could be shifted to the Army, while the USMC was to phase out its own pipeline and shift to Navy support. Any item coded for integrated management and depot-stocked in RVN would be incorporated in the common supply system by 30 September; a centralized inventory balance file would provide a capability to requisition within RVN; depots would retain the capability to perform stock control; common supply system stocks would be available to support all forces of any Service at any location; and issues to and from Army depots and the Navy depot in the I CTZ would be reimbursable (cross-Service funded), with subsequent issues on a free-issue basis (common Service funding).<sup>5</sup>

(S) On 8 February 1967 SECARMY submitted a revised plan to SECDEF incorporating the new guidance:

- 1) The Army was eliminating Okinawa as the principal supply support base for RVN. Okinawa's supply support mission would be limited to support of the major overhaul and repair mission which was currently assigned to Okinawa; support of US forces located on or staging through Okinawa; storage of USARPAC prepositioned reserve materials; and support of RVN depots in those items for which direct support from CONUS was not then feasible.
- 2) Stockage on Okinawa for the support of RVN would be eliminated by attrition, except for stocks of reserve ammunition, certain construction material, medical stocks, and items under repair for RVN in the Okinawa maintenance program. The construction stocks consisted of selected items required within a 45-day call forward time by RVN for specific projects.
- 3) Appropriate depot assets on Okinawa were to be incorporated into the records of CONUS supply sources.
- 4) In order to maximize direct support of RVN from CONUS, the 14th Inventory Control Center (ICC) was to be provided additional capability to enable it eventually to perform within RVN all functions essential to effective supply management. It was noted that when the 14th ICC in RVN had been augmented and had achieved, tested, and checked out its full supply-management capability, it would interface directly with CONUS supply sources through the Automatic Addressing

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

System (AAS). Until that time, it would continue to route requisitions through the 2d Log Cmd on Okinawa, which would provide essential cataloging, identification, maintenance of status information, and other services as required in support of the 14th ICC. The Aviation Material Management Center (AMMC), which controlled and managed aviation items in RVN, would be retained as a separate requisitioner and would not be placed under the 14th ICC. The AMMC, with its current personnel authorization and two UNIVAC 1005 card-processors, was capable of effectively performing minimum essential supply management functions. Additional functions required for full supply management capability would be performed in support of the AMMC by the 14th ICC when augmented. On 6 March SECDEF approved the proposed Army logistics system with certain modifications.<sup>6</sup>

(C) In early July CINCPACFLT recommended that the shifting of common supply support in I CTZ be reevaluated; CINCPACFLT believed that the DA plan would impose disruptions and a potential lessening of effectiveness on the existing supply systems. On the other hand, COMUSMACV believed that the Navy system would provide the most responsive short-term logistic support for I CTZ, but not the most economical nor responsive long-term support system. After a review of the CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV recommendations, CINCPAC felt that "the I CTZ is being served responsibly by the Navy supply system in an increasingly expanding and efficient manner." CINCPAC went on to point out that the Navy was geared to support the Marines, the principal force in the I CTZ, and that there was no tangible evidence that the extension of the DA Common Supply System to the I CTZ would provide a more economical and responsive system in the long run. CINCPAC also had serious doubt that transshipment through Okinawa or any other offshore base could provide better supply service to RVN without substantial buildup of facilities and personnel. "Troop strengths in I CTZ are at levels which produce volume requirements which can be satisfied most economically by ocean shipping direct from CONUS. Navy requisition channels flow directly from NAVSUPPACT Da Nang to CONUS. . . . Supply service to Da Nang using the Navy system has been highly responsive. The result has been a high percentage of fill by required delivery dates. Changeover to DA Common Supply System would, at best, involve a period of dislocation and attendant loss of efficiency which would inevitably hazard the capability of our troops to fight." Based on this evaluation, CINCPAC recommended to JCS that the DA Common Supply System not be extended to the I CTZ and the SECDEF decision relating to Common Supply in I CTZ

PAGE 711 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

be reconsidered. However, at year's end no such reversal had been made.<sup>7</sup>

(S) In early November 1967, J4 completed a staff study on support of Army units in southern I CTZ. The study was initiated by MACV at the request of CINCPACFLT to determine the feasibility of providing additional military spaces to NAVFORV to fulfill logistic support requirements in I CTZ. This request was based on the proposed movement of an additional US Army division (-) into souther I CTZ. At the time of the request NAVFORV had responsibility for support of the Americal Division and the Army advisors in I CTZ.

(S) In the discussion of the CINCPACFLT proposal, J4 pointed out that the transfer of component ceilings to NAVFORV from 7AF and USARV was not considered feasible due to the immediate nature of the requirement and the time required to obtain the necessary concurrences and approvals. Another possible course of action was to increase the civilianization of MACV components in order to provide the necessary military spaces. This was not considered feasible because of the ceiling and fund limitations of Program 5.

(S) Since it was evident that NAVFORV could not support the added logistics support requirement within its existing structure, the only alternative left was for USARV to assume support responsibility. J4 believed that USARV had sufficient capability to meet the requirement in southern I CTZ without additional troops. The study with its conclusions was forwarded to USARV, III MAF, and NAVFORV on 14 November for comments and recommendations.<sup>8</sup>

(S) III MAF and NAVFORV nonconcurred with the J4 study; both recommended retention of the logistic support responsibility for southern I CTZ by NAVFORV. NAVFORV concluded that, "the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of Navy support throughout I CTZ are a matter of record. The NSA Da Nang organization provides a permanent support system which can be readily augmented to support increased forces . . . [therefore] realignment of logistics responsibilities is neither required nor desirable."<sup>9</sup>

(S) For various reasons, primarily the emphasis on COMUSMACV's MACONOMY Program, 1967 drew to a close without implementation or reevaluation of the SECDEF approved extension of the DA Common Supply System to the I CTZ.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Reduction of Combat Support Troops

(S) In May SECDEF questioned the ratio of combat support troops to combat troops, noting:

I believe we may have too low a ratio of combat to support personnel in Army SVN strength. USARV's 1st Logistical Command will total approximately 70,000 at end of Program 4. Contractors (excluding RMK-BRJ) add the equivalent of 40,000 Army personnel, and they are still growing. Local national and off-shore personnel add further support. In addition, support is provided by aviation supply/maintenance units, construction battalions and the combat service support personnel organic to divisions and separate brigades.

The programmed 1st Logistical Command strength of 70,000 exceeds the 66,000 in all approved Army maneuver battalions. Program 4 Army maneuver battalions, combat support battalions, organic and non-organic aviation units, division and brigade staffs, advisors, special forces, and construction battalions account for only 165,000 or 50 pct of the Army's 322,000 force. While I appreciate that the entire balance of 157,000 cannot be categorized as combat service support, a very high percentage of them probably should be.

He directed that a study be conducted to validate current combat support staffing in RVN. The study was to include a unit-by-unit, function-by-function review of 1st Log Cmd staffing versus Program 4 tasks, to determine whether all units in-country, or programmed, were required in light of the sharply improved logistic posture. SECDEF deferred approval for deployment of any units to 1st Log Cmd with closure dates after August 1967 and required that the review arrive at OSD not later than 1 July.<sup>10</sup>

(S) On 13 June SECDEF recommended replacing US military personnel performing logistical support functions in RVN by Vietnamese. This action would free US troops for combat duties and train Vietnamese in skills that they would need to help build their nation. It was SECDEF's

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

opinion that this should be considered as a part of the Combat Service Support Staffing Study and that the analysis include each essential combat service support function to determine the extent to which it could be performed by RVN civilian personnel. SECDEF pointed out that while organic US military service support capability was obviously required in an active combat theater, the requirement in the permanent logistical enclaves such as Saigon or Da Nang should be less than at forward locations such as AnKhe or Dong Ha.

I also doubt we have adequately explored the use of "Type B" units which are a mix of military cadres and civilian workers. A preliminary review indicated that there are units with "Type B" TC&E's. Converting these units to "Type B" would cut military personnel by over 25,000 men; this might provide another combat division.

The Army's experience with the Korean Service Corps (KSC) should be carefully considered as it may provide a useful precedent. . . . A Vietnamese Service Corps could be the basic structure on which to expand Vietnamese employment and increase the Vietnamese effective contribution to the war.

On 20 June, DA, in a restatement of the SECDEF's memorandum, requested that CINCUSARPAC expand the analysis of the 1st Log Cmd combat service support staffing to determine the feasibility of using Vietnamese manpower to replace US personnel. This assessment was to include the availability of Vietnamese manpower and the time phasing needed for integration into 1st Log Cmd units. 11

(S) In June COMUSMACV directed a MACJ4 study to determine the feasibility of reducing US combat service support personnel in RVN. The study concluded that reduction and replacement of US personnel were possible in contract construction, transportation, port operations, and depot operations. A further reduction might be possible by having KSC take over US logistical support activities in those areas. Development of a Vietnamese Service Corps was considered feasible as an augmentation and/or a substitution for US units. This solution offered long-range potential for reduction, but depended upon training and manpower availability of Vietnamese civilian personnel. The conclusions and recommendations of this study reported to SECDEF possible methods for retaining over 19,000 US military spaces in RVN by substitution of civilian hire, contractor, and ROK military effort for US effort.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

These substitutions were primarily in the area of combat service support and would affect all components. Five possible actions were proposed:

Substitution of civilian hire for US military spaces in Army units (Type B) - - - - -	8,000
Increase civilian hire within Navy and Marine Corps units - - - - -	700
Increase the construction effort being accomplished by contract - - - - -	5,700
Substitution of ROK military units for effort being provided by US units supporting ROK forces - - - - -	3,017
Substitution of ROK military construction units for US military engineer units - - - - -	2,550
TOTAL:	19,967

These reductions were considered possible but were dependent upon the ability to recruit, train, and equip the substitute force. As the accomplishment of these tasks would necessitate an appreciable delay, implementation of these methods should be gradual and completion of substitution could involve up to one year.<sup>12</sup>

(S) On 5 October SECDEF approved the Program 5 force package which included a schedule for integration of civilians into the US logistics structure in RVN. The civilianization schedule in Program 5 included the substitution of 12,545 military spaces by retention of civilian contracts at a higher level than originally programmed and the direct hire of civilians by military units. The contractor substitution phasing depended upon the receipt of funds to finance the increased contract posture; however, if these funds were not forthcoming, the troop reduction would be deferred until such time as the funds became available and the contractor could initiate on-site construction. Since both the retention of the contractor force and direct hire of the civilians depended on funding, COMUSMACV directed, on 8 November, that components take action to obtain necessary funds through Service channels.<sup>13</sup>

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~REVIEWED BY: [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE: [REDACTED]~~  
~~DECLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]~~

### Reduction of Excess Supplies

(C) As a result of the accumulation of excess stock COMUSMACV, in November, requested that a high level team of supply management experts be sent to RVN to make an "on-the-spot" appraisal of supply problems. In a discussion of the problem, COMUSMACV pointed out that:

MACV has been aware for some time that there are excess supplies of many categories in South Vietnam. To appreciate the reason for development of

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per  
83.06.24

PAGE 717 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

excesses, and other imbalances which may be equally or more serious, it is necessary to review briefly the buildup over the past two and one-half years, the time from the late winter of 1965 when the decision was made to increase substantial U.S. forces in SVN. At that time there was one deep water port, Saigon, one small U.S. depot serving SVN and one all weather jet airfield. In the eighteen-fold increase of forces since the winter of 1965, a military augmentation to Saigon Port, called Newport, has been added and three other deep water ports, with supporting depot complexes, have been built. A logistics base capable of supporting more than half a million US troops, plus furnishing partial support of 1-1/2 times that many Vietnamese and Allied Forces, has been built from the ground up.

Operational requirements could not await the completion of ports, the construction and establishment of a depot system and the orderly requisitioning and flow of supplies. Emergency measures were needed and were taken. Priority here, and in CONUS, was given to insuring that combat troops had equipment and supplies in sufficient quantity and that their equipment was in a high state of readiness. Among the emergency measures used extensively was the "push package" where supplies were shipped into the theater based on anticipated, rather than known requirements. Documentation on some such shipments was lost.

Facilities to receive supplies were grossly inadequate to meet the flood of material reaching SVN. The Port of Saigon became clogged. Ships loaded with essential supplies waited as long as 100 days before off-loading could begin. This resulted in a great excess of supplies and equipment in the pipeline. On the ground the Saigon Depot Unit initiated operations in facilities that were described as a tent camp, an unused Fish Market building, three old Japanese warehouses with dirt floors and an empty apartment building which was used for a headquarters. By December 1965 supplies were being received at an average of 35,000 short tons per month, increasing to 61,000 short tons per month by March 1966.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Record keeping was performed manually (using many indigenous personnel who required on-the-job training) until the 14th ICC became operational in October 1966. Records of receipts and inventories under such conditions were inaccurate or lost. Duplicate quantities were requisitioned because quantities on hand were not recorded on stock records. Emergency requisitions were submitted for items although the same item might be in a ship awaiting discharge.

(C) The problem of excess supplies had also been compounded by the requirement for units deploying from CONUS to deploy with installation and housekeeping equipment, extra PLL and ASL items, and additional basic loads since supply and base facilities were inadequate in RVN. The lack of military personnel experienced in managing the more complex functions (particularly the wholesale aspects) of the modern supply system had detrimental effects on supply management in RVN, as well.

(C) With the logistical base well on the road to completion, management emphasis in 1967 was directed toward refining the system and making it more efficient and effective. Despite the management action on the part of MACV and USARV and assistance from USARPAC and DA, the problem continued. In fact, as supply records and procedures improved, the quantity of identified excesses had grown. In light of this, COMUSMACV stated that it was "in the overall interest of the Department of Defense to reduce the problem to manageable proportions as rapidly as possible, both to reduce the overall investment and to prevent deterioration of supplies."<sup>18</sup>

(U) In late November SECDEF directed action toward resolution of the excess materiel problem in a memorandum:<sup>19</sup>

The speed and magnitude of the Vietnam buildup has unavoidably resulted in the accumulation of some imbalances and excess in inventories. We will begin immediately to redistribute these excesses so as to assure their application against approved military requirements elsewhere in the military supply system. By doing so we can avoid the inefficiencies and waste experienced in the past. To this end the following steps will be taken effective at once:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

First, the Secretary of Army is designated executive agent for the Department of Defense to assure that SEA excess materiel of all services is promptly identified and made available for redistribution. A general officer will be designated the project coordinator.

Second, the Commander-In-Chief Pacific will establish a special agency to: (1) maintain an inventory of excess materiel identified in the Pacific Area, (2) supervise redistribution or disposal of such materiel within his area, (3) report the availability of materiel which cannot be utilized in the Pacific Area to other defense activities, in accordance with procedures developed by the project coordinator. This agency will be known as the "Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency."

By 1 February 1968, I desire to receive the Secretary of Army's plan for the implementation of the project and CINCPAC's plan for the organization and operation of the Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency. Each month thereafter I would like to receive a report on the excess materiel identified and on the reutilization accomplished.

(U) In compliance with the SECDEF guidance, CINCPAC, in coordination with component commanders, began developing a plan for the organization, location, and operation of the PACOM Agency. Of prime concern was the early identification of materiel in long supply, the intra and inter-service redistribution within both SEASIA and other PACOM areas, and the reporting and disposition of materiel which could not be utilized in the PACOM area.<sup>20</sup>

## DOD/AID Realignment

(U) The Military Assistance and AID programs in RVN had ceased to be merely components of foreign aid directed toward the orderly improvement of the RVNAF and the development of a sound economy. They had, in reality, become supply lines supporting a full-scale war. Many of the AID programs and services had become more closely

# UNCLASSIFIED

allied with the military effort, and in order to bring these programs more in line with the activity supported, DOD/AID developed plans for a realignment under the management of DOD. In November 1966 SEC-DEF had directed that DOD assume programming, budgeting, and funding responsibilities for a number of these programs and services. Under this planned realignment the following programs and services were to be assumed or supported by DOD:

- 1) Integration of AID cargo in military transportation system.
- 2) Utilization of the DOD logistics system for medical support for AID.
- 3) Conduct of a cadastral survey of An Giang Province in connection with the land reform program.
- 4) Administration of the Saigon Port.
- 5) Construction of new fish wharf in Saigon to replace wharf taken over by US military.
- 6) Medical supply for other than military civic action teams.
- 7) Military affairs in RD.
- 8) Air Traffic Control.
- 9) Railway sabotage replacement.
- 10) Highway maintenance.
- 11) Assistance to refugees.
- 12) Electrification.
- 13) Supply of medicines for Military Medical Civic Action Teams (MEDCAP).
- 14) Commodity support for GVN police.
- 15) Ports and waterways.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## 16) GVN TV.

These functions were to be funded and implemented in accordance with DOD procedures and channels for support of military operations in SEASIA. USAID was to be reimbursed the costs incurred from 1 July 1966 at the local (RVN) level in accordance with initial DOD components/USAID agreement. Defense components were directed to take action to implement the assignments (including funding) and to amend their 3 October 1966 budget submission reflecting the increased financial requirements for FY67 and FY68. SECDEF estimated the total funding required to support these programs and services would be \$127.2 million for FY67 and \$132.1 million for FY68. Items 1-3 above were areas in which DOD systems/facilities would be used to support AID programs but AID would reimburse DOD. Items 4-10 were areas in which DOD would assume responsibility utilizing DOD resources. Items 11-15 were areas in which DOD/AID would share program responsibility, but for which USAID would have responsibility for the overall program supervision and accomplishment.<sup>21</sup>

(U) In answer to CINCPAC's request for a statement of the impact of the realignment program, COMUSMACV noted that there would be a requirement for 2,305 additional spaces above the SECDEF approved force level. Assuming of responsibility for a fish wharf, warehouse for MEDCAP, and road improvements would require an adjustment in construction priorities and an increase in the piaster limitations by 1.9 billion piasters. As there were no accounting facilities or reporting capability in RVN which could be responsive to the reimbursement actions resulting from the programmed realignments, reimbursement should take place out-of-country.<sup>22</sup>

(U) On 14 January 1967 COMUSMACV established a task force comprised of USAID and MACV representatives to analyze the implications of each project proposed for DOD funding. Based on the findings of the task force, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC on 26 February that MACV be delegated directive authority for both programs in order to fulfill DOD responsibilities. Under this concept COMUSMACV would be a single DOD control in RVN for program approval and directions, but funding and fiscal accounting would remain a Service responsibility. CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV that directive authority should be a MACV responsibility and that the management of the program should be vested in joint channels because of the obvious impact on military operations.<sup>23</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) At a DA/AID/OSD/JCS/PACOM/MACV/USARV meeting held in Washington from 20-24 March, COMUSMACV/CINCPAC's request for directive authority was turned down, which meant that the final decision would be referred to the JCS or possibly the SECDEF. MACV maintained that without true directive authority, projects like MEDCAP and possibly highway and railroad maintenance, which required extensive and detailed coordination and reprogramming, would stall out and fail. No doubt existed that authority was required and that it should be vested in a control DOD agency. The relationship between MACV operations and these projects was so closely allied that to attempt to manage them under other than central control would obviate any meaningful contribution to the goals of the Combined Campaign Plan, and would adversely affect the conduct of the war.<sup>24</sup>

(U) On 11 April JCS rejected the action of the joint meeting and delegated "program directive and review authority," including "reprogramming," to CINCPAC, who in turn, subdelegated the same authority to COMUSMACV.<sup>25</sup>

~~SECRET~~

## SUPPLY

### Class I Supply

#### General

(U) During 1967 the Class I situation was adequate to support the US/FW forces. Although supply levels fluctuated periodically, overall stocks were consistent with stockage objectives and were within normal operating limits. In February with a more reliable supply pipeline in operation, Class I stockage objectives were reduced from 105 days to 70 days. By February there had been a noticeable improvement; however, a major Class I problem concerning the Army Meal Combat Individual (MCI) became apparent. USARV's assets fell far below the stockage objective as a result of increased tactical operations, including Operations JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR FALLS. Likewise, NAVFORV experienced a drastic drain on their MCI stocks as a result of Marine operations in the DMZ (away from base areas) and the unforeseen requirement to support TF OREGON deployed in I CTZ. Although shipments were received from CONUS, USARJ and EUSA, they did not improve the stockage position. Continued receipts were offset by continued draw-downs in March and April. Improvement was steady in May and by the end of the month the stockage objective was finally reached.

(U) The overall Class I supply posture was enhanced by available refrigerated storage facilities. In early 1967 refrigerated storage in RVN exceeded requirements; however, about one-third of this was temporary floating storage which was to be released upon construction of permanent storage facilities. Installation of refrigeration continued to keep ahead of forecast requirements through 1967, but the continued increase in troop strength narrowed the gap between storage availability and requirements.

(U) In May a schedule was established for a reefer ship from CONUS to arrive at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon every eight days. This improved the usage of available refrigerated storage space, as well as the supply of perishable components.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(C) Significant progress was made during 1967 toward converting all non-appropriated fund (MAF) messes to field ration messes. NAVFORV and SA I CTZ completed conversion by the end of the year. USARV had converted 24 of 54 NAF messes, affecting 9,342 persons. The remaining 30, affecting 8,492 persons, were scheduled for conversion by the end of March 1968. 7AF was scheduled to convert as facilities became available. The necessary construction was planned for completion by 31 March 1968. <sup>26</sup>

PAGE 725 OF 1340 PAGES

~~REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE [REDACTED]~~  
~~BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

-----830624-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4) Establishment by the ROKG of effective quality and sanitary controls over food processing and canning companies.
- 5) That cost to the US would be no more than for the equivalent US ration,

CINCPAC emphasized that the Korean ration would be a substitute for one US operational meal (MCI) and would not be a special Korean dietary supplement. The procurement of the ration would be contracted by the Korean Procurement Agency with the Korea General Food Company. The ration would be transferred by the US to RVN and the responsibility for receipt, storage, and issue in RVN would belong to the ROKFV. CINCPAC observed that provision of the special dietary items to which the Korean was accustomed was strictly for morale purposes.<sup>29</sup>

(S) On 15 March SECDEF informed the ROK MOD that the US did not want to purchase the Korean C-ration with US dollars which would cause gold outflow but would consider some kind of exchange agreement. On 28 March CINCPAC requested that the AMEMB Korea make initial contact to work out an exchange agreement.

(S) On 3 April, in compliance with a CINCPAC request, COMUSMACV conducted a cost assessment of the Korean combat ration computed at the rate of one meal per day per man. COMUSMACV computed the minimum annual cost in the neighborhood of \$5.8 million, but cautioned that the actual cost might be higher, depending on an increase in troop strength and troop acceptance of the ration. He indicated that a contract for the sale of scrap metal had been awarded to the General Pipe and Supply Company, as agent of the ROKG, in January 1967 for the sale of 25,000 STON at \$24 per STON; this could be increased to 38,000 STON which would result in \$1.01 million to help offset the cost of the combat ration. COMUSMACV was favorably disposed toward the Korean combat ration because it would provide a nutritious diet, as well as satisfy the individual ROK soldier's tastes. It was pointed out that the US MCI ration would sustain the ROK soldier indefinitely, but the soldier would not accept the MCI ration for extended periods. Initially, the US MCI

~~REVISIONS~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army BY JAG 808  
830624

PAGE 726 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ration was accepted by the newly-assigned ROK soldier, but later it was rejected and an abnormally high wastage of MCI resulted. 31

(S) On 4 April, COMUSKOREA indicated that the Defense and State Departments seemed exclusively oriented toward gold flow considerations. In this regard, COMUSKOREA pointed out, after conducting cost analysis, that the complete combat ration cost was less than the kimchi supplement. In light of these facts and the Natick Laboratory report which indicated the quality of the ration to be generally good, COMUSKOREA recommended action be undertaken to procure the ration for the ROKFV. On 6 April DOD agreed to work out an agreement with the ROKG to meet the Korean request that the ROKFV be supplied with the kimchi ration without adversely affecting the US balance of payments. DOD made no decision whether to purchase a full C-ration package or a kimchi supplement at that time. CINCPAC noted that the logistic annex of the current military working arrangement between COMUSMACV and COMROKRV provided that purchase of special dietary foods and any other items in excess of the authorized US ration value would be the responsibility of ROKFV at no cost to the USG. Thus the US would be responsible for funding the ration substitute and not a kimchi supplement to the normal ration issue. AMEMB Seoul noted that "[the] balance of payments consideration (even though as in this case marginal to our total balance of payments problem) have to be taken into account in any decision to procure Korean combat rations for the ROKFV in lieu of US rations. . . the procurement of these rations should be viewed in the totality of our relations with the ROK, particularly its effort in Vietnam." AMEMB Seoul

and recommended procurement of the Korean combat rations as proposed by ROKG provided the criteria and quality standards could be met. 32

(S) In May SECDEF approved a plan for providing the ROK soldiers with a kimchi and pepper supplement once each day. Under the plan ROK soldiers eating hot meals would receive a can of kimchi and package of peppers once each day and the soldiers eating C-rations would receive the same in lieu of the biscuit and spread of the existing ration. Implementation of this plan was expected to cost \$2 million per year.

DOD was prepared to consider broadening this purchase of a full Korean C-ration if a clear Bill of Payment (BOP) could be arranged. 33

REVIEWED BY  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DEC 1964

PAGE 727 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS PAGE REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army by 1AG per

830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



(U) On 11 October a news article in the Pacific Stars and Stripes related the final act in the tale of the Korean combat ration:

The US and the Republic of Korea Saturday concluded an agreement under which the US government will compensate the Korean government up to \$7.1 million for Korean combat ration meals to be supplied daily for ROK forces in Vietnam.

~~RECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE [REDACTED]~~  
~~BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~QA [REDACTED]~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

830924

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

The agreement was signed at the Economic Planning Board by Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Planning Minister Choong Hoon Park and USOM Director Henry J. Costanzo.

.....  
The Korean meal, consisting of a regular Korean diet including kimchi, saury, ginseng tea and powdered red pepper, will be substitutes for the American type noon meal now furnished by the US to the Korean forces in Vietnam.

Under the agreement, the Korea General Foods Co. will can and deliver the meals on board US vessels at Pusan for shipment to Vietnam.

The canned meals are expected to boost the morale of the ROK troops fighting in Vietnam.

Under the agreement, about 12 million meals will be provided over the period from December, 1967, through June, 1968, at a cost of 58.975 cents per meal. Additionally, a 45-day stock level of the meals will be maintained in Vietnam.

Disbursements under the \$7.1 million agreement will be tied to the procurement of US goods and services under special letters of credit to be issued by a US bank designated by the Foreign Exchange Bank of Korea. <sup>36</sup>

#### Class II and IV Supply

(C) The overall stabilization of the Class II and IV supplies in RVN reflected a more reliable and consistent support posture during 1967. There was a steady improvement in consumer requisition fill rates. Improvement in fill rates tended to stabilize ASLs and the demand volume while demand volume continued to be affected by the scale of operations and force buildup. <sup>37</sup>

#### Herbicides

(S) In February a shortage of herbicide for RVN prompted COMUSMACV to request assistance from CINCPAC to remedy the situation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The problem was twofold: The orange herbicide agent had been the most effective composition used for defoliation and crop destruction, but programmed receipts would not be sufficient to support operational requirements. This part of the problem was solved by acceptance of an interim substitute white agent until such time as the orange agent became available. At the same time, the number of available crop destruction sorties was insufficient to meet requirements. Aircraft availability was therefore used as the basis for the computation of FY68 herbicide requirements. The average monthly herbicide requirement forecast indicated:<sup>38</sup>

17 C-123 aircraft at 1.2 sorties/day/aircraft:.	612,000 gals
8 AGAVENCO spray systems at 2 sorties/day:	96,000 gals
Ground based spray:	<u>30,000 gals</u>
TOTAL:	738,000 gals

Armored Vehicles

(S) In May USARV indicated that a review of APC and tank replacement plans might be necessary because the increase in the enemy build-up and introduction of a more lethal antitank grenade might invalidate programmed loss rates. An evaluation of the enemy's antitank grenade RPG-7G (rocket-assisted) revealed that it had greater penetration power and greater range than earlier models, and that the rocket was capable of penetrating 11 inches of armor at a range of 500 meters. The enemy could probably continue to act strongly to overcome RVN control and utilization of the nation's highway system, and RVN control would be dependent in large measure on his availability of track vehicles for convoys and other security missions. The Closed Loop Support Program, a cyclical overhaul/replacement program for tanks and APCs, was instituted and provided the necessary repair/maintenance capability to insure operational readiness of combat serviceable armored vehicles. This program was, however, a complement to, and not a substitute for regular replacement vehicles from CONUS programmed for RVN to replace combat losses.<sup>39</sup>

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

M16 Rifle

(S) In November 1966 JCS proposed a revised distribution priority for the 1967 issue of the XM16E1 rifles for each Service from the November 1966 through June 1967 production. The proposed priority for the US Army included: (1) forces altered for RVN, (2) US maneuver battalions and division base elements in RVN and ROKA maneuver battalions in RVN, and (3) the infantry Brigade in Hawaii. The proposed priority for the USMC was: (1) USMC units in RVN, (2) CONUS training bases, and (3) ROKMC and VNMC battalions in RVN. MACV and CINCPAC concurred with the JCS proposal, and on 19 December the plan was approved by SECDEF with the exception of the issue to ROKA and ARVN which was deferred. On 9 January 1967, DA provided the revised issue schedule of XM16E1 rifles for USARV stating that the urgent requirements for CONUS active Army units made it imperative that M14 rifles, made excess through the XME16 exchange, be returned to CONUS expeditiously. 40

(C) On 10 January 1967 DCG USARV recommended to COMUSMACV rescission of the October 1966 MACV directive which had suspended issue of the XM16E1 rifle because of a shortage of 5.56mm ammunition. He noted that "because of the suspension and increases in the allocation of 5.56mm ammunition to SEASIA, the situation has improved considerably. In view of the improved stockage position, it is now felt that normal issue of M16 rifles can be resumed, with the understanding that issue and distribution will be carefully monitored and adjusted, as required, to insure that adequate stocks of 5.56mm ammunition are maintained." On 16 January COMUSMACV approved the recommendation, noting that "The Department of the Army has an urgent requirement for the M14 rifle to equip CONUS active Army units. Resumption of XM16E1 rifle issues to US forces will make available M14 rifles for return to CONUS". The JCS-revised allocation of ROKA (12,926) and the ARVN airborne units (3,073) were contained in the overall Army allocation. These quantities, together with those previously issued and those in stock, were required to satisfy the MACV proposal for equipping these units with the XM16E1 rifle. The original planning schedule called for completion of issues to ARVN airborne units by February 1967 and to ROKA by April 1967. However, in November 1966 CINCPAC had deferred future issues to non-US forces until further notice. This suspension was lifted and component commanders resumed normal issue to US forces; however, commanders were required to monitor issues to insure they were consistent with

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the availability of ammunition. MACV retained authority to approve all issues to non-US forces. 41

(S) On 18 January CINCPAC requested information from JCS regarding the availability of the XM16E1 to equip the ROKA maneuver battalions and ARVN airborne and VNMC units. JCS replied that:

The SECDEF on 19 Dec 66 in approving the DA rifle distribution memorandum, directed that allocations of XM16E1 rifles previously planned for ARVN-ROK forces should be reallocated to eligible US forces. The SECDEF, however, did not address the issue of this weapon to the ROK and RVN Marine maneuver elements. This matter has been recently forwarded to SECDEF for decision.

JCS requested that, in light of the foregoing, issue of the XM16E1 be deferred pending decision from SECDEF. 42

(S) On 18 February COMUSMACV emphasized to CINCPAC his concern at the delayed issue of XM16E1 to the ROK forces in RVN:

During my visit to Korea in September 1966, I stated, at a public press conference, that maneuver elements of ROKFV would be completely equipped with XM16E1 rifles by the end of April 1967. This statement was made in good faith based on information available at that time. It is my firm conviction that every effort must be made to fulfill this commitment in the time frame promised. If this is not done, we will subject ourselves to justifiable criticism by the ROK Government.

The importance of the US commitment to support the ROK became very evident in late February. LTG Chae Myung Shin, COMROKFV, interviewed by the press on 21 February, stated that "his troops were fighting with World War II carbines and M1 rifles which could not compare with the automatic-weapons fire laid down by the enemy." He went on to say that "General Westmoreland... had promised to replace the Koreans' World War II small arms with M16 rifles and newer modeled 30 and 50-caliber machine guns." This reference to the US commitment

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

further emphasized the necessity for the US to expedite the issue of XM16E1 to ROK forces or be subject to criticism by the ROKG and the foreign press. On 22 February CINCPAC recommended that JCS take action to remove the restriction on the issue of XM16E1 rifles to ROKA, ARVN, ROKMC, and VNMC maneuver elements. <sup>43</sup>

(S) On 10 March DOD announced that M16A1 (X and E were dropped from the designation as SECDEF approved the weapon as military standard) rifles would be issued to ROKA, ROKMC, VNMC, and ARVN airborne maneuver battalions. The following specific provisions were provided by JCS:

1) Issues to US maneuver elements (infantry, airborne, armor, and reconnaissance) would be accomplished prior to any issues to non-US forces.

2) Issues to ROK and RVN forces would be made concurrently.

3) Distribution would assume equal treatment of RVN and ROK forces.

4) Issue would be completed by 30 June 1967.

(S) The issue of the M16A1 rifles to III MAF maneuver battalions was completed on 13 April and US Army battalions on 15 April. With the US issue completed, the first increment (May issue) of M16A1 was issued to FWMAF by III MAF and USARV on 24 April. By 31 May the issue was completed with the exception of 645 weapons withheld from issue to the VNMC Bde. These weapons were to be used when the unit reached its authorized strength. In addition to the issues to ARVN and ROKFV, issue was also made to VNAF and VNN, PHILCAGV, and RTVAR. The RTVAR was to train with the weapon in Thailand prior to its deployment to Vietnam in early September. <sup>44</sup>

(S) In May a question arose regarding the issue of the M16 rifle to US advisory personnel. Sufficient M16 rifles had become available to support an issue to advisors; however, the MACV policy was based on several considerations which reflected the undesirability of such issue:

1) There was no information as to when all ARVN units would receive the M16.

PAGE 733 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

2) ARVN units would have to handle an additional type munition to support the advisors.

3) ARVN units did not have the maintenance capability to support the weapon.

4) Arming the advisor with a weapon other than the one the unit was armed with would make him very conspicuous.

5) The relationship between advisors and their units had to be considered; the man charged with fighting the war should be armed as well as his advisor.

(S) On 31 May COMUSMACV requested comments from the field regarding the established MACV policy on the issue of the M16. CG I FFORCEV concurred with the MACV policy, stating that:

The only advantage in providing advisors with the M16 rifle is that they would have an individual weapon with greater fire power than the weapons presently issued (the carbine, cal. 30; M2 pistol, cal. 45). The primary mission of advisors is the advising of the Vietnamese elements to which they are assigned. Advisors should engage in fire fights with the enemy only when it is necessary to protect themselves and their property. Therefore, the advantage of providing advisors with greater fire power would not be justified in view of the problems that would be generated by issuing of the M16 to advisors.

The DSA III CTZ did not concur but recommended that issue of the M16 be made to MACV advisors assigned to battalion and subsector level and all MACV advisors (enlisted and company grade officers) assigned to RVNAF units armed with the M16. The DSA went on to say, "This headquarters does not feel that the issuance of M16 rifles will cause the advisor to be any more conspicuous nor will it have any adverse effect on the attitude of counterparts."45

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army BY TAG post 2A  
8-3-06-2A

PAGE 734 OF 1340 PAGES

~~REVIEWED BY~~  
~~CLASSIFIED BY~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) In June HQ ROKFV requested 889 additional M16s for the ROKMC Bde. In evaluating this request it was determined that the ROKFV intended to divert a portion of the original weapons allocation from ROKMC maneuver battalions to units and organizations not originally scheduled to receive the weapons. The additional M16's, if approved, would have been used to replace those diverted from the maneuver battalions. In answer to the ROK request, COMUSMACV informed the COMROKRV that:

Release of M1A16 rifles to the FWMAF and the RVNAF is a matter controlled closely by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. This control is necessary due to the continuing shortages of these weapons. Recognizing the need for this weapon by troops actually engaged in combat with our common enemy, the JCS authorized these weapons to troops of the ROKFV ahead of certain US troops in Vietnam. This authorization was made specifically for individuals of the infantry battalions of the ROKFV division and the 2d ROK Mar Bde who are armed with the rifle. The recent arrival of the additional ROKMC battalion will require an increase in this authorization. [Except for this additional issue] no additional authorization for FWMAF and RVNAF can be made at this time. Upon completion of issue of the M16 rifle to units in RVN, forecast to be

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By IAG per

PAGE 735 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83-06-24

~~SECRET~~

accomplished by March 1968, this matter can again be considered. 47

(U) On 16 August COMUSMACV informed COMROKRV that accord-  
int to MACV records 15,717 ROKRV individual weapons had been gener-  
ated as excess by the issue of the M16 rifles. COMUSMACV requested  
that MACV be informed as to the status of these weapons and planned  
return shipments of these excess weapons to Korea. On 1 September  
COMROKRV informed COMUSMACV that 9,287 of the 13,827 rifles  
had been turned in and placed in storage in VNAF depots, and that  
HQ ROKRV was awaiting disposition instructions for the return of the  
carbines and the BARS to Korea. COMROKRV went on to say that "as  
M1 rifles are excessive even in Korea, it is, thereby, proposed to  
succeed the M1 rifle to RVNAF accountability, or instruction be [given]  
for this headquarters on disposing of the rifles after having coordinated  
with RVNAF." Subsequently, COMROKRV was informed by COMUS-  
MACV that "the weapons, which are being generated excess by issue  
of M16A1 rifles, were brought to Vietnam from Korea during deploy-  
ment of ROKRV units to RVN. Title to these weapons remains with  
the ROKG. There are no provisions for title transfer of these wea-  
pons from ROK to RVN." Accordingly, COMUSMACV requested that  
all excess weapons be returned to Korea and that MACV be advised of  
the quantities, by date, evacuated to Korea. 48

(S) In August CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV reevaluate  
requirement for additional issue of M16s to RVNAF for FY68 and for-  
ward this information with justification to CINCPAC. The weapons  
requirement which was originally requested by COMUSMACV in early  
1966 called for the distribution of a total of 115,436 rifles to VNAF.  
Only 9,731 rifles of the original request had been approved by JCS;  
this commitment was fulfilled on 31 May. COMUSMACV indicated a  
requirement for 3,005 additional weapons above the balance of 105,  
705 of the original requirement. The 105,705 rifles were to be allo-  
cated to the following units:

- 1) 20 ranger battalions.
- 2) 120 ARVN combat infantry battalions.
- 3) ARVN combat maneuver units including reconnaissance  
companies, separate infantry battalions, and mechanized rifle troops.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The 3,005 M16 rifles were to be distributed in the following manner:

- 1) 1,695 to three additional infantry battalions.
- 2) 1,140 rifles to 12 regimental reconnaissance companies (95 per company).
- 3) 170 rifles to be used as a 3 percent combat consumption and 3 percent maintenance float. In Justification of the request for these additional M16 rifles, COMUSMACV stated:

It is vitally important that the capability of RVNAF be expanded as rapidly as possible. One of the most effective ways to accomplish this goal is through the issue of M16A1 rifles to RVNAF units. The issue of these weapons not only increases the firepower of the receiving units but also has a beneficial psychological effect. The outstanding combat results of the RVN Airborne and Marine units after the receipt of M16A1 rifles vividly illustrate this point. The issue of M16A1 rifles will be used not only to increase the firepower of individual units but also to improve their overall performance. Those units whose status of training, leadership, and demonstrated combat record, including night and mobile operations, have proved most outstanding will be issued these rifles first. This will create a desire in other units to increase their performance so that they will be issued the M16A1 rifle (the rifle whose firepower, utility and limited availability have made a "prestige" weapon among all RVNAF and Free World Forces in RVN). ARVN can make significant gains in performance if given the means to do it. The M16A1 is one of these means.

On 2 September CINCPAC, concurring with COMUSMACV, forwarded the request to JCS. CINCPAC recommended that JCS initiate action to fulfill the immediate requirement for 5,000 M16 rifles and the maximum allocation as requested by MACV. The request for the 5,000 M16 rifles was approved by JCS on 4 October. 49

PAGE 737 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) In late August it was disclosed that RVNAF intended to divert 632 M16 rifles from the VNMC maneuver units to units and agencies not originally programmed for receipt of these weapons. Upon receipt of this information COMUSMACV at once communicated with Chief JGS:

A recent directive of your headquarters instructs the Marine Brigade to return 632 M16A1 rifles to the 20th Ordnance Base Depot for redistribution to other units. The M16A1 rifle is not a MAP supported item. The title of these rifles remains with the US component furnishing the weapon. In the case of the M16A1 rifles issued to the RVN Marine Brigade, the III MAF retains the title. The M16A1 rifle has been issued to specific Vietnamese units on an approved priority basis. They should not be diverted from their originally intended use. Any M16A1 rifles which are not required by the RVN Marine Brigade should be returned to the III MAF. The desire of this headquarters as well as that of your own is to furnish M16A1 rifles to those units engaged in active combat against the enemy. Any unauthorized redistribution of M16A1 rifles from their intended use could adversely affect our future M16A1 rifle distribution plans for the RVNAF.

COMUSMACV went on to request that all M16 rifles issued to the VNMC Bde be retained by the marine brigade for their use and not redistributed without prior approval from MACV. 50

(C) On 7 November JCS approved COMUSMACV's requested allocation of 108,710 M16s for ARVN. Included in this allocation were the 5,000 M16s approved by JCS for issue to ARVN in October. Of the 108,710 M16s approved, 85,371 were included in production scheduled through June 1968. It was expected that all Vietnamese Army combat maneuver elements could be provided M16A1 rifles during the first eight months of CY68.

(U) On 27 April an inspection team from the USAMC arrived in-country to check the performance of the M16A1 rifle. The team reported that there were few or no problems with the rifle. An extraction problem did exist to some degree, but the frequency with which the malfunction occurred had been minimized by increased emphasis on care and cleaning at the unit level, increased logistical and command

PAGE 738 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

emphasis on making cleaning materials available, and a continuing education program to teach the soldiers how to avoid problems. 51

(U) In May a controversy arose over the performance of the M16 in RVN. Rep James J Howard read a letter (written by an unidentified marine) in the House of Representatives which severely criticized the weapon's performance. The marine's letter included an emotional paragraph: "Believe it or not, do you know what killed most of us? Our own rifles. Before we left Okinawa, we were issued the new rifles, the M16. Practically everyone of our dead was found with his own rifle torn down next to him where he was trying to fix it. . . There was a newspaper woman photographing all of this and the Pentagon found out about it and won't let her publish the picture." It was assumed that the marine who had written this letter was referring to the fighting over Hills 861 and 881. The marine reported that "We left with close to 1,000 men and in one battalion came back with half."52

(U) Replying to questions from Rep Howard, the Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps noted that "neither of the battalions had casualties, killed or wounded, approaching those reported by the marine" adding that, "on the basis of reports from the field, the weapon (M16) is a reliable and effective weapon for our combat forces in Vietnam." On 26 May the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated that "contrary to a relatively few complaints about the rifle--complaints which we are certainly looking into--the M16 rifle has proved to be a reliable, hard-hitting, lightweight weapon for our troops." However, he went on, "in view of recent news media reports and letters indicating a degree of dissatisfaction with the M16 by some marines in Vietnam, CG III MAF promptly began investigating allegations of faulty operations of the weapon. . . He found a high degree of satisfaction with the performance of this rifle in combat. There was some dissatisfaction expressed by a relatively few marines armed with the M16, but no more than has been experienced in the past when any new weapon has been introduced into our inventory." USMC units had experienced malfunctioning problems: these were attributed to poor maintenance (care and cleaning) on the part of the user. To correct this, USMC units undertook extensive training programs to familiarize personnel with proper care and maintenance of the M16. 53

(U) Criticism of the M16 by letters and newspaper articles resulted in the House Armed Services Committee's undertaking a vigorous investigation of the alleged malfunctions of the M16, touring stateside bases, and

# UNCLASSIFIED

making on-the-scene checks in RVN. Representatives Richard H. Ichord (D-Mo.), Speedy D. Long (D-La.), and William G. Bray (R-Ind.) made up part of the Congressional delegation that visited RVN in June as part of the House investigation. The congressmen were briefed concerning the M16 rifle. The major problems and their causes were:

- 1) Failure to extract the fired cartridge usually was caused by a dirty or scored chamber, worn extractor, or weak spring.
- 2) Overfilling the magazine with 21 rounds caused spreading of the lips of the magazine and possible stoppage.
- 3) Failure to cycle with the selector switch in the automatic position was caused by improper assembly of the sear and trigger spring after the lower receiver group had been disassembled for cleaning. (The detailed disassembly should not be performed at the unit level)
- 4) Corroded or coppered barrels were caused by lack of proper cleaning and excessive use of tracer ammunition. It was pointed out to the congressmen that many of these malfunctions could have been prevented if training in the proper use and care of the rifle had been emphasized by small unit commanders and platoons and squad leaders.<sup>54</sup>

(U) COMUSMACV clearly stated his policy regarding the M16:

I want a concerted effort made by all commanders to insure that every rifleman is thoroughly proficient in the use and care of his weapon. Adequate cleaning materials are available to maintain this rifle. If you need technical assistance, it will be provided by support units on request. As a minimum you should take the following actions with your commands:

- 1) Provide each soldier armed with the M16 the proper cleaning equipment and lubricants and insure that he uses it correctly.
- 2) Perform frequent inspections to ascertain that weapons are being maintained properly.
- 3) Encourage the prompt reporting of malfunctions to support units for analysis and assistance.
- 4) Encourage the submission of equipment improvement recommendations.<sup>55</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) In July newspaper accounts of the M16 reflected opposing points of view regarding the weapon's effectiveness. The Washington News quoted CG III MAF as saying that "the M16 is a good weapon, it is not as forgiving as the one we used to have, it must be cleaned everyday. . . No weapon will forgive you if you neglect it." On the other hand, an article by the Washington Star indicated that a muzzling of servicemen had taken place during an on-site investigation of the M16 by the House Armed Services Committee in June. The article pointed out that Rep. Ichord, the subcommittee chairman, presented the text of several letters, written by servicemen to the Committee, which criticized the M16. These letters indicated that the servicemen would have been severely reprimanded or court-martialed if they said anything critical about the weapon. Rep. Ichord was quoted as saying, "If this information is accurate, and there is some basis for belief that it is accurate, it stands as a shocking example of muzzling by our military on a subject that can mean life or death to our combat soldiers." The "Muzzling" allegation however, quickly withered away in the absence of further "facts." 56

(U) To implement COMUSMACV's policy regarding the care and maintenance of the M16, the MACV CofS directed that USARV develop an M16 information card. The CofS pointed out that "COMUSMACV does not desire that this project be considered a counter to certain statements concerning the M16. Rather, it must take a positive approach and focus on methods to improve the care and handling of the weapon and, hence, enhance combat effectiveness." The "M16 Rifle Tips" card was published and distributed in June. 57 (See Figure VIII-1)

(C) In August DOD's Deputy Director of Inspection Services (DINS) arrived in RVN with an inspection team to conduct a field survey of the M16 rifle. Objectives of the survey were:

- 1) To ascertain the degree to which corrective action had been implemented to eliminate the cause of M16 malfunctions.
- 2) To identify problems, if any, being experienced with the M16 in the field.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## M16 RIFLE TIPS



The M16 is the finest military rifle ever made. It's lightweight, easy to handle, and will put out a lot of lead. If you know it, respect it, and treat it right, it will be ready when you need it. The following tips are from combat veterans who wanted to pass on to you their ideas on weapon care. Learn 'em, use 'em, and you'll not be caught short!



KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY

a. Keep your ammo and magazine as clean and dry as possible. Lightly lube the magazine spring only. Oil it up, and you're headed for trouble.



b. Inspect your ammo when you load the magazines. Don't load dented or dirty ammo. Remember, load only 18 or 19 rounds.



c. Clean your rifle every chance you get. 3 - 5 times a day will not be too often in some cases. Cleanliness is next to godliness, boy, and it may save your life!

Figure VIII-1


# UNCLASSIFIED



d. Be sure to clean carbon and dirt from those barrel locking lugs. Pipe cleaners help here and in the gas port.



e. Don't be bashful about asking for cleaning materials when you need 'em. They're available: get 'em and use 'em.



f. Check your extractor and spring often; if they are worn or burred, get new ones ASAP.



g. Lube your rifle using only LSA. That's the best. A light coat put on with a rag after cleaning is good. Functional parts need generous applications often. Put a very light coat of LSA in the bore and chamber after cleaning.

28 June 1967

Figure VIII-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3) To evaluate general performance and acceptability of the M16 in the field.<sup>58</sup>

(C) The DINS groups surveyed 1,592 (or 1 percent) of US combat and combat support personnel armed with the M16 rifle in RVN. The results of this survey revealed that the command follow-up of issued directives was not being accomplished as concerned the maintenance and care of the M16 rifle, and that certain deficiencies existed in training familiarization with the weapons. In order to correct deficiencies in the maintenance and training in the use of the M16, COMUSMACV dispatched a message on 10 September 1967 to all Service components emphasizing the following corrective actions:

- 1) Encourage construction of improvised ranges for familiarization of the M16 rifle.
- 2) Insure that all personnel armed with an M16 zero that same weapon in-country.
- 3) Provide special training in care and cleaning of the M16 rifle, ammunition, and magazine under field conditions.
- 4) Provide each rifleman with the proper cleaning equipment and lubricant, and insure that he uses it correctly.
- 5) Insure the conduct of frequent inspections by qualified personnel to ascertain that weapons are properly cared for.
- 6) Insure prompt reporting through appropriate Service channels of malfunctions and possible problem areas of the M16 rifle.<sup>59</sup>

#### Class III Supply

(C) The Class III tankage objective of 4.4 million bbls of combined military and commercial POL was the amount computed to provide 30-day stockage objective, floating storage tankers were used to partly offset the deficiency. The use of additional deep-draft tanker moorings, pipelines, and barge unloading sites enhanced the overall bulk petroleum posture and several T-1 type shuttle tankers and barges were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

acquired. The addition of storage facilities throughout 1967 increased the in-country bulk storage capacity. The completion of the Qui Nhon/An Khe six-inch line and the six and eight inch lines from Vung Ro Bay to Tuy Hao enhanced the bulk distribution of POL as well as relieving part of the port's storage problem.<sup>60</sup>

(S) MACV and CINCPAC plans for 1967 called for the development of Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) as a major POL redistribution facility. In February however, it became apparent that Army marine terminal tankage (376,000 bbls) at CRB could not support CRB as a POL redistribution facility because the amount of tankage was too small to discharge effectively 140,000-200,000 barrel ships and still maintain adequate stocks ashore between replenishment ships. The on-base tankage at CRB Air Base was so small (56,000 bbls) in relation to consumption, that much of the Army marine terminal tankage was, in fact, being used as on-base tankage. Also one single pier served for both loading and unloading tankers. The construction program (through FY66) had provided for 200,000 bbls of tankage for the Army at CRB, but only the most urgently required facilities could be constructed with funds available at that time. COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that if the construction requirements could not be met at CRB, the idea of a redistribution center be dropped and T-2 mooring/discharge facilities be developed for Phan Rang and Vung Ro Bay to handle POL supply requirements.<sup>61</sup>

(S) In late February CINCPAC reaffirmed policy of relying on CRB as a major POL redistribution port. He stated that until such time as permanent storage became available, floating storage tankers would remain close to RVN and then a portion of these would be shifted from storage duty to shuttle duty. The planned end-position on Army terminal tankage in CRB would be 580,000 bbls. This it was considered, would be capable of handling the redistribution mission without reliance on floating terminals. To implement planning, CINCPAC recommended that material for the 400,000-bbl terminal and T-5 jetty be shipped to RVN; the Army install the T-5 jetty and erect 200,000 bbls of terminal; the AF construct additional on-base aviation fuel storage to relieve the Army TF from CRB Air Base making this tankage available for those redistribution missions.<sup>62</sup>

(C) During the early months of 1967 POL consumption averaged 2,990,000 bbls per month, increasing in July to 3,239,000 bbls, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

reaching a level of 3,343,900 bbls per month by the end of the year. Although only 3,259,000 barrel tankage was available at the end of the year, close scheduling of tankers and tight management of resources combined provided POL when and where needed.<sup>63</sup>

(C) During the year significant progress had been made in the Class III field. Military tankage had been increased by 637,000 bbls to the capacity of 2.077 million bbls as of 31 December 1967. Civilian tankage used by the military remained at 1.182 million bbls. T-5 tanker discharge facilities were completed at Chu Lai and Da Nang. The inner harbor at Qui Nhon was dredged, and a T-2 jetty was constructed with 8" pipelines to upgrade this major distribution terminal from a T-1 to a T-2 tanker offload capability. The T-2's capacity would be limited to a 26 foot draft however, until further dredging was done. Two commercial T-1 shuttle tankers used to support I and II CTZs were released on 31 December 1967 with a net annual savings of approximately \$888,000. Pipelines connecting An Khe and Phu Cat with Qui Nhon were placed in operation eliminating most of the truck haul between these locations and providing more efficient and effective inland distribution of bulk products in II CTZ. Construction on the Marine POL terminal facilities and the connecting pipeline to a 576,000 bbl tank farm at CRB was 90 percent completed.<sup>64</sup>

#### Class V Supply

#### General

(S) In December 1966 JCS had delegated to CINCPAC authority to control all available assets of critical ground munitions enroute to PACOM. The idea behind this move was to provide management of ground munitions in critical supply to meet operational requirements in SEASIA. CINCPAC was given authority to transfer or divert munitions on hand or enroute, regardless of ownership, as required by military operations. CINCPAC was also authorized to delegate this authority to COMUSMACV, who could then direct component commanders to transfer or divert assets on hand to meet emergency military situations. However, requests for diversion of assets enroute would be referred to CINCPAC for necessary action. CINCPAC defined critical ground munitions as those conventional ground munitions items for which the projected on-hand status remained persistently below the 60-day level

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

computed at the SEASIA expenditure rate based on an analysis of forecast availability and anticipated expenditures. On 1 January the list of critical ammunitions included:<sup>65</sup>

Item  
5.5mm CTG, ball  
60mm CTG, HE  
60mm CTG, Illum  
81mm CTG, HE Fuse  
81mm CTG, Illum  
105mm CTG, HE  
4.2" CTG, HE

(S) There were two supply rates used to control the use of munitions within RVN--Theater Required Supply Rate (TRSR) and Available Supply Rate (ASR). The TRSR was used to compute a 30-day operating level and was a rate of fire or supply at which ammunition and/or explosives were required to support combat operations in RVN. This rate was expressed in terms of rds/wpn/day for ammunitions fired from weapons. The ASR was a rate applied to ground munitions which were in limited supply in order to conserve and insure equitable distribution of available stocks. The ASR did not constitute a ration and could be exceeded if required for combat emergencies. The TRSR and ASR were of particular importance in RVN because these rates reflected on supply efficiency and impacted heavily on combat effectiveness of US/FWMA forces.<sup>66</sup>

(S) As of 31 January seven munitions remained on the CINCPAC critical list:

<u>Item</u>	<u>TSR</u>	<u>ASR</u>
105mm HE	43.6	30
81mm HE	14.01	5.0
81mm Illum	1.68	.50
60MM HE	7.0	1.0
60mm Illum	2.0	.5
5.56mm Ball	12.50	-----
4.2" CTG, HE	-----	-----

Although only seven munitions items were listed as critical by CINCPAC, USARV had 24 listed under ASR control because of limited supply. However, of the 24 items, nine ASRs were increased during the last ten days of January 1967. <sup>67</sup>

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) On 6 March COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that two items be deleted from the critical munitions list--5.56mm ball ammunition and 4.2" mortar HE with fuse and without fuse. On 1 March USARV 5.56mm stocks were in excess of stockage objectives, and III MAF allocations met projected requirements for stock buildup in anticipation of issue of the XM16E1 rifle. At the same time COMUSMACV recommended suspension of issue of 5.56mm ball ammunition to the RVNAF because their stocks were far in excess of requirements. The 4.2 mortar munitions exceeded 30-day requirements, and continued improvement was forecast at that time. On 20 March CINCPAC recommended to JCS that both items be removed from the list of critical ground munitions, and on 17 April JCS approved CINCPAC's request. 68

(S) In May COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that action must be taken to support future operational requirements for the use of 175mm ammunitions. In March 175mm munitions were placed under ASR control, with an expenditure rate of 26 rds/wpn/day, because of appreciable increase in overall firing rates. This fact, coupled with the projected increase in density of weapons (74 tubes) in support of increased troop structure, would cause a deterioration in assets by November 1967 and cause it to become classified as a critical munition (less than 30 days stockage) by February 1968. In order to support future operational requirements, COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC assist MACV to insure additional 175mm ammunition to support operations in RVN. 69

(S) During a June Commander's Conference, DCG USARV noted improvements in the munitions posture: "On the subject of mortar and artillery ammunitions, there should be a sufficient production capability so that we can go off the ASR and into a RSR for 81mm ammunition in July or August and for 105mm and 4.2" in August or September." The prediction did materialize; improvement in stocks resulted in the three munitions being withdrawn from the ASR list in July. CINCPAC critical ground munitions, likewise, reflected an improvement within the Pacific area by 31 August, except for 105mm HE, as shown: 70

60mm HE	*81mm HE
105mm HE	*81mm Illum
105mm Beehive	*60mm Illum

\*Recommended for deletion by COMUSMACV.

REVIEW DATE: ~~1 Oct 68~~  
CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED BY: ~~DA~~ PAGE 748 OF 1340 PAGES  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(S) In July COMUSMACV noted:

The FWM Forces and the GVN forces continue to maintain a favorable casualty ratio over enemy forces. Advanced technology, multiple and sophisticated weapons delivery systems, extensive munitions expenditures, mobility and communications are some factors that make possible this favorable ratio. However, we must continually seek means to improve this ratio.

One way in which COMUSMACV sought to bring about improvement in the kill ratio was improvement in the employment and use of available support munitions, i.e., artillery, naval gunfire, and air. COMUSMACV pointed out that during 1966 some 570,000 tons of support munitions had been expended--approximately six tons of munitions for each enemy loss (KIA, defector, etc.). In view of this hard fact, COMUSMACV requested DCG USARV to evaluate the artillery support doctrine and reemphasized his concern for the high ammunition expenditure rate, particularly those munitions used for unobserved harassing and interdiction fires. In light of these increased expenditures, and pending the results of the USARV study, COMUSMACV desired all units to scrutinize carefully the utilization of artillery to determine whether the results justified the current expenditure rates.<sup>71</sup>

(S) On 6 September USARV completed the artillery study requested by COMUSMACV, a portion of which included an evaluation of artillery effectiveness and ways of reducing ammunition expenditures. In the study USARV pointed out that:

Effective artillery support is gained by careful target analysis, surprise, and mass fires. Tactics used in RVN have, with few exceptions, precluded the capability to mass fires on the scale used in World War II and Korea. Any changes in techniques or tactics must consider the necessity of prohibiting civilian casualties and preventing the destruction of property.

USARV concluded that there were several ways in which artillery effectiveness could be improved and ammunition expenditure reduced:

REVIEW DATE: ~~5 Oct 88~~  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED BY: ~~DTA~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ or GADR

PAGE 749 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

increasing observed fire capabilities, improved target acquisition, centralized control of target selection by fire support coordination elements, and introduction of new equipment and procedures. 72

(C) Although increased combat activities and the introduction of new combat units into RVN resulted in higher expenditure rates and heavier demands, at no time were units denied ammunition, and the overall status continued to improve. Further, to support the increased RVNAF activity, steps were taken to provide additional ammunition on an interim basis and to obtain higher allocations for the future. This was a part of the overall effort to encourage RVNAF to assume a larger share of the combat and combat support role. In the last three months of 1967, approximately 6,600 tons of munitions were transferred to ARVN from in-country assets over and above the allocation under the Vietnamese Ammunition Monthly Program (VAMP). For the long haul, MACV recommended, and JCS approved, an increase in the RSR for 105mm HE ammunition from 10.7 rds/wpn/day to 17.8. On 15 December 1967 this headquarters recommended to CINCPAC that VAMP RSR's for 80 items be increased and that allocations from production be adjusted to support these increases.

## Beehive Ammunition

(C) The Beehive munitions contained flechettes (arrow shaped metal particles) that resulted in a shotgun effect or pattern when a round was fired. When the Beehive round was fired the fuse armed immediately and functioned upon leaving the gun muzzle or at a preset range, depending upon the setting.

The explosive force of the radially oriented detonators rips open the forward skin of the projectile ogive, dispersing the flechettes in the forward section of the projectile by centrifugal force. At the same time the axially oriented detonator and relay flash down the flash tube and ignite the base charge. The pressure built up by the burning base charge forces the flechettes in the rear of the projectile forward and out of the projectile [causing a shotgun effect].

# SECRET

The number of flechettes contained within the various munitions depended upon the caliber, i. e., 4,100 for 90mm, 8,000 for 105mm, and 25,000 for 155mm rounds.<sup>73</sup>

(S) In early 1967 there were many favorable comments from the field regarding the effectiveness of Beehive ammunition, particularly the 105mm. One battle account of Beehive ammunition was given at the April MACV Commander's Conference:

It was decided to fire Beehive rounds at 0900 on the 21st of March. The first round was fired at 800 meters and the second at 400 meters. A friendly ambush patrol in the vicinity saw many VC hit and fall, and saw units withdrawing carrying casualties. When the enemy got close to the guns, 28 rounds of Beehive, set for muzzle action, were fired and later 150 bodies were found along the line of fire from the guns. The lessons learned from the use of Beehive were:

1. The round is effective, as advised.
2. It is very important to prepare a Beehive concentration plan, separate from other fire plans.
3. The decision to use Beehive should be decentralized to battery/company commanders, or even lower.
4. In the defensive position, the primary and alternate howitzers to fire Beehive should be selected, based on the greatest possibility of having to fire. The bulk of the available rounds should be distributed to those weapons.<sup>74</sup>

(S) In April COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the 105mm Beehive had proven extremely effective against enemy mass assaults on artillery positions. In light of this success COMUSMACV indicated the desirability of issuing this ammunition to ROKAFV and RVNAF. On 18 April MACV requested III MAF and USARV to issue two rounds of 105mm Beehive per tube to FWMAF being supported. These rounds were authorized for direct defensive fires; however, if not used on intended targets within a 100-day period, the Beehive rounds were to be fired at any suitable target either direct or indirect fire to prevent deterioration.<sup>75</sup>

~~SECRET~~

(S) In May USARV indicated that the monthly Beehive requirement for the tube density for USARV and III MAF was 52,744 rounds. The TRSR was three rds/tube/day for USARV and 1.62 for III MAF. The 52,745 rounds did not include issue of FWF; this amount would increase total requirement to 58,500 rounds per month. USARV reemphasized that distribution of the Beehive was by tube density and allocations on a "fair share" basis. Only a minimum amount was retained in depot stock for resupply purposes. The USARV goal was to equalize the number of rounds at each howitzer position and to maintain six rounds of Beehive at each position. 76

(U) Reports from Operation JUNCTION CITY and Operation THAYER I demonstrated the dramatic effectiveness of the 105mm Beehive ammunition. These reports indicated that the munition was instrumental in preventing numerically superior attacking forces from defeating and annihilating US forces. Until May, firing of the Beehive was restricted to direct fire, and then only in emergency situations. However, with the DA-announced increase in CONUS production of the rounds and distribution of applicable indirect firing tables, use of the Beehive in both offensive and defensive operations was expected. 77

(S) On 17 May COMUSMACV provided guidance on the use of the 105mm Beehive ammunition for indirect fire by emphasizing that it should be limited to lucrative mass targets under observed fire. The following considerations were to govern the use of the Beehive ammunition:

- 1) Except for instances where lucrative mass targets were located, the munition would be used for close-in-defensive direct fire only.
- 2) Utmost care would be exercised in the handling, storage, and firing of Beehive munitions at all times.
- 3) Utmost precautions would be taken to prevent the capture of Beehive ammunitions by the enemy. 78

(S) In late May COMUSMACV suspended the use of the round in the indirect fire role. Results from a 1st Cav Div test had shown that the SM563E2 fuse system was unreliable and unpredictable. In answer to a query from CINCPAC and DA as to the effectiveness of the 105mm Beehive round, COMUSMACV felt that "there is no doubt of its increased

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

effectiveness as over the 105mm HE in direct fire role particularly when used against human wave attacks where gun positions are in danger of being overrun." However, evaluation of the indirect fire role was not made because of the fuse suspension in that role. A comprehensive discussion of the munition, including RVNAF requirements, took place during the July Ammunition Conference.<sup>79</sup>

(S) In July COMUSMACV noted that because of open storage of the 105mm Beehive round, it was anticipated that the round would have a relatively short service life in RVN. MACV undertook a study to determine the feasibility of either retaining the rounds in CONUS after production or storing them in PACOM depots and shipping them to RVN as requirement dictated. Although there was no information available in RVN regarding the service life of the Beehive round, results from a Picatinny Arsenal destructive test was expected to provide this information at a future date.<sup>80</sup>

(C) In answer to a query by COMUSMACV regarding the use and effectiveness of the Beehive rounds, USARV stated, "The 105mm Beehive has proven its effectiveness in RVN when employed in the direct fire role against massive ground attacks; however, lucrative targets of this nature have limited actual consumption." As pointed out by USARV, the infrequent use of the round in the direct fire role was influenced by the following factors:

- 1) Since this item was in short supply, commanders preferred to retain their stocks for possible direct fire employment.
- 2) Mass-type targets for which the weapon was most effective seldom appeared in the counterinsurgency type conflict.
- 3) The inability to observe the effect of this round on indirect targets limited its use.
- 4) Restrictions were placed on the use of the round when firing over the heads of friendly troops and indirect fire because of the projectile's instability in flight and the erratic functioning of the fuse.<sup>81</sup>

(U) As the year rolled by, 1st Log Cmd's Beehive munitions issue indicated a significant improvement in the Beehive supply posture; this was based on diminishing demands from tactical units in the field. The

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

improved posture of the Beehive was also evidenced by the turn-in of older rounds, some of which had deteriorated because of excessive exposure to the adverse Vietnamese climate and weather conditions. The decrease in use of these munitions was attributed to the lack of lucrative direct fire targets, which was the only approved use of these rounds, and the continued restriction against its use in any indirect fire role because of the lack of a reliable fuse mechanism for the round.<sup>82</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SERVICES

(U) Some logistical functions did not contribute directly to the command's ability to "shoot, move, and communicate," but they did influence the health, morale, and welfare of the US servicemen. These fringe logistical functions included various services such as: laundry, mortuary, property disposal, and dairy services.

### Laundry Services

(U) There were various means by which laundry service was provided to the combat and combat service support personnel: mobile field laundries, unit contract laundries, individual contract service, use of unit washing machines, and the do-it-yourself method. While units were on combat operations, the mobile field laundries operated from field locations; mobile field laundries were also used in base camps to supplement garrison facilities. Contract laundries provided service on an area basis where major troop populations were located: Saigon, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Nha Trang, Soc Trang, Vin Long, Can Tho, Pleiku, Vung Tau, An Khe, Cu Chi, and Tuy Hoa. One of the major problems that affected the laundry service was the use of outdated equipment and the concurrent lack of sufficient repair parts to properly maintain the washers and dryers.

(U) Receipt of Eidal trailer-mounted laundry units eased the laundry problems to some degree by the replacement of older models with newer and more modern types. Further improvements were expected to continue as the replacement units were received. By 31 December military resources were able to handle 95 percent of the forces' needs.<sup>83</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Property Disposal

(U) USARV's 1st Log Cmd handled the property disposal mission for the US forces' property in RVN. Under the control of 1st Log Cmd were seven property disposal yards located at Saigon, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Vung Tau, Long Binh, and CRE. Property disposal sales in 1966 were limited to out-of-country sales to prevent material from being used by VC/NVA forces. The stopping of in-country sales and the inability of exporters to ship material out of RVN created a backlog of Property Disposal Office (PDO) materials. An attempt to eliminate this backlog was made in January when negotiations were initiated with ROKG for the purchase of 25 - 38 thousand STONs of ferrous and nonferrous scrap material. The contract for the purchase of the scrap metal was completed and signed on 20 January. The contract provided for the sale of 27,500 STON of ferrous and nonferrous metal for an estimated value of \$617,940. By early June it was apparent that the terms of the contract would not be met as reflected by the contractor performance. As of 1 June a total of 2,619 STON had been removed leaving a shortfall of 5,964 STON. Attempts to resolve the disposal contract performance resulted in ROKG assurance that every effort would be made to meet the requirements of the contract.

(U) To increase the disposal rate and cut down on the accumulation of disposable property, MACV recommended to the Embassy that in-country sale of property be reestablished. This would not only reduce the backlog to a manageable level but would allow for better safekeeping as well. The Embassy approved the plan subject to USARV's accepting responsibility for end-use in-country checks. Subsequent agreements and State Department approval came on 23 November to allow in-country sales. It was anticipated that this action would greatly alleviate the backlog of disposal property.<sup>84</sup>

## Dairy Services

(U) Although the production of dairy products is not ordinarily considered a service, neither are they considered normal Class I

# UNCLASSIFIED

items of food in the combat zone. These items can better be classed as "niceties" or morale items. The first Foremost Dairy plant became operational in Saigon in 1966 and was expanded to include the Long Binh areas in 1967. These plants produced recombinated dairy products including milk, cottage cheese, and ice cream. In June 1967 plants became operational in Chu Lai and Da Nang, with a combined daily capacity of 16,000 gals of milk, 5,000 lbs of cottage cheese, and 4,000 gals of ice cream. A plant was completed at CRB on 15 November, and one was programmed for completion at Qui Nhon in January 1968. When fully operational, these two plants would have the combined capacity to produce 21,500 gals of milk, 3,400 lbs of cottage cheese, and 3,000 gals of ice cream.<sup>85</sup>

## Mortuary Services

(U) In July 1966 responsibility for the mortuary service was transferred from 7AF to USARV. With the assumption of this responsibility, USARV took over the TSN facilities which had the capacity of 36 remains per day, 50-60 under emergency conditions. Since TSN supported all of the US/FW forces in RVN the facility was hard pressed to meet the workload; an additional facility was approved for Da Nang. Although the original plans called for completion of the Da Nang facility in January 1967, this was delayed until June because of shortages of supplies, equipment, and personnel authorizations. Opening of the Da Nang facility increased the combined capabilities to 75-80 remains per day and obviated transporting of remains from I CTZ to TSN. Evacuation of remains directly from Da Nang to Dover and Travis AFB was initiated in July. ROKF remains were cremated at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang and then returned to Korea by air.<sup>4</sup>

(U) In June Cmdr 7AF recommended that the US Army Mortuary at TSN be relocated because "Odors emanating from the mortuary are offensive to personnel within several hundred yards of the facility. Many personnel live or work within this range." In order to rectify the situation, COMUSMACV concurred in the construction of new mortuary facility to be located away from the developed area within the TSN Base Complex. Arrangements for the necessary real estate and the actual construction of the facilities were handled by

UNCLASSIFIED

USARV. The project was approved by the SECDEF on 17 October and actual construction began three days later.<sup>86</sup>

PAGE 758 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

## MAINTENANCE

(S) While there existed major maintenance problems during 1967, the overall maintenance performance was a significant improvement over 1966. Factors such as weather and terrain, lack of repair parts, and excess usage under abnormal conditions caused more than normal downtime on major items such as: aircraft, material handling equipment (MHE), track vehicles, and trucks. Although these factors contributed to maintenance difficulties, most equipment's non-operational ready supply (NORS) and non-operational ready maintenance (NORM) rates were consistent with DA and CINCPAC objectives. The maintenance posture was significantly improved by the increased emphasis on organizational maintenance, receipt of critical repair parts, and supply management improvements.

### USARV

(S) An extensive preventive maintenance program, initiated in 1966 by USARV, indicated favorable trends in 1967 with decreased deadline rates and increased operational readiness. Likewise, the USARV standardization program contributed to the lowering of deadline rates by the replacement of non-standard equipment with standard equipment lines which allowed for the rapid resupply and interchange of repair parts. USARV's Red Ball Express System continued to be highly responsive to repair parts requirements and was expanded in 1967 to provide requisitioning of repair parts to prevent equipment from being deadlined.

(S) Aviation maintenance activities were directed toward internal improvements and increased response to customer requirements on aircraft, avionics, and air armament spare parts items. These factors contributed immeasurably to the favorable operational readiness (OR) rate of the front line Army aircraft. While the OR rates of two of the most important aircraft in the Army inventory (UH-1D and CH-47) were within CINCPAC objectives, the CSA reflected his feeling regarding the readiness of the Chinook:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I am concerned about the operational ready rates being experienced with the Chinook in Vietnam. Each week the NORS and each month the NORM rates are reviewed by OSD in detail and when they exceed the DA standards of 15 percent NORS and 25 percent NORM we are asked to do something about them. I am also personally concerned that unless we improve these rates, especially the NORS rate which is under constant fire when it exceeds 15 percent, measures will be directed which may seriously affect our planned deployments and utilization of the CH-47. Accordingly, we must take immediate action to improve the rates within our currently available resources and develop a longer range program to maintain them.

(S) In April the CSA backed up his thoughts with action by authorizing the exchange of 25 new CH-47 aircraft for 1962 and 1963 models and the delivery of 45 rebuilt UH-1Ds as a part of a modernization program. These replacement aircraft resulted in increased OR rates starting with first increment receipts in April and May.

(C) Due to extreme environmental conditions and excessive usage of tracked vehicles (APCs and tanks) in Vietnam, a cyclical overhaul/replacement program was implemented in 1967. Under the cyclical overhaul/replacement program, tracked vehicles that accumulated excessive mileage were to be replaced by vehicles which had been completely overhauled on a one-for-one basis. This program required close management in order to provide timely overhaul of equipment prior to its reaching a point where overhaul became uneconomical. Initially the majority of APC's and tanks injected into the system were issued as combat loss replacements.

(U) In April a conference was held at HQ USARV in which representatives from DA, USARPAC, and 1st and 2d Log Comds discussed a new program for the cyclical overhaul/replacement of tanks and APCs. The purpose was to develop a program which would be more responsive to USARV's needs. The new schedules

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for the overhaul/replacement of USARV's tank and APC fleets took into consideration world-wide assets as well as anticipated battle losses. The concept was expanded in April to include other community groups and given the title "Closed Loop Support Concept." The expanded community groups included: M107/M110 guns and howitzers, communications equipment, material handling equipment (MHE), generators, etc.

### Seventh Air Force

(S) Major portions of the primary mission aircraft in the 7AF inventory were above 70 percent in operational readiness during 1967. The major problem aircraft was the F-4C with OR rate consistently below the 70 percent 7AF objective. The most significant contributing causes to the F-4's low OR rate were the requirement for extensive engine rework and excessive nonscheduled maintenance.

### III MAF

(S) Organizational, field, and intermediate maintenance was adequate to support requirements. Major factors impacting on operational readiness of major items of equipment were the shortage of repair parts, the large number of makes and models of vehicles, and the cumulative effects of heavy monsoon rain and heavy usage. Improvements in the maintenance posture resulted from the completion of house maintenance facilities and accelerated preventive maintenance schedules to minimize the destructive impact of rain and mud. Of the major III MAF primary mission aircraft, the F-4B and the A-4 indicated the lowest OR rates. The deadline rate of the F-4B was consistently high due to the high non-operational readiness for maintenance (NORM), as experienced by 7AF. Provisions for additional covered space (during inclement weather) to perform maintenance on the F-4B and A-4 aircraft should result in lower deadline rates.<sup>88</sup>

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## TRANSPORTATION AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION

### General

(U) During CY 67, transportation achievements in RVN surpassed all previous surface airlift and sealift movement performance records. Highway tonnage movement during CY67 increased approximately 100 percent over CY66. Movement of military tonnage by rail also increased significantly, exceeding CY66 by approximately 160 percent. Improvements in air logistic operations resulted in record performances for the MACV Common Service Airlift System (CSAS), and resulted in more than 1,200,000 STON of cargo, mail and passengers being transported by CSAS during the year. Improvements were made to Military Airlift Command operations by realigning cargo channels from CONUS to Vietnam and return. As a result the severe traffic congestion problem at Tan Son Nhut was relieved and the use of in-country aircraft resources critically needed for tactical airlift support was reduced. Saigon Port operations were revamped and the massive port congestion that existed in early CY67 was relieved through close coordination of the Saigon Port Authority, USAID and US Military Advisors.

### Highways

(S) In late 1966, RVNAF/MACV published the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan which contained a plan for security and restoration of RVN highways. The goals of this plan were to eliminate VC/NVA interdiction of vital roads and to restore them to uninhibited friendly military and commercial use. In fulfillment of these objectives, military operations were conducted in 1967 to destroy the VC tax collection system, to eliminate VC ambushes of military and commercial cargo carriers, and to demonstrate the ability and intentions of the RVN and FW forces to use RVN highways freely. <sup>89</sup>

(U) At the beginning of 1967 the highway system in RVN was badly deteriorated, the result of several years of sabotage, lack of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

maintenance, monsoon rains, and increasingly heavy use by allied military forces. But even had it been in good condition, the highway network would have been inadequate, for it had not been designed for the large carriers and increasingly heavy axle loads of military traffic. The width of the roadways, the alignment, the paving surface, and the bridges were all substandard to the needs of the 1960s. The deterioration that had accelerated since the FWMAF buildup of 1965-1966 was far beyond the capability of the GVN Ministry of Public Works to reverse. Highways in RVN had been maintained and improved only on the minimum basis necessary to support military operations and provide for the essential flow of commerce. In light of the requirements for increased use of highways by military forces because of the increased tempo of military operations, and the commercial transportation requirement essential to the GVN economy, a greater participation by MACV/USAID was planned in order to bring about improvements in RVN's highway system in 1967. 90

(S) In January the MACV Construction Directorate (MACDC) was charged with the responsibility for developing an effective program of maintenance and upgrading of highways in RVN. NAVFORV, USARV, and USAID were asked for information on the status of their RVN highway-upgrading programs, and, with the information received, MACDC completed its study in March. The study developed a program of highway restoration and construction for a total of 3,300 km of national highways to be completed by 30 June 1968. A joint Embassy/USAID/MACV message to SECDEF and SECSTATE requested that \$100 million be made available for highway upgrading to be handled by RMK-BRJ. The use of surplus contractor effort would provide a rapid method of accomplishing urgent requirements for which other resources were not at that time available. It was pointed out that the operational and tactical benefits and the combat and combat service support economies which would accrue each day, by making an improved segment of highway available, would be justification for upgrading with an RMK-BRJ construction force. In the joint message mentioned, dispatched on 9 March, COMUSMACV stressed the importance of extensive maintenance and upgrading of RVN highways, pointing out that VC sabotage, inability to perform maintenance due to wartime activity, flood damage, and the influx of FWMAF traffic had been contributing factors to the degraded highway condition. There was no question that the existing system was not constructed for loads which exceeded design capability by 50 to 100 percent. Tactically, an improved highway system would greatly

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

assist in troop movements, particularly as the tempo of military operations increased. Logistics requirements dictated that the initial phase of highway improvement program be initiated immediately.<sup>91</sup>

(C) One of the most significant military operations which was oriented towards increasing security of the RVN highways, was Operation PAUL BUNYAN, conducted in October 1967. PAUL BUNYAN was a land clearing operation directed at clearing forested areas along major military essential highways. Rome Plows of US Land Clearing Teams cleared 100 to 300 meter wide strips along many RVN highways. The resulting open areas lessened VC capability to mount ambushes and reduced the effectiveness of those which occurred. During the month following land clearing activities along Route 20, 1, and 2 there were no ambushes of the 11th ACR; previously many ambushes had occurred. These cleared strips lessened security escort requirements and permitted rapid movement of helicopter and road reaction forces against VC ambush forces. The strips cleared along highways also proved to be an effective barrier to free movement of enemy troops and supplies. Open roadsides also provided cleared right-of-ways for construction activities oriented toward route restoration and upgrading.<sup>92</sup>

(C) Route 4, running from the Mekong Delta to Saigon, and frequently referred to as "Rice Road," was the most important commercial route in RVN and had great strategic value in terms of political and economic overtones in the Vietnam conflict. Over this route were transported the bulk of the foodstuffs produced in the Delta and shipped to Saigon. While Route 4 had historically been a major VC military objective and source of tax collections, the volume of mining and attacks significantly increased during 1967.<sup>93</sup>

(U) A major problem that developed in 1967 on Route 4 was the traffic congestion which precluded full utilization of this vital LOC. This affected both military and civilian traffic, and created an adverse economic impact on a large section of the South Vietnamese population.

(C) DEPCOMUSMACV, on 8 November 1967, expressed deep concern over a major traffic jam that he observed on Route 4 which appeared to be caused by lack of traffic control. As a result he directed a detailed study to be conducted by J4 to examine establishment of a central traffic management system which would control

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

traffic flow, and security, as well as road repair and construction. Further, on 13 November, it was directed that a system for combined US/ARVN investigation on Route 4 route-cutting incidents be developed.<sup>94</sup>

(C) Studies were undertaken by MACJ4 to determine measures that could be taken to improve the situation. The studies were completed by the end of the year, and some corrective measures were implemented during the process of the study; however, improvements would be dependent largely on the amount of security that could be provided along the route. As a result of the studies, it was recommended to COMUSMACV that a combined GVN/JGS/MACV/USAID Working Group be established to coordinate and expedite the many actions concerning Highway 4 with the many agencies involved.<sup>95</sup>

(C) As a result of the increase in military operations devoted to route missions, there was a marked increase in the percentage of military essential roads classified "secure" during 1967. Roads defined as secure (Green) were those that could be traveled during daylight hours without an armored escort. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan identified a total of 2,805 km (1,720 miles) of roads which were considered to be essential for the conduct of military operations. Statistics for 1966 and 1967 shown below indicate the significant improvement in highway security of these essential roads.<sup>96</sup>

<u>Month</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Jan	Unknown	605 miles (35%)
Feb	396 miles (23%)	638 miles (37%)
Mar	447 miles (26%)	638 miles (37%)
Apr	605 miles (35%)	655 miles (38%)
May	535 miles (31%)	655 miles (38%)
Jun	620 miles (36%)	792 miles (46%)
Jul	690 miles (40%)	775 miles (45%)
Aug	740 miles (43%)	962 miles (56%)
Sep	605 miles (35%)	1,050 miles (61%)
Oct	550 miles (32%)	1,063 miles (61%)
Nov	605 miles (35%)	944 miles (54%)
Dec	500 miles (29%)	1,061 miles (61%)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

(C) The opening of Route 1 in the southern II Corps/northeast III Corps in December, and the opening or securing of all of Route 1 in I Corps completed the requirement for the CY67 road security goal. As of the end of the year 99.7 percent of the military essential roads contained in AB 142 were open, and 60.9 percent were secure. The 0.3 percent deficit was open in early January 1968. The goal of 50 percent secure was exceeded by almost 11 percent. Highway tonnage movement during CY67 increased approximately 100 percent over that moved in CY66 from just over seven million STON to almost 14 million STON. Line haul tonnage moved over the highways were expected to continue to increase as roads were improved further and security was extended.<sup>97</sup>

#### Railroads

(S) In May 1966, MACV initiated a plan to rebuild the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS). This restoration plan was based on the premise that, as friendly forces secured areas through which the railroad passed, the track could be rebuilt and policed. However, the VC disrupted both restoration plans as well as military and commercial use of the railroads throughout RVN by destroying rails and bridges. Consequently, during the last six months of 1966 the program saw very little progress. In order to provide a better coordinated and unified RVN/US effort toward the restoration of the VNRS, the MACV plan was incorporated into the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) (AB 142), providing that the US/GVN effort would "eliminate VC/NVA interdiction of the VNRS...and restore it for uninhibited friendly use." However, during the first six months of 1967 the lack of tactical security caused considerable lag in railway restoration plans. As a result, MACV J4 conducted a study of the VNRS to reevaluate the 1967 restoration plans and concurrently to analyze proposed construction of rail facilities to service US military logistical installations. The following major revisions in the restorations schedule (by priority) were recommended by the study group:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Priority 1 - 1967

Da Nang - Lien Chien  
Phu Cat - Bong Son  
Tuy Hoa - Dien Tri

\*Priority 2 - 1968

Bong Son - Quang Ngai

\*Priority 3 - 1968

Xuan Loc - Thap Chan

\*Priority 4

I CTZ

\*Portion of program to be reviewed in 1968.

Recommendations for restoration priorities were based on the following considerations: (1) restoration should continue, with an ultimate goal of complete restoration by the end of 1968; (2) the restoration schedule should be based on projected attainment of adequate security conditions and availability of materials; (3) military and civilian benefits to accrue by development of rail transportation would materially aid the war effort; (4) restoration would be of present and future benefit to the psychological and economic development of the country; (5) restoration should continue uninterrupted; and (6) greater benefits would be derived as larger operational segments become available for use. These recommendations were approved by COMUSMACV on 6 July 1967. <sup>98</sup>

(S) In 1967 the VC determination to disrupt completely any restoration of the VNRS was indicated clearly by a number of sabotage incidents. On 27 April the VC placed several satchel charges (approximately 15 kilos each) in and under the engine compartments of locomotives parked in the relatively secure Chi Hoa repair yard near Saigon. This covert attack by an unknown number of VC resulted in heavy damage to seven diesel locomotives and one crane, and light damage to three additional locomotives. On 19 May the VC detonated a mine against an engine and four rail cars on the outskirts of Saigon, resulting in the train's derailment. As a result of such VC activities, less than 100 km of rail line had been restored since 1 December 1966. <sup>99</sup>

(C) By October it was quite evident that 1967 restoration goals would not be realized. The reconstruction program was six months behind the projected schedule. There were two major problems that had hindered progress: the difficulties encountered in moving of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

railroad building supplies to the work sites, and the continuing sabotage of operational rail lines by the VC. In order to keep operational lines open, men and equipment had to be diverted from reconstruction projects. 100

(S) In November RVNAF/JGS/MACV published the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan (AB 143) which included expanded restoration of the VNRS. AB 143 placed emphasis on offensive operations along essential rail lines to provide adequate security for opening and restoring efforts. Tentative rail security and restoration goals for 1968 included: 101

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Segment</u>	<u>Distance</u>
1 Jan - 30 Jun 68		
II	Phu Cat - I/II CTZ Boundary	73 km
II	Chi Thanh - Tang Vinh	60 km
1 Jul - 31 Dec 68		
II	II/III CTZ Boundary - Thap Cham	160 km
III	Xuan Loc - III/II CTZ Boundary	82 km

(S) At the end of the year the security of the VNRS was below the CY67 goal of 55 percent: 477 km (39 percent) of the VNRS lines were operational, 98 km (8 percent) were undergoing repair, and 665 km (53 percent) were nonoperational. The railroads in the priority areas of II and III Corps were secured 100 percent, and the total percentage of secure rail lines had risen from 22 percent to 31 percent during the year. Actually, the statistics do not present a true and complete picture for the year. With the increased number of ports established along the Vietnamese coastline during the year, and the improved road network serving these ports, the importance of the railroad lessened. Transportation performance, however, increased considerably in 1967. Movement of military tonnage by rail increased over that moved in 1966 from approximately 93,000 STON to over 247,000 STON. At year's end VNRS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

was being used for military requirements including assistance in clearing the Saigon port, movement of cargo for Phu Cat AB from Qui Nhon, transporting vegetables from Dalat to Ba Hgoi and Nha Trang; and initiating a daily passenger service between Saigon and Long Binh for local-hire personnel of 1st Log Cmd and USARV, when those headquarters were relocated.<sup>102</sup>

#### Intra-Country Airlift

(S) The requirement to provide rapid, dependable response to special and emergency airlift requests had a significant impact on aircraft utilization in 1966. The combat environment in RVN frequently required emergency airlift of war-essential cargoes and/or troops on short notice. Circumstances usually dictated positioning or directing aircraft into areas with little regard for efficient aircraft loading, and often the cargo and personnel airlifted did not fully utilize the aircraft. Responsive tactical airlift in an emergency frequently spelled the difference between victory and defeat on the battlefield. These tactical missions caused excessive disruption of the Southeast Asia Airlift System passenger/cargo mission; therefore, a system for more rapid replacement or augmentation of aircraft was needed when tactical requirements exceeded its capabilities. This system was augmented by out-of-country C-130 aircraft to support critical logistic requirements.<sup>103</sup>

(S) In order to attain maximum response to the tactical situation and air-drop operations, COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC set up objectives for additional support from the 315 AD at Tachikawa, Japan. He desired to be able to obtain 50 percent of total special airlift requirements within 12 hours of initial notification, 75 percent of the total special airlift requirements within 24 hours, and 100 percent of total special airlift requirements within 36 hours. The request was approved and provided timely augmentation to the intra-country airlift capabilities.<sup>104</sup>

(S) In Vietnam the 834 AD had the mission of providing intra-country airlift. It consisted of the 315th Air Commando Wing (ACW) with 60 C-123s, the 483d Troop Carrier Wing (TCW) with 96 C-7As (CV2), and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No. 35 Squadron

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

with seven A-4s. In addition to organic aircraft, the 834 AD was supported by aircraft from the 315 AD. These aircraft were under the operational control of 834 AD and were based at Tan Son Nhut (23 C-130Bs) and Cam Ranh Bay (13 C-130As and eight C-130Es). Even with the 44 support aircraft from the 315 AD, the requirement for additional intra-country support continued.<sup>105</sup>

(S) On 13 June COMUSMACV requested seven additional C-130s to support the MACV Common Services Airlift System (CSAS), formerly known as the SEA Airlift System. The request was based on the increased passenger and cargo movement performance for the first five months of 1967. During this period the monthly passenger movement increased from 185,000 to 215,000, which decreased the number of aircraft available for cargo movement. Additionally, the increased frequency of tactical force deployments and supply-by-air missions also disrupted planned movement of priority cargo. Failure to move priority cargos with specified delivery dates resulted in an increase of emergency missions supported by the 315 AD. Forecasted military cargo and passenger requirements through the last half of 1967 necessitated increased airlift support. Planned increases in cargo support for USAID and contract engineers, and assumption of CORDS responsibility [important because of logistical support] by MACV, also figured heavily in the support forecasting. [Major airlift support of CORDS and USAID remained with the airlift contractor funded by USAID and operated by CORDS].<sup>106</sup>

(S) By October, when the request for the seven additional C-130s was approved raising the authorized augmentation to 51 C-130 aircraft, it became apparent that the MACV CSAS would require still additional aircraft. On 27 October COMUSMACV requested 7AF to develop personnel and facilities requirements to support an increase in the augmentation of C-130 to a total of 60 aircraft.<sup>107</sup>

(S) Improvements in logistic operations combined with a significant increase in airlift requirements resulted in record performances for the MACV CSAS during CY67. A total of more than 1,200,000 STON of cargo, mail and passengers were transported by the CSAS during the year. The average daily cargo tonnage moved in January 1967 was 1,600 STON; this increased to almost 2,100 STON by December 1967. Average daily passenger movements also increased from over 5,900 passengers in January

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1967, to over 7,000 in December 1967. A major factor contributing to the improved operations was the increase in the number of C-130 capable airfields from 53 to 68 during the year.<sup>108</sup>

Military Airlift Command (MAC)

(S) During 1966 the increased movement of US military personnel and cargo via air to RVN had caused a considerable burden on the air terminal facilities at Tan Son Nhut (TSN). This was the only aerial port of entry in RVN. The situation existing at TSN was further complicated by the in-country requirement to air transport a correspondingly increased volume of passengers and air cargo from TSN to final in-country destinations. For these reasons several measures were taken in CY67 to increase and realign ten MAC passenger and cargo channels from CONUS to Vietnam and return. These MAC channel actions included:

<u>Channel</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Action Taken</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>
Norton-Da Nang	Pax/Cgo	Established	1 Jan 67
Travis-Bien Hoa	Passenger	Established	1 Jan 67
McGuire-Bien Hoa	Passenger	Established	1 Jan 67
McChord-Cam Ranh Bay	Passenger	Established	1 Jan 67
Travis-Pleiku	Pax/Cgo	Established	1 Mar 67
Travis-Cam Ranh Bay	Passenger	Established	1 Aug 67
Travis-Pleiku	Passenger	Terminated	1 Oct 67
Travis-Phu Cat	Cargo	Established	1 Oct 67
Travis-Pleiku	Cargo	Terminated	1 Oct 67

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

<u>Channel</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Action Taken</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>
Dover-Phu Cat	Cargo	Established	15 Dec 67
Dover-Da Nang	Cargo	Established	Dec 67

As a result of these actions which permitted dispersal of the aircraft workload to five different airfields in RVN, some of the severe traffic congestion at TSN was relieved. It also provided for expeditious delivery of supplies and reduced the use of in-country aircraft resources critically needed for tactical airlift support. 109

#### Sealifts

(C) Difficulties in commercial port operations in Saigon that had created massive port congestion in the past continued to hamper both military operations and the civilian economy in the early part of CY67. This congestion was primarily due to a lack of centralized control of port operations, limited port facilities and the lack of available funds for local civilian consignees to pay for barges, ship clearances and customs fees. Consequently, oceangoing vessels and barges were held in waiting for discharge status for extended periods of time at considerable cost to both the US and RVN governments. Moreover, numerous cargo barges were used by local civilian consignees as floating warehouses to store commercial cargo which avoided payment of charges for storage of cargo in commercial warehouses.

(C) The port congestion problem was solved in CY67 through close coordination of the Saigon Port Authority, USAID, and US military advisors. Together, these agencies revamped Saigon Port operations and established a modern port capable of maintaining the smooth and continuous flow of cargo necessary to sustain and foster a growing economy. In addition, the completion of military facilities at Newport in mid-1967 allowed the return of all but four deep-draft shipping berths in the Saigon Port to the Saigon Port Authority for civilian use. As a result of this joint effort, by June 1967, commercial ships were able to move directly to a berth without

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

waiting. As of 6 January 1967, there were 35 ships with 203,000 STON of cargo in waiting and hold status. By the end of December 1967, there were no commercial cargo ships in hold or waiting status that were bound for Saigon Port. On 20 March 1967, there were 966 barges under load and 650 of these had been under load for over 30 days. By the end of December 1967, these figures had been reduced to eight barges under load, and only one of these had been under load for over 30 days.

(C) The highly successful measures taken to improve the Saigon Port operations made it possible for the military to begin returning responsibility for port handling and clearance of cargo to the GVN in August 1967. During the first month of operations under GVN responsibility over 46,000 STON of cargo were handled with no major problems. The return of responsibility to the Vietnamese for all other GVN cargo discharge was being accomplished as rapidly as procedures could be completed.

(C) US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps stevedore personnel, working in conjunction with Vietnamese and persons of other nations, cleared more than 12,600,000 STON of military and USAID cargo from six deep draft and seven shallow draft water ports located in the logistical complexes of RVN. An increase from 24 to 32 deep draft shipping berths contributed significantly to a buildup in total water port throughput capability. During eight months of CY67, RVN ports handled over a million STON of cargo per month; and in November and December, the discharge and out loading of military cargo alone amounted to over one million STON.

(C) SEALAND Containership Service in RVN was initiated late in the year. This service was based on regular routes and schedules between the contractor's west coast terminals in CONUS and the RVN ports of Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Saigon. Service commenced at Da Nang in August and at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Saigon in November. During the year SEALAND transported over 78,000 STON of cargo from CONUS to RVN and approximately 3,600 STON of retrograde cargo was transported in SEALAND vans returning from RVN to CONUS.

(C) In December 1967, a joint MACV/USAID Saigon Port Advisory Plan was approved and provided for the orderly transfer of advisory functions for the Saigon Port Authority from MACV to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USAID as well as for a GVN training and equipment program. The total time required to recruit and train advisors and to implement the plan would be from 10 to 18 months; the effective implementation date was being negotiated with AID, Washington, as 1967 ended.<sup>110</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## COMMUNICATIONS

### Background

(U) The Vietnam conflict was the first large-scale combat employment of the centralized DOD Worldwide National Command and Control System. The rapid and large buildup of US forces in Vietnam during 1965 demanded that then existing PACOM elements of this system be expanded. Concurrently, the communications capabilities within RVN had to be upgraded greatly. Moreover, and perhaps paramount, US government and internal sensitivity to the conduct of the Vietnam War, plus the administration's close civilian control of military actions (even down to the tactical level) demanded an unprecedented communications network in the field and between in-country headquarters and higher headquarters out-of-country.

(U) To effect the highest degree of command and control possible a vast system of communications lines was built within Vietnam and from there to Hawaii, the Philippines, and CONUS. Every method from field wire up to submarine cables and orbiting satellites was ultimately employed. The tactical situation in Vietnam demanded the use of small units equipped with reliable communications for requesting tactical air support or in directing supporting arms fire. The application of air-mobility as the key to operational success required that these tactical systems be light weight, man-transportable, climate resistant, and easily repaired in the field.

(U) To link headquarters within RVN a long-lines system was developed and partly installed during 1965 and 1966, to augment the already existing tropospheric scatter system (BACK PORCH and CROSS BOW) and the GVN (Southern Toll) Microwave System. It consisted of the following elements:

- 1) An Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS).
- 2) A coastal submarine cable system (Project 439L).

# CONFIDENTIAL

At the same time US forces in RVN were linked with the remainder of SEA and the world by:

- 1) A submarine cable system (WETWASH).
- 2) An IWCS.
- 3) Military satellite communications channels.
- 4) Commercial satellite communications channels.

These varied and complex networks were a part of the Defense Communications System's (DCS) basic network known as the Southeast Asia Wideband System (SEAWBS).

(U) In addition to the above command and control systems, communications capabilities in RVN included facilities for troop morale and welfare consisting of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) and the Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS).

(U) Past US communications advisory efforts had been directed towards improving RVNAF communications assets and capabilities, tactical and long lines. The GVN radio and television network, which was supported jointly by MACV and USAID, was used for entertainment and education, and for PSYWAR as well. MACJ6 provided a member to monitor and advise the Vietnamese Telecommunication Panel (VTP), whose purpose was to provide long-range planning for establishing an adequate and efficient countrywide telecommunication system in RVN. These efforts continued during 1967.

(C) For 1967 COMUSMACV's specific communications goals included:

- 1) Improving long-lines systems by completion of IWCS Phases I and II (see Figures VIII-2 and 3).
- 2) Improving the coastal submarine cable system.
- 3) Testing of satellite communications ground stations.
- 4) Improving teletype and data-transmission facilities.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




Figure VIII-3  
REVIEW DATE: Oct 1983  
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLLED BY: DTA  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5) Interconnecting teletype and data transmission systems to the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).
- 6) Expanding and refining secure-voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM).
- 7) Expediting delivery of secure voice FM tactical communications equipment to the field (KY-8, KY-28, KY-38).
- 8) Increasing MARS phone patch capabilities.
- 9) Completing installation of AFRTS TV stations throughout RVN.
- 10) Installing Dial Central Offices (DCO) throughout RVN.
- 11) Improving the IWCS in RVN. <sup>111</sup>

#### Integrated Wideband Communications System

(U) As a result of the greatly increased number of US forces in SEA, the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) was approved in principle by SECDEF in April 1965. This system was an upgrading of the then-existing long-lines system in SEA, a system which could no longer support planned operations. By the addition of multi-channel tropospheric scatter systems and both line-of-sight and diffraction microwave systems the IWCS expanded communications capabilities many fold within SEA mainland.

(U) The initial IWCS plan was approved in September 1965. However, by that time it already had become inadequate for its projected role in SEA, having been overtaken by the rapid US buildup in RVN. Therefore, in October 1965 COMUSMACV and CINCPAC had proposed an expansion of the planned system. SECDEF in January 1966 approved the expanded plan. In March 1966 as the tempo of operations increased and further deployments

~~REVIEW DATE: Oct 1993  
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLLED BY: DTA  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

PAGE 779 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

were anticipated, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC requested further expansion of the system, which SECDEF approved in August of the same year.

(C) During 1966 progress in the construction of the system, installation of its equipment, and final operational testing was slow and erratic for several reasons. Among these were delays in construction caused by enemy actions, the non-availability of equipment, and the civilian contractor's limited capability to test and quality assure the system for operation. As a result, at the end of 1966, only two of the programmed 19 links in IWCS Phase I were in service. <sup>112</sup>

(C) Contractor performance during most of 1967 continued to be below standard. Lack of adequately equipped technical control facilities and a shortage of qualified technical controllers plagued the program. As of 1 May Phase I was programmed for completion by 30 June and Phase II by 15 December 1967. The target date for completion of Phase III (see Figure VIII-4) was set at the summer of 1968.

(C) At the end of 1967 all 19 Phase I links had been accepted. Thirty of the 35 Phase II links had also been accepted by this time. A revised completion target date for Phase II of 31 January had been set, representing a seven-weeks delay from the May forecast. One link of 23 in Phase III had been completed at year's end. <sup>113</sup>

## Coastal Submarine Cable System

(C) The Coastal Submarine Cable System (Project 439L), designed to provide long-lines communications in support of combat operations in Vietnam, had been approved during 1966. Shore terminal construction began that year. The cable system was completed in early June 1967. Its six links (see figure VIII-5) were laid by Underseas Cable Corporation under the management of the Air Force Systems Command. Each link provides 60 high quality voice channels and is now operated by the Air Force Communications Service. At each terminal, the underseas

CONFIDENTIAL




Figure VIII-4

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROJECT 439L

COASTAL SUBMARINE CABLE NETWORK




Figure VIII-5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cable is interconnected to the IWCS by a US Army operated microwave link installed by Page Communications Engineers. This part of the system, which was installed by a civilian contractor (Pacific Architects and Engineers) was managed by the Air Force Systems Command. Cable repair and guard service was provided by the Underseas Cable Corporation's cable ship Neptune, which was normally anchored in Subic Bay, R. P., and on call from there. 114

## Satellite Communications

(U) In January 1966 the Defense Communications Agency had promulgated a plan to use communications satellites in support of US efforts in Vietnam. Planned were 32 satellite communications paths between SEA, Hawaii, and CONUS. The 32 paths were divided between two satellite communications systems, the Initial Defense Communications Satellite System (IDCSS) and the Commercial Communications Satellite Corporation's (COMSAT) System.

(U) The IDCSS as implemented employed 19 satellites in random distribution near synchronous equatorial orbits servicing 14 earth terminals. Seven of these terminals were in the Pacific area--two in RVN (Nha Trang and Ba Queo (Tan Son Nhut)), two in Hawaii, and one each in the Philippines, Okinawa and Guam. The system provided 33 communications channels, of which 22 were allocated to RVN.

(C) The two RVN IDCSS ground stations had been constructed in late 1966. Acceptance testing of these stations' equipment then continued through April 1967. Two months later, on 10 July, the RVN portion of the IDCSS went into operation with 10 of the planned 22 voice channels accepted for use: five voice channels from Ba Queo to Hawaii and five from Nha Trang to Okinawa. Five months later, on 11 December 1967, six more channels from Ba Queo to Hawaii became operational, for a total of 11 in that link and 16 of 22 planned for RVN. At the end of 1967 the remaining six channels from Nha Trang to Okinawa were scheduled to be in operation in January 1968.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) In addition to the 22 IDCSS RVN voice channels DCA leased from COMSAT 10 other channels to complete the 32 channel SEA package. These channels, which terminated at Bang Pla, Thailand, were accepted for use on 16 May 1967. Extension of six of these ten channels from Bang Pla to RVN was accomplished via the 439L submarine cable link to Vung Tau, where interface with the in-country IWCS was accomplished. <sup>115</sup>

## Long-Lines System

(C) Within RVN the following long-lines systems were in use during 1967:

- 1) WETWASH--a high quality 60-channel submarine cable link between Nha Trang and NAVCOMMSTA San Miguel, R. P. The Underseas Cable Corporation performed cable repair and guard service for the system (as it did for Project 439L).
- 2) BACK PORCH--a heavy troposcatter system interconnecting Vung Tau, Saigon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang. It interfaced with the WETWASH cable at Nha Trang.
- 3) CROSS BOW--a light troposcatter system providing alternate and backup capacity for BACK PORCH.
- 4) SOUTHERN TOLL--a GVN Postes et Telecommunications (P&T) microwave system in the Delta, south and west of Saigon, which had been constructed under the AID program by the MACV OICC and turned over to P&T for operation and maintenance in May, 1965. Military channels were leased from P&T on a case-by-case basis.
- 5) SYNCOM--a two channel system from Saigon to Hawaii via a synchronous orbit satellite.
- 6) IWCS--a composite of fixed facilities of multichannel microwave and troposcatter radio long-haul point-to-point links throughout and between Vietnam and Thailand.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Telephone Systems

(U) As part of the 1965 US buildup of forces in RVN telephone systems sprang up wherever headquarters, base camps, logistics centers, air bases, etc., were established. Initially each system was "operator oriented," requiring users to work through a manual central switchboard to place a call. Such an inefficient system was a natural consequence of the rapid military buildup.

(C) To automate dialing the Dial Central Office (DCO) system (see Figure VIII-6) had been planned during 1966. Originally, more than 30 US Army and Air Force DCOs, providing approximately 45,000 local telephone lines, had been programmed to become operational by the end of 1967. By the end of 1966 12 DCOs were in operation, and at the end of 1967 the system had 29 DCOs in operation, but only slightly over 34,000 local lines in operation.

(C) Completion of the entire system, to include direct distance dialing throughout SEA, was targeted for mid-1968. By that date plans called for 47 DCOs, with more than 58,000 lines in service

(C) Complementing the DCO system was the Common User-Long Distance (CU-LD) telephone system which served to connect stations in RVN with the rest of SEA (see Figure VIII-7). Six terminals were sited in RVN at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Tan Son Nhut, and Can Tho. Three were located in Thailand at Bangkok, Korat and Warin. In its manual configuration the system was operational by mid-1967. Upgrading to fully automatic switching for greater efficiency in operation was in progress before and after that date. At the end of 1967 switchover of the network to fully automatic operation was expected by October 1968.

## Automatic Digital Data Network

(C) Supplementing the voice communications systems an Automatic Digital Data Network (AUTODIN) for teletypewriter lines in

# CONFIDENTIAL




Figure VIII-6

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## COMMON USER-LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE PLAN




Figure VIII-7

# CONFIDENTIAL

SEA had been developed in 1966, for construction in 1967. In RVN AUTODIN centers had been planned at Phu Lam (Saigon) and Nha Trang. These two centers were planned to service 130 US military and civil subscribers, providing a 750,000 standard length message capability per day. This represented a tenfold increase in system capacity over the then existing tape relay network's capability.

(C) Construction of the two sites proceeded according to schedule during the spring of 1967. Equipment installation began in June. Although January 1968 was targeted as the operational date, delays in equipment arrivals and in test check-outs caused slippage so that by year's end the operational target date for RVN AUTODIN was set at March 1968.<sup>116</sup>

## Secure Voice Systems

(U) In April 1965 CINCPAC detailed his most urgent secure voice requirements to the JCS who then directed DCA to prepare a plan to satisfy these requirements. The immediacy of the need for secure voice communications in SEA dictated that as a first measure a plan for an interim system be prepared. This interim system was dubbed with the unclassified code name TALK QUICK. TALK QUICK was an expedited measure to provide secure voice communications to a limited number of PACOM subscribers within a target date of 1 October 1965. As far as possible TALK QUICK was to be compatible with the planned follow-on worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications System (AUTOSEVOCOM).

(C) In SEA the TALK QUICK system provided for 24 subscribers in the Saigon/TSN area, seven RVN up-country subscribers and another seven subscribers in Thailand/Laos. Included was a switching center at TSN capable of interfacing all SEA subscribers. Access to other PACOM TALK QUICK users would be through the Joint Overseas Switch located at Phu Lam (Saigon).

(C) On 15 November 1965 the Saigon/TSN switch (24 subscribers) went into operation. Six weeks later, on 1 January 1966,

# SECRET

the overseas portion of the system to and from other PACOM commands had become operational. In May 1966 the seven RVN up-country subsystems were put into operation. Final test and acceptance of the TALK QUICK system was completed on 30 June 1966, a scant 14 months after the original requirement had been stated by CINCPAC. 117

(U) The follow on to TALK QUICK was AUTOSEVOCOM, the DCS single, integrated, worldwide strategic secure voice communications system. It encompassed all secure voice requirements except those tactical communications organic to the tactical forces and those systems specifically authorized by SECDEF for establishment outside the AUTOSEVOCOM system.

(C) Implementation of the system had been planned to be in four phases. By 1967 Phase I was funded and installation of components was planned for FY67-69. Phase I provided for terminals for 200 RVN subscribers.

(C) On 17 July 1967 the first portion of the RVN system became operational. This was an automatic dial switch serving 50 Saigon / TSN subscribers. Installation of the remaining 150 up-country subscriber lines and attendant switching centers was planned for early 1968. Concurrent with this, the TSN switch would be re-located at Long Binh in May 1968, at which time TALK QUICK system would be phased out in the PACOM area. 118

## Summary

(S) In summarizing the 1967 military communications in SEA CINCPAC said:

During the year substantially all of the 1965 program for fixed-trunk communications in SEASIA became operational, permitting implementation of high speed data and secure voice service. While most major base areas now have good intra-base communications, the 1966 inter-base switching program was delayed and will not be operational until late 1968. Expanded and improved satellite

# SECRET

service to SEASIA was provided, including the COMPASS LINK photo transmission system. The manual interface between the USAF Tactical Air Control System and the USN/USMC Tactical Data System improved the capability to control US aircraft over NVN and to provide expedited MIG and SAM warning alerts. Full automatic interface is planned to be achieved by late 1968. Army tactical communications were vastly improved by modernizing ground radio sets and refitting Army aircraft with new communications equipment. While significant progress was made, major tasks still outstanding include: (1) implementation of the 1966 and 1967 Long Line Program to meet increasing demands for reliable and highly sophisticated modes of communications, (2) improvements of the AUTODIN and AUTOSEVOCOM Programs, and (3) improvements of the G-E posture of the RVNAF.<sup>119</sup>

## Radio, TV, and MARS


### Radio

(U) In 1962 the AFRTS radio broadcast system in RVN consisted of a studio/transmitter facility in Saigon. It provided service to approximately 94 percent of the US troops in RVN, who were then concentrated in one percent of the republic's land area. With the subsequent large buildup and dispersion of US forces in RVN expansion of the system was necessary for full programming to reach the majority of US personnel.

(U) As a result of this situation and requirement in April 1965, engineer personnel provided by AFRTS Los Angeles,

# UNCLASSIFIED

## AFVN RADIO & TV FACILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



(P) = PROPOSED

Figure VIII-8

# CONFIDENTIAL

together with personnel from 7AF and USARV, surveyed the existing system to determine its effectiveness and to recommend improvements. The team recommended a \$500,000 improvement plan for coverage based on a population density approach, as had been done for the original system. The improved system was designed to cover up to 75 percent of the land mass and, hopefully, more than 90 percent of the troop population.

(U) Soon after (July 1965) a MACV staff study determined that the best technical approach in providing AFRTS to the maximum number of troops could essentially be met by blanketing the entire area of RVN by means of 50-kw transmitters located at Saigon, Nha Trang, Pleiku and Da Nang. This four-station proposal was forwarded to CINCPAC in August 1965, approved by SECDEF on 5 February 1966, and implemented by DA and MACV that year.

(U) Based on a SECDEF memo of 5 February 1966 a later study (April 1966) was conducted by a special DA team to resolve technical aspects of AFRTS, Vietnam. This study did not change the approved objectives of the four transmitter plan but did recommend changes in the number, location and power output of the stations and transmitters. This plan called for 50-kw stations at Saigon, Pleiku, and Dong Ba Thin (Cam Ranh Bay) and 10-kw stations at Da Nang and Qui Nhon. In addition, contingency standby transmitters in Saigon, Ban Me Thuout, Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and Qui Nhon were included.

(C) By the beginning of 1967 radio programs were transmitted from the Saigon transmitter facility which provided a rebroadcast signal to 24 low-power satellite transmitters throughout RVN at the nodes of the long-lines system. In pursuing upgrade plans for AFRTS radio real estate acquisition for the high power transmitter stations was completed in April 1967 and construction directives were issued the same month. The Da Nang transmitter became operational on 1 June 1967 and the Saigon transmitter on 1 November. (Plans for 1968 called for the Pleiku and Qui Nhon transmitters to be operational in January and Dong Ba Thin in February).

(U) At the end of 1967 AFRTS radio broadcasting in RVN was providing 24 hour AM programming and an average of 12 hours a day FM programming. Features of AFRTS radio included hourly

# UNCLASSIFIED

news programs, rebroadcasts of CONUS public events programs (i.e., Face the Nation, Capital Cloakroom, presidential addresses), full length sports rebroadcasts, religious programs and a variety of music features (jazz, popular, country and western, and classical).<sup>120</sup>

## Television

(U) In December 1965 SECDEF had approved the installation of a two-channel television system in RVN, one channel for broadcast of US English language programs and the other for GVN use. In January 1966 after inter-government negotiations the GVN authorized the USG to establish Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) TV stations in RVN. Concurrently, the USG agreed to assist the GVN in establishing its own television network by providing the GVN equipment, advice, and technical assistance. To avoid dual contracting and to permit joint use of some facilities, DOD both built the facilities and provided the equipment, being reimbursed by USAID for the purely GVN portions of the project. AFRTS personnel provided the bulk of the assistance to GVN stations.

(U) Initial TV broadcasting began from airborne transmitters (Project JENNY) on 7 February 1966. This was limited to the Saigon area. Construction of the Saigon AFRTS TV ground station began in April 1966. AFVN airborne TV transmitting continued until 25 October 1966 when the 240-kw Saigon station went into operation. After discussions with the GVN, (May 1966), COM-USMACV directed that seven 40-kw mobile van AFRTS TV stations be sited at Da Nang, Hue, Chu Lai, Qui Nhon, Tuy Hoa, Pleiku, Nha Trang, plus a UHF translator at Phan Rang to rebroadcast the Nha Trang signal. By 1 January 1967 the Saigon fixed and the Qui Nhon and Da Nang mobile van stations were in operation. Four of the five remaining van stations were operational by 22 October 1967. Site approval was holding up installation of the Chu Lai van, a five-month project after authority to proceed would be given.

(U) At the end of 1967 US TV broadcasting (primarily news programs, special interest features and reruns of stateside shows)

# UNCLASSIFIED

was on a seven-day a week basis throughout RVN. In the Saigon area programs were scheduled about five hours a day on weekdays and 11 hours a day on weekends. Up-country stations provided from six (Pleiku) to ten (Da Nang) hours of TV each day. 121

## GVN Television

(U) As previously discussed, establishment of GVN TV was a joint USG-GVN project under the direction of USAID and the Vietnamese Telecommunications Panel. In order for the GVN to utilize TV as a tool in "winning the hearts and minds" of the people there were three main projects to effect: (1) build a GVN TV studio and transmitter site at Can Tho, (2) distribute TV sets and allow retail sales of TV sets throughout RVN, and (3) use Project JENNY aircraft to broadcast GVN TV until ground facilities became operational. MACV was involved in the second and third projects.

(U) Distribution of TV sets throughout RVN was by either government gift or commercial sale. In respect to the first means in early 1966 500 TV sets had been given to the RVNAF under MAP. Later that year and on into 1967 JUSPAO distributed 2,500 TV sets to provincial capitals, villages and hamlets throughout RVN. These sets were placed in public squares in order to garner the maximum number of viewers. Concurrently, an additional 800 TV sets were given to RVNAF. As to retail sales JUSPAO estimated that by the end of 1967 30,000 TV sets had been bought by the public, 2,500 more were being bought each month and that another 22,000 had entered RVN legally or illegally at one time or another. Total viewing audience figures were hard to gauge accurately, but JUSPAO conservatively estimated that private TV sets averaged four viewers, hamlet TV sets 30 viewers, and those emplaced in public squares 100 viewers each.

(U) MACV's responsibility vis-a-vis Project JENNY support of GVN TV was to effect coordinated control of and provide

# UNCLASSIFIED

specified support to Air Development Squadron EIGHT, Western Pacific Detachment (AIRDEVRON EIGHT, WPD). Specifically MACJ6 provided staff supervision of Project JENNY operations and coordinated all requirements for AIRDEVRON EIGHT, WPD resources as negotiated by JUSPAO with the GVN.

(U) GVN TV had commenced on 25 October 1966. This was just one day after AFVN TV had ceased using the specially configured NC-121J aircraft of AIRDEVRON EIGHT, WPD (Oceanographic Air Survey Unit, Western Pacific Detachment at that time). As before, nightly flights were flown from Tan Son Nhut to an orbit over Can Tho providing GVN TV to the Saigon area and the Delta. Normal broadcast hours during 1966 and 1967 were from 1900 to 2200. In general, programs included 15-20 minutes of news, some PSYOP, depiction of Revolutionary Development skills and projects, and approximately 90 minutes of music and/or entertainment programs.

(U) With an effective range of 75-plus miles the Project JENNY TV transmitter covered the entire IV CTZ and the southern fringes of the III CTZ. The broadcast area contained more than 60 percent of the population of RVN. This invaluable propaganda tool was scheduled to be expanded in January 1968 by addition of an orbit over Qui Nhon in II CTZ, covering at least another ten percent of RVN's population. It was expected that ground TV operation from the Can Tho site would commence by July 1968, at which time Project JENNY aircraft resources would shift to another as yet undetermined location.<sup>122</sup>

## Military Affiliated Radio Station System

(U) The Military Affiliate Radio Station system (MARS) was established with permission of the GVN in November 1965 after three years of negotiations. MARS is essentially an amateur radio telephone operation whereby a serviceman overseas, through an approved MARS facility, is connected to a MARS "Gate Way" station in CONUS - either a MARS station or a ham operator - who in turn patches to the caller's home telephone. Calls were

# UNCLASSIFIED

placed at the local MARS station or, in the case of hospitalized personnel, phone patches direct from bedside were provided. If a caller received no answer from his party in CONUS MARS personnel later delivered the message as patch time permitted.

(U) By the end of 1965 MARS in RVN had 13 stations in operation. Growth during 1966 was swift and by 1 January 1967 the system had expanded to 36 operational stations and one approved but not operational station. The continued increase in number of stations and total traffic handled during 1967 is graphically depicted in Figure VIII-9 following. <sup>123</sup>

UNCLASSIFIED

MARS STATIONS TRAFFIC - 1967




Figure VIII-9

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

## MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

### General

(U) In 1967 MACMD (Surgeon) activities were oriented toward the improvement of medical services in support of US/RVN/FWMA forces. These activities included expansion of medical assets, improving health standards and conditions through preventive medicine, evacuation of the sick and wounded, and a medical program oriented toward improvement of health services for the people of RVN.

### Expansion of Medical Assets

(C) Medical capabilities were enhanced during 1967 with the activation of the 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh on 9 January, the completion of the 71st Evacuation Hospital at Pleiku in June, and the arrival of a second hospital ship, the Sanctuary, in June. Also during 1967, to bolster in-country medical assets to support increased medical services requirement, the following additional medical units were deployed to RVN:

<u>1st Qtr (Jan - Mar)</u>	<u>2nd Qtr (Apr - Jun)</u>
14th Med Det	154th Med Det
498th Med Det	519th Med Det
500th Med Det	534th Med Det
222nd Pers Svc Co	437th Med Det
	518th Med Det
	551st Med Det

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>3rd Qtr (Aug -Sep)</u>	<u>4th Qtr (Oct - Dec)</u>
45th Med Corp (Air Ambulance)	67th Med Gp (Main Body)
54th Med Det (Heli-Ambulance)	159th Med Det (RA) (Heli-Ambulance)
67th Med Gp Hq (Adv Party)	50th Med Det (RA) (Heli-Ambulance)
	571st Med Det (RA) (Heli-Ambulance)
	22nd Surgical Hospital

## Hospitalization

(U) During 1967 there was a noticeable upward trend in hospital admissions. This was attributed to the increase in strength of US forces in RVN and the concurrent exposure of a greater number of US troops to the enemy in combat operations, to adverse Vietnam environmental conditions, and to a variety of exotic diseases. The hospital admissions for 1967 broken down by categories (Injuries resulting from hostile action (IRHA), non-battle injuries (NBI), and diseases for 1967 were:

<u>Month</u>	<u>IRHA</u>	<u>NBI</u>	<u>Diseases</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	2,276	2,225	9,760	14,261
Feb	2,923	1,966	8,644	13,533
Mar	3,340	2,578	10,100	16,018
Apr	2,973	2,127	10,986	16,086
May	4,247	2,587	13,133	19,967
Jun	3,170	2,370	12,882	18,422

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>Month</u>	<u>IRHA</u>	<u>NBI</u>	<u>Diseases</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jul	3,017	2,215	11,615	16,847
Aug	2,417	2,278	14,398	19,093
Sep	3,418	2,716	13,447	19,626
Oct	2,689	2,768	15,623	21,098
Nov	3,663	3,083	14,866	21,613
Dec	3,078	3,043	14,723	<u>20,844</u>
TOTAL				217,407

As can be seen, the main cause of high hospitalization rates was disease which represented twice the combined total of NBI and IRHA. Some of the more significant diseases contributing to high hospitalization rates were malaria, fevers of unknown origin (FUO), dermatologic conditions, respiratory ailments, and diarrhea conditions. The monthly tabulations are as follows:

<u>Diseases</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Malaria	668	455	543	687	882	1,023
FUO	1,368	1,373	1,591	2,122	2,427	2,273
Dermatologic conditions	948	697	850	800	1,033	1,123
Respiratory ailments	1,212	698	1,040	998	1,389	981
Diarrhea	1,219	1,319	1,643	2,003	2,739	1,884

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>Diseases</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Malaria	1,045	826	920	1,456	1,208	961
FUO	2,193	2,278	2,390	2,759	2,377	2,349
Dermatologic conditions	1,034	1,990	1,516	1,585	1,704	1,760
Respiratory ailments	879	1,783	1,758	1,978	2,552	2,619
Diarrhea	1,563	2,025	1,808	1,864	2,062	1,719

Hepatitis, eye infections and neuropsychiatric cases also impacted on hospital admissions.

(U) Based on a rate per thousand for the total troop population in-country, a comparison of the leading causes of hospitalization for 1966 and 1967 showed a slight downward trend:

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Admission Rate</u>	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Hostile Action Injuries	74.7	80.7
Non-Battle Injuries	70.5	65.1
Fevers of Unknown Origin	57.5	50.2
Diarrheal Diseases	49.7	47.1
Respiratory Diseases	45.0	39.6
Dermatologic Conditions	33.2	32.6
Malaria	28.2	23.1
Neuropsychiatric Conditions	14.5	10.5
Hepatitis	3.6	5.9

# UNCLASSIFIED

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Admission Rate</u>	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Heat Injury	4.5	2.5
Eye Disorders	5.3	3.0

(U) The following figures point out quite vividly the detrimental effects diseases had upon US Forces:

<u>Condition</u>	<u>No. of Cases</u>		<u>Avg Duration</u>		<u>Days Lost</u>	
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Malaria	7,882	10,674	35	25	275,870	266,850
FUO	16,060	25,910	7	9	112,420	233,190
NP	4,050	4,812	37	37	149,850	178,044
Hepatitis	1,006	2,729	40	40	40,240	109,160
Respiratory	12,582	18,265	7	7	88,074	127,855
Dermatologic	9,263	15,021	8	8	74,104	120,168
Diarrheal	13,874	21,716	4	3	55,496	65,148

The most poignant fact about the above chart is the number of days lost as a result of hospitalization. A comparison of 1966 and 1967 figures indicate an upward trend in total days lost for each disease. To offset this trend increasing Command emphasis was placed on medical activities, particularly preventive medicine, orientating them toward better health conditions and standards to lessen the effects of disease on troop efficiency.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Preventive Medicine

(U) As in 1966, preventive medicine activities in RVN were oriented toward the establishment of health standards and conditions which would enable the fighting forces to adjust to environmental conditions of RVN with little or no loss of combat effectiveness. One of these activities, and one of the most important, was the fixed-wing aerial dispersal of insecticides by C-123 aircraft to assist in malaria control; this was accomplished only in secure areas such as base camps and outposts which were located within known malaria-infested areas. This preventive measure was also supplemented with expanded educational programs on the Armed Forces Radio and Television stations and included instructions on precautions and prophylactic measures against malaria.

(U) In an attempt to improve sanitation, health and living conditions of the troops, MACV updated and republished several regulations covering food service sanitation, prevention and control of communicable diseases of animals, waste disposal, and insect and rodent control. These regulations delineated command and individual responsibilities for maintaining health standards. MACV Directive 40-16, Food Service Sanitation, provided command guidance for mess sanitation, and placed particular emphasis on bacillary and amebic dysentery, typhoid fever, food poisoning, acute gastroenterities, diarrheal conditions, infectious hepatitis, and cholera--the major causes of troop ineffectiveness. In addition to emphasizing the need for high mess sanitation standards in the food storage and preparation, the directive also stressed that all military personnel should be informed of the hazards of eating on the economy in RVN.

(U) Emphasis was placed on preventing the exportation of rodent infested retrograde cargo from RVN. This came about as a result of rodents found in some retrograde cargoes, revealing the possibility that plague could be transmitted from RVN to plague free countries. As a result of the numerous incidents involving cargo infestation, greater command emphasis was placed on rodent and insect control activities. To insure compliance with MACV directives regarding the rodent control problem, a team of officers from J4 and the Surgeon's office was sent to the field to inspect selected depots, ports and aerial terminal facilities. These inspection trips included visits to Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Long Binh, Saigon, and

# CONFIDENTIAL

Vung Tau. The inspections indicated that rodent infestation of retro-grade cargo did not occur at terminal facilities, but in areas where the cargo was prepared for shipment. They also revealed that all activities were making concerted efforts to prevent the infestation of cargo and were complying with the directives on insect and rodent control.

## Medical Evacuation

(C) In March the 10th Aeromedical Evacuation Group (MAC) established C-141 flights from Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay to Yokota, Japan, to CONUS. The first flight from Da Nang was initiated on 2 April and from Cam Ranh Bay on 5 April. Subsequent scheduling planned for two flights weekly from Cam Ranh Bay and three weekly flights from Da Nang. The expeditious evacuation of the seriously wounded and sick provided bed spaces for the less seriously wounded and sick personnel who did not require prolonged hospitalization in PACOM or CONUS. Additionally, in March, the 25th Casualty Staging Flight (CSF), Qui Nhon, and the 26th Casualty Staging Flight, Cam Ranh Bay, became operational. The 25th CSF located with the 85th Evacuation Hospital had a capacity of 50-beds, and the 26th CSF located with the 12th USAF Hospital had a 35-bed capacity. All patients scheduled for out-of-country evacuation were reported to the Air Force by the CSFs.

(C) The number of patients evacuated to PACOM and CONUS during 1967, by categories, were:

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Jan - Mar</u>	<u>Apr - Jun</u>	<u>Jul - Sep</u>	<u>Oct - Dec</u>
Army	5,479	6,094	4,528	6,136
Navy/Marines	2,629	3,999	3,717	3,253
Air Force	442	483	440	411
FWMAF	354	473	490	587
Others	<u>141</u>	<u>153</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>130</u>
TOTAL	9,045	11,202	9,319	10,517

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP)

(C) In April new medical supply procedures for US advisory teams were approved which changed the alignment of advisory procurement procedures to coincide with those used by other US/FWMA forces customers of the US military supply systems. Division and special zone general medical officers were assigned responsibilities for medical technical supervision of items to be requisitioned and used by all advisory teams within the division/special zone area. Additionally, plans were underway to transfer logistical responsibility for medical supplies from USAID to MACV; this was to result in a concurrent transfer to MEDCAP supply support of US/FWMA forces from the ARVN medical depot system to US military logistics systems in RVN. However, ARVN medical depots would retain MEDCAP supply support of RVNAF. On 1 July the DOD-AID realignment program resulted in the transfer of MEDCAP medical supply responsibility to the US Army (see DOD-AID realignment, this chapter). The new supply system for MEDCAP allowed for the expansion in expendable medical supplies as stocked in the Army medical supply system. Previously MEDCAP had been limited to 125 designated items; under the new system, no separation of MEDCAP supplies was required. This allowed the Medical Supply Officer to furnish MEDCAP supplies in a more convenient and efficient manner.

(U) MEDCAP treatments during 1967 reflected increased participation over 1966 by ARVN in the program. This increased participation was very much in consonance with the intent of the program. MEDCAP treatments by quarters are shown below:

<u>1967</u>	<u>MEDCAP I</u>	<u>MEDCAP II</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Qtr (Jan - Mar)	2,088,236	776,522	2,864,758
2d Qtr (Apr - Jun)	2,192,192	949,197	3,141,389
3d Qtr (Jul - Sep)	1,131,825	1,043,961	2,175,786
*4th Qtr (Oct - Nov)	938,662	895,580	1,834,242

\*Reporting not complete, estimate 200,000 additional treatments credit to MEDCAP II.

# UNCLASSIFIED

From all indications the MEDCAP had a favorable impact on the Vietnamese people while continuing to provide considerable support to the overall GVN health program. For further discussion of MEDCAP, see Chapter VII, Section E.<sup>124</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## PORT DEVELOPMENT

### Introduction

(U) In 1965 when US and FW forces deployed in strength to RVN to counter the VC/NVA insurgency, there were only two deep water ports in RVN--Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, and these ports had only ten and two deep draft berths, respectively. All logistical support for US/FWMA forces had to pass through these woefully inadequate ports. The enemy controlled or could interdict major portions of the north-south road and railway LOCs from these two ports. Much of the distribution of free world supplies therefore, of necessity, had to be accomplished by airlift into provisional airfields. It was obvious that as the US/FWMA forces troop strength increased, and RVN forces were enlarged and supported for expanding offensive action, the existing two port/airlift long-haul logistics system was wholly inadequate.

(U) The solution arrived at in 1965 was to develop during 1965 and 1966 four separate logistic islands in RVN: Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon. Additionally, smaller shallow water ports had to be selected, developed and then resupplied by intracoastal shipping from these deep water ports. These ports and subports were chosen so as to make logistic operation from the sea the primary LOC in the flow of supplies inland to the US and FWMA force units. Later (1967) an additional deep draft port was constructed at Vung Tau.

(U) By 1967 the majority of the construction at all these ports had been completed. It had been a Herculean task, particularly when one considers that concomitant to building these ports, supplies to support over 750,000 combat and service troops had been transhipped through them; the construction was accomplished in a hostile environment, under the deleterious effects of an unfavorable climate and topography; and material had come from as far as 12,000 miles away. <sup>125</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## The Saigon Port

(U) Saigon, with its predominantly Chinese suburb of Cholon, is the traditional economic and political center of RVN. It is situated on the west bank of the meandering Saigon River, 43 miles from the South China Sea. Shipping for Saigon proceeded from Vung Tau up the narrow, twisting, poorly marked channels of the Long Tau and Saigon Rivers. Enroute to Saigon, river traffic had to transit the VC-infested Rung Sat Special Zone.

(U) The Saigon Port complex was made up of three distinct areas-- the commercial port, the Fish Market area, and the Newport (military) (see Figures VIII-10 and 11). In addition, there was the ammunition unloading and storage complex centered about Cat Lai, and numerous canals bordered by storehouses (go-downs) served by thousands of junks and barges.

(U) As the economic center of the nation, Saigon's port was the bellwether of the RVN's economic viability as well as the USG's ability to stabilize the economy and government of Vietnam. From 1965 to 1967 Saigon had been a separate and prime logistic problem area. Even though much military and limited amounts of USAID cargo moved through other ports in RVN during this time, all transoceanic commercial cargo for RVN continued to move through Saigon. Saigon bound military cargo was destined primarily for US/FW/RVN forces in the southern III CTZ and in the IV CTZ.

(U) Congestion in the port had manifested itself as soon as large numbers of US and FW forces arrived in RVN. The port in its arrangement, its physical location, its working routine and its material handling equipment was geared to support an agricultural economy, not a vast, modern war machine. What was required was a completely separate port, free from the overburdening USAID/commercial cargoes and at the same time an overhauling of the traditional port. A military port, dubbed Newport, was planned in 1965. Construction of it had started that same year. Meanwhile, modernization of the existing commercial port was undertaken. This was a continuing process that required constant liaison with the GVN and local port agencies.

(U) Adding to the problems of the Saigon Port was the susceptibility of the Long Tau Channel to interdiction by the Viet Cong. Despite

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure VIII-10

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure VIII-11

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

constant USN and VNN minesweeping and convoy patrolling, the channel was never considered safe. Blockage by a sunken ship was a continual danger potentially catastrophic to military operations. Fortunately, despite numerous attacks on merchant and military shipping or craft, the VC were not successful in their attempts to block the channel leading to Saigon.

(U) Starting in mid-1965 the Saigon Port had become overcrowded with dozens of ships and hundreds of barges filled with military, USAID, and commercial cargoes. The river anchorages near and in Saigon and the waiting anchorage at Vung Tau were choked with ships in a hold status throughout 1965 and most of 1966. Demurrage fees mounted and worse, vital cargoes did not get to the front-line soldiers in a timely fashion due to the inadequate, antiquated off-loading facilities and regulations in Saigon Port and the port's resulting low throughput capability.

(U) Aggravating the problem had been the Commodity Import Program (CIP) which entailed USG financing of commercial imports to saturate the Vietnamese market with salable goods and thus "soak up" the inflationary excesses caused by the rapid, large influx of US/FWMA forces into Vietnam. In essence the problem had been to expand Saigon's port capability to handle military and CIP cargoes while making every effort to insure that, at the same time, the movement of civilian goods was not adversely affected.

## Saigon Port--1966

(C) During 1966 the cargo backlog problem at Saigon persisted and at times grew worse. Based on numerous newspaper articles and congressional reports pressures were generated in Washington for MACV to take over operation of all port activities in Saigon. COMUSMACV, fully supported by the AMEMB and CINCPAC, did not agree with such a position. COMUSMACV believed that the essentially civilian problem of commercial cargo clearance should be left in civilian hands, while AMEMB and MACV supported an intensified advisory effort. Besides, the root problem was not the physical handling of the cargo from ship to shore but the clearance of the cargo from the port into the hands of importers, a civilian matter, not within the province of an army transportation company or navy cargo handling battalion.

PAGE 811 OF 140 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Compounding this problem was the fact that the USG's CIP had been welcomed too enthusiastically by local importers, who had ordered more goods than they could move. When these goods arrived the importers had been reluctant to tie up their cash by paying the duties and port tariff and had left their goods in the port's warehouses. MACV and the AMEMB (August 1966) repeatedly urged enforcement of existing GVN regulations which required cargoes to be cleared within 30 days of arrival or be confiscated. This effort was of little avail. Consequently, unless and until this situation was changed by aggressive action on the part of the GVN, COMUSMACV saw no real point in a military take-over of the port, which at best would only have transferred the congestion to inland holding areas. To ease the commercial cargo backlog COMUSMACV did agree to military handling of USAID Central Purchasing Authority (CPA) cargo, since CPA goods were USAID financed commodities consigned to the GVN for use in the counterinsurgency program and were therefore quasi-military.

(C) Under the tutelage of the 125th Terminal Command, the efficiency and organization of the commercial port in 1966 did improve, but the basic problem of cargo clearance from the port was not solved during that year. In December 1966 a joint White House/State/USAID/Defense message directed COMUSMACV to submit a plan for full military operation of the Saigon Port by 1 February 1967, if feasible, but in any case not later than 1 March 1967. This order was a direct reaction to the port situation wherein ships were held at anchor up to 45 days and sometimes longer before being assigned berths.

(C) The take-over plan was prepared and forwarded as directed but included recommendations against implementation. COMUSMACV pointed out that: (1) the plan would require US forces over and above those then in-country or approved by SECDEF; (2) action to draw the additional troop requirements from current assets would have an adverse effect on military operations; (3) vehicular capability to move the projected 63,000 STON of cargo per month was available only at the expense of combat support; and (4) government-to-government agreements for the GVN to issue stringent customs and tariff regulations and allow the US to enforce them would be required. Moreover, COMUSMACV considered that implementation of the plan would result in adverse political implications, loss of confidence by the populace, refutation of the US Revolutionary Development programs, and branding of the US as a colonialist instead of a nation-builder. 126

# CONFIDENTIAL

Saigon Port--1967

(C) As 1967 began the Saigon Port was in a crisis. Although military cargo operations at the leased commercial facilities were proceeding without undue problems, commercial port was jammed with loaded ships, barges and cargo. Some 311,400 STON of cargo were waiting to be off-loaded from ships in the port and at Vung Tau. Pressures grew for a complete US military take-over of the port. The consensus in the AMEMB was that the GVN would not agree to a complete US take-over of the Saigon Port. Without such agreement any such plan was considered foredoomed to failure. An additional argument against MACV operation of the commercial port was that the GVN would not be gaining the experience in port management that was desirable in the nation-building effort on which the US presence in RVN was broadly based. As CINCPAC pointed out in supporting the COMUSMACV/AMEMB position:

In addition to the political implications in take-over of commercial operations in Saigon, there is no assurance that take-over would solve root problems. CINCPAC notes continuing reference in msg traffic on this subject to importer difficulties in financing and storing commodities when market conditions are slow.

Another factor . . . is the inconsistency of the US pursuing a nation building program on one hand, while at the same time proposing take-over by US personnel of one of the essential elements of national responsibility. Inasmuch as the whole fabric of RVN commercial practice is involved, it would appear that US interests can best be served by encouraging and aiding the Vietnamese to improve their procedures rather than by forced transfer of the operation to US military control.

The Manila communique provided for withdrawal of US military forces from RVN within a period of six months under certain conditions. The US military currently provides extensive support to RVNAF, USAID and other US agencies in RVN. The greater the US involvement in the

PAGE 813 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

operation of these agencies and in assistance to RVN civil government, the greater the problems should there be a rapid US military withdrawal.

CINCPAC concurs in the need for extraordinary action to clear the port and provide for rapid clearance of goods into the RVN economy. The most constructive, long lasting, and in the long run, effective means of accomplishing this objective is by bolstering the RVN effort toward self-accomplishment.

(C) Correspondence between Saigon and Washington concerning possible plans of action continued into mid-February. US agencies were preoccupied with the number of barges under load in Saigon, which in fact had been increasing, although the actual cargo tonnage backlog had been decreasing (from 311,394 STON on 1 January 1967 to 164,385 STON on 20 February 1967). The AMEMB recognized that much of the cargo had been discharged to barges and in late January reported to SECDEF that:

With respect to the whole questions of the number of barges under load, we believe it has been over-emphasized. The pool of goods in the port serves the definite economic purpose of discouraging hoarding and market speculation.

. . . MACV and USAID have considered the feasibility of "mass discharge" [of barges]. Such a plan would closely parallel a similar experiment conducted by the GVN Port Director during December, which proved to be a failure in that cargo accumulated in great quantities on the quay awaiting consignee pickup.

However, the gradually improving cargo backlog situation and the firm position of COMUSMACV, USAID, and CINCPAC apparently dampened concern in Washington, as no pressure for a MACV take-over of the port occurred after mid-February.

(U) Meanwhile, the first of four military deep draft berths at Newport was completed in January 1967 which permitted the return to civilian

# UNCLASSIFIED

use of one berth at the commercial port. The 4th Transport Command, however, continued to operate four other deep draft berths at the commercial port and one at the Fish Market. In April the second deep draft berth at Newport was completed, and another berth in the commercial port was released by COMUSMACV to civilian use, further easing the commercial port's backlog problem.

(U) The progress made in the commercial port operations during the early months of 1967 was due in large part to the advisory effort of the 125th Terminal Command and USAID. The GVN Port Authority by early 1967 was in fact operating the port, not just watching the port operate. A major innovation was the obtaining of cargo stowage plans by ships' agents from ships prior to their arrival and the use of these to work out discharge plans with the stevedore companies. These plans were then submitted to the Port Authority prior to the ships' being called up on berth. Then a task force made up of personnel from the Port Authority, 125th Terminal Command, and USAID called on importers and notified them exactly where and when their consignments would be unloaded. GVN Customs allowed the importer to clear his cargo using the ship manifest prior to discharge, thereby delivering the cargo directly to the importers' trucks "from the hook" and obviating any dockside storage--the biggest obstacle to raising the port's through-put capability.

(U) After initial growing pains importers saw the advantages to this system and cooperation increased. In March 1967 two ships were unloaded of virtually all their cargo (99.6% and 97.2%) in this manner. An inventory of old cargo on barges, and the new practice of accurate preparation of manifests of cargo discharged to barges allowed a similar system of pre-clearing and calling up of barges when importers were ready to receive their goods. This made possible accelerated barge discharge without further crowding of in-transit facilities. By March, after much urging, the GVN began moving long unclaimed cargo out of the port to inland holding areas and published new tariffs reflecting increased penalties and storage rates for over-age cargo. This action was a great boon in the total effort to clear the port of cargo stored over 30 days. The direct result was an increase in port discharge and throughput rates.

(U) By late spring the Saigon commercial port crisis was essentially over. On 21 May CO, 4th Transportation Command, reported that "Four commercial vessels are at Cap St. Jacques (Vung Tau) waiting for berths

# UNCLASSIFIED

at Saigon Port. . . . Under the circumstances, I feel that the backlog of commercial vessels is virtually eliminated." A month later, on 20 June, there were no ships in a hold status, and only four ships (with 6,300 STON of cargo) waiting at Cap St. Jacques. All of these ships were waiting by choice of the owner and agent concerned. Ship turnaround time was down to an average of seven days, compared to 89 days ten months earlier. In three months time the number of barges under load had dropped from 966 to 79. Similarly, the number of barges under load over 30 days was 16 compared to 658 in March.

(U) In the meanwhile the advisory effort took other actions which also contributed to the above results. The Harbor Police were assisted in their efforts to enhance the physical security of the Saigon commercial port by initiation of joint US-VN patrols, joint guard posts at gates, issuance of personnel and vehicle access passes, initiation of searches, construction of watch towers and installation of lighting. Physical conditions at the commercial port were also improved through USAID provision of materials handling equipment, additional lighting, hardstands, and warehousing. The well-being of the port's workers was also of concern. Clean-up of the port area, increased safety standards and practices, and greater cooperation between the unions and the stevedoring companies all led to enhanced port operation. These improvements and efforts started in 1966 and bore fruit in 1967.

(U) The phenomenal progress made in the Saigon Port's operations made it possible for the military to begin returning full responsibility for port handling and clearance of cargo to the GVN on 21 August 1967. During the first month of full GVN responsibility over 46,000 STON of cargo were handled with no major problems.

(U) The military advisory effort was so successful that by December 1967 it was possible to approve a joint MACV/USAID Saigon Port Advisory Plan providing for the orderly transfer of advisory functions for the Saigon Port Authority from MACV to USAID. This plan provided for a six-month turnover period with alternative turnover periods of 4 or 12 months. USAID required six months to recruit and train an advisory organization so the total time to implement the plan was considered to be from 10 to 12 months. Included were provisions for an extensive GVN training and equipment adjustment program. At year's end the plan's implementation date was being negotiated with USAID in Washington.<sup>127</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

### Summary of Saigon Port Facilities

(C) The deep draft, shallow draft, and lighterage port of Saigon was divided into two categories: military (Newport, Cat Lai and leased commercial facilities) and commercial (the commercial port and the Fish Market area). Of the latter, in use by the military at the end of 1967 were:

- 1) Commercial port berths: 3
- 2) Fish Market berths: 1
- 3) Barge sites: 4

Newport, the USG built deep draft, shallow draft, and lighterage port upriver from the commercial port consisted of:

- 1) Four deep draft quays.
- 2) Two LST slips.
- 3) One LCU/LCM ramp.
- 4) Four barge sites.

At the end of 1967 no major construction of new facilities was planned for the commercial port. Repair and modernization of existing facilities would be undertaken by USAID and the GVN. Newport pier/ramp facilities were complete.

(C) The Cat Lai complex was used exclusively for ammunition unloading. Ships anchored in the stream and discharged their cargo to barges. Facilities at Cat Lai included:

- 1) One barge site at Buu Long.
- 2) Two barge sites at Cogido.
- 3) One barge site at Can Bien Thieu.
- 4) One barge site at Can Bin Loi.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5) Four barge sites at Than Tuy Ha.
- 6) One LCM ramp at Cat Lai.
- 7) Three mooring buoys at Cat Lai.

Only the Buu Long barge site (300 STON/day) and the Cogido barge sites (1,200 STON/day) were used exclusively for US ammunition. The other facilities were mainly dedicated to RVNAF. Planned expansion of US facilities, beginning in July 1968, would increase US throughput to 4,000 STON/day.

(C) As of the end of 1967 Saigon Port military facility discharge rates were: 128

1) Commercial port:	5,383 STON/day
2) Newport:	6,060 STON/day
3) Cat Lai complex:	<u>5,066</u> STON/day
TOTAL:	16,509 STON/day

#### Other Ports

(U) With the exception of the Da Nang logistic island in the I CTZ, which was operated by the US Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, all ports in RVN were US Army-operated. At the beginning of 1966, except for Saigon, Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were the only deep water ports in RVN with alongside berthing--and these two ports were of extremely limited capacities. During 1966 an additional deep water port was opened at Qui Nhon, and existing facilities at other ports were upgraded to the extent that by the end of that year military cargoes destined for all ports in RVN except Saigon were moving without undue delay.

#### I CTZ

(C) US/RVN/FWMA forces in I CTZ were served primarily through the deep draft, shallow draft, and lighterage port of Da Nang. Da Nang

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

was the intracoastal transshipment point for the subsidiary shallow draft port of Chu Lai to the south and the shallow draft complex centered about Hue to the north. The latter included facilities at Cua Viet, Phu Bai, Dong Ha, Tam My, and Dam Sam (see Figures VIII-12, 13, 14, and 15). Intracoastal requirements accounted for approximately 20 percent of the Da Nang throughput.

(C) During 1966 Da Nang had been upgraded to a first class deep draft port by the construction of:

- 1) Two piers (one permanent, one DeLong).
- 2) Nine LST ramps.
- 3) Two causeway sections for lighterage.
- 4) A 1,600 foot quay wall.
- 5) A lighterage site.

At the beginning of 1967 another DeLong pier was under construction and became operational in March. "In addition, by the end of 1967 Da Nang also boasted eight LCU ramps."

(C) At the beginning of 1967 Da Nang had two POL lines (4"). These were augmented by two 10" lines and two 12" assault lines during 1967.

(C) During 1966 the shallow draft Hue complex had been expanded to include:

- 1) Hue:
  - a) Three LCU ramps.
  - b) One 4" assault POL line.
- 2) Tam My:
  - a) Three LCU ramps.

UNCLASSIFIED

CUA VIET - DONG HA




Figure VIII-12

PAGE 820 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

# HUE - PHU BAI - TAN MY




Figure VIII-13

PAGE 821 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

# DA NANG




Figure VIII-14

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure VII-15

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

At year's end an additional LCU/LCM ramp site at Dong Ha, expected BOD of June 1968, was planned. Planned for Tam My were two more LST ramps in March and two in April 1968, while a T-2 POL terminal with two 8" lines was under construction; BOD April 1968.

(C) Chu Lai was a shallow draft and lighterage port approximately 50 miles south of Da Nang. It had been upgraded during 1966 from a beaching area to a shallow draft port by construction of:

- 1) Four LST ramps.
- 2) Three LCU ramps.
- 3) One 4" assault POL line.

At the beginning of 1967 planned improvements called for an additional two LST ramps and a 700-foot marginal wharf. However, the changed tactical situation in I CTZ during 1967, with more units being committed further north near the DMZ, resulted in the deletion of the additional two LST ramps. The 700-foot marginal wharf was completed in January 1967 though. The only other significant construction during 1967 was the building of two 4" assault POL lines in the inner harbor and one 8" and one 12" submarine moored pipeline.

(C) Port discharge rates in I CTZ as of 31 December 1967 were: 129

<u>Port</u>	<u>STON/Day</u>	<u>Bbl/Day</u>
Da Nang	10,560	309,000
Hue complex	2,125	14,000
Chu Lai	<u>2,040</u>	<u>151,000</u>
TOTAL:	14,725	574,000

## II CTZ

(U) The II CTZ was served by five ports: Cam Ranh Bay (CRB), Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Phan Pang, and Vung Ro. CRB and Qui Nhon were the deep draft ports and thus the main points for influx of men and material. (See Figures VIII-16, 17, 18, 19, and 20)

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CAM RANH BAY




Figure VIII-10

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure VIII-17

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

QUI NHON




Figure VIII-18

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED PHAN RANG




Figure VIII-19

UNCLASSIFIED

TUY HOA - VUNG RO




Figure VIII-20

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) CRB was a deep draft, shallow draft, and lighterage port, militarily comparable to Da Nang or Saigon in importance. Port facilities that had become operational during 1966 were:

- 1) Four DeLong piers.
- 2) One permanent pier (actually an old MAP facility).
- 3) A 300' sheet pile wharf.
- 4) A 220' marginal barge wharf.
- 5) Two 6" POL lines.

(C) Improvements carried out in 1967 included enlargement of the permanent pier and lengthening of the sheet pile wharf to 600 feet. A two-point 130-foot high gantry crane for unloading non-self-sustaining containerhips was completed on the No. 4 DeLong pier in October. This permitted non-self-sustaining containerhips to unload at CRB. At CRB their cargo was reloaded on self-sustainers for transshipment to either Saigon or Qui Nhon (containerhip service in RVN commenced at the Da Nang self-sustaining facility on 1 August 1967). Underway but not completed at year's end was construction of two LST ramps (ammunition), scheduled for completion in February 1968, and 1,100 feet of additional sheet pile wharfage, scheduled for completion in April 1968.

(C) CRB was the storage and redistribution point for POL in southern II CTZ. As additions to the existing two 6" POL lines, end of year plans called for a T-5 jetty with three 12", two 8" and two 6" POL lines, all expected to be completed by February 1968.

(C) Approximately 25 miles to the north of CRB was the satellite lighterage and shallow draft port of Nha Trang. Its facilities included an LST ramp, two barge points, and two 6" POL lines. Two more LST ramps were constructed during 1967. At year's end no further expansion of this port was planned.

(C) Qui Nhon was a deep draft, shallow draft, and lighterage port. It supported US/RVN/FWMA forces in the northern half of the II CTZ. Prior to 1967 the following facilities had been constructed at Qui Nhon:

# CONFIDENTIAL

- 1) One deep draft DeLong pier.
- 2) Two temporary LST ramps.
- 3) One pontoon LCM pier.
- 4) A boat landing ramp.
- 5) A LCU/LCM beach.
- 6) Two 4" assault POL lines.

(C) During the first half of 1967 two 4" submarine and a 6" commercial POL line became operational at Qui Nhon. As a result the two 4" assault lines were decommissioned in June 1967. At year's end the construction of two permanent LST ramps had been funded, but the start of construction was delayed due to material shortage. In addition, a 950-foot sheet pile bulkhead for deep draft shipping and an 1,800-foot ammunition barge wharf were requested and a DOD funding decision was pending.

(C) Phan Rang was a shallow draft port which had been built during 1966 to support the local jet airfield. It was capable of over the beach operations. At the beginning of 1967 it consisted of:

- 1) Three temporary LST ramps.
- 2) A barge facility.
- 3) Two 6" POL submarine pipelines.

No improvements were made during 1967 and none were planned for 1968.

(C) Vung Ro served the Vung Ro/Tuy Hoa area and jet airfield. As of 1 January 1967 this deep draft, shallow draft and lighterage port included the following facilities:

- 1) One DeLong pier.
- 2) Two temporary LST ramps.

# CONFIDENTIAL

- 3) A pontoon pier.
- 4) One 6" POL submarine pipeline.

During 1967 two 8" POL submarine pipelines were added to the port. At year's end no further expansion was planned.

(C) Port discharge rates in II CTZ as of 31 December 1967 were: 130

<u>Port</u>	<u>STON/Day</u>	<u>Bbl/Day</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	6,620	30,000
Nha Trang	900	30,000
Qui Nhon	6,275	59,000
Phan Rang	900	30,000
Vung Ro	<u>1,560</u>	<u>45,000</u>
TOTAL:	16,255	194,000

## III and IV CTZs

(C) Forces in the III and IV CTZs were supplied primarily from the Saigon Port complex or the Vung Tau roadstead by means of shallow draft shipping or land and air LOCs from these two points. At the beginning of 1967 Vung Tau had the following facilities: (See Figure VIII-21.)

- 1) One LST ramp.
- 2) Two barge points.

Constructed during the first half of 1967 were:

- 1) A deep draft DeLong pier.
- 2) Five barge points.
- 3) Two 4" assault POL pipelines.

UNCLASSIFIED

# VUNG TAU




Figure VIII-21

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

One temporary LST ramp and two barge points were constructed during the remainder of 1967. At year's end a T-2 capable jetty with 8' lines was under construction, with a projected completion date of March 1968.

(C) In the IV CTZ at the beginning of 1967 there was no US port facility. Supplies were sent to the Delta by either land or air LOCs or by use of small cargo auxiliaries, both commercial and USN (LSTs and AKLs). The first US port in IV CTZ was built at the Mobile Reverine Force's base camp at Dong Tam, eight km up the Mekong River from My Tho. This shallow draft port was constructed by dredging out an LST turning basin from the mud of the Delta. The basin was opened on 7 May. At that time its facilities included one permanent LCU ramp, one permanent LST ramp, and one temporary barge point. Toward year's end four additional barge points were constructed.

(C) Augmenting US facilities in the Delta during 1967 was a GVN shallow draft, three-barge capable T-head pier and two temporary LST ramps at Can Tho. This facility had been built in the early 60's, prior to the US buildup.

(C) Port discharge rates in III/IV CTZ as of 31 December 1967 were:<sup>131</sup> (See Figure VIII-22.)

<u>Port</u>	<u>STON/Day</u>	<u>Bbl/Day</u>
Vung Tau	2,450	21,000
Dong Tam	710	-
Can Tho	850	-
TOTAL:	4,010	21,000

Comparative Port Tonnages -- 1965-1967

(C) A clear indication of the size of the US port buildup in RVN can be grasped from the below port throughput totals:<sup>132</sup>

UNCLASSIFIED




Figure VIII-22

# CONFIDENTIAL

- 1) December 1965: 370,000 STON
- 2) December 1966: 970,000 STON
- 3) December 1967: 1,098,860 STON

## Deep Draft Berths Available in RVN 1965-1969

	1 Jan 65	1 Jan 66	1 Jan 67	1 Jan 68	1 Jul 68	1 Jan 69
Saigon	-	3*	4	4	4	4
Newport	-	-	-	4	4	4
Vung Tau	-	-	-	2	2	2
Cam Ranh	-	4	10	10	10	10
Vung Ro	-	-	2	2	2	2
Qui Nhon	-	-	4	4	4	4
Da Nang	-	-	4	6	6	6
TOTAL:	0	7	24	32	32	32

\*Three berths at Commercial Port of Saigon, not constructed by military but exclusively used by US military since December 1965. 133

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Summation

(U) Port capacity and performance in RVN continued to rise and improve throughout 1967, as they had in 1966 and 1965. Occasional slumps caused by known deleterious effects of the weather, particularly the NE monsoon, did slow unloading and transshipment operations at times. However, and most important, by the end of 1967 port capabilities in RVN had caught up with demand from the field. The frantic days of 1965 and 1966, when port discharge capabilities and facilities were both below that required by tactical operations, were over. Waterborne logistics receiving points could now meet tactical demands.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CONSTRUCTION

The construction program for Vietnam did not result full blown from any single planning action. Rather it began modestly in the late spring of 1965 and grew by leaps and bounds in a continuous expansion. . . .

(U) Its dynamic development was concurrent with and complementary to the expanding force structure and increasing tempo of operations in Vietnam. Functional type facilities such as ports, air bases, and depots were required, but number and location were at best educated guesses. The construction program had to remain flexible to reflect each change in operational and logistical concepts and requirements. In spite of the vague nature of requirement definition, decisions were made and resources and capabilities were assembled. Urgency was the order of the day and there is no question that it was the proper order in light of the situation. 134

(C) During the early stages of the construction program, there was a definite lack of adequate planning capability in the Army and Navy components. Both the Army and Navy utilized a decentralized system in which commanders on-the-scene were responsible to a large extent for their own planning. Neither the Army nor Navy had elements in-country capable of performing this task. As a consequence, both Services were forced to plan concurrently with the buildup underway, using makeshift staff elements. Confusion and delays in developing requirements and in translating these requirements into plans for execution resulted. It was apparent that centralized control of the construction program was necessary. Initially, in order to provide control on the Army side and to facilitate management of the program, COMUSMACV had placed the engineer element of MACJ4 in charge of the construction effort. The control and management responsibilities encompassed authority over construction standards, priorities, allocation of resources, base development plans, and project approvals. The role was essentially passive, with approval of the proposals of the components the usual practice. The passive nature of the engineer role resulted largely from the inability of the limited staff to cope physically with the program of such magnitude. 135

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) In December 1965, the MACV Engineer pointed up the problem by stating that:

The Theater did not have a centrally controlled and truly integrated single construction program, nor an integrated execution capability, but rather had three construction programs, three execution agencies, and four construction "bosses," i. e., the three component commanders and COMUSMACV. Such a system had distinct disadvantages in that it put the three component commanders in direct competition with each other for equipment, materials, funds, and facilities. In addition, the system lacked the flexibility necessary for timely responsiveness to changing requirements of theater needs, and tended to emphasize component interests rather than theater interests. 136

(C) To remedy the situation (on 6 January 1966) the Deputy SECDEF approved the establishment of an "engineer construction boss" within MACV. On 11 February 1966 the Construction Directorate (MACDC), MACV was established as a Special Staff Section, with a brigadier general as director. MACDC, similar to a Theater Engineer, handled the Military Construction Program (MILCON) for Vietnam. It exercised direct supervision and authority over all DOD construction commands and agencies, both military and civilian, in the RVN--except for those organic to major combat units. MACDC also assigned specific projects and their MILCON funds to the various construction agencies and adjusted equipment, materials, and the resources to meet established priorities. 137

## Contractor Construction

(C) Since 1965 the bulk of the construction effort in Vietnam had been handled by civilian contractors. The reason for the civilian contractor effort was a 1965 Presidential Policy decision not to call up the Reserves or National Guard. Since the Reserves and National Guard contained the preponderance of troop construction units, it was

# SECRET

necessary to go the contractor route. As the civilian construction effort depended on the availability of funds, it became apparent in January 1967 that the contractor would have to be demobilized because of a reduction in requested funds for the FY67 supplemental program and SECDEF's announced intention not to request a FY68 supplement. In February 1967 the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) (DOD construction agent for SEA), in conjunction with MACV, appraised the RMK-BRJ workload in light of the programmed construction requirements. This resulted in OICC recommending a reduction in the RMK-BRJ work force to a level of 30,000 by mid-March and projecting reductions through April 1968, at which time the civilian construction effort would terminate. The proposed plan was supported by the AMEMB Saigon and called for a close working relationship between the OICC and Service components to effect transfer of contractor assets to the Services as the contractor was phased out. According to the plan the contractor would be demobilized, insofar as military construction was concerned, by April 1968. Personnel remaining after that date would be largely for administrative closeout. As the contractors phased out, more of the construction effort would be assumed by the troops, and completion of the program would, therefore, require a longer time frame. However, the majority of hardcore operational and logistical requirements to which the contractor was best suited would be completed, and delays caused by the contractor phase-out were expected to have no appreciable impact on the tactical or logistical operations. 138

(S) In March a committee with MACV, OICC and Service component representatives was established by the Director of Construction to monitor and provide guidance to the agencies involved in the phaseout of the contract (RMK-BRJ) portion of MILCON. As the contractor completed construction at sites, the OICC would declare the releasable assets to the committee, and the committee would recommend the disposition of plant, equipment, and material to the Director of Construction. First priority for disposition of assets would be to other agencies working on MILCON, and would be received without reimbursement. The items not needed for MILCON would be available to the components, i. e., OMA, and then to non-DOD agencies on a reimbursable basis. As the programmed demobilization of the contractor continued, the military construction units would assume a greater role in the construction effort. However, as a result of the AID/DOD realignment in March, MACV supported the continuation of the contractor to augment the engineer effort, at least until the magnitude of the total LOC construction was completed. Under the AID/DOD realignment, MACV had assumed responsibility for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

highway maintenance and upgrading. If funds became available prior to the planned work force reduction in July, the contractor would be in a good position to assume a portion of the highway program and would also be used to assist in the construction of facilities required to support the Program 4 forces. 139

(S) In July MACV developed a plan for retaining the contractor until October 1968. Under this plan the contractor work force would stabilize at approximately 15,000 in order to maintain efficiency and have the capability to remobilize. In addition, COMUSMACV considered the possibility of substituting 7,000 civilian contract personnel for 5,700 construction troops thus allowing for possible 22,000 construction force. With a work force between 15,000-22,000, the contractor would be able to operate in an efficient and economic manner. However, the extension of the constructor force was dependent on the economies in the contractor's operations, increase in non-MILCON projects, and an increase in FY68 regular funds. If these efforts were successful, and the MACV FY69 program request for \$445 million for MILCON and MAP construction was approved, the civil contractor effort could be extended into FY69. 140

#### Engineer Construction Units

(U) The major benefit of troop construction was its universal capability which was designed to give it considerable flexibility as to where it could go and what it could do. In many respects it was self-sustaining. Contracts on the other hand were made upon the basis of specific capabilities tailor-made to a given job or jobs within an area and required extensive base facilities and considerable time for the contractor to mobilize on a job. However, the constructor forces, because of their tailored make-up, were more efficient than troop units; the latter had to adapt a universal capability to specific tasks. 141

(S) Regardless of the drawbacks of the troop construction unit, it was necessary for the military to assume a greater role in the construction effort with the programmed phase-out of the civilian contractor. As of 1 July the engineer construction assets available to support this requirement included 14 Army construction battalions, 11 Army combat battalions, 7 Navy NMCEBs, and 5 Air Force civil engineer

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

squadrons. Increased construction requirements to support Program 4 add-ons and Program 5 forces resulted in the deployment of additional construction units in early FY68, bringing the construction units country to 42 (15 Army construction battalions, 11 Army combat battalions, 11 NMCBs, and 5 Air Force squadrons).<sup>142</sup>

## Construction Funds

(U) In early 1967 the total funded Military Construction Program (MILCON and MAP) was \$1.08 billion. This included all military construction funds for US forces in RVN since 1965 regular appropriation and the unexpended balance of funds transferred from the Military Assistance Program (MAP). In mid-1967 the total funded program increased to \$1.482 billion with the inclusion of the \$397 million 1967 supplement. The status of construction funds (as of 30 September 1967) is shown below in thousands of dollars:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fund Availability:	757,628	354,703	367,860	1,480,191
Work In-Place:	430,230	251,075	279,992	961,297

A comparison of the funds available with work in-place (construction completed) reflected the funded MILCON Program to be 65 percent completed.<sup>143</sup>

(S) An October summary of COMUSMACV's requested funds for FY68 construction, including additional facilities required by Program 5, showed the following breakout of funds:

# SECRET

<u>FY/Category</u>	<u>Funding</u>
FY68 (Regular)	\$ 77 million
FY68 (Contingency)	195 million
FY68 (Supplemental)	<u>146 million</u>
TOTAL:	418 million

These funds were developed to support FY68 forces' construction requirements for road improvements, new or expanded airfields, expanded port facilities, expanded logistics facilities, and minimum essential base development. These fund requests were still pending at the end of the year. 144

(U) Base development and construction of land LOCs:

1) Construction at the Bien Hoa airfield of a parallel 10,000-foot concrete runway started in May 1967. The runway was required to support a MAC passenger and cargo terminal, the Long Binh/Long Thanh military complex and expansion of tactical in-country airlift operations. The project was 44 percent complete by the end of the year.

2) Airfield upgrade. Twenty-four Army airfields were upgraded to C-130 capability during CY67.

3) Quang Tri airfield. Construction which started on 15 September 1967 was completed on 18 October 1967 to provide an alternate to Dong Ha AB.

4) A base camp for a brigade of the 9th Inf Div and two Navy River Assault Groups (RAG) was built at Dong Tam where 600 acres of land were reclaimed by hydraulic fill. Construction started in January 1967 and was approximately 90 percent complete by the end of the year.

5) Lines of communication constructed during 1967 included:

	<u>Troop</u>	<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Total</u>
a) Kilometers of high-way and city streets restored to MACV standards	235 km*	39 km	274 km

# UNCLASSIFIED

\*Includes Joint Contractor - Troop Projects.

b) Kilometers of high-ways and city streets maintained	7,132 km	0	7,132 km
c) Meters of new bridg-ing constructed	5,553 m	2,020 m	7,573 m
d) Meters of destroyed/damaged bridging rebuilt or replaced with tactical bridg-ing	12,145 m	355 m	12,500m

6) Petroleum, oils, and lubricants:

a) Hue construction was completed in October 1967 with a two-mile pipeline from the ramp port of Col Co to 34,000 bbl storage tank farm.

b) In Qui Nhon a 193,000 bbl tank farm was completed during November 1967; construction of a POL jetty with a capacity of 2,500 bbl/hr was completed during December 1967.

c) Construction of a 53-mile six-inch pipeline from An Khe to Pleiku was 80 percent complete by December 1967. Additionally, construction of a marine POL terminal facility and connecting pipeline to a 576,000 bbl tank farm was 90 percent complete at Cam Ranh Bay. 145

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER VIII

### Footnotes

1. Rpt (C), British Military Attaches--Saigon, incl to Ltr (C), MACJ2, 3 Feb 67, Subj: Attache Team Report (U).
2. DF (S), MACJ43, 24 Mar 67, Subj: Input for Command History Publication (U).
3. Rpt (S), MACJ4, Jan 67, Subj: MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (U).
4. Ibid.
5. Army Buildup Progress Reports (S), DA, 1 Feb and 8 Mar 67.
6. Army Buildup Progress Report (S), DA, 8 Mar 67.
7. Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 232132Z Jul 67, Subj: Responsive Logistic Support for Combined Operations in RVN (U).
8. Ltr (S), COMUSMACV to USARV and NAVFORV, 14 Nov 67, Subj: Transfer of Logistics Responsibility, Southern I CTZ (U).
9. Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 210930Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 210010Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
10. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 260003Z May 67, Subj: Combat Service Support Staffing in RVN (U).
11. Memo (S), SECDEF to JCS, 13 Jun 67, Subj: Increased Use of SVN Civilians for US Troop Support (U); Msg (S), DA to CINCUSARPAC, 202108Z Jun 67, Subj: Combat Service Support Staffing in RVN (U).
12. J4 Historical Report (S), MACJ43-LM, 19 Jun 67; Fact Sheet (S), MACJ44, 23 Jul 67, Subj: Reduction of US Support Troops.
13. Fact Sheet (S), MACJ312, 12 Nov 67, Subj: Civilianization Schedule, Programs.

# UNCLASSIFIED

14. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 211132Z Dec 66, Subj: Korean Logistic Service Corps (KLSC) (C); Msg (S), SECSTATE 1-1541 to AMEMB Seoul, 15 Jan 67, Subj: FWA and KLSC (U).
15. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 250335Z Mar 67, Subj: Korean Logistic Service Corps (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 300140Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 150511Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.
16. Embtel (S), Saigon 28126 to SECSTATE, 141010Z Jun 67, Subj: Korean Participation in Vietnam.
17. Memo (S), MACJ44, 21 Nov 67, Subj: Korean Logistic Service Corps (U); DF (S), MACJ44, 13 Nov 67, Subj: Utilization of KLSC Units (C); Msg (S), SECSTATE 85568, 152352Z Dec 67.
18. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 170127Z Nov 67, Subj: Excess Supplies Materiel (U).
19. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 261948Z Nov 67.
20. Msg (U), CINCPAC to JCS, 010321Z Dec 67, Subj: Utilization and Redistribution of Excess Materiel in the Pacific Area (U).
21. Ltr (U), SECDEF to JCS, 30 Nov 66, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignments for Support of Operations in Vietnam (U).
22. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 060150Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.
23. Memo (U), Dir USAID to CofS MACV, 7 Jan 67, Subj: DOD Funding (U); Memo (U), CofS MACV to Dir USAID, 14 Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS, 13 Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS, 26 Jan 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignment (U); Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 161205Z Feb 67, Subj: AID/DOD Realignments for Operations in Vietnam (U); Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260900Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (U), DA to CINCPAC, 062210Z Mar 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignment for Support of Operations in Vietnam (U); Embtel (U), Saigon 19544 to SECSTATE, 4 Mar 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Alignment (U).
24. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ44, 2 Apr 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignments for Operations in Vietnam (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

25. Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 190052Z Apr 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignments for Support of Operations in RVN.
26. Rpt (S), MACJ4, Jan 67, Subj: MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (U), LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43, Jan - Aug 67, Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 300108Z Jan 68, Subj: Resume of Supply Situation in RVN, CY67 (U).
27. Msg (S), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 062358Z Dec 66, Subj: Subsistence Support of ROKFV (U).
28. Msg (S), COMUSKOREA to COMUSMACV, 081115Z Dec 66, Subj: Korean Combat Rations (U).
29. Msg (S), CINCPAC to OSD, 240220Z Dec 66, Subj: Subsistence Support of ROKFV (U).
30. Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Seoul, 280117Z Mar 67, Subj: Korean Combat Rations (U).
31. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 031220Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.
32. Msg (S), COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC, 040551Z Apr 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Seoul, 020215Z Apr 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 082251Z Apr 67; Embtel (S), Seoul to SECSTATE, 210450Z Apr 67; Ibid., 210245Z Apr 67; All Subj: Korean Combat Rations (U).
33. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Seoul, 201874, 252055Z May 67; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Seoul, 204916, 302045Z May 67; Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to COMROKRV, 12 Jun 67.
34. Embtel (S), Seoul to SECDEF, 150035Z Jun 67, Subj: Korean Combat Rations (U).
35. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 192303Z Aug 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260630Z Aug 67; Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 030022Z Sep 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 131222Z Jul 67; Ltr (U), HQ ROKFV, 3 Jul 67; 1st Ind (C), MACJ42, 3 Jul 67, All Subjs: Dorean Combat Rations (U).
36. Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 11 Oct 67.

# UNCLASSIFIED

37. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43-LM, Feb and May 67.
38. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CONCPAC, 271201Z Feb 67, Subj: Flagpole Report for Feb 67 (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 011338Z Apr 67, Subj: Flagpole Report for Mar 67 (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 241612Z Jul 67, Subj: Herbicide Shortage (U).
39. Msg (S), CG USARV to CINCUSARPAC, 301825Z May 67, Subj: APC and Tank Battle Loss Ratio--Project Codes MOI and MOU (U); Rpt (S), USARV, Apr 67, Subj: Operational Report--Lessons Learned (U)
40. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 181319Z Nov 66; Msg (S), MACV to CINCPAC, 220429Z Nov 66; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 230242Z Nov 66, All Subjs: Phase Allocation of XM16E1 Rifles; Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 012037Z Dec 66, Subj: Phased Allocation Plans for XM16/ZM16E1 Rifles (U); Rpt (S), DA, 15 Mar 67, Subj: Army Buildup Progress Report; Msg (C), DA to CINCPAC, 092053Z Jan 67, Subj: Phased Allocation of XM16E1 Rifles.
41. Memo (C), DCG USARV, 10 Jan 67, Subj: M16 Rifles and Ammunition (U); Memo (S), COMUSMACV, 17 Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 152150Z Nov 66, Subj: Issue of XM16E1 Rifles; Msg (C), MACV to USARV, 01895, 161231Z Jan 67, Subj: XM16E1/M16 Rifle Issue (U); Monthly Historical Report (S), MACJ43-LM, 19 Feb 67, Subj: XM16E1 (U).
42. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CSA, 182045Z Jan 67, Subj: Phased Allocation of XM16E1 Rifles (U).
43. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 180808Z Feb 67, Subj: Issue of XM16E1 Rifles (U); Saigon Daily News, 21 Feb 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 220439Z Feb 67, Subj: Issue of XM16E1 Rifles (U).
44. COMUSMACV Fact Sheet Vol II (TS), Apr 67; Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 102055Z Mar 67, Subj: M16A1 Rifle Distribution (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 032158 Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 210555Z Apr 67, Subj: M16A1 Distribution to Non-US Units; Monthly Historical Report (S), MACJ7, 17 Jun 67; MFR (U), MACJ42, 29 Apr 67, Subj: M16A1 Rifle Distribution to Non-US Forces (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to USARV, 030504Z May 67, Subj: Ibid.

# ~~SECRET~~

45. Monthly Historical Report (S), MACJ4, 17 Jun 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG/SA CTZs, 310312Z May 67; Msg (S), CG IFFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 091150Z Jun 67; Msg (S), DSA III Corps to COMUSMACV, 100100Z Jun 67, All Subjs: Issue of M16 Rifles to US Advisory Personnel (S).
46. Msg (S), DIA to CINCPAC, 142325Z Jul 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to DIA, 150925Z Jul 67, Subj: M16 Rifles from Singapore (U); Embtel (S), Singapore to DIA, 180231Z Jul 67, Subj: Diversion of M16 Rifles from Singapore (U).
47. Ltr (C), HQ ROKFV, 12 Jun 67, Subj: Additional Requirement of Rifle, 5.56mm, M16 for the Marine Brigade (U); DF (C), MACJ4, 27 Jun 67, Subj: ROKFV Request for Additional M16A1 Rifles (U); Ltr (C), HQ MACV, 4 Aug 67, Subj: Issue of Additional M16A1 Rifles to ROKFV Elements (U).
48. Ltr (U), HQ MACV, 16 Aug 67, Subj: Disposition of Weapons Generated Excess by Issue of M16 Rifles (U); Ltr (U), w/1st Ind, HQ ROKFV, 1 Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.
49. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 311231Z Jul 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 250421Z Aug 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 281011Z Aug 67; Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 022327Z Sep 67, All Subjs: M16A1 Rifle Distribution (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 102145Z Oct 67, Subj: M16A1 Rifle Priorities (U); Msg (S), DA to CINCPAC, 111738Z Oct 67, Subj: M16A1 Rifle Distribution (U).
50. DF (FOUO), MACJ4, 31 Aug 67, Subj: RVNAF Diversion of M16A1 Rifle (U); MFR (FOUO), MACJ4, 29 Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.; Ltr (U), RVNAF JCS to Abn Div VNMCC, 20 Jul 67; Ltr (U), HQ MACV, 2 Sep 67.
51. Ltr (U), USAMC, 25 May 67, Subj: After Action Report--AMCPM-RS Team Visit to Vietnam (U).
52. Baltimore Sun, 23 May 67; Washington Post, 1 Jun 67; Newport Daily News, 19 May 67.
53. Ibid.; Msg (U), NMCC to MACV, 261627Z May 67.

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

54. Fact Sheet and Talking Paper (U), AVHGD-MD, 8 Jun 67, Subj: M16A1 Rifle Problems (U).
55. Ibid.
56. Washington News, 5 Jul 67; Washington Star, 26 Jul 67.
57. Memo (C), MACV CoS to USARV CofS, 8 Jun 67, Subj: M16.
58. Msg (FOUO), COMUSMACV to USARV, 131101Z Aug 67, Subj: Visit Of MG R. L. Strong, Jr., USAF, Deputy Director for Inspection Service to RVN; Memo (U), MACJ02, 14 Aug 67, Subj: M16 Rifle Investigation--DINS Group.
59. Memo (C), MACJ03, 6 Sep.67, Subj: DINS Survey Group--M16 Rifle (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to Service Components and Major Subordinate Army Commands, 100230Z Sep 67, Subj: M16 Rifle Training (U).
60. Rpts (S), MACJ4, Jan and Apr 67, Subj: MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (U); LOGSUMs (S), MACJ-LM, Jan - May 67; Rpt (S), MACJ43-LM, Jan-May 67, Subj: J4 Historical Report.
61. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 150815Z Feb 67, Subj: POL Terminal CRB (U).
62. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 030517Z Apr 67.
63. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 251200Z Jul 67, Subj: POL Product Allocation for SEA, FY68 (U); Draft Ltr (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 5 Dec 66, Subj: Evaluation of POL Support RVN (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 180130Z Jan 67, Subj: POL Support RVN (U).
64. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 112214Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.
65. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 162332Z Dec 66, Subj: Allocation Munitions in Vietnam (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 24 Dec 66, Subj: Allocation of Critical Ground Munitions (U); Rpt (S), MACJ4, Jan 67, Subj: MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to CSA, 182301Z Jan 67, Subj: Critical Ground Munitions (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

66. Rpt (S), MACJ4, Jan 67, Subj: MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (U).
67. Ibid.: LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43-LM, Feb and May 67.
68. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 061219Z Feb 67, Subj: Critical Ground Munitions (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to DA, 182222Z Mar 67, Subj: Allocation of Ground Munitions in Vietnam (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 202056Z Mar 67, Subj: Allocation of Critical Ground Munitions (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 210523 Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.
69. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 041204Z May 67, Subj: 175mm Ammunition Requirement (U); LOGSUM (S), MACJ43-LM, May 67.
70. MFR (TS), MACV, 24 Jun 67, Subj: MACV Commanders' Conference, 11 Jun 67 (U); Memo (FOUO), MACJ03, 7 Aug 67, Subj: COMUSMACV News Conference (Fact Sheet).
71. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to USARV, 080951Z Jul 67, Subj: Artillery Requirements Planning Factors (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to FFORCES and III MAF, 110820Z Aug 67, Subj: Artillery Requirements (U).
72. Ltr (S), USARV to COMUSMACV, 6 Sep 67, Subj: Non-Divisional Artillery Requirements Planning Factors (U).
73. USA TM 9-1300-203, Apr 67, Subj: Artillery Ammunition (U); USA Mun Cmd Special Report on Development Type Munitions for SEASIA Feb 67 (C).
74. MFR (TS), MACCOC, 10 Apr 67, Subj: MACV Commanders' Conference, 2 Apr 67 (U).
75. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 161233Z Apr 67; Subj: Beehive Ammunition Production (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to USARV, 180809Z Apr 67, Subj: Issued 105mm Beehive Ammunition (U).
76. Msg (S), USARV to DA, 050937Z May 67, Subj: Beehive Ammunition, XM546.
77. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 10 May 67, Subj: Operational Employment of the 105mm Beehive Ammunition (U).

PAGE 852 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

78. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to USARV and III MAF, 171219Z May 67, Subj: 105mm Beehive Ammunition (U).
79. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 120530Z Jun 67, Subj: Ibid. ;  
Msg (S), CINCPAC to DA, 172316Z Jun 67, Subj: Ibid.
80. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 271030Z Jul 67, Subj: Beehive Ammunition (U).
81. Msg (S), CG USARV to COMUSMACV, 131103Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.
82. Monthly Ammunition Feeder Reports (U), 1st Log Cmd, Apr - Sep 67.
83. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43, Nos 1 - 9-67; MACV Logistical Review Evaluation (S), MACJ4, Jan/Apr/Jun 67; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ42-MS, 15 Nov 67, Subj: Laundry Service.
84. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43, Nos 1 - 9-67; MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (S), MACJ4, Jan/Apr/Jun 67; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ42-MS, 15 Nov 67, Subj: Property Disposal Operations, RVN; Year-End Wrap-Up (S), MACJ341, Jan 68.
85. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43, Nos 1 - 9-67; MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (S), MACJ4, Jan/Apr/Jun 67; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ42-MS, 15 Nov 67, Subj: Recombined Dairy Product Plants.
86. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43, Nos 1 - 9-67; MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation (S), MACJ4, Jan/Apr/Jun 67.
87. Ltr (U), Cmdr 7AF to COMUSMACV, 5 Jun 67, Subj: Relocation of Mortuary at TSN AB (U); Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Cmdr 7AF, 7 Aug 67, Subj: Ibid. ; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ42-MS, 15 Nov 67, Subj: Mortuary Services in RVN.
88. Msg (S), DA to CINCPAC DTG 190042Z FEB 67, Subj: Operational Readiness of the CH-47 Chinook. LOGSUMs (S), MACJ43-LM Jan-Oct 67; REPORTS (S) USARV 28 Feb, Apr 15 Aug 67, Subj: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (U).
89. 1967 Combined Campaign Plan (S), 7 Nov 67.
90. Fact Book (TS), MACJ00, Apr 67.

PAGE 853 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

91. Rpt (S), MACDC, 22 Apr 67, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to SECSTATE/SECDEF, 090717Z Mar 67, Subj: Upgrading of Highway System, RVN (U).
92. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 201203Z Oct 67, Subj: Highlights of Land Clearing, RVN--Operation PAUL BUYAN (U).
93. Southeast Asia Analysis Report (S), Dec 67.
94. CofS Action Memo No. 67-139 (C), 8 Nov 67, Subj: Command/Staff Conference (U); CofS Action Memo No. 67-1444 (S), 13 Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
95. Briefing by J4 for COMUSMACV (S), 25 Jan 68, Subj: Update Briefing on Highway 4 (U).
96. Memo (C), MACJ341, 11 Nov 67, Subj: Fact Sheet for AMB Bunker (U).
97. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67.
98. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Combined Campaign Plan (S), 1967; DF (S), MACJ45, 29 Jun 67, Subj: Vietnamese National Railroad System (VNRS) (U).
99. Weekly Rpt (S), MACV Railway Security Advisory Detachment, 29 Apr 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 200900Z May 67, Subj: SPHINX Report; DF (S), MACJ45, 16 Jun 67, Subj: Restoration VNRS (U).
100. Historical Rpt (C), MACV Railway Security Advisory Detachment, 20 Oct 67.
101. Combined Campaign Plans (S), 1968--RVNAF, JCS and MACV, AB 143, 11 Nov 67.
102. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67.
103. Rpt (S), HQ PACAF and MAC, 30 Jun 67, Subj: PACOM Theater Airlift Study (U).
104. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 261301Z Jan 67, Subj: Airlift System (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

105. Rpt (S), HQ PACAF and MAC, 30 Jun 67, Subj: PACOM Theater Airlift Study (U).
106. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 130221Z Jun 67, Subj: In-Country Airlift Capability (U).
107. Fact Sheet (S), MACJ45, 8 Nov 67, Subj: Airlift Requirement and Capabilities.
108. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67.
109. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Monthly Historical Rpts (S), MACJ43-LM--19 Feb, 20 Apr and 19 May 67; LOGSUMS (S), MACJ43-LM, Apr and May 67.
110. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67.
111. DF (U), MACJ6, 25 Mar 67, Subj: Draft USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), May/July 1967.
112. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.
113. MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), Jan - Dec 67; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6-10, 1 May 67, Subj: Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) (U); Interview, LCDR Frommer, MHB, with MAJ Richards, MACJ6, 24 Jan 68; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ62, 5 Jan 68, Subj: IWCS (U); Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6, C-E Div, 23 Sep 67, Subj: Technical Control Facilities (U).
114. Fact Sheets (C), MACJ6-10, 1 May 67/16 Jan 68, Subj: Project 439L, Coastal Submarine Cable System (U); Interview, CDR McAlevy, MHB, with MAJ Wix, MACJ6, 14 Jun 67.
115. USMACV Historical Report (TS), 1966; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6-10, 1 May 67, Subj: Satellite Communications, Pacific (U); MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), May, Jun, Jul and Dec 67; Briefing Note (U), MACJ6, C-E Div, 22 Sep 67, Subj: SATCOM Pacific Area (U).
116. USMACV Historical Report (TS), 1966; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6-10, 1 May 67, Subj: SOUTHERN TOLL System (U); Fact Sheet (C),

PAGE 855 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

MACJ6-10, 1 May 67, Subj: Dial Control Offices, RVN (U); MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), Jan 66, Apr Jun, Nov and Dec 67; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ6-10, 1 May 67, Subj: Long Distance Telephone System, Southeast Asia; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6, C-E Ops Div, 12 Dec 67, Subj: WETWASH Cable (U).

117. Fact Sheet, MACJ6 C-E Ops Div, 6 Oct 67, Subj: TALK QUICK (U).
118. MACJ6 Monthly Historical Report (C), Nov 67.
119. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 010156Z Jan 68, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam (U).
120. USMACV Historical Report (TS), 1966; MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), Jan - May 67; Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6, C-E Ops Div, 19 Dec 67, Subj: AFVN (Radio) (U); Fact Sheet (C), MACJ6, C-E Ops Div, 25 Oct 67, Subj: AFVN (TV) (U).
121. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 010156Z Jan 68, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam (U).
122. USMACV Historical Report (TS), 1966; Dir (U) MACV Directive 105-20, 25 Oct 66, Subj: Communications, OASU Det, WPD (U); Ltrs (U), OIC, AIRDEVRON EIGHT, WPD to CO, AIRDEVRON EIGHT, 3 Nov 67 and 18 Apr 68, Subj: Command History (U); Interview, LCDR Frommer, MHB with LCDR Brown, AIRDEVRON EIGHT, WPD and MAJ Whelan, MACJ6, 21 Apr 68.
123. MACJ6 Monthly Historical Reports (C), Jan - Dec 67.
124. Monthly Historical Reports (C), MACMD, Apr/Jul/Oct 67; Statistical material taken from MACMD Surgeon Statistics Charts (U).
125. USMACV Command Histories (TS), 1965/1966; Fact Sheet (S), MACJ44, 12 Jul 67, Subj: Logistics Information (U).
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid., Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 040900Z Jan 67, Subj: RVN Port Development Report (U); Facilities named center of the following positions (see USN Hydrographic Chart H. O. 3150) Fish Market 10°42'25"W, Newport 10°47'15"N-106°42'15"W; Ltr (C), MACJ45,

# UNCLASSIFIED

- 4 Jan 68, SubjL RVN Port Development Report (U); USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Embtel (S), Saigon to SECSTATE, 101115Z Jan 67, Subj: US Mission Weekly Report 1-7 January 1967 (U); MFR (FOUO), 4th Trans Cmd (AVCA-TC-CG), 26 Jan 67, Subj: Expansion of MACV Activities, Saigon Port (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 210932Z Jan 67, SubjL Saigon Port Plan (U); Embtel (S), Saigon to SECDEF, 230230Z Jan 67, Subj: Saigon Port Barge Plans (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 122053Z Feb 67, SubjL Saigon Port (U); DF (C), MACJ43-LM, 20 May 67, Subj: LOGSUM #5A-67 (U); Ltr (U), MACJ45 to CINCPAC, 20 Mar 67, Subj: Summary of Actions Being Taken at Saigon Port as of 15 March 1967 (U); "New Measures to Decongest Port," Saigon Post, 23 Mar 67; MFR (FOUO), 4th Trans Cmd (AVCA-TC-CG), 21 May 67, Subj: Expansion of MACV Activities, Saigon Port (U); DF (S), MACJ43-LM, 19 Jul 67, Subj: Logistical Historical Activities (U); DF (S), MACJ543-LM, 21 Jan 68, SubjL Logistical Historical Activities (U).
128. Study (S), MACJ45, 25 Feb 68, Subj: MACV Transportation Resources Evaluation (U); Interview LCDR Frommer, MHB, with LTC Jones, MACJ45, 16 April 1968.
129. DF (S), MACJ43-LM, 24 Mar 67, SubjL Monthly Historical Input (U); DF (S), MACJ43-LM, 21 Jan 68, SubjL Logistical History Activities (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 040900Z Jan 67, SubjL RVN Port Development Report (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 010611Z Apr 67, SubjL Ibid.; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 010930Z Jun 67, SubjL Ibid.; USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Rpt (S), MACDC Quarterly Historical Report-1st Qtr 1966; Ltr (S), MACJ1, 25 Mar 67, SubjL US Personnel Distribution (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS, 220510Z Apr 67, Subj: Weekly Strength Report (U), Fact Sheet (S), MACJ44, 12 Jul 67, SubjL Logistics Information (U); Ltr (C), MACJ45, 4 Jan 68, Subj: RVN Port Development Report (U); Study (S), MACJ45, 25 Feb 68, SubjL MACV Transportation Resources Evaluation (U).
130. Ltr (C), MACJ45, 4 Jan 68, SubjL RVN Port Development Report (U); Fact Sheet (S), MACJ44, 12 Jul 67, Subj: Logistics Information (U).
131. DF (C), MACJ43-LM, 20 May 67, SubjL LOGSUM # 5A-67 (U); DF (S), MACDC-RE, 22 Apr 67/20 Jul 67/21 Oct 67/21 Jan 68, Quarterly Historical Report (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

132. DF (S), MACJ43-LM, 24 Mar 67, Input for Command History Publication (U); DF (S), MACJ43-LM, 21 Jan 68, Logistical Historical Activities.(U).
133. Fact Sheet (C), MACJ45, 19 Apr 68, SubjL Deep Draft Berths (U); Interview LCDR Frommer, MHB, with LTC Jones, MACJ45, 18 Apr 68.
134. Rpt (C), MACCD, 1 Jun 67, SubjL Observations on the Construction Program, RVN (U).
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 211150Z Feb 67, Subj: Reduction in RMK-BRJ Work Force; Briefing (U), MACDC, 28 Jun 67, SubjL Military Construction Program, SVN (U); Rpt (C), MACCD, Jun 67, SubjL Observation on the Construction Program, RVN (U); Quarterly Historical Report (S), MACDC-PO, 22 Apr 67.
139. Quarterly Historical Report (S), MACDC-PO, 22 Apr 67; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 310825Z Mar 67, SubjL Force Requirements (U); Rpt (S), USARV, Apr 67, SubjL Operational Report--Lessons Learned (U).
140. SECDEF Briefings (TS), 7 and 8 Jul 67, OASD/SA, 22 Jul 67.
141. Rpt (C), MACCD, 1 Jun 67, Subj: Observations on the Construction Program, RVN (U).
142. Ibid.; 7 Figures on in-cojuntry engineer units were received from LT Ross, USN, of the Plans and Operations Div of MACCD, in two interviews conducted by CPT Spencer, MHB-SJS, in July and November. 7

# UNCLASSIFIED

143. Briefing (U), MACCD, 28 Jun 67, Subj: Military Construction Program, SVN (U); Rpts (S), MACJ4, Apr and Jul 67, SubjL MACV Logistical Review and Evaluation; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to OASD, 251218Z Oct 67, Subj: MILCON Status Report.
144. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINGPAC, 210043Z Oct 67, Subj: FY68 MILCON Funding (U).
145. Year-End Wrap-Up (S), MACJ341, Jan 68.

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE NOT USED

PAGE 860 OF 1340 PAGES  
UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

## CHAPTER IX

### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

#### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

##### Background

(U) Research and Development (R&D) was characterized by two essential trends in 1966. First was the evolutionary change in the organizational structure of the program. Second was the ever-expanding scope and a quickening pace of developmental projects within the MACV AO which provided a combat environment for research, analysis, and development as well as operational tests of equipment, concepts, doctrine, and techniques. At that time, under a single organizational concept, the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) exercised operational control over the Advanced Research Project Agency's Research and Development Field Unit, Vietnam (ARPA-RDFU-V); the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV); the Air Force Test Unit, Vietnam (AFTU-V); and the US Navy Research and Development Unit, Vietnam (NRDU-V). Operational control over JRATA was vested in COMUSMACV.

(C) At the time of JRATA's creation there had been no component commanders as such within MACV. With establishment of the component commands, COMUSMACV was of the opinion that it would be appropriate to consider assignment of the JRATA test units to the component commanders, and the ARPA team to a MACV staff agency. In June 1966 COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that the three Service test units (ACTIV, AFTU-V, and NRDU-V) be reassigned to their Service commanders. ARPA would be continued as a MACV agency to advise and support the development of indigenous RDT&E capability and provide a point of contact with US military service test units. This would assure appropriate participation by RVNAF personnel in US testing and evaluation activities. MACJ3 was assigned certain residual joint RDT&E functions of monitorship and control.

(C) Despite his feeling that the components should absorb Service-oriented RDT&E activities, COMUSMACV felt the need for scientific

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

technical advice on his own staff. He was, therefore, particularly receptive to a JCS recommendation that he establish on his staff a small group of technical advisors under the direction of a nationally prominent scientist. The head of this group would serve as Science Advisor to COMUSMACV, would assist the MACV staff in scientific and technical questions, and would act as a bridge to the scientific and engineering community in CONUS concerning the technical problems growing out of the war in SEASIA. Upon approval of this concept by JCS, JRATA was deactivated as of 15 November 1966, and on 8 December the Office of the Science Advisor, HQ MACV, was established, with Dr. William G. McMillan as the Chief. 1

(U) Definition of the organization and function of MACSA, spelled out on 24 December 1966, remained constant throughout 1967. The office was under the supervision of COMUSMACV and in turn MACSA exercised staff supervision over OSD/ARPA RDFU-V. Functions assigned to MACSA were to:

monitor and conduct an independent review of development, test, and evaluation activities within the command and make recommendations to COMUSMACV as appropriate; review plans and results of intelligence and field operations exploiting new equipment or scientific and technical innovations as requested by COMUSMACV; coordinate and as appropriate monitor the activities of scientific and technical personnel on duty in Vietnam and those who may be accredited to HQ MACV; maintain contact with DDR&E on the alert to possible new applications of advanced technology deserving increased R&D emphasis but in no case to transmit official requirements nor make commitments for COMUSMACV; in reviewing the MACV command for scientific advisors, recommend staff relationships and determine qualitative and quantitative requirements for such personnel in the command.

(U) ARPA RDFU-V was in turn responsible for:

conducting approved research, development, test, evaluation, and combat development (RDT&E and CD) projects in Vietnam to include operational analysis, special studies, and field evaluations

# CONFIDENTIAL

related to the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam; assisting RVNAF and RDT&E and CD matters through participation as appropriate in activities of the Combat Development Test Center, Vietnam; providing access to data and test environment for the US scientific and military communities in development of new improved materiel concepts and techniques applicable to operations in Vietnam. 2

(C) COMUSMACV, represented by ACofS, J3, monitored RDT&E and combat development (CD) activities of the Service components. This was to assure the cross exchange of ideas, ascertain the impact on operations and resources, and determine the cancellation, coordination, or modification of projects. MACV's major area of responsibility lay only with those projects requiring the specific combat environment of RVN or data uniquely derivable from that area. In view of this focus of attention, the primary emphasis of RDT&E projects was directed toward those offering direct or significant improvement of combat capability for forces involved in Vietnam. This in turn would achieve the proper objective of enhancing combat effectiveness of the counterinsurgency and countersubversion capabilities of US/RVN/FWMA forces. Joint Service activities or those having joint Service impact required approval by COMUSMACV. It was, therefore, necessary that tests, evaluations, and studies be designed and conducted in a manner, which, as appropriate:

- 1) Advanced significantly knowledge or capabilities concerning combat and other operations in RVN, to include countersubversion, counterinsurgency, and military participation in socioeconomic development.
- 2) Provided sound objective evaluations of new or improved operational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and materiel.
- 3) Made the maximum contribution to and caused minimum interference with operations being conducted in RVN.

(C) The further delineation of duties and responsibilities for the Service components (USARV, COMNAVFORV, 7AF, III MAF) established interservice coordinating procedures and spelled out the interrelationships with the joint command. The military Service, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC as well as the departmental level and Service

# CONFIDENTIAL

components at CINCPAC and MACV might establish projects of a unilateral Service nature, though CINCPAC and COMUSMACV retained the prerogative of modifying or cancelling any in-country program. Furthermore, the Service components were to:

- 1) Establish, conduct and report on unilateral service RDT&E and CD projects as prescribed by the services concerned.
- 2) Conduct projects of a joint nature when directed by COMUSMACV and in coordination with other interested service components.
- 3) Keep COMUSMACV and other components informed of significant projects.
- 4) Recommend to COMUSMACV joint projects which offer promise of beneficial results toward accomplishment of COMUSMACV's missions.
- 5) Insure that projects were scheduled and implemented in a manner which makes the minimum interference with operations, while fulfilling project objectives.
- 6) Maintain a point of contact for matters pertaining to RDT&E and CD (i. e., ACTIV and NRDU-V be retained to conduct appropriate projects).

The military Services and ARPA were to provide funding, budgetary, and logistics Support for their respective test units and for personnel on TDY. Material and personnel not available in Vietnam would be provided by the sponsoring military Service or ARPA.<sup>3</sup>

## MACSA Development

(U) The year 1967 produced a number of significant moves which expanded and augmented the RDT&E efforts in RVN. The Air Force Test Unit - Vietnam (AFTU-V), which had been reassigned to 7AF, was replaced by the Directorate of Requirements (DPLR), a special staff agency of 7AF. The position of the Air Force Systems Command Liaison Officer, originally assigned to 7AF as early as 1965, was placed in DPLR. To further improve 7AF R&D capability the Office of Operations Analysis (COA) was established under the leadership of Dr. R. N. Schwartz, and other research and analysis functions were grouped

PAGE 864 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SECRET

together to form the Directorate of Tactical Analysis (DOA). In June 1967 the 45-man Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team - Vietnam (WDMET-V) became operational in-country. This was a data collection and analysis effort having the objective of determining the lethality of present and future weapons, validating criteria for estimating weapons and munitions requirements, correlating the traumatic effects of wounds with their causative agents, evaluating protection gear, and validating criteria for estimating medical requirements. A further development in the fall of 1967 was the establishment of a MACV Research/Systems Analysis Office (MACEVAL) at the direction of DEPCOMUSMACV. MACEVAL is discussed at length in Annex J to this history. <sup>4</sup>

(S) Early in December 1967 the MACV Science Advisor presented a far-reaching proposal to COMUSMACV for an expanded MACSA organization to cope with the military R&D problems in Vietnam. His program was in three parts. First, field science advisors were to be attached to the commanders of field units down to the level of division and independent brigade. Next, the fragmented RDT&E units in South Vietnam were to be placed under the operational control of MACV. And third, the MACSA office in HQ USMACV would be enlarged to support the expanded RDT&E activities and capabilities in the field.

(S) The field science advisors would perform as the principal scientific and technical advisors to commanders in the field and accomplish an important liaison function in scientific and technical channels. They would watch for new equipment ideas, modifications, special captured enemy equipment, etc., and would serve as a focal point for dissemination of special information. In addition, the field science advisors would follow through on R&D equipment to insure that such equipment was thoroughly understood, properly handled and employed to the fullest of its potential. The proposal also embraced the Army, Navy, and Marine RDT&E units in an overall organization which had as its sole mission the expeditious development and application of new technical equipment for prosecution of the Vietnam war.

(S) Reports generated by RDT&E activities would be routed through command channels to COMUSMACV. To handle the greatly expanded number of programs and problems expected to be generated by the field advisors and to provide the necessary integration of the assembled test units, the proposal urged that the central MACSA office staff be augmented by one O-7 (to be MACSA Deputy) and twelve other personnel.

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

It was anticipated also that the staff of TDY consultants, who would serve both as technical specialists and project officers, would be doubled and funded from DDR&E funds. On 12 December the proposal was forwarded to the commanders of each service component in RVN. At year's end it was still under consideration.<sup>5</sup>

## Joint R&D Seminars

(U) The disestablishment of JRATA in late 1966 and the ensuing decentralization of the RDT&E had incurred the disadvantage of disrupting the close working relationship of the R&D community in RVN and segregating the valuable coordination between development and test activities under MACV. The undesirable loss of the stimulating effect of total community thinking and experience on individual projects became accentuated as former JRATA personnel completed their tours of duty in Vietnam. To recoup the diminishing coordination and cross-pollination of ideas, the Science Advisor on 29 May 1967 proposed a program of short, biweekly "Joint R&D Seminars" involving selected personnel from MACSA, ACTIV, NRDU, 7AF DCS/Plans, MAC-J342, and the ARPA Field Test Unit for a mutual exchange of information and informal coordination. The first of these biweekly meetings was held 10 June. Initially only the units directly involved in R&D activities were invited to attend. As the success of the program became apparent, attendance was expanded to include MACV units with peripheral R&D interests, representatives of all of the MACV Service components, including 5th SFG and MACSOG, and a member of the Office of Special Assistance, U. S. Embassy. In this manner close coordination and monitorship of the activities of scientific and technical personnel on duty in Vietnam was achieved to the advantage of the whole RDT&E community.<sup>6</sup>



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: 041 1983  
CLASSIFICATION CONCERNED BY: [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

Personnel Sensors



PAGE 698 OF 1340 PAGES

REVIEW DATE: [REDACTED]  
CLASSIFICATION CONCERNED BY: [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER Sec Army By TAG per

830624

**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVISIONS  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 869 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **SECRET**

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per  
830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~  
**SECRET**

REVIEW DATE: ~~31-1-93~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION~~ ~~SECRET~~  
~~CLASSIFY ON:~~ ~~SI/OADR~~

Night Vision

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PAGE 170 OF 1140 PAGES

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

~~SECRET~~

-----  
830624  
-----

**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CLASSIFIED~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 871 OF 1340 PAGES

**SECRET**

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

-----830624-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL SECRET~~

REVISIONS ~~ON 1981~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION CONCERNING~~  
~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 874 OF 1340 PAGES

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Order Sec Army By IAG per

-----B 30624-----

~~**SECRET**~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: [unclear]~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PAGE 875 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By 1AG per

-----B-20624-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~REF ID: A66168~~

~~CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED BY~~

~~DATE: 01/03/08~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per  
-----8-3-08-24-----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 876 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: ~~04-1983~~  
CLASSIFICATION CONTROLLED BY: ~~DIA~~  
EXEMPTION CODE: ~~1.4(C)~~

Mines/Booby Traps

PAGE 877 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
ORDER SCS AFDY By TAG per  
830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

THIS PAGE RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order See Army R: TAG per  
8 20 6 2 4

PAGE 878 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: ~~12/24/66~~  
CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~1/1/70ADR~~

### Defoliation and Rome Plow

(S) Defoliation operations in RVN began in 1961 as a test program limited to key communications routes. In 1967 a total of 6,018 square kilometers was defoliated, an effort which more than doubled the area sprayed in 1966. The total area in SVN is 173,000 square kilometers of which approximately one third is jungle area. By the end of 1967 approximately 5% of the country had been sprayed. Defoliation has proven effective in opening jungle areas to aerial observation and has reduced the number of ambushes along LOCs. The 1967 emphasis was on exposing suspected enemy infiltration routes and base areas in addition to the establishment of a defoliated strip along the border.

(S) As an alternative to the use of spray defoliant, Rome Plow blades mounted on D6B and D7 tractors were introduced to remove jungle concealment and protection of the enemy in heavily wooded areas. Experience to date indicates a D7 with Rome Plow can clear approximately 0.7

THIS PAGE REQUIRED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order See Army BY IND post

8 J 0 0 2-4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVIEW

acre per hour of medium jungle growth of fairly level and firm ground. Results in clearing enemy base areas and areas adjacent to LOCs and friendly bases have been impressive. By the end of December, 10,525 acres of the Ho Bo Woods had been leveled. During the operation, one unit cleared a record 555 acres in a single day using the Rome Flow. 39

#### Tunnel Destruction and Denial

(C) The XM 69 Acetylene Generator Tunnel Destruct Set consists of a portable acetylene generator which utilizes calcium carbide and water to generate acetylene gas. The gas is pumped into the tunnel and then detonated. One set produces enough acetylene to destroy 50 meters of tunnel having a diameter of one meter and overburden less than eight feet. Three sets can be used in series to destroy a 150 meter tunnel. When more than two sets are used, the M106 Mighty Mite blower should be employed to pump air into the system.

(C) During 1967 the XM 69 underwent extensive evaluation in SVN. The following results were furnished by USARV:

1. Tunnels with overburdens of more than five to eight feet are not effectively destroyed.
2. The acetylene is not distributed evenly throughout the tunnel complex resulting in incomplete destruction of tunnels.
3. There is danger of premature detonation of the acetylene.
4. The set contains too many components.
5. The liquid oxygen and water used with the set are not always readily available.

(C) USARV concluded that the XM 69 is less effective than other demolitions normally used to destroy tunnels and recommended that R&D efforts be expedited to provide a more suitable tunnel destruct system. 40

PAGE 881 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# SECRET

(C) Development of the Liquid Explosive Tunnel Destruct System (LETUDS) began in 1967. This system consists of lay-flat, plastic tubing deployed into a tunnel by trained personnel using a Drag Pack which pays out the tubing as the "tunnel rat" crawls through the tunnel. The tubing is then filled with PLX (Picatinny Liquid Explosive) dispensed from its shipping container by a pumping system. One LETUDS will be capable of destroying 1,000 feet of tunnel with ten feet of overburden. Present plans call for shipping 30 sets to SVN in June 1968. 41

(C) The technique of using a burning CS grenade, a poncho over the tunnel mouth, and the Mighty Mite blower has proven to be successful in flushing personnel from tunnels. This concept was first employed in SEA in 1965. Tests indicate that CS-2 blown into tunnels will remain effective in denying tunnels for periods up to 90 days. This appears to be the most promising approach for tunnel denial. The M106 Mighty Mite blower is limited in its capability to dispense CS agent throughout the deeper and longer tunnel complexes found in SVN. Under ENSURE 34, the requirement was established for a large capacity tunnel flusher. 42

## Munitions

(U) The year 1967 saw the initial employment of numerous munitions and weapons new to the Vietnam conflict. The majority were recent developments, fruits of the DOD development agencies.

## Area Weapons

(S) The most widely used new weapons were the cluster weapons or CBUs, which are designed to compensate for some of the delivery errors through the use of submunitions which provide lethal effects over a wide area instead of concentrating the effect about a point as is the case with conventional bombs. The BLU-3, BLU-26, BLU-36 and the XM-27 bomblets were used with varying degrees of success. The BLU-3 was introduced in the CBU-3 and CBU-14 weapons and provided

# SECRET

long, narrow patterns of impact. This weapon was designed for use against personnel, but high dud rates resulted in an alarming number being used by the enemy as booby traps. This caused curtailment of its use pending a redesign of the fuse. 43

(S) The CBU-24 containing BLU-26 bomblets, proved to be a highly effective weapon. It is shaped and delivered like an ordinary bomb, but after release from the delivery aircraft, the dispenser opens allowing the bomblets to disperse. It was used most effectively to suppress AAA fire in NVN and against troops in SVN. 44

(S) Many types of flechette weapons were introduced in 1967, ranging from the ineffectual .45 caliber round through 12 gauge shotgun rounds and 2.75 "rockets, to the very successful "Beehive" round for the 106mm recoilless rifle. 45

(U) New mine munitions have been discussed earlier under Area-Denial: Mines/Booby Traps.

## Other Munitions/Ordnance

(S) The chemical agent, CS, came into its own in 1967. It was used successfully in various offensive and defensive roles to supplement "conventional" weapons and was also employed to deny the enemy access to tunnels and other prepared positions.

(S) The Marines tested the Navy's 80-lb Fuel-Air Explosive weapon and found it to have some capability for clearing mine fields and helicopter landing zones of pressure-actuated mines. 46

(S) The XM-148 grenade launcher, an attachment for the M16, had been tested. It was decided that the majority of the units in SVN did not need it. The SEALs, however, accepted it enthusiastically. 47

(S) A new VT fuze (XM-429) for the 2.75" rocket round gained wide acceptance because it greatly increased the munitions effectiveness against personnel. 48

# ~~SECRET~~

## Duds

(S) Statistics prepared on the dud rate of US munitions during 1967 indicated that because of the enormous amounts of munitions used by FWMAF, a dud rate of even 1% was excessive. This conclusion is particularly significant when coupled with the fact that more than 50% of the mines and booby traps found in SVN during 1967 were made from dud US munitions. 49

## Mobility

(S) The movement of men and equipment within RVN was allotted a large share of R&D attention during 1967. Included were not only air and surface transportation items, but also means of creating landing zones and protecting existing lines of communication. In addition, the mobility and comfort of the individual soldier were subjected to close scrutiny.

## Air Movement

(S) A new light observation helicopter the OH-6A, Cayuse, was introduced into Vietnam in October. It is a small (2200 lb gross weight), high speed, highly maneuverable, turbine-powered helicopter having a crew of two (pilot and observer) plus 400 lbs cargo payload, with fuel for approximately three hours. It is planned that this helicopter will replace three Army aircraft: the O-1 fixed wing aerial observation aircraft and the OH-13 and OH-23 observation helicopters. Initial use of the LOH has been very successful and operational units are requesting its deployment as rapidly as production will permit. 50

(S) The Army introduced its first attack helicopter (the AH-1G COBRA) into Vietnam in October 1967. The COBRA is a gunship capable of providing armed escort for troop transport helicopters and direct fire support to the ground soldier. The aircraft consists

# SECRET

essentially of a new, highly streamlined fuselage incorporating the proven rotor system of the UH-1C helicopter. The crew consists of a pilot and co-pilot/gunner seated in tandem. Various combinations of 2.75 inch rocket (up to 52), 7.62mm miniguns and a 40mm grenade launcher can be achieved. A typical armament load consists of 38-2.75 inch rockets, 2-7.62mm miniguns in pods on wing hardpoints and a combination 7.62mm minigun and 40mm grenade launcher in a forward turret. Planning was initiated this year to add a 20mm automatic cannon option. The success of the AH-1G has far exceeded initial forecasts. Its effectiveness in providing escort and ground fire support has significantly enhanced the Army's mission capabilities. 51

(S) In mid-1967, it became apparent that a helicopter landing platform was needed to permit rapid evacuation of casualties resulting from river-oriented operations and to provide a re-arm/re-fuel base for helicopters supporting such operations. Accordingly, a helicopter landing pad (helipad) was designed, fabricated, and installed on a PCM-6 landing craft. This project was eminently successful and represents one of the few in which design, fabrication, and use were accomplished in RVN on a rapid reaction basis. 52

(S) In November 1967, MACV stated a Priority I requirement for an air delivered device or material which, five-to-ten minutes prior to the arrival of assault helicopters could clear a landing zone in a heavily forested area. This capability would provide flexibility and an element of surprise in combat assaults. Tests of a 3,000-pound bomb, statically detonated, were performed during 1967 with encouraging results. These tests led the Air Force to adopt plans to test a 10,000 lb bomb for the role. This project was nicknamed COMBAT TRAP. Initial planning was completed for (1) tests of various weights and shapes of ordnance, (2) coordination of parachute qualification tests for helicopter delivered ordnance, (3) determination of proper fusing techniques, (4) qualification flight tests in CONUS and (5) in-theater final tests in mid-1968. 53

## Surface Movement

(S) In October of 1966, following successful Army tests of Navy-owned Air Cushion Vehicles (ACV) in the Mekong Delta, an ENSURE request for three vehicles was submitted. A contract for the three craft,

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

including technical and spare parts support, was negotiated in mid-1967. The ACVs are 39 feet long, 23 feet wide, 16 feet high and have engines rated at 1,150 shaft horsepower. They normally operate at 30-35 knots, but can reach speeds of 50 knots. Two types of craft are being procured. One is used primarily for its firepower; the other is a transport vehicle, less heavily armed, capable of carrying 12 combat equipped troops. An operational evaluation of the Air Cushion Vehicles is planned for mid-1968 in the Mekong Delta area. In 1967, the Navy's three vehicles were sent to CONUS for refurbishing. Later in the year they were returned to RVN for use in the northern coastal plains. They have been successful in both patrol and logistical resupply modes. 54

(S) Current procedures and equipment make minesweeping slow and hazardous. Present towed sweep gear has the inherent disadvantage that the tow boat traverses the mined area ahead of the sweep. In mid-1967, the performance of a Drone Mine Sweeping Boat was tested and evaluated to determine its effectiveness and operational suitability. Test results showed that the drone concept is feasible. The principal deficiencies in the tested craft were structural weaknesses that limited the boat's use to waterways free of obstacles and debris. Development of a follow-on system eliminating these deficiencies was recommended. 55

(S) A requirement became apparent in 1967 for suitable platforms from which to fire artillery in the Mekong Delta area where suitable firm ground is not readily available. In mid-year the concept of using conventional Navy barges as artillery platforms was tested. Results indicated that barges firmly anchored to the river bank were suitable firing platforms. One disadvantage was that the platforms could be towed at only half the speed of the attack force. Therefore, they had to be dispatched early, thus warning the VC that an attack was imminent. Plans were initiated for a version of the floating platform utilizing a landing craft with the same speed as the attack force to eliminate this undesirable feature. 56

(S) The concentrated efforts of the NVA/VC to blow up highway bridges, many of them by underwater destruction of piers, indicated that methods to counter this threat were urgently required. The enemy's major advantage is the stealth with which he can move, particularly during adverse weather conditions and periods of reduced visibility. Several countermeasures, both passive and active, were evaluated during 1967, including swimmer detector sonar and swimmer deterrent electrical devices and physical barriers, such as chain link fences,

**SECRET**

anti-swimmer nets and/or concertina wire to bar approach to the piers. From these tests, it appeared that a physical barrier combined with guards in sampans under the bridge, offered the best short term approach to bridge protection. Underwater listening devices, while enhancing the ability to detect sub-surface swimmers, were not extremely successful due to the high background noise level in busy waterways. Evaluation of a doppler sonar for swimmer detection is planned as well as tests of simpler listening devices for use in relatively quiet waterways. 57

(S) In November 1967, impetus was given to the Lighter, Environmental-Adaptive Personal Systems (LEAPS), by the augmentation of MACSA with a consultant on individual clothing and equipment for US and ARVN forces. Based on a field survey a list of equipment shortcomings and proposed solutions was developed. Among the proposed items were: redesigned lightweight load bearing equipment, rucksacks, bandoleers, ponchos, raincoats, field hats, hammocks, gas masks and entrenching tools; a flotation bladder/collapsible canteen, a 6.1 pound breath-inflatable boat, individual wrist compasses and mosquito protective uniforms. Also, a new self-cleaning sole tread design was proposed for the tropical combat boot. 58

(S) In February the Limited War Laboratory (LWL), in response to an expedited development request under project PROVOST, sent five Position Locators to Vietnam for evaluation. The instrument worked on the pedometric principle of measuring the span of each step, resolving that distance into North-South and East-West components, and updating the displayed eight-digit UTM coordinates for each five meters traveled. Initial tests were inconclusive due to equipment malfunctions. The instruments were returned to LWL for modifications, and in September 1967 five modified versions arrived in Vietnam for continuation of the evaluation process. Results indicated that the Position Locator was inaccurate and functionally unreliable and that the theory of average step length was questionable. Although this principle was not recommended for further development, continued development of other principles was recommended since a need for such an item still exists. 59

**SECRET**

# SECRET

## Communications

(U) The problem of notifying the military forces whenever and wherever the VC enter a village has been widely recognized. A number of schemes have been proposed to fulfill this requirement.

(S) The Village Alarm System consists of a simple tone-modulated transmitter located in the village with a receiver at province headquarters to receive and identify the reporting village. One test set was evaluated by the US 1st Inf Div in July-August and found to be inadequate due to limited range and poor construction. Effort at the end of the year was to procure an improved set. The Sandia Corporation was developing a more elaborate system for testing in 1968. 60

(S) Two prototype agent radios were tested by NRDU-V in June and July. One system was found unsuitable for the RVN environment. The second set utilized the PRC-25 as a receiver with an add-on readout panel. As the transmitters in this test were too low power, they were returned to CONUS for redesign. Sets returned to RVN in a larger package appeared promising in tests underway at the end of the year. 61

(S) The Digital Message Entry System is a manpack device which permits the transmission of preselected digital messages to a base station. The received message is decoded and printed out on paper tape. Specifications for the DMES were published by AFSC in April. Prototypes were tested at Eglin AFB in late 67/early 68 with later testing in SEA.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER IX

### Footnotes

1. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.
2. Manual (U), MACCO, 1 Aug 67, Subj: Organization and Functions Manual (U).
3. MACV Directive 70-1 (C), 27 Sep 67.
4. Plan (FOUO), USAMC, 6 Apr 67, Subj: Wound Data and Munitions Effectiveness Team (Vietnam) (U).
5. Memo (S), MACSA to COMUSMACV, 5 Dec 67, Subj: Toward Improved RDT&E for Vietnam (U); Ltr (S), MACV to USARV et al., 12 Dec 67, Subj: Ibid.
6. Ltr (U), MACSA to ACTIV et al., 29 May 67, Subj: RDT&E Coordination (U); Memo (U), MACSA to MACJ031, 2 Sep 68, Subj: R&D Summary (U).
7. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DDR&E, 111220Z Apr 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 131515Z Apr 67, Subj: R&D Priorities for Support of MACV (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 232323Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.
8. Msg (S), DA to COMUSMACV, 162057Z Jan 67, Subj: Detection Systems (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Vientiane, 070050Z Dec 66, Subj: Evaluation of Intrusion Detection Devices (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to AMEMB Vientiane, 300037Z Dec 66, Subj: Status of Sensor Devices (U); Msg (S), CG USARV to COMUSMACV, 250045Z Jan 67, Subj: Sandia Device (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 280020Z Jan 67, Subj: Sandia Truck Sensor Device Operational Evaluation (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to DA, 020005Z Mar 67, Subj: Sandia Truck Sensor Operational Evaluation (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to AMEMB Vientiane, 020006Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.

# UNCLASSIFIED

9. Ltr (U), ARPA-RDFU-V to ACTIV, 28 Dec 67, Subj: Project Cesaro-Silent Joe-Portable Transceivers (U); Ltr (U), 9th Inf Div to ACTIV, 5 Feb 68, Subj: Balloon Mounted Radio Relay System (U); Ltr (U), ACTIV to AVIB-AAD, 23 Dec 67, Subj: Ibid.
10. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCUSARPAC, 271045Z Mar 67, Subj: Airborne Personnel Detector (U); Rpt (TS), MACJ34, 24 May 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary (U); Ltr (U), DCG USARV to CG USARV, 1 Jun 67, Subj: Airborne Personnel Detector (U); Msg (S), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 251041Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid., Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Apr 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
11. Ltr (C), CG USAECOM to DCG USARV, 18 May 68.
12. Msg (C), CG USARV to DA, ACofS for Avn., 221027Z Nov 67, Subj: Airborne Ground Fire Detector for the AH-1G.
13. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to Harry Diamond Lab, 290821Z Dec 67, Subj: GOES Equipment (U).
14. Msg (C), DA to CG USARV, 192216Z Jul 67, Subj: Night Vision Devices for Use in Helicopters (U).
15. Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to CG USARV et al., 31 May 66, Subj: Night Vision Binoculars (U).
16. Rpt (C), ACofS J3, May 68, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
17. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to Cmdr 7AF, 041402Z Oct 67, Subj: Special Project Aircraft (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 050245Z Nov 67, Subj: QT Aircraft (U).
18. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 150404Z Aug 67, Subj: ARVN Deployment (U); Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CSAF, 220802Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), AFSC to CINCPACAF, 242310Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 122140Z Dec 67, Subj: Ibid.; Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Nov 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
19. Rpt (S), USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center, Jan 68, Subj: Monthly Status Report, Dec 67 (U).
20. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 232004Z Nov 67, Subj: Classified.

# UNCLASSIFIED

21. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CSAF, 2 Oct 67, Subj: Request for Assistance Compass Eagle (U).
22. Studies (TS), CICV, Subj: Probable Rocket Launch Sites, Jun 67 - Jul 68.
23. Study (TS), MACSA, 4 Oct 67, Subj: Artillery/Mortar/Rocket Countermeasures - First Interim Report (U).
24. Msg (S), CG III MAF to CINCPAC, 011244Z Jun 67, Subj: Thirty-Day Report on Countermortar Radar (U).
25. Msg (C), DA to COMUSMACV, 242042Z Aug 67, Subj: Omni-directional Sound Ranging System (U).
26. Rpt (TS), MACJ34, 19 Nov 67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Oct 67 (U); Rpt (TS), MACJ34, 22 Jan 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Dec 67 (U).
27. Msg (S), MACSA to ODDR&E, 021216Z Dec 67, Subj: Mithras Platform Unit (U).
28. Op. cit. 1.
29. Plans (S), PINK ROSE Test Plan, 26 Dec 66 (U); Ltr (S), MG Rosson to 7AF, 7 Oct 66, Subj: Project PINK ROSE (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 162258Z Nov 66, Subj: Munitions for PINK ROSE (U); Msg (S), CG II FFORCEV to 1st Inf Div, 060700Z Jan 67, Subj: PINK ROSE (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 100146Z Jan 67, Subj: PINK ROSE Test Plan (U); Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 200613Z Jan 67, Subj: PINK ROSE (U); Msg (S), 7AF to 3AD, 210500Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPAC, 220859Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 232333Z Jan 67, Subj: PINK ROSE Slides (U); Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPAC, 030015Z Jan 67, Subj: PINK ROSE (U); Msg (S), SAC to 7AF, 011750Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 031055Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPAC, 060535Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPAC, 040938Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to OSD, 170728Z Apr 67, Subj: PINK ROSE III (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 220150Z Apr 67, Subj: PINK ROSE (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

30. Msg (S), NAVORD to CINC PACFLT, 301415Z Dec 66, Subj: DST for Underwater Harassment and Interdiction (S); Msg (S), CINC PACFLT to COMSERVPAC, 170527Z Feb 67, Subj: Destructor 115A (U); Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to CINC PAC, 170819Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to CTF 116, 230152Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 271154Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 030811Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMSERVPAC to Subic, 090058Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 100400Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 121037Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, 261049Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), CINC PAC to COMUSMACV, 042320Z Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), SA IV Corps to COMUSMACV, 170100Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DCPG, 221009Z Apr 67, Subj: Air Delivered Water Mine (U); Msg (S), DCPG to COMUSMACV, 142350Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.
31. Ltr (S), MACSA to SJS, 21 Jul 67, Subj: Periodic Historical Summary (U).
32. Msg (S), CINC PACAF to CSAR, 062201Z Feb 67, Subj: CALTROP (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to USARV, 151022Z Mar 67, Subj: Operational Evaluation of RINGTROP (U); Msg (S), CSAF to CINC PACAF, 171601Z Mar 67, Subj: CALTROP (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF et al., 140845Z Jun 67, Subj: RINGTROP (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to Cmdr 7AF et al., 140837Z Nov 67, Subj: C-123 RINGTROP Dispenser (U).
33. Msg (S), CINC PAC to JCS, 300107Z Dec 66, Subj: Aerially Emplaced Anti-Personnel Mines (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINC PAC, 092333Z Jan 67, Subj: Gravel Production (U); Msg (S), DCPG to CSA, 022110Z Mar 67, Subj: Production Schedules (U); Msg (S), CINC PAC to COMUSMACV, 251935Z Feb 67, Subj: Sterilization Period of BLU-43 (U); Msg (S), DCPG to SEC Army, 102111Z May 67, Subj: Camouflage of PRACTICE NINE Munitions (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 071818Z Feb 67, Subj: Test of Gravel and Button Bomblets (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 230737Z Feb 67, Subj: Button Bomblet--Gravel Sweep Tests (U); Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 011530Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to COUSAPA, 070305Z Mar 67, Subj: Button Bomblet Tests (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINC PAC, 220650Z Feb 67, Subj: Dragon Tooth Mines (U). Msg (TS), 7AF

# UNCLASSIFIED

- to COMUSMACV, 281330Z Apr 67, Subj: Classified; Msg (S), DCPG to COMUSMACV, 111500Z May 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 230317Z Mar 67, Subj: Reporting of XM-27 Effectiveness (U); Memo (S), DC 7G LNO to MACV, 24 Mar 67, Subj: XM-27 Gravel Detonation Pressure (S).
34. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to COUSAPA, 210808Z Apr 67, Subj: CONUS Testing of XM-27 (Gravel) Mines (U); Rpt (S), MACJ3 22 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Summary (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DA, 181225Z Dec 67, Subj: XM-27 Travel Reemployment (U).
  35. Rpt (TS), ACofS J3, 22 Jan 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Dec 67 (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV et al., 071245Z Mar 67, Subj: Air Delivered RCA (U).
  36. Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Nov 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter, Vol. I, No. 3.
  37. Rpt (U), HQ USARV, 30 Oct 67, Subj: USARV CHEMICAL CONFERENCE - Final Report - (U).
  38. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 070254Z Jun 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA (U); Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 161457Z Jun 67, Subj: Ibid.; Rpt (S), MACSA to SJSH, 21 Jul 67, Subj: Periodic Historical Summary (U); Embtel (TS), Vientiane to SECSTATE, 291000Z May 67, Subj: Operation COMMANDO LAVA (U); Msg (TS), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 262330Z Jun 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II (U); Msg (TS), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 281045Z Jun 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA (U); Msg (TS), 7AF to PACAF, 060745Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II Test and Evaluation; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071040Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II (U); Msg (TS), CSAF to 7AF, 112023Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), CASF to 7AF, 112023Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 142317Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 181022Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 191230Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II (U); Msg (TS), USAIRA Vientiane to 7AF, 210515Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II Test (U); Msg (TS), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 210615Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II (U); Msg (TS), 7AF to AMEMB Vientiane, 221235Z Jul 67, Subj: COMMANDO LAVA II - Target in Laos (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

39. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 220411Z Mar 67, Subj: Forest Clearing Operations (U); Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Apr 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter, Vol I, No. 1 (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 141115Z Feb 67, Subj: Forest Clearing Operations (U); Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 21 Dec 67; Memo (C), MACV Construction Dir., n.d., Subj: Forest Clearing News Release (U), 1st Log Cmd, n. d.
40. Rpt (U), DA OCR&D, 3 Apr 68, Subj: Compendium, Intra-agency Conference on the Tunnel Problem (U).
41. Ibid.
42. Op. cit. 36 & 40.
43. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 230543Z Dec 67, Subj: BLU-3 Dud Munitions (U); Ltr (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 6 Oct 67, Subj: Dud Bomblet (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 300630Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.
44. DF (S), MACJ3 to MACJ2 et al., 6 Oct 67, Subj: Dud Bomblets (U).
45. Ltr (S), MACSA to SJS, 21 Jul 67, Subj: Periodic Historical Summary (U); Rpt (C) ACofS J3, Jul 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter(U).
46. Msg (S), MACJ342 to III MAF, 160938Z Mar 68, Subj: Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE) Weapons (U); Msg (S), MACJ342 to ODDR&E, 250436Z Apr 68, Subj: Fuel-Air Explosive Device (U).
47. Rpt (C), ACofS J3, May 68, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
48. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 290408Z Sep 67, Subj: XM-429 VT Fuse for 2.75 inch FFAR (U).
49. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 230543Z Dec 67, Subj: BLU-3 Dud Munitions (U); Ltr (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 16 Sep 67, Subj: Dud Bomblet (U); Ltr (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 6 Oct 67, Subj: Ibid., Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF et al., 300630Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.
50. Rpt (TS), MACJ341, 21 Jul 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Jan 68 (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

51. Rpt (TS), MACJ341, 21 Jul 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Jan 68 (U); Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Apr 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
52. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 27 Oct 67, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary, Jul 67 (U).
53. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 120319Z Jan 67, Subj: Helicopter Landing Zone Mines (U), Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Apr 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPACAF, 100130Z Nov 67, Subj: Clearing Landing Zones (U); Rpt (TS), ACofS J3, 22 Jan 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Dec 67 (U); Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Apr 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
54. Rpt (C), ACofS J3, May 68, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
55. Rpt (C), COMNAVFORV, 27 Oct 67, Subj: Monthly Historical Supplement, Jul 67 (U).
56. Rpt (S), ACofS J3, Jul 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
57. Rpt (C), ACofS J3, May 68, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U); Rpt (TS), MACJ341, 14 Mar 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Feb 68 (U); Rpt (TS), MACJ341, 17 Apr 68, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Mar 68 (U).
58. Rpt (S), ACofS J3, Jul 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U); Msg (S), DA to CG USARV, 292111Z Jun 67, Subj: Footprintless Shoes (Ensure No. 206) (U); Rpt (C), ACofS J3, May 68, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
59. Rpt (S), MACJ342, 7 Aug 67, Subj: Significant Problem Areas (U); Msg (S), DCPG to CINCPAC, 221400Z Jun 67, Subj: Loran C/D Man Pack (U); Rpt (C), ACofS J3, Nov 67, Subj: R&D Newsletter (U).
60. Ltr (S), MACSA to SJS, 21 Jul 67, Subj: Periodic Historical Summary (U).
61. Rpt (C), USNRDU-V, 1 Jan 68, Subj: Second Semi-Annual Progress Report (U).

PAGE 895 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE NOT USED

PAGE 896 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER X

### SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS

#### MORALE AND WELFARE

(U) During 1967 the morale and welfare program remained an area of primary interest to COMUSMACV. Facilities and programs were expanded and improved to support the growing military population and great effort was exerted to make conditions more livable during the tour in RVN. Additional USOs and Red Cross recreation centers were added. Efforts were made to carry the services and entertainment to the troops in the field to the lowest level possible. New R&R locations were opened, old ones expanded, quotas increased, and programs improved. Exchange facilities continued to expand, and, like other services, carried to the lowest level possible. The liberal award policy was continued and awards for the recognition of merit or heroism were encouraged. The extremely high morale of the command can be attributed to a number of factors. The most significant single factor was, without a doubt, the one-year tour. Of significance also were the free mail privileges. Other factors were well expressed by the 25th Div Chaplain:<sup>1</sup>

Morale [is] high, very high, [as] shown by obedience, personal cleanliness, cheerful acceptance of the rigors they face, quickness of cooperation with the unit, pride in the unit. We found many reasons for high morale. One basic reason lies in the soldier's awareness that the command is thinking of him as a human being with human needs and feelings. Hot food and cold drinks and ice cream are brought to him in the field. The Base Camp Concept assures him of a welcome return at intervals to barracks, mess hall, P.X., movies, and other conveniences. He knows he

# UNCLASSIFIED

will get the quickest and most competent medical care ever heard of. The R&R program gives him visions and memories of another world. Command emphasis on unit integrity and unit self-help forges a strong sense of unit integrity and keeps them busy. So much anti-war talk at home seems to increase the soldiers sense of dedication and responsibility.

## Awards and Decorations

(U) The awards and decorations program was an important morale factor. This program had been enhanced by the delegation of awards authority, which remained the same as during 1966, to commanders in the field. The awards presented in-country by service during 1967 are shown below:<sup>2</sup>

<u>Decorations</u> <u>(Svc Equiv)</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy/Marine</u>	<u>Air Force</u>
MH	6	7	2
DSC/NC/AFC	175	46	9
DSM	29	12	13
SS	3,137	513	918
LM	1,578	190	87
DFC	3,045	547	6,098
SM/N&MCM/AM	849	47	160
BS I	48,450	2,429	5,315
AM	135,145	39,804	55,189
JSCM	985	312	341
ACM/NCM/AFCM	49,730	3,829	24,354
PH	<u>34,349</u>	<u>50,558</u>	<u>435</u>
TOTAL	277,476	98,294	92,921

(U) DA authorized US Army advisors assigned to foreign units to wear US unit award emblems awarded to the unit. The individual had to have been assigned as advisor to the unit concerned and physically present during the action cited. Also, DA authorized US Army

# UNCLASSIFIED

personnel to accept and wear the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st and 2nd Class, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 145b, AR 672-5-1. This medal was formerly designated the Republic of Vietnam Medal of Honor and was not awarded to members of RVNAF. With this change, all Vietnamese decorations and badges meet the requirements of Public Law 89-257.<sup>3</sup>

(U) DA announced the approval of the fourth campaign of the Vietnamese conflict on 2 August 1967. This campaign was designated Vietnam Counteroffensive, Phase II covering the period 1 July 1966 to 31 May 1967.<sup>4</sup>

(U) US Mission Policy had been to recommend foreign military personnel for US decorations only for acts of heroism directly related to US personnel or for gallantry in action against the enemy of a nature which fully met the criteria for award of the Silver Star. On 14 March 1967, Ambassador Lodge approved the mission policy for meritorious awards for third-country officers.

(U) Awards were restricted to third-country officers; Vietnamese were ineligible. They were further restricted to only the top commands, such as the highest commander or, in the case of the Koreans, the division commanders, and had to meet the criteria for the award of the Legion of Merit. Each award had to be approved by the AMEMB, the Chief of the US country team in the home country of the recipient, and the appropriate service chief. The medal was awarded only upon the recipient's return to his own country.<sup>5</sup>

(U) The US Mission Policy had required that acts of heroism not fully meeting the criteria for the Silver Star must have been directly related to US personnel, and further, that each recommendation for the award must have been accompanied by an eye-witness statement of a member of the US armed forces. These restrictions greatly limited the number of foreign personnel to receive US decorations. Since COMUSMACV desired, through the use of US awards and decorations, to recognize a greater proportion of the non-US military personnel in Vietnam for their valorous deeds against our common enemy on the battlefield, the Mission policy was modified on 26 November 1967 to read as follows:

United States Mission policy is to recommend foreign military personnel for US decorations only

~~SECRET~~

for acts of heroism or for gallantry in action against the enemy. Each recommendation for award of the Silver Star or Distinguished Service Cross must be accompanied by an eye-witness statement of a member of the US Armed Forces. Acts for which recommendations for award of the Distinguished Flying Cross and lesser valorous decorations are submitted need not have been witnessed by a member of the US Armed Forces. However, such recommendations must be submitted by a member of the US Armed Forces who has personal knowledge that the facts contained therein are essentially correct. All recommendations will be routed to COMUSMACV to secure US Mission concurrence and will be accompanied by a biographical sketch of the intended recipient. <sup>6</sup>

(S) On 27 July 1967 Air Force personnel serving in Laos became eligible for the award of the Vietnam Service Medal if they were assigned, for one or more days, to an organization participating in or directly supporting the Vietnam military operation. Unit personnel records were authorized as the basis for determining eligibility. Normally the Vietnamese decoration required an aggregate of six months or more service in RVN. However, Laos based personnel assigned to a unit in direct support of the RVN program were authorized this decoration. <sup>7</sup>

(U) At year's end several unresolved problems remained in the awards and decorations program. No authority had been delegated to approve meritorious awards to foreign military personnel. The awards approval authority delegated to CG III MAF did not provide for timely recognition of MC personnel. The integrated military/civilian teams in support of civil operations and RD presented a problem since adequate means of recognition in the form of decorations for the civilian members of these teams was not available. Action was in progress to develop awards and decorations to recognize the service, achievement, and heroic acts of these civilians. <sup>8</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Living Conditions

### Project MOOSE

(C) The need for Project MOOSE (Move Out of Saigon Expeditionously) was born as the result of the rapid buildup of US forces in RVN. Saigon had the only deep water port capable of handling the tonnages required to support the buildup, and the location of the major aerial port of entry to RVN, Tan Son Nhut Air Base. These circumstances caused a concentrating of command and control and logistical units in the Saigon area for port clearance, line haul of material, and movement of personnel through the sea and aerial ports.

(C) Becoming concerned about the increased American presence in Saigon, Ambassador Lodge and COMUSMACV had initiated action during January 1966 to insure that US personnel presented a good image, to prevent overwhelming the Vietnamese, and to minimize the adverse effects on the Vietnamese economy. In April 1966 COMUSMACV had directed component commanders not to program any additional units into the Saigon area and to divert to other locations those already programmed but not arrived. Requests for exceptions to this policy had to be fully justified and referred to COMUSMACV personally for approval. In May 1966 he had issued further instructions to the component commanders prohibiting them from acquiring additional Vietnamese owned buildings in the Saigon complex for use as billets without his approval. In early 1966 COMUSMACV informed JCS and CINCPAC of the situation in RVN. He established a program for informing senior government officials of his plans for, and progress in, relocating personnel and units from the Saigon area.

(C) In August 1966 the President expressed his desire that MACV plan to reduce further facilities and personnel in the Saigon area and, where possible, to expedite the reduction process. In response to the President's request, COMUSMACV verbally instructed his component commanders to submit their relocation plans based on his new guidance. Collectively, these plans became the MACV "Project MOOSE" plan.

(C) During September 1966 COMUSMACV had reviewed the plan and informed CINCPAC of the reductions that could be accelerated, providing that the requested funding and real estate could be acquired

# CONFIDENTIAL

expeditiously. In October 1966 CINCPAC concurred in the MACV position and so informed JCS. Key elements of the plan submitted and concurred in were to:

- 1) Move and consolidate MACV Headquarters from its several locations in Saigon/Cholon to newly constructed facilities at Tan Son Nhut.
- 2) Move HQ USARV and the 1st Log Cmd from Tan Son Nhut, the Rice Mill, and Fish Market areas of Saigon/Cholon, to newly constructed facilities at Long Binh.
- 3) Move elements of the 7AF from Tan Son Nhut Air Base to new facilities at Bien Hoa, Phang Rang, and other air bases.
- 4) Move elements of NAVFORV from Saigon to new facilities at Nha Be and Cam Ranh Bay.

(C) COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC of the difficulty foreseen in funding for the accelerated move which was estimated to require an additional \$40,000,000 prior to 30 April 1967. An increase in the MACV piaster expenditure ceiling was also considered essential to the successful acceleration of Project MOOSE. CINCPAC notified JCS of his concurrence in MACV's plan and emphasized that savings in piasters gained by moving personnel out of Saigon would partially amortize the increase in piaster expenditures related to construction costs. During September and October 1966 funds were reprogrammed to allow for the increased construction effort. USARV, which also funded MACV's new headquarters construction through MCA assets, had the most significant increase in funding requirements. These were made known to CINCUSARPAC, who, in turn, requested the additional funds from DA.<sup>9</sup>

(U) Project MOOSE planning was completed at all echelons by April 1967, and the execution phase began with the move of HQ USARV to Long Binh during the period 1-15 July 1967. This was followed immediately by MACV's move to Tan Son Nhut. By the end of 1967 other units and elements had moved as facilities were completed. The original target date, 31 December 1967, for completion of all moves, was met by all units with the following exceptions:

- 1) MACAG was scheduled to move to Tan Son Nhut in February 1968 when their building was finished.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2) NAVFORV was scheduled to move to Nha Be on completion of their facility, which was anticipated in February 1968.

3) The 38th Base Post Office was scheduled to move to Long Binh in May 1968, the forecasted date of completion of their facility.

(U) As of the end of 1967 Project MOOSE was generally on schedule. Concurrent with the population reduction in the area, 70 facilities were released. Six additional facilities were released from the USAHAC billeting system but were reallocated to other units/activities.

(C) As of September 1967 the Air Force had no units in Saigon/Cholon; however, they did have 146 personnel from units at Tan Son Nhut working in Saigon/Cholon. No further reduction was planned in that area. Through the relocation of units the 7AF reduced its population as programmed in Project MOOSE.

(C) In contrast with USARV and 7AF, the Navy had a relatively small number of personnel. In July and August 1967 the Navy suffered some slippage in construction BODs (Beneficial Occupancy Date). They had planned to have their relocation completed by 31 December 1967, however, the date was slipped to 28 February 1968. As of 31 December 1967 there were 7,915 personnel working in the Saigon/Cholon area and 19,938 working in the Tan Son Nhut area. 10

(U) On 19 October 1967 an editorial appeared in the Vietnamese newspaper, Cong Chung, which brought certain aspects of Project MOOSE sharply back into focus. The writer, To Van, recalled a meeting that Ambassador Lodge had had with a group of Vietnamese journalists. Mr. Lodge said that the US Embassy was preparing to move the American agencies and installations, civilian and military alike, and their personnel residing in the city of Saigon, into the suburban areas to avoid causing trouble to the Vietnamese people and also to settle the problem of common security for the Americans. The Ambassador also said that the move would be completed in six months at the latest. The editorial went on to comment that a year had passed since the press conference, yet the US agencies, installations, and personnel still remained in the city. In conclusion, the editorial urged that the new Ambassador move the military and civilian agencies out of Saigon as soon as possible or concentrate them into a certain area so as to prevent daily friction between the Americans and Vietnamese. 11

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) As a result, Mr. Calhoun, Political Counsellor, sent a memorandum to the MACV stating that although considerable improvement had been made in moving installations and personnel out of Saigon "we retain several large and very visible hotels in the downtown area. The closing of even one of these could have a more immediate and dramatic psychological effect than our steady but gradual disposal of small billets." Since the Lower House of the National Assembly included a number of members not totally respectful to all aspects of the American presence (e.g., Ho Huu Tuong, Nguyen Trong Nho), he recommended that the Brink Hotel, including the PX, the Ambassador Hotel, and the Rex Hotel be vacated. He felt that the first three installations should be a priority move and the Rex at a later date. This move would release the parking lot between the Brink and the Ambassador which would be perfect for Lower House needs. The Brink and Ambassador, because of their locations overlooking the National Assembly, were a constant and politically undesirable reminder that US personnel were still very much in town. It would be advantageous to execute a quiet, unpublicized withdrawal from these buildings, with the stipulation that they not be utilized by any USG civilian agency or civilian contract firm. This would blunt much criticism from deputies and might even win a few compliments.<sup>12</sup>

(U) On 10 November 1967 USAHAC submitted a study to MACV on the feasibility of complying with Mr. Calhoun's request and developed four possible courses of action:

1) Maintain the status quo and proceed with the existing plans of Project MOOSE.

2) Retain the Brink and Ambassador Hotels, close the Brink PX, relocate the central bus station from in front of the PX and relocate the central billeting office from the Ambassador Hotel. This would not meet the objectives expressed by Mr. Calhoun but would reduce the US military presence in the downtown area around the Brink and Ambassador. This would be less costly than courses of action of 3 and 4 below.

3) Moves outlined in 2 above plus release of the Ambassador and Town House BEQs which were located one block from the National Assembly Building. This would partially meet Mr. Calhoun's objectives but deprive the US of a rent-free hotel intended for TDY personnel which was to save an estimated \$1,369,000 annually.

# UNCLASSIFIED

4) Moves outlined in 2 and 3 above plus release of the Brink and Rex Hotels. This of course would meet Mr. Calhoun's objectives, however, it would deprive the US of two rent-free hotels with a replacement cost estimated to be over \$275,000 per annum; would deny the savings of TDY funds in paragraph 3 above; and would leave no facility to feed the residual US population.

(U) The study concluded that the status quo should be maintained. However, COMUSMACV asked what could be done short- and long-range rather than maintain the status quo. The MACV staff restudied the problem and determined that a short-range plan to reduce the US presence could be accomplished by relocating the military billeting office, closing the Brink PX facility, relocating the bus station and relinquishing the parking area between the Brink and Ambassador Hotels. This could be accomplished by 1 February 1968. The Brink, Ambassador, and Rex Hotels were included in the HQ MACV Project MOOSE Plan for timely and economical releases as early as possible.<sup>13</sup>

## Non-Appropriated Fund Messes

(U) Two mess systems were operated in RVN by the US Forces. Each component command, exclusive of III MAF, operated both types to provide essential feeding facilities for their personnel. Government messes provided food service for 287,200 (88.4%) of the US Forces, primarily those assigned to organizations in the field. These personnel forfeited their monthly subsistence allowance of \$47.88 for officers and \$77.10 for enlisted. The NAF (Non-Appropriated Fund) messes provided food service to 37,800 (11.6%) (11,700 officers and 26,100 enlisted) of the US Forces, primarily those assigned to small advisory detachments in the field and to major headquarters and units located in Saigon, Cholon, Tan Son Nhut, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Nha Trang, etc. These personnel received their monthly subsistence allowance.

(U) A study directed by COMUSMACV on 21 September 1966 determined that the conversion of all NAF messes, except those feeding approximately fifty people or less, to government messes, could save the USG about \$8.9 million annually. In addition, there was a potential annual savings to the USG of about \$1 million in per diem costs when the NAF messes were converted to government messes. This was based on a very conservative estimate of 650 personnel on TDY at any one time in the Saigon, Cholon, Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang areas. Because government messes were not available, the

# UNCLASSIFIED

subsistence portion (\$4.50 per day) of the per diem was paid to the individual. Computed on a yearly basis this amounted to more than \$1 million. <sup>14</sup>

(U) On 15 December 1966 COMUSMACV directed the component commanders and senior advisors to establish government messes outside the Saigon/Cholon area within 90 days. Exception was given in cases where only approximately 50 people were fed. Conversion programs were required by 30 January 1967. The program was required to include any NAF messes desired for retention, and justification therefore. 7AF stated that three AF installations had established field ration messes for all personnel. However, there were some problems related to facilities, personnel, and morale to be resolved before field ration messes could be established at the remaining seven bases. 7AF agreed with the basic goal of field ration messes for all military personnel and stated that proper programming would be taken to phase conversions within the availability of funds, personnel and facilities. MACV approved the extension but stipulated that 30 September 1967 would be used as the target date to complete the program. Upon receipt of the stipulated target date, 7AF requested a deferment of six months to the conversion schedule of 30 September 1967. Slippage was also experienced in the conversion of messes in USARV, USAHAC, and NAVFORV. <sup>15</sup>

(U) Significant progress was made during 1967 toward converting all NAF messes into field ration messes. NAVFORV and SA I CTZ completed conversion. NAVFORV converted ten messes, I CTZ converted seven messes. A new field ration mess was constructed by USAHAC, within MACV Annex. SA II, III and IV CTZs made significant progress in CY67 by converting 19 NAF messes to field ration messes and constructing one additional field ration mess in II CTZ. Only seven NAF messes remained in II, III and IV CTZs to be converted. USARV had converted 24 of 54 NAF messes by the end of 1967. The remaining 30 were scheduled for conversion, to be closed, or made into snack bars not later than 31 March 1968. 7AF was planning on converting to field ration messes by conversion of existing facilities and/or new construction not later than 31 March 1968. <sup>16</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## The USO in RVN

(U) The United Services Organization, Inc. (USO) began in the year 1966 with four clubs in operation in support of US servicemen in RVN. By the end of 1966 the number had grown to ten, employing a professional staff of 29. Three of the clubs were located at Da Nang with the others at Saigon, Ta. SonNhut, Nha Trang, Di An, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Chu Lai. During 1967 the number of clubs grew to 14, with additional clubs being established at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, An Khe, and Vung Tau. All but five were located within a military perimeter. The staff was increased to 47. Over 5.5 million servicemen availed themselves of the USO facilities in-country during 1967. 17

(U) USO Club personnel shared the hardships of adverse living conditions and transportation problems with the troops they served. In common with the troops they also had their supply problems. As one club director described the problem: 18

Like the air conditioners it might never get here [a new vehicle], so there will be no problem. Things destined for Chu Lai often never arrived. Air conditioners, tables, chairs, lounge furniture, refrigerators, often get lost in the bye and bye. However, the "bennies" or advantages of being in the bush league far outweigh the occasional loss of something that would only complicate our simple inventory.

## Entertainment

(U) During 1967 the number of professional shows appearing in RVN hit a new high. There was an average of ten per month and, at times, the number reached 14. Every effort was made to insure that the shows reached the troops at the lowest possible levels. This, at times, caused major problems because a group of more than five could not be transported or billeted at the more remote installations. The shows were mainly of two types, the entertainers who performed and the "hand shakers" who did not perform but merely visited and

# UNCLASSIFIED

talked with the troops. These latter included such famous personalities as Roger Ward, Robert Stack, Robert Mitchum, Floyd Patterson, Lana Turner, Charleton Heston, Ann B. Davis, and Joe DiMaggio. Among the entertainers was the ever-popular Bob Hope with his perennial Christmas Show. Others were Connie Francis, Hugh O'Brien, Nancy Sinatra, Martha Rae, Sons of the Pioneers, Johnny Grant Show, and Phil Crosby.

(U) Another source of entertainment for the troops were the troops themselves. These performers consisted of groups of US servicemen, who because they had something to offer, were militarily sponsored and transported through RVN giving as many as 39 shows in a 30-day period. Their talents ranged from country and western style to popular band music. Fleet and soldier shows were also exchanged.<sup>19</sup>

## Postal Operations

(U) During 1967 a total of 104,284 tons of mail entered and left RVN. Although the figures for previous years appear more impressive, they are deceptive. Prior to 1 May 1967 mail tonnage was counted in-country each time that it was handled, resulting in multiple counting of the same mail. In addition, in-country mail was also included. The sale of money orders and stamps reflected the additional load placed on the postal facilities by the troop strength increase.<sup>20</sup>

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Money Order Sales	\$199,093,261.67	\$290,567,340.89
Stamp Sales	4,534,162.47	8,360,176.06

(U) During the year postal facilities expanded in proportion to the increase in troop strength. By December 1967, 95 total APO/FPOs, two Base Post Offices (BPO), one Postal Concentration Center (PCC) and three Aerial Mail Terminals (AMT) were operational in RVN. Operating in conjunction with these were 227 finance units for the sale of money orders and stamps. By year's end, 1,880 personnel were assigned primary duty in the postal facilities in-country as contrasted to 1,570 assigned at the beginning of the year. From October through December, postal personnel were

# UNCLASSIFIED

augmented 25 percent to support operation SILVER STAR, the handling of Christmas mail. <sup>21</sup>

(U) As the result of complaints involving non-receipt of mail, excessive transit time, and out-of-sequence receipt of letters, DEPCOM-USMACV on 13 September 1967 directed that the matter be investigated. The committee appointed to investigate the matter found that in general mail was moved with a number one priority, and liaison between postal activities and aerial ports was generally good. However, postal personnel were not fully aware of the availability of in-country transportation and consequently, were not taking advantage of all opportunities to dispatch mail. Since mail shipments frequently arrived without proper documentation, it was virtually impossible to trace the mail delays or mishandling. <sup>22</sup>

(U) On 7 November 1967 the committee reviewed in-transit time studies made by USARV and USAF. These studies covered the period 25 September through 13 October 1967. The transit time from Saigon to many APOs was from two to four days less than from the same APO to Saigon. There should not have been more than one day time difference. On 15 November 1967 the committee visited the most critical areas with the purpose of reviewing procedures at each stop and insuring that each element involved had the latest instructions on mail movement and the instructions were being implemented. <sup>23</sup>

(U) With the increase in troop strength each year, the problem of handling the Christmas mail grew proportionally. In 1967 it posed a problem of major proportions and the solution required a concerted effort. A meeting was called of representatives from all the major commands and the nickname of SILVER STAR was assigned to the Vietnam Christmas Mail Program. The coordinating meeting was held on 19 June 1967 to formulate plans for an efficient SILVER STAR program. For planning purposes MACV estimated the following mail tonnages would be handled during October, November and December 1967:

# UNCLASSIFIED

	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>
Personal mail (Including 5 lb parcel post)	19,000 tons	13,800 tons
Personal surface mail	7,000 tons	6,000 tons
Official mail (Air and Surface)	<u>9,200 tons</u>	<u>4,000 tons</u>
Total	35,200 tons	23,800 tons

(U) Even though the facilities throughout RVN had improved in most cases since the previous Christmas season, efficient mail processing and distribution depended on the ability to keep mail moving via in-country aircraft. MACJ4 was tasked with the responsibility of providing the necessary in-country airlift to meet the additional requirements. Plans were made for augmenting certain Postal and Aerial Port activities with personnel to meet the increased workloads. The augmentees were used primarily as bulk mail handlers. In anticipation of heavy increase the following Christmas mailing periods were established for RVN:24

## RVN to CONUS

Surface: 1 October - 1 November  
Airmail: 1 - 13 December

## CONUS to RVN

1 October - 1 November  
1 - 10 December

(U) Periodically news releases were placed over the RVN TV and Radio Network and other media to remind people to do their Christmas mailing as early as possible. In addition, personnel mailing gifts were reminded that careful wrapping and addressing was a necessity to insure safe and timely delivery. To facilitate further matters and eliminate a backlog, Customer Service Tables were set up in the lobbies of some APO/FPOs, and BPOs. There the clerks determined the mailability, proper packing and wrapping, and proper completion of customs tags. Arrangements were made for more frequent pickup of mail from APO/FPO/BPOs. Directories were updated and purified to prevent lost time in delivery. The success of the program was realized in the fact that there was no backlog at any of the in-country postal facilities. 25

# CONFIDENTIAL

(U) Superimposed on the already overtaxed postal system was the Red Cross "Gift Bag" program (see Chapter X, Red Cross). Since all shipments of the Gift Bags were to be handled a number of times under extremely difficult conditions before ultimate disposition, packing instructions had to be followed carefully. The bags were to be packed in new corrugated cartons at least 275-lb test stock securely sealed at all openings and not to exceed 70-lb gross weight nor 100 inches in length and girth combined. In 1966 some shipments were made to the West Coast by Air National Guard aircraft. This method was unsatisfactory because at the destination special arrangements had to be made to off-load the aircraft on arrival, usually at night, and to move the cargo to the area warehouses or post office. Since the expense and problems involved offset the initial advantage of free movement from point of origin to the point of mailing in San Francisco, the procedure was not used in 1967.<sup>26</sup>

(U) A continuing problem plaguing postal personnel at all echelons was that of War Trophies. San Francisco Customs Officials reported that many items of live explosive ordnance had been found in parcels originating at RVN APOs. The items ranged from C-4 plastic explosive, claymore mines with arming mechanisms, and TNT, to rifle grenades, flares, and M-72 rounds with launchers. Customs declarations vaguely identified the contents of these parcels as "War Trophies," "fifty dollar gifts," etc. An intensive campaign giving maximum publicity to this matter was initiated through radio, TV, and other information media emphasizing the seriousness of POD and DOD regulation violations and the danger to transport passengers and crew, to Customs and Postal Officials, and to family and friends to whom the parcels were addressed.<sup>27</sup>

## Tour Length

(C) In August 1964 DA changed the provisions of AR 614-30 (Overseas Service) which authorized overseas commanders to extend tours of individuals for 30 days for convenience of the government and authorized COMUSMACV to involuntarily extend overseas tours of Army personnel whose term of service permitted, for such period and for such personnel as was deemed necessary in the interest of operational readiness and continuity of effort. On 14 October 1966, the Secretary of Defense announced that "we have no intention of changing the twelve

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

month tour of duty. All of the men assigned to SVN, with the exception of such commanders as General Westmoreland, and a few members of his staff and higher echelon staffs in the field, are sent on a twelve month tour of duty. We are equipped to supply the replacements to support it." OSD requested that appropriate action be taken to modify any special tour extension authority granted COMUSMACV to insure that it was in agreement with the policy statement of the SECDEF. This provision did not apply to General Officers and a select number of Colonels/Captains.<sup>28</sup>

#### Phillipine Housing

(C) During the SECDEF Saigon Conference in October 1967, the SECDEF authorized the extension of tours of selected key officers beyond twelve months with the attendant authorized government lease of up to 100 houses in Manila and the movement at government expense of the families whose sponsors were on extended tours in RVN. The plan envisioned that officers who were assigned in designated key positions and who were selected for tour extension would be notified at an appropriate time that their service in RVN would be extended beyond the normal twelve month tour. These selected officers would be offered a choice between two compensatory options:

- 1) Periodic leave in accordance with PL 89-735.
- 2) Relocation of dependents to Clark AFB with opportunity for periodic sponsor travel to Clark AFB. This option entailed a minimum of twelve months service in RVN after relocation of dependents. Two problems still required resolution. They were entitlements of general officers under PL 89-735 and movement of POVs.<sup>29</sup>

(C) JCS directed that the military services would retain responsibility for the relocation of dependents from their locations to Clark AFB in accordance with respective service regulations and based upon priority schedules established by COMUSMACV in coordination with the Commander 13AF. OSD was aware of the problem as pertained to POVs; and if legal authority was lacking, they were prepared to develop appropriate legislation. The AMEMB Manila was requested to assist in obtaining approval for coverage of MACV personnel and dependents under

# CONFIDENTIAL

the 1947 Military Base Agreement (MBA). On 19 January 1967 these negotiations were still going on. On 29 March 1967 MACV informed OSD, JCS, and CINCPAC that due to the impact of PL 89-735 regarding special leave, applications for Clark AFB housing would be considerably fewer than previously expected. This was because the public law was liberal with respect to travel and nonchargeable leave time offered an immediate program for maintenance of family relations. The option of the Philippine housing, on the other hand, required that the officer remain separated from his family for twelve months and then serve a minimum of twelve months after his family arrived in the Philippines. This caused a longer initial family separation than did leave under the public law. In this connection, SECDEF agreed with COMUSMACV that the only change to the original plan would be to make arrangements with 13AF to utilize the bulk of the planned MACV quarters. Copies of the MACV/13AF mutual quarters utilization agreement were forwarded to JCS and CINCPAC on 6 May 1967.<sup>30</sup>

(C) Because only five officers had by 20 May 1967 accepted the option of Philippine housing, COMUSMACV desired that the option of Philippine housing be made more attractive by offering a shorter initial family separation. Specifically, COMUSMACV desired that key officers be required to serve only six months in-country prior to the movement of his dependents to the Philippines. The total tour commitment would remain two years. JCS made a counter proposal that the selected key officers be offered an additional option of concurrent travel of dependents to Clark AFB. The proposal was rejected by COMUSMACV who was of the opinion that any officer taking advantage of the option to move his dependents to the Philippines must have proved himself in-country for a minimum period of at least six months.<sup>31</sup>

(C) By 16 June 1967 the GOP had not acted on the State Department request for extending the coverage of the Military Base Agreement (MBA) to the dependents of officers selecting the Philippine option. COMUSMACV had by this time approved six officers for tour extensions under the plan. The DEPSECDEF had approved, as an interim measure, the assignment of these six officers to the 13AF with duty station in RVN, and the dependents were authorized transportation to Clark AFB.<sup>32</sup>

(C) The negotiations with GOP to bring the dependents of MACV personnel under the MBA seemed to be leading the AMEMB Manila officials into a morass of complications. When it was suggested

# CONFIDENTIAL

that perhaps the best solution was to bring these dependents under MBA by assigning their sponsors to Clark AFB with TDY to RVN, GOP representatives were greatly relieved and requested that GOP be given the names of those so assigned. No questions, however, would be raised about duties or whereabouts of the sponsors, nor would there be any difference in position of these dependents and that of others normally assigned to Clark AFB. The fact that some assigned to Clark AFB would be officers from other services was of no concern. Although GOP had been slow and clumsy, their legal problem and the goodwill of the officials were authentic. Their real problem was a lack of legal basis for the privileges requested. It was their prudent judgment that going to congress with legislation or an inter governmental agreement would cause even further delay and could stir up a new debate on US bases and PHIL role in RVN conflict which would not be beneficial to our broadest interests.<sup>33</sup>

(C) In July 1967 OSD expressed concern regarding the evident lack of interest in voluntary acceptance of the plan by personnel assigned to the designated selected billets since only six Army officers had volunteered for tour extensions under the plan. To provide greater incentive than that proposed by COMUSMACV to permit personnel to apply for dependent travel after six months in RVN, OSD proposed to COMUSMACV: that on a trial basis those officers assigned to designated key positions who volunteered for extensions be authorized travel under the following provisions:

- 1) The sponsor be required to serve a 24-month tour in RVN after relocation of dependents at Clark AFB.
- 2) Sponsor be permitted periodic visits to dependents at Clark AFB at the discretion of COMUSMACV and based upon available airlift.
- 3) Any officer accepted under this procedure who failed to meet the high performance standards desired be returned to CONUS for reassignment upon completion of at least a twelve month tour. Earlier return would be permissible where the circumstances warranted such action.

This was essentially the same proposal previously made by JCS on 24 May 1967. After careful study, COMUSMACV adhered to his position that an officer must have proved himself for a minimum

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

period of at least six months before he could take advantage of the option to move his dependents to the Philippines. However, he did agree to approve concurrent travel for certain selected officers whose qualifications were well known to him and who were programmed for particularly key positions. However, on 16 August 1967 after further consideration COMUSMACV decided to accept the OSD proposal on a trial basis for general officers and those other officers to be assigned to key positions. He felt that the reasons for rejecting this proposal previously were still valid, but the importance of achieving continuity within the overall effort were considered overriding and sufficient to accept the inherent calculated risks of such a program. 34

(C) The SA III CTZ proposed that COMUSMACV invite a number of III CTZ COLs and LTCs to extend their tours in order to maintain and accelerate the III CTZ programs. COMUSMACV concurred. In recognition of the possible personal difficulties associated with an extended tour, these officers were offered the compensatory options of Clark AFB housing for their dependents with provisions for periodic visits and a thirty day special leave UP PL 89-735. 35

(C) In September COMUSMACV requested authority to grant a thirty day special leave at any time to those in-country officers who elected the Philippine housing option in conjunction with an extension of their RVN tour. This request was based on the response received from in-country officers who indicated an interest in moving their families to the Philippines. In the past, officers selecting this option had made use of the thirty day special leave to assist in the movement of dependents. This leave, by the policy in effect, could only be taken no sooner than three months prior to DEROS. Therefore, the personnel who had recently arrived in-country were not eligible to avail themselves of that option under the regulations. On 26 September 1967 JCS informed COMUSMACV that the tour extension plan had been approved by the SECDEF with some changes. Notably these were:

- 1) A maximum of 100 officers were authorized to extend tours under this plan. Only twelve families were authorized to be relocated to Clark AFB before 1 January 1968.
- 2) Personnel selected for tour extension under this plan would be assigned to HQ 13AF at Clark AFB, with duty station in Vietnam.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3) The nine-month in-theater requirement was reduced to six months. 36

(C) COMUSMACV concurred in all but two of the changes which he felt would have a significant effect on the overall program. It was never understood that only twelve families would be relocated to Clark AFB before 1 January 1968. The statement previously made that twelve families would arrive at Clark AFB prior to 1 January 1968 was based only on an estimate of the number of families who might be expected to arrive in that time frame. The estimate had never been intended as a limitation. He strongly urged the removal of any restriction other than occupancy by more than 100 families at any one time. Also, it had been the understanding of COMUSMACV that acceptance of the concurrent travel proposal in effect eliminated any time in-country requirement for officers already assigned. This was considered the fairest solution to phasing in the concurrent travel option. JCS felt that changing the nine-month in-country request for eligibility would not only be contrary to the testimony of Defense witnesses, but also would not be within the spirit and intent of the law. Furthermore, to authorize the special thirty day leave "at any time" for a particular category of officers could possibly jeopardize favorable consideration by the Congress of the contemplated request for an indefinite extension of the 30 June 1968 termination date of PL 89-735. In view of the short time left before the restriction of twelve families at Clark AFB to 1 January 1968 expired, JCS did not consider it appropriate to raise the issue. Concession was made that should MACV require quarters at Clark AFB in excess of the twelve authorized before 1 January 1968, requests would be handled on a case-by-case basis. 37

(U) Under-Secretary of the Army David E. McGiffert as the result of his visit to RVN, felt that the tour length of the top military advisor in each province should be at least eighteen months. This would correlate his tour more closely with the tour of his civilian counterpart (eighteen to twenty-four months), and would provide a much more effective advisory effort both at province and district levels. However, emphasis should be placed on the province advisor since this level could, to some extent, compensate for district level turnover. He felt that, since there was a clear requirement that sector (province) advisors be of the highest attainable caliber, incentives should be offered to induce the best LTCs obtainable.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) Basically the proposals provided that qualified individuals would be invited to serve with certain incentives and qualified officers would be permitted to apply for such duty, but none would be ordered to serve.

(C) COMUSMACV had been aware for some time of the need for qualified personnel in the province advisor positions and the need for retaining them in that position as long as possible and the obvious benefits to be derived from the program. In this respect, some of Mr. McGiffert's proposals were already in effect. Advisors from sector/province level were included in the plan for tour extension of key officers and were offered Philippine housing. Efficiency report channels provided for a general officer in the rating chain for all advisors from sector/province level upward.

(U) DA approved a modified program and on 6 December 1967 COMUSMACV distributed it to the field. The program was limited to the 44 Province Senior Advisors/Deputy Province Senior Advisors. The tour length for in-country officers was set at twelve months beyond their normal tour. For officers deployed from CONUS, the tour was set at eighteen months with the option of a six-month extension. Qualifications for consideration were an outstanding record, served or be serving a tour in RVN, graduate of CGSC, combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor, engineer), command a battalion (not necessarily in RVN) and be able to speak Vietnamese or have the aptitude to learn the language (this requirement was waived for in-country nominees). The predeployment training was not applicable to in-country nominees but included training to be conducted under the common POI at the FSI in Washington. The training was designated as the MACV Province Senior Advisor Training Course. The course integrated military and civilian training and consisted of approximately eleven weeks of advisor training and thirty-one weeks of language training.

(U) To increase the attractiveness of the program, several additional incentives were provided. A letter signed personally by the Army CofS would be sent to the selected nominees, informing the officer of his selection. The letter would outline the options/incentives available. When possible, the selectee would receive his preference for assignment to the province of his choice in RVN. Command credit would be given for the tour as a province advisor. The selectee would have the option of moving his family

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

to Hawaii, Okinawa, or Guam. He was encouraged to utilize the assets available at Clark AFB. He was further given the option to quarter his family in CONUS at a post of his choice, if available. He was authorized to spend two weeks leave with his family at a time during his tour to be determined by COMUSMACV. The leave site was Hawaii and his dependents would be transported to the leave site at government expense. While there the family would receive a substantial family allowance (\$30.00 per family member per day) during the vacation period. After completing twelve months in-country the officer would receive thirty days nonchargeable leave. Insofar as possible, the officer would be able to select his next assignment. 38

(U) Public Law 89-735 authorized a special thirty-day period of leave to a military member who, by reenlistment, extension of enlistment, or other voluntary action, extended his required tour of duty in a hostile fire area for at least six months. Since its enactment a total of 48,540 personnel received approval for the extension of their tour of duty under its provisions. The popularity of this extension program was indicated by the fact that of all tour extensions of one month duration or longer 73 percent were under the provisions of PL 89-735. In view of the advantages and economies realized by continuity of service in RVN of area-oriented, training, experienced and motivated personnel, COMUSMACV recommended on 10 November 1967 a permanent extension of the provisions of PL 89-735. 39

## Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Program (Out-of-Country)

(U) The out-of-country R&R program was second only to the one year tour as a morale factor for US/FW forces assigned duties in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). This program was based upon the acknowledged need to remove the individual from his normal duty environment and allow for a respite from the rigors of a tour in Vietnam. R&R taken by military personnel was not charged as leave in accordance with special authority granted by JCS. US Civil Service employees and certain other authorized civilians were also offered R&R as a privilege. The program utilized government and commercial aircraft to transport R&R passengers to approved R&R sites. Normally,

# CONFIDENTIAL

the schedule allowed the passenger a stay of five nights at the R&R sites unless unusual circumstances dictated otherwise.

(C) In addition to being of major morale value, the R&R program served to reduce piaster expenditures in VN and assisted in stabilizing the economy. With these objectives in mind, DOD established a minimum goal of 250,000 personnel for FY67. The final total of participants exceeded this goal by 15,283. Personnel on R&R spent approximately \$350 per individual, which removed 2.4 billion piasters from possible expenditure on the already inflated VN economy.<sup>40</sup>

(U) At the beginning of 1967 there were nine out-of-country R&R sites. Sydney, Australia was added in October 1967.

<u>Site</u>	<u>On-Ground Capability</u>	<u>Percent Utilization</u>
Bangkok	996	97.4
Hong Kong	996	91.5
Taipei	830	93.8
Singapore	300	90.6
Kuala Lumpur	166	86.7
Penang	249	86.0
Tokyo	1,000	93.9
Hawaii	1,570	97.9
Manila	300	95.8
Sydney	1,000	99.1

(U) By the end of 1967, 351,692 people had availed themselves of the opportunity to take out-of-country R&R.<sup>41</sup>



# CONFIDENTIAL

carriers (Northwest, Pan American, and United) filed short tariffs which became effective on 24 June 1967.

(U) The airlines requested a standard R&R order form with the DD Form 1580, Military Authorization for Commercial Air Travel, printed on the bottom or reverse side of the R&R order. Upon presentation of a copy of the R&R order, DD Form 1580 and DD Form 1173, Dependent ID Card, the dependent would be authorized the reduced round-trip fare from the West Coast to Hawaii and return. The transportation applied to economy class only, and it was required that travel from the West Coast and return be completed not later than fifteen days after the date of purchase of the ticket. This fare reduction was applicable only to wives of military personnel in RVN on R&R leave to Hawaii. The round-trip was to be \$165 and would be combined with other fare reduction options such as the "Discover America" plan.

(U) During the planning it was noted that a problem could be anticipated in that wives might not receive the necessary DD Form 1580 in sufficient time to meet the sponsor. To prevent the obvious heart-ache and frustration that such a possibility would cause, HQ USAF advised all major ZI commands that during the initial period of this program (until 1 August 1967), AF installations could issue a DD Form 1580 to the military wife when she presented a letter or other document to indicate her husband had been granted R&R leave in Hawaii. Experience factors showed that approximately 80 percent of users of Honolulu R&R met a family member or fiancée who traveled from the mainland. 43

## Australia

(C) Late in December 1966 concept approval for an R&R program to Australia was received. Final approval of the R&R site establishment in Australia was withheld pending the results of a visit by a CINCPAC team to determine exact site locations and other administrative details. The findings of the survey team were:

1) Adequate facilities existed and for numbers far in excess of any program that had been envisioned.

# CONFIDENTIAL

2) Sydney and the Gold Coast were both desirable because of differences in recreational opportunities in two prime areas.

3) Although the MACV R&R program needed these sites as soon after 1 July 1967 as possible, the earliest practical starting date would be 1 September 1967, taking into consideration lead times on airlift contracts, need for establishment of R&R detachments, and working out a detailed plan.

4) No obstacles to initiation of the program were found that could not be resolved satisfactorily.

(C) For planning purposes the starting date of 1 September 1967 was suggested with the initial site being Sydney. The maximum on the ground strength was to be held at 1,000 with this figure being reached by a phase-in program. At a later date, and if desirable, the second site could be opened on the Gold Coast from Surfers Paradise to Coolangatta. The maximum on the ground strength in this area was to be held at 1,000. A phased program leveling at 500 was recommended initially until demand and experience warranted an increase to 1,000. The R&R detachment was to be furnished by MACV and be composed of outstanding officers and men who had completed a normal twelve month tour and voluntarily extended for this duty.

(U) By 4 July 1967 the R&R team had completed its training and was ready to depart for Australia. Sixty days was considered the minimum time for the team to be in place prior to the site becoming operational. Any substantial delay at this time would possibly delay the planned operational date of 1 September 1967. The earliest date that the team could proceed to Australia was requested.

(U) On 3 August 1967 the R&R program and the dispatch of the team to Australia was formally approved. On 7 August the OIC of the team and one NCO departed for Australia with instructions to report to the AMEMB Canberra upon arrival. The rest of the team followed as they were required. The OIC was briefed on the necessity that no contact be made with the press until the Embassy had been contacted. Problems with the aircraft carrier in positioning its staff required that the operation date of the site be moved up to 1 October 1967.

~~SECRET~~

(C) On 15 August 1967 the AMEMB Canberra made a recommendation that the first plane carrying R&R personnel to Australia bring a minimum of five Australians even though that proved to be a higher percentage than normal because of the interest that would focus on the arrival of the first such aircraft. It was felt that if only one or two GOA soldiers debarked severe adverse publicity might result. Due to the political situation at that time it was decided that the quota for GOA soldiers would be increased during the initial phases of the program so that each plane would carry approximately ten Australians. Actually, there were twenty-five members of the Australian Army on the first plane to arrive. <sup>44</sup>

#### Thailand Based Personnel

(S) On 9 August 1967 a proposal was made in a memorandum from JCS that an R&R program be established for US forces serving in Thailand on unaccompanied tours. The initial CINCPAC position was that Thailand-based combat aircrews regularly engaged in missions over Vietnam should receive all benefits afforded US forces in Vietnam to include out-of-country R&R and that in-country R&R should be established for noncombat personnel serving in Thailand. CINCPACAF wholeheartedly supported action for the earliest implementation of a program for Thailand crews to participate in the R&R program with the stipulation that participation not exceed 150 per month. This figure was considered nominal in comparison with the MACV monthly participation. Also, he felt that a five-day-in-country nonchargeable respite for all other unaccompanied personnel (anticipated 2,900 per month) was a minimum requirement in view of compressed duty schedules and direct contributions to the SEASIA effort plus lack of entitlement to other SEASIA benefits (income tax, free mail, and \$50.00 customs exemptions). COMUSMACV stated that the existing MACV R&R program provided a basic operational program with sufficient diversity and that it could be expanded to include Thailand-based personnel with much less expense than the activation of a separate program. However, one problem was envisioned resulting from the impact of in-country R&R for Thailand personnel on the MACV site in Bangkok. COMUSMACV felt that the facilities in Bangkok might be overstressed by the additional personnel. JCS approved the out-of-country R&R for the combat

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

crews on 9 November 1967 but disapproved the request for in-country R&R. COMUSMACV was requested to coordinate the program, keeping in mind the necessity that commanders in Thailand be granted considerable latitude in determining the participation rate versus firm quotas in view of the acute situation regarding crews manning some weapons systems. 45

Philippine and Korean R&R Problems in Hong Kong

3125

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PAGE 924 OF 1340 PAGES  
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per  
830824  
~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~SECRET~~

CLASS DATE: ~~04/13/83~~  
CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECURITY: ~~SECRET~~  
PAGE 922 OF 1340 PAGES

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army by TAG per  
-----830624-----

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~EVERYONE~~  
~~EXCEPT AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL~~  
~~EXCEPT AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL~~  
~~EXCEPT AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL~~

Manila

(C) At the request of the PHILCAG Commander, all PHILCAG personnel were eliminated from the R&R program to Manila on 3 July 1967. Instead the PHILCAG personnel were to participate in a special leave program to the Philippines. The program would permit the personnel of the PHILCAG contingent to spend fifteen days in the Philippines on a special leave program after they had spent one year in RVN. To support this program 20 percent of the R&R spaces to Manila were programmed to accommodate the PHILCAG contingent.<sup>47</sup>

(D) COMUSMACV was desirous of obtaining contract carrier lift for R&R flights into Manila in order to offer the same service on the Manila channel that was offered on other R&R channels, and he also felt that the USAF desired to recoup its military airlift for other missions. The indications had been that the use of military airlift on that channel was implemented as an interim solution pending acceptance of contract services into Manila by GOP. With the lack of a firm policy on commercial airlift, the 1st Quarter FY68 airlift requirement to Manila was firmed up contemplating the use of military aircraft.

(E) The underlying problem reference using a commercial contract carrier on the Manila channel rose from the fact that they did

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

8-3-06-24

PAGE 926 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

not have landing rights from the Philippine Civil Aeronautics Board, (PCAB). Negotiations had not been initiated because the question of applicability of Philippine tax law to MAC commercial carriers landing at Clark AFB might be raised. The recommendation that Manila be eliminated as an R&R site, due to the unsatisfactory performance of the military airlift, was not favorably considered because of the possible unfavorable reaction from the PHILG. The use of the Philippines Airlines (PAL) appeared to be an ideal solution and their use would eliminate all of the problems of military airlift and airport taxes. In addition, their use would assist in maintaining a favorable political climate with the PHILG.

(C) CINCPACAF nonconcurred in the use of PAL since it was felt that this would probably generate a similar request from RVN and other countries hosting R&R personnel. It was finally decided that, based on the requirements submitted by MACV, the 13AF would support the program through December 1967.<sup>48</sup>

#### Hong Kong Demonstrations

(C) During the month of May 1967 consideration was given to eliminating Hong Kong as an R&R Center on a temporary basis because of the demonstrations in the Hong Kong-Kowloon area. Realizing that the use of Hong Kong might have to be discontinued as an R&R area for troops on very short notice, COMUSMACV requested that the Thai government be contacted for authorization to increase the R&R on-ground strength in Bangkok, on an interim basis, from 996 to 1,826. The increase was to be implemented only should the political unrest in Hong Kong force temporary curtailment of the R&R program there. Bangkok appeared to be the only R&R site capable of rapid expansion with adequate hotel accommodations, recreational facilities, and public transportation. COMUSMACV was desirous of maintaining the DOD directed goal of 250,000 for FY67 and, to avoid disruption to the entire program, other sites would have to be expanded.

(S) On 18 May 1967 POLAD initiated an R&R discussion conveying a request to the AMEMB Hong Kong that R&R flights from Saigon be suspended as soon as possible. He offered as the reason "to avoid possible incidents in the disturbed Kowloon areas at night."

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

When queried as to whether this was necessary in light of the restrictions already imposed, he proposed, as a possible alternative, that R&R be cut by half with no arrivals or departures after dark in order to lessen the security problem for the police. It was pointed out that the intense press query over continuation of R&R as well as the fleet visits made certain any suspicion would become public knowledge with obvious implications for all concerned. The POLAD immediately admitted this aspect had not been considered by the governor and agreed with alacrity to reopen the matter and inform us of the final decision changing the status quo, if any.

(C) AMEMB Bangkok did not favorably consider the recommendation. He recognized the problem that would be caused by even temporarily discontinuing Hong Kong as an R&R center. However, at that time, he was engaged already in coping with some of the psychological and cultural aspects of the impacts of our already large and growing US military presence in that country.

(C) COMUSMACV directed that immediate action be taken to direct the R&R processing personnel at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Tan Son Nhut to present a special briefing for R&R passengers scheduled for Hong Kong. The special briefing was to advise all R&R passengers of the tense situation existing in Hong Kong and to alert them that they may be subjected to certain restrictions imposed by the Hong Kong Governor or the US Consulate. Any restrictive actions dictated would be necessary for the individual's protection and would be strictly complied with. Each individual was directed to be extremely careful of his personal dress and conduct in dealing with persons residing in Hong Kong. They were warned that even minor infractions of dress or conduct could result in an international incident and jeopardize the use of Hong Kong as an R&R site. 49

## Korean R&R Site

(U) In September 1967, COMUSKOREA informed COMUSMACV that the Korean Tourist Bureau proposed to permit Korea to be used for Environmental and Morale (E&M) leave and requested comments. COMUSKOREA was informed that, since servicemen in RVN were not

~~SECRET~~


# UNCLASSIFIED

accompanied by their families, there was no requirement for E&M leave. However, each serviceman was authorized a five-day R&R. A short background on the R&R program and the sites used and proposed at that time was furnished to COMUSKOREA. He was also informed that there were no figures or experience on the desire by US personnel to visit Korea except that, during the past eighteen months, MACV had processed approximately ten requests for leave in Korea.

(U) COMUSKOREA had been informed that General Kim, the president of the Korean Tourist Bureau, had called on General Westmoreland and discussed the same subject. At that time General Kim was informed that, after 1 January 1968, consideration could be given to MACV participation in R&R in Korea. Absolutely no commitment on the part of MACV had been given or implied. In order to get a feel for the number of personnel who might be interested in R&R in Korea, COMUSMACV directed a survey be conducted of fifteen percent of the component commands to ascertain the degree of interest among US troops. It was directed that the survey include a cross-section of officer and enlisted personnel, and the question to be posed was: "Assuming Seoul R&R facilities would be on a par with other approved R&R sites, would you apply for R&R in Seoul, Korea in preference to the current available R&R sites at Bangkok, Taipei, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hawaii, Penang, Hong Kong and Sydney?" The number of personnel surveyed and the number of personnel signifying preference for Seoul R&R were to be reported to COMUSMACV by 23 October 1967. The result of the survey was inconclusive. However, on 20 November 1967 CINGPAC informed COMUSKOREA, that the E&M program was not applicable to RVN since the R&R program was in effect for that area. The sites already in use were adequate to meet the R&R requirements of the US personnel for the foreseeable future, and the establishment of an R&R site in Korea was not advisable at that time. 50



CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~BY: [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE: [REDACTED]~~

PAGE 931 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec ATRY EL TAG per

0-0624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) The R&R program was expected to serve 400,000 passengers during FY68. To attain this utilization, the program at the Sydney, Australia site was to be expanded and the number of passengers to some of the other sites increased. 53

#### Post Exchange

(U) The story of the Vietnam Regional Exchange (RVNR) began early in 1956. The USN managed the PX, and served 20,000 customers from eight exchanges. Customers were military personnel and their families, for until February 1965, tours in RVN were accompanied. The majority of US military personnel in RVN were stationed in the Saigon area. Although the PX existed in RVN prior to 1965, January 1965 has been designated a reference point in RVNR history since during that year the exchange experienced a 100 percent expansion in customers. The Navy was not prepared to expand their operations to keep up with the meteoric rise of US personnel, and on 19 May 1965 JCS directed transfer of control of the RVNR from the Navy to the Army and Air Force. In July 1965 a survey team from the Army and Air Force Regional Exchange System (AAFRES) arrived in RVN to estimate the size of the task which lay before them. In September 1965 a group of professional AAFRES personnel arrived to prepare for the changeover, which took place on 26 December 1965.

(U) By the end of 1966, 4,255 persons were engaged full-time in operating twenty-four exchanges, eighty-six site exchanges, thirty-six imprest fund exchanges, and forty-three snack bars. The income from the 146 retail outlets netted \$156,407,000 for 1966. To this the snack bars contributed an additional \$4,157,000.

~~REVIEWED BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~CLASSIFICATION OFFICER [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE [REDACTED]~~

THIS PAGE RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By IAG per

PAGE 932 OF 1340 PAGES

83-0624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) During 1967 the PX facilities grew with the increase in troop buildup in RVN. At year's end 304 retail outlets were serving US and FW forces. These outlets included twenty-seven branches, one-hundred sixty eight annexes, thirty-seven site exchanges, and 72 imprest fund outlets. In 1967 the gross sales from the retail outlets was \$321,347,000. The 105 food facilities contributed an additional \$12,509,000 for the same period. Retail automobile sales through concessionaires in 1967 was \$1,843,099.

(U) On 6 February 1967 an RVNR Board was established to review and evaluate exchange affairs in RVN, and to improve the efficiency of operation of exchange services. In February 1967 the board approved the selling of Vietnamese, Thai, and Korean gift items through concessions in the PX. PX customers had been buying products from those countries on the local economy for a higher price than they could be sold in the PX. This contributed to inflation which was being combatted by both the USG and GVN. In December 1967 all concessionaire sales were converted to MPC from piasters. This had a double benefit of reducing piaster expenditures and convenience to the customer. 54

(U) On 8 August 1967 Governor Hanh, Minister for Economy and Finance, GVN, in a letter to Ambassador Bunker, expressed his concern regarding the control of PX operations in RVN. He pointed out that there had been significant indications of misuse and possible violation of laws and regulations of RVN. He cited as an example the cases of two US nationals who had been found conducting activities with duty-free imported PX goods outside the authorized PX installations. Also, the individuals mentioned might be guilty of violations of customs, taxation, and commerce laws and regulations of RVN, although operating under some form of contract with PXs. Further, there was information that a large number of businessmen were conducting operations with PX goods outside authorized PX installations and under contract with the PX. Investigation of these cases pointed out the difficulties encountered by VN authorities in undertaking an effective control to ensure that no violations of the laws and regulations of RVN were committed in operations relating to PXs. There was a significant illicit diversion of PX goods into the local markets. This illegal introduction of duty-free goods into the local markets constituted a violation of customs and commerce laws and regulations of RVN; furthermore, the practice constituted a loss of customs and tax revenues for GVN. Local businessmen

# CONFIDENTIAL

had made numerous complaints relating to the unfair and illegal competition from PX goods. The problem had outgrown technical considerations and had become the object of rather strong political sentiments of both GVN and the US Congress.

(U) Governor Hanh felt that because of the undefined status of PX operations, the work of the GVN was very difficult and the coordination of the control undertaken by the USC and GVN was not as effective as would be desirable. He proposed that an important element in the system of control of the PX operations should be that all imports destined for the PX undergo clearance by RVN customs authorities in order to obtain the necessary authorization for duty exemption. He proposed that special clearances would be simple and expeditious; however, they would be sufficient to adequately control the imports. He stressed that the establishment of the customs procedures for PX imports would not modify the policy of the GVN concerning the free entry of PX goods. The points that he raised were complex, and numerous issues needed to be jointly considered and resolved by both governments. He proposed that a special joint committee be set up in order to examine the related matters.<sup>55</sup>

(C) Ambassador Bunker, also, had been becoming increasingly concerned by reports of irregular practices involving illegal currency dealing, contracts calling for payment in US dollars although piaster payment would be less expensive, diversion of PX commodities into the private sector of the Vietnamese economy, and illegal activities by PX concessionnaires. A related problem dealt with the large-scale diversion of commissary items. He felt that a thorough, systematic investigation of the problem areas was required. When the investigation was completed it would then be possible to devise controls and procedures designed to reduce the incidence of the irregularities. The Irregular Practices Committee (IPC) was established. Its membership was made up of a representative of the Deputy Ambassador's Economic Warfare staff and senior officers from MACV, OSA (Office of the Special Assistant, US Embassy), USAID Public Safety, and the Joint Economic Office.<sup>56</sup>

(C) On 29 September 1967 the IPC submitted its initial report to Ambassador Bunker. Throughout their inquiry, the committee found that no single area offered more possibility for improvement than vigorous enforcement of laws and regulations. Although many of their recommendations were for changes or additions to already existing procedures, they felt that none of the changes would make

# CONFIDENTIAL

much difference unless they were accompanied by a sincere effort in enforcement on the part of both the Mission and the GVN. They recommended that the IPC continue to function because they considered it important that some inter-agency committee have the responsibility for following up the implementation and enforcement of the recommended changes and because they felt that additional investigation in certain areas would be fruitful. They also recommended that the purposes of the IPC be made known to all US personnel in RVN. Anyone knowing of apparently improper actions should be encouraged to inform the committee in care of the Embassy. They also recommended that a substantial publicity campaign be directed against specific practices.

(C) The IPC investigation dealt with all the areas of concern to Ambassador Bunker. However, only those matters pertaining to PX operations are covered here. The investigation revealed that the appearance of PX or commissary items in bars and street stalls was a highly visible dimension of the more general problem of the diversion of commodities into the private economy without the payment of import duties. Two aspects of the problem were examined by the committee: (1) theft or other diversion of PX, commissary or other government-owned commodities; and (2) the activities of PX concessionaires. Although the situation had improved by September 1967, thefts from warehouses, trucks, and convoys still occurred. The rapid buildup of military forces along with associated logistical support activities created a situation where adequate inventory control was virtually impossible. Thus, records on the movement and accountability of goods had been less than satisfactory.

(C) The clearing of the port of Saigon along with the accelerating rate of buildup had enabled improved procedures to be implemented throughout the PX logistics system. Procedures were in effect which accounted for all cargo received at the port and made it possible to trace merchandise from receipt at the dock to final sale at the PX or commissary outlet. Thefts could and still did occur, however, at all points in the process of movement to the consumer. Losses in the Delta alone were \$240,000 in the first eight months of 1967. Also, an apparent loss of about eight million dollars between December 1965 and January 1967 was being investigated by HQ MACV. PX government property had been trucked from docks to depots, and branch stores in the case of PX goods, by contractor firms. An MP escort had been provided only for

# CONFIDENTIAL

"security cargo" such as alcoholic beverages, arms and ammunition, certain high-value technical items, pharmaceuticals, and narcotics. Thus, in general (for the PX) only liquor and some value items such as electronic equipment were given an escort. As of the time of the investigation, all PX goods were moved in five-truck convoys with an MP in the lead vehicle, and followed by an MP jeep. Although this practice reduced the opportunity for theft, instances still occurred when trucks were able to pull out of the convoy and escape with the cargo. In spite of the controls already in effect in the movement of all types of commodities, including those going to the PX, there was a considerable lag in time before documents showing accountability were returned to the point of origin. If there was an irregularity, it might be a week or more before investigation could begin.

(C) Aside from theft in-transit, goods were also illegally diverted from intermediate depots and PX branch stores. This problem was not, of course, unique either to RVN or the PX system. It occurred wherever large volumes of goods were moving through a system accessible to many people. The committee received no information which would indicate the existence of a large, well-organized operation to divert PX merchandise in that way. The extremely high volume handled by the PX and the need to rely on non-US personnel made them an important source of supplies for the black-market. The committee believed that the bulk of black-market commodities consisted of stolen goods. Individual purchases did, however, make some contribution to the problem when personnel resold their purchases. That problem arose, in part, from the large number of personnel having PX and commissary privileges. Identification and ration cards which gave these privileges were of various types, and were issued by a number of agencies. Although a check of identification and ration cards was made at the entrance to all PXs and the commissary the wide range of permissible identification cards and the three classes of PX cards undoubtedly made it difficult for employees to ensure that only authorized persons were using the facilities and were making permissible purchases.

(C) It was usually easy to identify PX liquor when it appeared in bars in Saigon. PX cigarettes and many other items were also fairly obvious when they were offered for sale in "PX Alley." An even more important source, however, was probably the result of

# CONFIDENTIAL

illegal sales of commodities brought in under individual duty-free import privileges. Although the GVN had moved to limit the amount of liquor which might be imported by individuals, the availability of the privilege to those with access to the APO made it possible to bring in virtually unrestricted quantities of other kinds of goods which were in demand on the black-market. There had been numerous complaints about the activities of some PX concessionnaires. Those firms enjoyed duty-free import privileges under the umbrella of the PX, and few controls over their receipt of merchandise. There had been some instances of merchandise being stored at homes or offices outside the PX. That meant that opportunities did exist for importing goods under the PX exemption which could have gone into the local economy rather than sold in the PX. Although numerous rumors were apparently circulating through the Mission, PX officials asserted that their discussions with members of the committee were the first official ones they had had concerning such activities.

(C) Finally, and possibly most important, there were those aspects of the problem which related to the GVN. The committee received documented evidence of lack of cooperation between the local police and US authorities. There was even an indication that the police might have been actively a part of the black-market network. In any case there were numerous instances of the seizure by the police of US-leased trucks containing government property which was never recovered. Even more frequent were cases in which numerous representations had to be made to the police before trucks and equipment could be recovered.

(C) In summary, the committee was, of course, convinced that the diversion of duty-free goods to the local economy was serious. It was not convinced, however, that the most visible aspect of the black-market--street stalls selling PX goods--was the most important one. Although most apt to catch the eye of visiting congressmen, congressional committees, or newsmen, and although the part of the operations most likely to be cracked down on by the GVN, it was almost certainly a surface manifestation of the much bigger problem. The committee made several recommendations for immediate steps to be taken by the Mission.

(C) Although recommendations could be made which would help reduce the problem, experience in other countries in which the USC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

has had similar problems showed that without the enthusiastic cooperation of the host government, improvement would be modest. The committee, therefore, recommended that negotiations begin, at whatever level was appropriate, to urge the RVN to enforce its own laws against its citizens engaging in black-market activities. Even though this had been requested many times previously, the numerous steps to be taken on the US side would provide some additional leverage. The USG would make it clear that what was needed was not the confiscation of a few packages of cigarettes from a peasant woman operating a street stall, but really important action against black-market wholesalers. If it were true that the police were themselves a part of the black-market, urging this kind of action might be empty unless important changes were made in police leadership. 57

(C) After having received the recommendations of the IPC, Ambassador Bunker, on 19 October 1967, sent a memorandum to the DEPAMB stating that although he would be directing other steps in the near future, he considered the problems of illegal currency transactions and diversion of PX and other US goods to be so serious that he believed that the recommended actions of the IPC should be implemented as soon as practicable. In directing that those actions be accomplished, he made it perfectly clear that he intended to bring to an end the involvement of US citizens in those transactions. He directed that the affected elements of the Mission take the following actions as pertained to PX operations:

- 1) Devise and put into operation as soon as possible a computerized system designed to provide control over monetary exchange transactions and purchases of PX and other goods most sought after on the black-market.
- 2) Design and issue a single privilege card to all persons authorized PX and other privileges to permit ready identification by personnel operating the facility involved.
- 3) Examine all imports by PX concessionnaires to insure that all merchandise imported for resale was strictly and accurately accounted for.
- 4) Initiate a request to PX suppliers to furnish distinctive markings or labels for those PX goods most commonly observed on the local black-market to enable ready and indisputable identification by VN and other authorities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5) Take necessary action in accordance with applicable service directives to increase the manpower of the military police to provide greater protection to PX and US goods during port, transportation, and storage operations.

6) Substitute US-owned trucks for civilian contractor vehicles in the transport of PX and commissary commodities.

7) Require the execution of MACV Form 311A on all PX items valued at more than \$10.00.

8) Take necessary action to increase the manpower of military investigative units to enable more thorough and detailed investigation into alleged thefts and other illicit activities involving US goods or personnel, and to increase the likelihood of more successful punitive or administrative action when a violator was identified.

9) Publicize under the direction of JUSPAO the activities of the IPC, clearly emphasizing Mission policy regarding the elimination of illegal activities concerning US goods and exchange and soliciting the cooperation of all entities and individuals in identifying those who engage in improper transactions.

(C) Work was already in progress in many of these areas. However, Ambassador Bunker emphasized that he placed the highest priority on full and successful completion. To this end he established the IPC as a permanent body within the Mission to report to the DEPAMB at frequent, regular intervals regarding all matters concerning illegal or potentially illegal activities involving US property or personnel. 58

(U) On 25 October 1967 Ambassador Bunker informed the Minister for Economy and Finance, RVN of the actions he had taken to correct the black-market and illegal monetary practices. He also stated that the IPC had strongly emphasized the need for complete, active cooperation between USG and GVN in enforcing relevant laws and regulations. Without that cooperation it would be very difficult to make much progress in correcting the illegal practices. He cited as an example, effective prosecution of merchants openly selling PX goods on the street would go a long way toward alleviating the problem. He requested the approval of the Minister to designate appropriate members of the US Mission who would stay

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In close contact with him and his staff on the problem areas. The GVN Minister for Economy and Finance replied that complete and active cooperation between the two governments was essential for the effective resolution of the problems under consideration and his cooperation was assured. 59

(U) In reference to the use of identifying marks on PX merchandise, Headquarters AAFRES contacted several vendors of consumable items. Based on discussions with them, it was believed that identification of many exchange resale items was possible without the addition of such a mark. Beer, cigarettes, Class VI, and soap powder vendors contacted advised that they were not selling or distributing their products through RVN commercial outlets. Liaison by the RVNR Exchange with GVN officials would establish that items identical to exchange resale items, if any, were being imported into RVN. Those items found on the black-market identical to exchange items not imported through RVN customs could be presumed to be there illegally, whether from the RVNR Exchange or other US military sources.

(U) Exchange merchandise shipments were normally made from the vendor's warehouse stocks. Any identifying mark would have to be added during a manufacturer's production run. AAFRES considered it impractical for manufacturers using high-speed automated production line methods to break into a production run and mark a portion of the run with an exchange mark. However, vendors contacted indicated a willingness to supply the RVNR Exchange with any code information they use on their packaging that might assist in the identification of exchange items. HQ AAFRES felt that any attempt to distinctively mark nonconsumable merchandise would not only be impractical for manufacturers but also objectionable to patrons and would further act to lessen the value of merchandise and detract from the brand name. Nonconsumable items with serial numbers could be obtained from manufacturers and identified by providing law enforcement authorities with the information. Application of a distinctive mark to items was considered economically infeasible due to the additional cost to the exchange that would be involved. 60

(C) The matter of putting identifying markings on PX merchandise was discussed further between HQ AAFRES and RVNR, and indications were that significant problems existed with respect to requiring manufacturers to specifically identify exchange merchandise.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Some were:

1) Marking cases on the outside would not be of great value, as goods would immediately be removed from cases to obliterate traces.

2) Price markings could be removed too easily.

3) Due to production line methods and changeover costs, vendors would undoubtedly frown on making distinctive boxes or cans.

4) Use of distinctive name or name tag would destroy the image most companies sought in the business world. They lost the impact of their national package recognition.

5) A label sewn into garments was easily removed by clipping out the labels.

6) Stamping with a metal die could be overcome by filing.

In addition to the above considerations, which could well increase the price to the military customer, it was not clear exactly what value this distinctive marking would be in keeping such items off the black-market. A large number of appropriated fund items distinctively painted and labeled "US Army" or "US Navy" or similar USG markings were frequently observed on the black-market. In those cases the sources were obviously not normal imports, but it apparently did not impede their sale through black-market outlets, or cause their seizure by authorities. The proposal was not considered economically feasible or practical from a cost and value standpoint. If such actions were directed the results would be at least pipeline period away, perhaps six months.

(C) In accordance with the recommendation by IPC that a system of controls be established to provide for accurate accountability of concessionaire merchandise entered into RVN for resale, RVNR published a directive providing for the establishment of a book inventory that would be maintained in the Finance and Accounting Office (F&AO) of RVNR. The book inventory would show shipments in and sales reports. Monthly physical inventories would then be used for comparison purposes to insure that merchandise was not being diverted from authorized sales. December 1967 was designated for activation of the book inventory control.<sup>61</sup>

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) RVNR felt that the requirement for the completion of a form (MACV Form 311A) for all purchases over \$10.00 (one of the recommendations of the IPC) would be a distinct disservice to the military customer. Many of the major exchange outlets were inadequate and extremely congested under the current conditions. Long lines and waiting periods at the cash registers was already creating problems in adequately servicing the customer. To require the completion of the form for each purchase over \$10.00 involved many items which were not rationed and not normally found on the black-market. A sales slip was already in use for items over \$10.00. Additionally, unless a close comparison was made with the individual's identification card (another time-consuming process) there was little to stop an individual from giving an incorrect identity when accomplishing the MACV form. The current procedure did not normally require the purchaser to present his identification card upon entry to the PX or at the cash register unless he was in civilian clothes. Such a procedure would also create problems in many of the small isolated areas which were not subject to black-market difficulties.<sup>62</sup>

(C) MACV Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) concurred in the recommendation that MACV Form 311 (or its successor) not be used for \$10.00 PX purchases. The IPC reviewed the contemplated computer capability, reconsidered the recommendation and, likewise, agreed it was not an item that could be adopted to the system programmed. Also, SJA did not consider that a spot-check was considered satisfactory for checks on concessionaire imports in the case of high-value items such as gems, jewelry, furs, and tailored clothing. He felt that examination of the contents of all such packages received via APO or air freight should be made without exception. The same procedure had to be applied to exports from RVN by concessionaires utilizing USG facilities. The problem of a six-month lead time in obtaining distinctive markings on PX merchandise was of no consequence considering the long-term objective. Clarification was needed on this point and at year's end the problems had not been completely resolved.<sup>63</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Chaplain

It has been my experience that there is at least one problematic area which has demanded the attention of chaplains in Vietnam that was not encountered in other wars. I refer to the role of the chaplain in the promotion and maturation of patriotism. I believe the chaplain to fulfill a key role in this area because patriotism, like a religious faith, is inextricably linked to a conviction--a conviction of that which is right and just. Unlike the II WW (ala Pearl Harbor) where the issue tended to be black and white, this conflict must be worked out on a context of vague, foggy precepts which are debated in the highest echelons of our country's service. He must fight a war for which our president has not succeeded in stirring much universal fervor in the hearts of his countrymen. Thus, a prime topic in my counseling has been the validity and justice of this war. The chaplain is forced to fortify himself in this type of investigation, and in a sense broaden his scope to include not only America's present role, but her place and purpose in the whole sweep of history. I regard this as a unique opportunity in the history of the chaplains corps. Never before have young men been called upon to fight so totally for a concept rather than geography. The chaplain's happy task in lecture, counseling, and preaching is to expose, clarify, and expand that concept of freedom. America has the blood of the world in its veins. And having sprung from an essentially spiritual motive, has always felt it its destiny to be the big brother to the world. History gives no example of any nation, heretofore, championing the causes of the small downtrodden people of the earth, asking no reward save that all men have the right to live peaceably without fear of aggression and dictators. Her ideal must never be to self-centered pride. Her words never cheap braggadocio. Her spirit must be born of humility, gratitude, and a deep sense of what is right. 04

PAGE 043 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Chaplains in the command made significant contributions to the field of civic action and community relationship. Their efforts did much to foster good relations with and healthy attitude toward the United States. In one case an educational program was initiated to cover the culture and religions of RVN. The purpose of the instruction was to assist the soldier to better understand the Vietnamese people, their culture, and society. The chaplains provided the instruction and the program aided in furthering Vietnamese/American relations. Many people were encouraged to help in teaching English, to train Vietnamese in various skills, to assist in building, and to provide desperately needed supplies. Chaplains also assisted in distributing many tons of food, clothing, and other supplies sent from CONUS organizations and individuals. The involvement of personnel in those humanitarian services and civic action programs greatly enhanced the morale of the command and relations with the Vietnamese people. 65

(U) The greatest problem faced by the chaplains in South Vietnam was that of transportation. Wheeled vehicles were almost useless for coverage, due to mined roads and ambushes, extremely large TAORs, constantly moving units, and inaccessibility of terrain in which operations were conducted. Some solutions were found workable by various combinations of the following:

- 1) Use of helicopters carrying daily logistical supplies to isolated units for transportation.
- 2) Area coverage of small isolated units and detachments.
- 3) Weekly meetings of chaplains in the forward AO so as to survey work accomplished and work to be done in LZs, fire bases, and hospitals. In all cases, the unit integrity concept was stressed within the limits of capability. The area coverage concept answered needs where they were indicated. 66

(U) Generally speaking, the incidence of counseling cases was lower than in CONUS. Broadly speaking, the nature of the counseling cases were:<sup>67</sup>

- 1) Approximately 95 percent of the counseling cases concerned family difficulties in CONUS. A very small portion of these resulted in requests for ordinary leave for compassionate reasons.

# UNCLASSIFIED

2) Approximately four percent of the counseling cases concerned personal problems (i. e., two percent health problems--hospital patients; one percent working conditions--not enough work, improper supervision, alcohol problems; one percent problems of conscience and religion).

3) Approximately one percent of the counseling cases were concerned with marriage counseling and misbehavior (Article 15, court-martial, AWOL, etc.).

(U) As of 31 December 1967 there were 564 chaplains contributing to the religious welfare of the servicemen in RVN. They were distributed throughout the command as follows:<sup>68</sup>

	<u>Protestant</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Jewish</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	286	99	3	388
Navy	99	30	1	130
Air Force	<u>32</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>46</u>
TOTAL	417	143	4	564

## American Red Cross

(U) During 1967, American Red Cross (ARC) personnel in RVN increased 46 percent from 249 to 363, exceeding the 28 percent rate of increase of military personnel. Twenty-three new field stations and four new recreation center/club/mobile units were opened. ARC personnel were placed in three additional military hospitals and aboard the USS Sanctuary. In addition, a headquarters for the ARC was established in June 1967 to administer and supervise the ARC personnel at 96 locations in SEASIA. It was located in Saigon.

(U) Service to Military Installation (SMI) consisted of consultation and guidance on personal and family problems, financial assistance, and emergency communications on behalf of servicemen and their families. During the year, SMI staff increased nearly 31 percent from 127 to 177. This staff aided 222,534 servicemen in 1967, an increase of 55 percent over the 1966 case load. A total of 265,546 cables were sent during the year representing an increase of 140 percent over the 1966 traffic level. Message transmission time,

# UNCLASSIFIED

however, was reduced by over 50 percent. Over 7,000 servicemen received emergency interest-free loans or grants totaling nearly \$700,000. This increased Red Cross service did not indicate a lowering of troop morale but rather was attributed to the increased troop strength and increased ARC staff servicing these troops.

(U) Service in Military Hospitals (SMH) offered a program designed to help patients derive maximum benefit from hospital care by aiding in the solution of personal and family problems and by providing medically approved recreational activities. During the year, 25 additional staff members were assigned to this program, increasing the total to 58 ARC personnel serving at 17 hospital facilities. Nearly 13,000 hospitalized servicemen received direct ARC assistance, an increase of 130 percent over 1966. An estimated 93,000 patients participated in individual and group recreational activities. Comfort kits containing personal items needed by hastily evacuated combat casualties were distributed to 4,000 servicemen on arrival at the hospital.

(U) Supplemental Recreation Activities (SRAO) consisted of fixed recreation centers at base camps and clubmobile recreation visits to forward positions. New units were established at the 9th Inf Div, 11th Armored Cav, 1st Div Arty and the Americal Division. By the end of the year there were a total of 19 of these units. The staff of young college graduate women increased during 1967 from 87 to 107. Expanding clubmobile schedules resulted in an increase of mobile runs from 1,493 to 2,919 during 1967. Attendance at these visits soared from 76,000 per month to 160,000 per month. Total attendance at all SRAO activities reached 310,000 per month. In addition to these activities, the SRAO staff served beverages on flight lines, job sites, embarkation points, and visited medical clearing and holding companies and hospitals.

(U) A number of special programs were conducted in 1967. Among the most notable were:

1) Operation HELPMATE--The 17 military hospitals and 19 SRAO units were individually adopted by an ARC Chapter in the US. The sponsoring chapters provided books, records, party prizes, shower scuffs, and special holiday decorations not normally available through requisition or local purchase.

2) Operation SHOP EARLY--Over 564,000 "ditty bags" filled with Christmas gifts were distributed to military men and women.

# UNCLASSIFIED

3) FRIENDSHIP KITS--Over 100,000 kits consisting of school supplies, hygienic items and small gifts were compiled by ARC youth and sent to RVN. Distribution by the military to the children of rural hamlets was made in conjunction with civic action programs.

4) PROGRAM 45-- Through selected field stations, hospitals and SRAO units, ARC Chapters donated tape recorders, phonographs, and Polaroid cameras. 69

# UNCLASSIFIED

## DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

### Military Justice

#### Jurisdiction and Court-Martial

(U) Within the US Forces in RVN the administration of discipline remained basically a uni-Service responsibility of component commanders. HQ MACV and the advisory organization, however, presented a different situation. Within HQ MACV each Service had a designated officer as commander of its personnel. These commanders, listed below, exercised command over and were responsible for the administration of discipline of their respective personnel, including those attached to the MACV advisory teams.

1) Army--The CG US Army Element MACV (ACoS, J1) administered Article 15 punishment for all officers assigned to the US Army Element regardless of place of duty. No special or summary court-martial jurisdiction was exercised by the CG USA Element and such cases were forwarded to the CG Headquarters Area Command for action. The Deputy Commander, US Army Element (MACV Headquarters Commandant) had been delegated authority to impose nonjudicial punishment on enlisted personnel performing duty within HQ USMACV. Within the advisory structure Article 15 and summary and special courts-martial authority was vested in the senior advisors in the CTZ. All units were under the general court-martial jurisdiction of the CG USARV.

2) Air Force--All disciplinary actions were handled by commanders of Detachments 10, 11, or 12 of the 1131st USAF Special Activities Squadron to which all AF personnel performing duty with HQ MACV were assigned. Cmdr 7AF exercised general court-martial jurisdiction.

3) Navy--All US Navy personnel were under the summary and special courts-martial jurisdiction of the Commander, US Naval Support Activity, Saigon. Advisory personnel located in the Da Nang area were administered punishment as determined by the OIC, US Naval Advisory

# CONFIDENTIAL

Detachment, Da Nang. All personnel were under the general court-martial jurisdiction of the Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam.

4) Marine Corps--All Marine Corps personnel attached to MACV were assigned to Co B, HQ Bn, HQ Marine Corps. The senior Marine officer on duty with HQ MACV (the Director COC, during 1967) was designated Officer-in-Charge of the in-country unit, and was empowered to impose Article 15 punishments upon officers and enlisted personnel and to convene summary and special courts-martial. The CG III MAF exercised general court-martial jurisdiction.

5) Coast Guard--All US Coast Guard personnel were assigned administratively to Commander, Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam. Courts-martial jurisdiction rested with the Cmdr CGAV and other commanders as provided by Articles 23 and 24 of the UCMJ. The Commander, 14th Coast Guard District, Honolulu exercised general court-martial jurisdiction. 70

(U) The court-martial rate for US troops during 1966 and 1967 was less in Vietnam than the worldwide averages for US Army personnel. The court-martial rate in RVN for 1967 was: 71

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Total Court-Martial	2,475	2,536	2,494	2,659
Rate per 1,000	2.04	1.83	1.71	1.84

## Exercise of Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians

(C) The judicial applications of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to US civilians in RVN was discussed in December 1966. The Department of State had asked whether the Mission Council believed it necessary to apply UCMJ to US civilians employed by the USG or one of its contractors. MACV SJA stated that in his opinion application of the UCMJ would be proper, referring to precedents in WWI, WWII and the Korean war. The USAID legal advisor did not feel that the evil to be eradicated or diminished was so clear and present as to warrant such drastic action. The Ambassador stated that he would like to see the code applied to US civilians in RVN. While some members of the Council were against the proposal, most of them agreed with the Ambassador. No further information was promulgated during 1966.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) In early March the Saigon press focused on the subject of US military jurisdiction over civilians, primarily as a result of a UPI article which stated, "American MPs from now on may arrest and detain American civilians, including newsmen, businessmen and tourists." The Saigon news media gave a clear impression that the US was making a unilateral decision since both the GVN Foreign Minister and the Minister of Justice allegedly stated that there had been no inter-governmental consultation. A statement of the policy regarding jurisdiction over civilian personnel in RVN was prepared by the US Mission and released on 13 March as follows:

The US Government has reviewed the question of the exercise of US military control over US civilian personnel in Vietnam.

US policy in this connection is based on full respect for the sovereign authority of the Republic of Vietnam. In no event will US civilians serving with or accompanying and having direct connection with our Armed Forces in Vietnam be tried by court-martial except where the Vietnamese Government has waived jurisdiction. In our judgement it will in fact rarely be necessary to conduct such court-martial.

Other US civilians such as businessmen, newsmen, tourists, and government employees, who are not serving with or accompanying our Armed Forces in Vietnam and who do not have a direct functional relationship with those forces, would clearly not be subject to court-martial.

Civilians who are not US nationals will not be tried by court-martial in any case.

However, US military authorities may be required to exercise some degree of control over US civilians in situations where immediate action is required and where Vietnamese police are not readily available. American authorities will advise Vietnamese police authorities as soon as possible of any such action. In this connection the number of US and Vietnamese joint police patrols will be increased.

These conclusions have been the subject of full consultation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.<sup>72</sup>

PAGE 050 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Interest in the area of court-martial jurisdiction over US civilians was extremely high both in-country and in the US. Congressional interest was demonstrated by a visit to Vietnam of a Special Congressional Investigating Committee of the House Judiciary Committee during the period 25 March to 1 April 1967. This three-man committee, accompanied by the Chief, International Law Division, MACJA, traveled throughout RVN, holding conferences with COMUSMACV and SJA, field judge advocates of all Services, representatives of the US Embassy, commanders and advisory team personnel, civilian employees of DOD, contractors, and news media representatives. Many persons were in favor of the ultimate position taken that the military forces exercise courts-martial jurisdiction over certain classes of civilians, and many were opposed. Typical of those in favor was Mr. Jim G. Lucas, a well-known member of the press corps, who wrote informally to a member of the House Committee:<sup>73</sup>

It was good to see you and members of your sub-committee at Dong Ha today. I know you will return home with a wider grasp of what is going on over here.

I'd like to repeat what I told you there. I believe that members of the press and other civilians accompanying the US Armed Forces in Vietnam should come under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In fact, it was something of a surprise to me to learn that we have not always come under it. I believe we should, and I can add that I devoutly want to. I came under it in Korea, and civilian correspondents were included under the provisions of its predecessor in World War II. In return for its protections--which are many and important--I am willing to accept its restrictions.

I believe that many, if not most, correspondents in Vietnam feel as I do. I do not feel at liberty to speak for them, without their express permission, but those of us in the field have other things to talk about--have indicated they consider the furor raised in Saigon to be silly. There are enough legitimate issues involving freedom of the press, access to information, etc., without fighting over one that is patently phoney. I have been with American troops in Vietnam since January 1964. I was in Korea throughout that war. I was a Marine Combat Correspondent

PAGE 951 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

in World War II. I have been in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic. I think I know something of the problems of a troop commander. Certainly, if I commanded troops, in Vietnam or in any other combat zone, I would not admit an outsider to my area, as we are admitted, give him access to detailed and classified information concerning my men, as we are given every day, feed, house and transport him, provide his communication if I were not given legal authority to punish him.

This is war. It is not a game. The responsibility that lies on the shoulders of our troop commanders is a heavy one. I do not intend to do anything that will make their job more difficult.

I cannot conceive of a commander's invoking the Code against a correspondent except under the most extreme provocation. But he is entitled to the right to invoke it in those cases. If anything, they lean too far in the other direction NOT to provoke us. We are privileged characters in this war. We have travel priorities no one else has. We are given the best billets, the best food available. We are briefed by top commanders before and after operations.

Anyone who objects to coming under the Code need not accompany American troops. It is as simple as that. I have been with them most of the time for the past 22 years. I trust them. I believe I should come under the Code. I WANT the protection of the Code. I am confident most objective reporters feel as I do.

It is significant, I think, that those protesting loudest in this matter also have protested vigorously against the jailing of Americans by the Vietnamese. Apparently, they feel we should be under no restraint out here, that we are answerable only to our own consciences. I would say, off hand, that is a very thin reed--in the case of some Americans I have observed in Vietnam--to lean on.<sup>74</sup>

(U) The first instance of referral of a capital crime committed by a US civilian to court-martial occurred in September 1967. On 11

PAGE 952 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# CONFIDENTIAL

August 1967, at Da Nang, RVN, a US citizen merchant seaman, James H. Latney, stabbed to death another US merchant seaman, Byeth A. Trimm. Upon request of US authorities the Minister of Justice acting for the Government of Vietnam waived the primary right of the Government of Vietnam to exercise criminal jurisdiction over LATNEY to the US authorities. On 12 September 1967, the charge of premeditated murder was referred to a general court-martial convened by the CG III MAF, the commander being most closely associated with the case as the offense occurred within his jurisdictional area. All matters pertaining to the LATNEY case were coordinated with the American Embassy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and State Department.

(C) Under the current interpretation of the Pentilateral Agreement, the Government of Vietnam has the primary right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States civilian contractor employees. Two US civilian contractor employees were tried by Government of Vietnam authorities during the last months of the year for negligent homicide and aggravated assault, and a third is pending trial following a preliminary hearing of 5 December 1967. No US civilians connected with the US Mission have been placed in confinement by the Government of Vietnam. Two waivers of foreign jurisdiction (Latney and Perdue cases) were granted by the Government of Vietnam. <sup>75</sup>

## Legal Matters

### Claims Against the Government

(U) During CY67, 4,440 claims against the US were filed with the Foreign Claims Commissions located in Saigon and Da Nang, adjuncts of MACJA. Claims filed, approved, and monetary value of the approved claims by calendar quarter were as follows:

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>4th Qtr</u>
Claims filed	964	775	1,305	1,444
Approved	557	658	968	947
Amount approved	\$172,618.54	\$197,684.72	\$395,545.51	\$282,806.13

# UNCLASSIFIED

Comparison of these figures indicated a general increase in the number of claims filed. Experience indicated that this trend was likely to continue into the 1st Qtr of CY68. Most claims involved incidents arising out of vehicular accidents. No combat-associated claims were paid by Foreign Claims Commissions, these being under the cognizance of the Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP), which was handled, for claims purposes, by the GVN. The US Army was charged with Single-Service claims responsibility and handles all claims for all Services cognizable under the Foreign Claims Act (10 U. S. Code 2734).<sup>76</sup>

## Civil Law

(U) The Civil Law Division of MACJA provided advice to other staff sections within MACV and the various civilian agencies regarding contract, real estate, administrative investigations, and other matters of a legal or quasi-legal nature. One of the principal items handled was the assumption of responsibility within MACV for conducting all correspondence with the owners of the Capitol Hotel BEQ relative to rental payments by the USG and related matters. The question of ownership and entitlement to rental proceeds had been a matter of dispute between three local parties since the winter of 1965. One party to the dispute continued to correspond concerning his entitlement to rental proceeds for US occupancy of the Capitol Hotel. A prorata one-third share of such rent was offered, as established by decision of the Saigon Court of Appeals on 17 November 1966, but he refused to accept such payment. The other parties to the dispute have accepted their payments. A final decision in the civil dispute was still pending as of 31 December 1967.

(U) Another matter of concern was the request of the GVN that US employers (US appropriated and non-appropriated fund activities and US contractors) withhold VN income tax from the salaries of VN employees. A country-to-country agreement was consummated with GVN whereby US contractors would make such withholding, but that US appropriated and non-appropriated fund activities would only encourage VN employees voluntarily to allot a portion of this pay to cover the withholding tax. The procedures became effective 1 July 1967.<sup>77</sup>

(U) On several occasions, the Government of Vietnam had requested the US to begin paying rent on properties previously confiscated by the Diem regime of the Government of Vietnam and made

# UNCLASSIFIED

available to the US Government. Most notably, the Ambassador Hotel and the TAX building were involved. The present government had returned these properties to the former owner (Dalat University) and was now seeking to have the US pay the rent. As of 27 December 1967, MACV had taken the position that payment was the responsibility of the Government of Vietnam. 78

## Irregular Practices Committee

(U) By direction of AMB Bunker on 30 August 1967, a committee composed of three Embassy personnel and one MACV representative was established to investigate and report on ways and means of controlling black-market and other illicit activities resulting from the presence of US forces in Vietnam. The Staff Judge Advocate was appointed as the MACV representative.

(U) On 19 October 1967, following the Committee's initial report the Ambassador directed that certain recommended actions be implemented. Such actions included the introduction into Vietnam of an automated system for recording PX purchases, money conversion and purchases of dollar instruments; the revision of privilege cards entitling the various categories of civilians to PX and other facilities; the tightening of controls over ration privilege cards; the identification of and taking action against civilians who abuse PX and other privileges; the more detailed inspection of PX concessionaire goods; increasing investigative and police manpower; the establishment with the GVN of a procedure for "deportation" of those persons deemed undesirable; and the revision of MACV directives designed to curb illegal activities. The status of USG contractor's and their entitlements (customs, dollar payments, tax status, employee benefits, etc.) was still under a study as of 31 December 1967. 79

## Black-Market Activity/Currency Violation

(U) Black-marketing activities in RVN encompassed both diversion of US source merchandise and material into unauthorized channels and illegal currency conversion and manipulations contrary to currency controls imposed by military authorities during 1966-1967. Controls imposed by military authorities working in close coordination with GVN officials proved to be effective in reducing the scope of such activities.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) US source merchandise entered black-market outlets as a result of individual thefts, gifts from members of the US forces to Vietnamese employees and associates, and through illegal sales by individuals of PX and other merchandise. Increased security controls of US cargo and Exchange merchandise through ports to consignees reduced the vulnerability of such material to theft. In addition, actions taken by the GVN in late 1966 and early 1967 in arresting black marketeers and cleaning up illegal and unauthorized outlets had a favorable impact resulting in a downward trend of such activities.

(C) In November 1966 Saigon city officials had disrupted the flourishing sidewalk black-market businesses, as dealers were routed from their stands and piles of illegally-procured US goods burned. However, prior to Christmas the stands began to reappear, and by the end of the year the downtown sidewalks again were lined with merchants peddling merchandise illegally obtained, although not in such vast quantities as prior to the November "crackdown" by the GVN. The markets continued to operate until after TET (February) 1967, but as soon as the days of celebration were over the number of vendors diminished. While vendors offering illegally-procured US merchandise for sale were still plentiful in downtown Saigon throughout 1967, the streets and sidewalks were no longer cluttered with high-value items such as tape recorders and radios; most items were small--batteries, candy, cigarettes, soap, and government-issue items such as pocket knives and foodstuffs.

(U) Currency violations resulted from excessive postal money order purchase, illegal conversion of US green dollars, unauthorized possession of green dollars or MPCs, and illegal or unauthorized personal check negotiations. Controls established included monitoring and investigating systems for postal money order purchases, individual accounts in the military banking facilities, and military finance disbursements. During 1967 there were 64 courts-martial of currency and black-market offenders. Illegal currency conversions continued to be a problem and it seemed would continue to be so long as the favorable exchange rates are maintained by unauthorized money changers in the back alleys of Saigon. The only solution seemed to be in the control, security, enforcement, and investigative efforts of US forces police and GVN authorities to combat black-market activities. 80

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Marihuana and Narcotics

(U) Marihuana and certain types of narcotics were readily available to the US forces in RVN. Marihuana was grown in abundance in RVN. Narcotics, originating in Thailand, are smuggled into RVN from Laos and Cambodia. Marihuana is readily available in bulk and cigarette form from bar owners, taxi drivers, and street peddlers. Prices ranged from \$0.20 a cigarette or \$30.00 a kilo in Saigon to \$1.00 a cigarette and \$100.00 a kilo in Da Nang. Opium and morphine were also available in Vietnam from bar owners, taxi drivers, and other illegal outlets. Current prices for opium were \$1.00 per injection, \$1.00 per pellet, or \$400.00 per kilo. Morphine could be obtained at about \$5.00 per vial. There were no instances of heroin being identified.

(U) During 1967, 1,391 investigations involving 1,688 military personnel were conducted concerning the use or possession of marihuana in Vietnam. This represents an average monthly involvement rate of .25 per thousand. For comparison purposes, the worldwide rate of US Army personnel during the 1st Qtr of FY68 was .30 per thousand. The two major problem areas were in the Long Binh-Bien Hoa (Army) and the Da Nang (Marines) areas. The subject of the use of marihuana by US servicemen came under renewed scrutiny during the last half of 1967 when attention was focused on the subject by US press reports of marihuana being smuggled into the US through APO/FPO channels, US servicemen smuggling marihuana into R&R centers, notably Australia and Hong Kong, and the alleged widespread use of marihuana in RVN by US troops. One news report, allegedly quoting US servicemen, indicated that packets of marihuana containing two to three "sticks" were issued free to US servicemen in Vietnam. Investigation failed to corroborate this report in any aspect.

(U) During 1967, 29 narcotics investigations were conducted, involving 25 US military personnel. Narcotics identified were opium and morphine. The incidence rate was significantly below that in the US for comparable populations and is not considered a problem. However, COMUSMACV stressed that command emphasis be maintained at all levels for the prompt identification and investigation of marihuana and narcotics offenses through joint integrated US forces/GVN police efforts. During the year, there were 427 trials by court-martial for offenses involving the wrongful use or possession of marihuana and narcotics, the great majority of cases involving marihuana. 81

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Serious Incidents

(U) The general categories of serious incidents included homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and larceny. Included as homicides and aggravated assaults were several instances of US guards shooting Vietnamese who were either stealing from US installations or had breached the security perimeters of the installations. The following list not only depicts the serious criminal acts committed by US personnel against the Vietnamese, but reflects the number of offenses that were of the highest concern to COMUSMACV. The list includes traffic fatalities, although such are not normally treated as criminal offenses, as well as minor offenses committed in the Saigon/Cholon area:

	<u>1st Qtr</u>	<u>2nd Qtr</u>	<u>3rd Qtr</u>	<u>3<sup>rd</sup> 4th Qtr</u>
Serious Incidents	38	38	66	104
Traffic Fatalities	96	98	123	142
<sup>1</sup> BM/Currency Con	16	9	14	25
<sup>1</sup> Narcotics Control	74	93	141	119
<sup>2</sup> Minor Offenses in Saigon/Cholon Area	1,384	2,718	2,933	6,671

<sup>1</sup>The number reflects the number of personnel who have received court-martial as a result of being involved with narcotics-type offenses, black-market activities or currency violations.

<sup>2</sup>Minor offenses and incidents are not necessarily limited to criminal acts against the Vietnamese: the majority involved uniform violations, curfew, pass and leave violations, as well as drunk/disorderly conduct, assault, AWOL, destruction of private property, and shooting.

<sup>3</sup>The increase in offenses reported and action taken is attributed to better policing and investigating and more vigorous action rather than a serious upsurge in lawlessness by US personnel. <sup>82</sup>

~~SECRET~~

PRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION

(U) There has been no other US military action in which the press has been more active than they have in their coverage of the war in Vietnam. At the end of 1967, 466 journalists from the United States, Vietnam, and third country news media were accredited to Vietnam. Reporters fluctuated from day to day throughout the year, but generally the number, at any one time, was approximately 500, plus or minus 75. In 1967 MACV issued nearly 2,500 accreditation cards. This was an indication of the number of people engaged during the year in reporting what they saw, heard, or felt. To these could be added an unknown number of reporters denied accreditation, who nevertheless, published their findings. As might be expected in an environment of relative press freedom, the multiplicity and diversity of what was published was confusing. The public was able to find verification of a priori sentiments conceived without benefit of facts, with which they could agree; and find, at the same time, contradictory factual information about Vietnam which they could easily dismiss.

(S) An unfortunate by-product of these stresses was rather wide acceptance in the United States of a false impression that the total RVNAF was incompetent, corrupt, and ineffective. As a result a meeting was held in Washington where the major subject of discussion concerned the deteriorating public support in the US for the Vietnamese war. One of the problems considered was that many Americans believed the ARVN was not carrying its fair share of the combat effort. Additionally, many believed that the bulk of the Vietnamese combat casualties were borne by the RF and PF rather than ARVN. There was a consensus that a serious problem existed with American public opinion; namely, the fallacious concept that the ARVN was not carrying its share of combat operations. Much of this problem arose from press reports and comments of visitors to RVN which derogated the willingness and capability of the ARVN to fight. Some press reports cited comments to that effect by unnamed American military men.

(C) COMUSMACV undertook several actions which, it was hoped, would assist in correcting the erroneous impression that ARVN would not fight. Among these he:

~~SECRET~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1) Discussed with General Vien the necessity of an effective public information program to present ARVN's side of the story in a factual and favorable light.
- 2) Directed the information advisory effort to explore all methods of actively assisting the RVNAF information effort.
- 3) Met with JUSPAO to determine the feasibility of conducting joint US/Vietnamese daily press briefings for correspondents.
- 4) Sought to obtain more balanced news coverage of AFRTS and in Stars and Stripes which would highlight Vietnamese combat actions.
- 5) Made known a policy of emphasizing ARVN achievements in numerous discussions by key members of the MACV staff with newsmen and influential visitors. Points made were: (a) the disparity between US and ARVN units in strength, armament, mobility, and fire support; and (b) the impressive record of ARVN combat successes in 1967, highlighting the most recent.

(C) COMUSMACV further directed every echelon of command to be alert to situations that would improve the RVNAF image. The objective was not to deceive but to insure that the publicity given RVNAF treated them fairly and reflected the credit they deserved. Care had to be taken to be objective. The press was skeptical of claims made by advisory personnel, because of personal involvement in the development and improvement of RVNAF. Any statements made had to be substantiated.<sup>83</sup>

(U) In a letter to General Vien, Chief of JGS, COMUSMACV pointed out the danger of losing US public support for the Vietnam war unless RVNAF's important role in the struggle received proper recognition and publicity in the US. The letter suggested that US information officers be assigned as advisors to ARVN divisions and other major commands. COMUSMACV also advocated joint US/RVNAF military briefings as another step toward solving this problem. In his reply, General Vien concurred in the suggestion to assign the information officers but did not comment on the proposal for joint briefings. In his letter the General indicated that he had ordered his staff "to study the question urgently to improve the military information program." COMUSMACV directed that the Information Advisors begin functioning as soon as

# CONFIDENTIAL

possible. These advisors were to function initially on the Special Staff of the RVNAF Commanders. In addition they would advise the RVNAF Information Officers, who would also be a Special Staff level. Their principal duties were: (1) to advise and assist the RVNAF in developing a public information capability at division level; (2) to encourage and facilitate visits by the press to observe activities of the division and its components; and (3) to prepare public information materials about division accomplishments and transmit them through MACV information channels for release by the RVNAF Press Office.

(U) RVNAF field commanders displayed varying degrees of cooperation with the press. The Commanding General of I Corps encouraged participation of newsmen in ARVN operations. On the other hand, the Commander of the 25th ARVN Div, refused absolutely to allow newsmen to accompany his units in the field. At the end of the year it was not known what immediate effect the new interest in the RVNAF information program might have had upon the over-all degree of cooperation by field commanders.<sup>84</sup>

## Press Problems

(U) With many members of the news media not wanting to be outdone by their contemporaries and seeking the sensational whenever possible, much reporting could not be considered completely factual. Some stories released by reporters, in and out-of-country, were filed with little or no relationship to the truth or with facts so distorted that it was impossible to correlate the story with the actual situation being reported. In some cases officials seemed to have been deliberately misquoted for the sensationalism that would result. In one case news personnel deliberately participated in a crime against humanity merely for the sake of the resulting adverse criticism and sensational news interest. In the case of the death of General Hochmuth the fundamental precepts of good taste and consideration were violated.

## Derogatory Reporting

(C) As a result of a Newsweek article "Their Lions--Our Rabbits, in the 9 October 1967 issue, COMUSMACV sent a message to Osborn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Elliot, editor of Newsweek. He stated he knew that Mr. Elliot was aware that GVN officials were very upset about the article and that upon reading the article he had immediately directed an IG inquiry into the three allegations in the first paragraph of the story, since they involved US troops.

(C) The first allegation was, "An entire ARVN regiment was taken out of action in order to concentrate on supplying the 173d Abn Bde with beer, prostitutes, and laundry service." The only ARVN regiment near the 173d was the 42d ARVN, located in Tan Chan, seven kilometers east of the 173d which was headquartered near Dak To. The ARVN regiment had been actively engaged in operations with the 173d and the frequency of these operations had increased significantly rather than decreased since the 173d arrived in the area in June. They were far from being out of action, having spent approximately 200 battalion days in operations from July through September 1967, using three battalions in the combat area. In early August two battalions of the 42d ARVN assisted significantly in repelling the enemy assault of two battalions in the Dak Seang area. Moreover, the investigation clearly established that the 42d ARVN Regt was furnishing to the 173d none of the alleged services.

(C) The second allegation was, "A Vietnamese Ranger Unit performed the same function for the 4th Inf Div." There were three Ranger battalions under a Ranger Group Headquarters stationed in the Pleiku area about 12 km from Dragon Mountain, the location of the closest 4th Div unit. Again, the investigation showed that these Ranger units provided none of the alleged services to the 4th Div. The third allegation was, "And in Bien Hoa, next to a sprawling airfield crowded with GI's, another enterprising Ranger outfit had built a "red-light" district known as 'Tijuana East'." The only Ranger battalion in the area was the 35th. Its mission was to provide security to an area over 45 miles from its home base with the result that it spent only about three days a month in the Bien Hoa area. In addition, there was no longer a "red-light" district in the area known as 'Tijuana East' although there had been one which may have been called by this name in early 1966 and before. In fact the entire Bien Hoa area was often jokingly referred to as "Tijuana East." In any case, the 35th Rgr Bn provided none of the services alleged to any American troops. COMUSMACV closed his message by saying "This is not a 'letter to the editor' nor am I writing with the thought in mind of starting a controversy. I simply thought you would be interested in the facts of the matter."

PAGE 002 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) COMUSMACV urged General Vien to make a similar investigation of allegations against RVNAF and offered the services of the MACV IG organization to assist. General Vien's original idea had been that the RVNAF would continue to "suffer in silence" rather than debate with the US Press, but had not made a final decision on the matter at the end of the year.<sup>85</sup>

## Violation of News Embargo

(C) MACV felt that the flagrant breach by UPI of the MACV and III MAF embargo in connection with the announcement of the death of General Hochmuth on 14 November 1967 required some form of counter action. Many members of the Saigon press corps were enraged with UPI's action, and several said that teeth must be inserted in the program in some fashion or else all would be afraid to honor future embargoes, other than those clearly involving security. The UPI Bureau Chief expressed mild regret for the breach, stating that he was not originally aware of the embargo since he heard of the story from an unidentified third party who did not mention the embargo. However, he also admitted that his Da Nang correspondent, who had agreed to the embargo, personally contacted him before the story was actually filed so that he was, in fact, aware of the embargo in time to hold the story. He further stated that he would have honored the embargo if he had known of the agreement by his correspondent earlier. His basic position, however, was that the item should not have been embargoed because it involved a "national figure" and news considerations should have had priority over concern for the next of kin (NOK). It was pointed out to him that he was the only bureau chief involved who had held such a view. The others had been willing to await notification of the NOK.

(C) Only two weapons were readily available to combat UPI's tactics: (1) withdrawal or suspension of appropriate accreditations and (2) nonrelease of embargoed information to UPI until publication time. However, to put real teeth into the program, withdrawal of accreditation appeared to be the best weapon. Using different release procedures for the various agencies or other discriminatory treatment was not desirable.

(C) Theoretically, withdrawal of accreditation was limited to violation of press ground rules or failure to show the MACV accreditation

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

card to police authorities when requested. Actually, previous accreditation withdrawals from bona fide correspondents appeared to have been limited to violations with security connotations such as premature announcement of troop locations, movements, operations, etc. The ground rules carried a paragraph cautioning correspondents against release of casualty information prior to notification of the NOK, but not forbidding such a release. Consequently, the withdrawal of the UPI Bureau Chief's accreditation in the Hochmuth case had to be based primarily on a breach of an embargo not directly involving security. To act otherwise would establish a precedent. The feelings of MACV that the establishment of such a precedent would be well worthwhile. However, it was fully understood that the suspension of the Bureau Chief's accreditation for 30 days would result in great pressure being brought to bear on authorities in Washington to have the suspension reversed. MACV planned to suspend the Bureau Chief's accreditation if CINCPAC and ASD(PA) concurred.

(C) SECDEF did not agree with suspending accreditation. He felt, however, that UPI's actions were reprehensible in view of the fact that the remainder of the press corps abided by the embargo. Since the success of the embargo was based on the voluntary cooperation of all the press involved, he felt those elements which did not abide by an embargo should not be trusted in the future. He pointed out, however, that there was an accepted dictum by the press and the American public that certain figures were so prominent that news about them overrode consideration of the NOK. Therefore, there could have been an honest difference of opinion about the spectrum of prominence. A further point to be considered was that the case in question did not involve security. In connection with future guidelines for the Saigon press corps, and in an effort to avoid future incidents, SECDEF suggested that consideration be given to developing, with the press corps, a set of guidelines which would list the two or four or six officials who would be considered so newsworthy that the normal practices of holding information pending notification of NOK would not apply. He felt strongly that the Bureau Chief and the UPI owed an apology to the CG III MAF, to COMUSMACV, and the press corps for the violation. He also felt that an apology would be helpful to COMUSMACV in maintaining control in the future.<sup>86</sup>

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Misquoted Interviews

(U) A UPI distributed item dated 28 November 1967, byline Alvin B. Well, Jr., gave the following quote: "Gen John McConnell, Chief of Staff of USAF, said Wednesday American planes have been bombing targets in Laos since 1964 under agreement with neutralist government of the Kingdom next door to South Vietnam." UPI was informed by DOD and USAF that the tape transcript of Gen McConnell's press interview did not substantiate the UPI reference to bombing in Laos. The tape, in fact, verified that during the interview Gen McConnell several times referred to the US/RLG agreement for aerial reconnaissance with armed escorts which could return fire if attacked.<sup>87</sup>

(U) A New York Times story, 28 November 1967, quoting USMC sources who stated that COMUSMACV had recommended in writing that General Walt be named the new Commandant of the USMC, was completely without foundation. To set the record straight COMUSMACV sent messages to the Washington Bureau of the New York Times, LTG Walt, and Commandant USMC informing them that he had made no recommendation as to General Green's successor, either orally or in writing, since such would have been improper unless asked by appropriate authority, which had not been the case. At the same time he expressed a high regard for General Walt in view of his personal knowledge of his service in Vietnam.<sup>88</sup>

## Press Promptings

(C) Two incidents that generated considerable comment in American news media took place in the vicinity of Lai Khe, RVN on 7 October 1967. An Army SP4 was alleged to have attempted to cut off the ear of a Viet Cong soldier while an Army SP5 was alleged to have removed the ear of a dead Viet Cong.

(C) Much news media interest was generated by the case of the SP4 who was in the field as an observer escort for CBS news reporter Don Webster and cameraman John Smith. This episode of "ear cutting" was reported in the US on the CBS Evening News TV program of Walter Cronkite on 9 October. Mr. Don Webster narrated the story, with pictures taken by Smith. Eric Sevareid commented about ear cutting. No pictures released on TV showed the actual attempt by the SP4 to cut off an ear, but testimony was presented at a subsequent trial that the

# CONFIDENTIAL

attempted cutting was, in fact, filmed by Smith. The cameraman was also alleged to have furnished the knife used in the cutting attempt.

(C) CG 1st Inf Div, requested authority to proceed against Smith as well as the two EM. COMUSMACV concurred but because of non-concurrence of the AMEMB, Saigon, no action was taken other than to subpoena Smith as a witness. Both Webster and Smith were subpoenaed but neither appeared at the trial. Both were absent from Vietnam at the time.

(C) Two separate Special Courts-Martial were convened by the CG 1st Inf Div on 22 December. The Army SP4 and SP5 were charged with attempting to cut and cutting off ears from dead VC soldiers, a violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Both trials ended with the defendants being found guilty.

(C) A report of the court proceedings was furnished to OSD because of the potential news interest that could develop. The question as to why the soldiers were given a court-martial and no action was taken against the cameraman might be raised in accounts of the trial reported by ABC, Times, Overseas Weekly, and perhaps other media. Little or no interest was expressed by media in the second case of the SP5 in which the CBS cameraman was not involved.<sup>89</sup>

(C) MACV had become increasingly concerned at the negative, sensational, and sometimes almost sadistic approach of the TV crews in RVN. Feeling that most TV reporters were basically objective, or at least would not flaunt facts, if the facts were made known to them, COMUSMACV instructed all component commanders that when a TV camera crew was visiting a unit in RVN, it would be accompanied by an officer, preferably an Information Officer. Realizing that on many occasions an Information Officer might not be available, it was important that a knowledgeable officer escort the crew. The escort was not only to be available to explain what was going on and to guide the crew to appropriate locations, but also to take or recommend immediate remedial steps when something went wrong or someone was doing something which was subject to misinterpretation.

(C) There was no question that a sizable percentage of the negative TV reporting which had occurred was at least partially the fault of members of the unit concerned. On some occasions enlisted men and even officers who had been interviewed had apparently been unaware of their military objectives; had been unreasonably negative concerning

# CONFIDENTIAL

results, tactics or equipment: or had commented knowingly on something about which they knew nothing. In rare instances men had been willing to perform improper acts on camera. Much of this would not have occurred in the presence of an officer escort.

(C) MACV cautioned that care must be exercised to avoid any implication of muzzling or keeping reporters from going to locations where they would normally be permitted to go. The procedures established were not designed to impose any sort of censorship, rather the objective was to handle TV crews in a sensible, intelligent fashion at all times.<sup>90</sup>

## The Credibility Gap

(C) On 22 September 1967 COMUSMACV established a requirement for a survey to determine the validity of the enemy body count reports. On 5 October survey teams were deployed to the headquarters of each CTZ to cover company size or larger actions and significant RF/PF actions. However, as the survey progressed it was expanded to cover smaller actions. The survey concluded that at no time was there any intentional inflation in body count and every effort was made by the units to report only accurate and verified enemy KIA.

(C) The most prominent error detected during the survey was unintentional human error. In combat situations where no front lines existed, most actions were continually moving and the possibility of dual counting on the battlefield existed. It was doubtful that this exceeded five to ten percent in any major action and probably did not exist at all in small actions. Aerial observer reports were always questionably low unless the action took place in a completely open area, or a ground assessment team was inserted. In one instance during the survey a ground assessment team located 26 more bodies than was reported by the aerial observer. Dual counting could have existed with the reporting of bodies found in graves and different procedures were used in each CTZ in reporting graves. Errors in reporting grid coordinates were always a problem and the possibility of dual counting as a result of location errors was present. Also, civilians were undoubtedly killed as a result of some ground actions or air and artillery strikes and their bodies classed as VC. Their true identification was impossible. The survey report concluded that errors, when balanced against each other, usually erred on the deflationary rather than inflationary side.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) The body count survey was conducted because the press, on several occasions, inferred that the reported body count was inflated. These inferences were initiated for the most part by members of the press, in the field with the engaged units, who were unable to see the entire action and reported disagreement with the official count. In some cases the doubts expressed were discovered only on publication of an article, too late for any clarification of the problem, or else the information obtained by the reporter was from servicemen who were not in a position to comment on the overall situation. In most cases, had the doubts been brought to light immediately or had the reporter been briefed by an officer in a responsible position, the doubt would have been clarified and the unfavorable reports avoided. The field commanders were informed that when doubt was expressed, immediate action would be taken by persons in a position of responsibility to clarify the misconception. If a briefing of the overall action and reporting procedures did not satisfy the reporter then a visit to the scene might be necessary. In cases of doubt, visits to the scene by reporters wishing to verify a body count were authorized and encouraged. DEPCOMUSMACV stressed, however, that he did not expect US military or press personnel to be needlessly exposed to unnecessary risk. He felt that a full explanation of the procedures and reports for any given operation probably would satisfy any reasonable reporter. <sup>91</sup>

Another Opinion

(U) The foregoing is not to imply that all reporting was as discussed above. On the contrary, most of the news personnel were very conscientious and factual in their reporting. They were a definite asset to the proper presentation of the Vietnam situation to the people at home and abroad. Such an example was an unbiased and clearly presented article by Stan Carter, staff correspondent of the Los Angeles Daily News. In the article he said, "We are winning this war. It is slow and costly in both money and men--perhaps too costly. But the only thing that can beat us in the end is for the American people to buckle." After talking with American military personnel and diplomats throughout RVN he did not believe that anyone could doubt that the Allies were winning the war. Carter felt that some of the doubters were opposed to the war before they came to Vietnam; that they were emotionally committed to US defeat because they predicted it. He agreed that in some cases the situation was indeed, touch-and-go. There was pessimism but there had been progress: schools were built in rural hamlets that once were

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

indisputably controlled by the VC; an obvious preference by most of the people for the GVN, shown by their turnout to vote in the national elections in the face of VC threats; and the fact that VC battalions had split into two and three-man units. Elsewhere in the country, there were grounds for valid criticism of many ARVN units, but no more so than there was for the South Korean divisions that bugged out on the flanks of US outfits in Korea in the early 1950s. He noted also that some ARVN units had done some heroic fighting. Among them were the paratroopers and rangers who fought northeast of Dak To in the November Central Highlands battle and the VNMC who bore the brunt of the battle in the Mekong Delta in which 235 Vietnamese were lost. Overall US advisors reported that, while still spotty, the RVNAF were improving, much as the ROK forces improved under US tutelage in the latter stages of the Korean war. Also, what about the Communists? Their head-on rushes into slaughter at Dak To, Loc Ninh, and elsewhere could have no other meaning than that they were desperate, seeking against overwhelming odds to achieve a propaganda victory that might turn the tide of American public opinion as their victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu turned the tide for them in 1954. While the NVA was bearing more and more of the burden of the war (in their homeland as well as in South Vietnam), the VC apparatus in the south was becoming eroded. Meanwhile, this was becoming more and more a NVN war and less one fought by RVN dissidents. He cited the relative strength of the VC who were recruiting about 7,000 new soldiers in RVN a month. In December 1967, the recruitment figure was believed to be less than half that. Infiltration had been cut from 14,000 per month in mid-1966 to 5,000 or 6,000 a month--not enough to compensate for the casualties. He felt that it would take another year to grind down all of the enemy's organized strength. Then, according to one official, perhaps eight to 15 years of "nation rebuilding" to reach the point of nationhood that South Korea had reached, 13 years after the Korean war. Carter concluded that whether it was worth it or not was for the American people to decide. But he was convinced the Communists were being defeated.<sup>92</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## PRISONERS OF WAR

(U) Great emphasis had been placed by the USG on the handling and proper treatment of PWs in accordance with its responsibilities under international law. In so doing it hoped to insure equally humane treatment of U. S. Personnel captured by enemy forces. NVN and VC forces captured in RVN were detained by the NVN in PW camps inspected by the ICRC. There they were given the treatment stipulated by the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the treatment of PWs. Some sick and wounded prisoners were repatriated to NVN as the convention required. Others were repatriated or released in RVN, in the hope that FWMAF PWs would receive equal consideration.

(U) The USG appealed repeatedly to NVN and to the NLF to treat PWs humanely; to respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention by which they were bound. On 17 July 1967, the White House issued a public statement calling upon the NLF and NVN to permit impartial inspection of all prisoners and to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners. The statement reiterated a desire for an exchange of prisoners and emphasized that the USG was willing "to discuss such exchanges at any time and in any appropriate way, using intermediaries or directly, by public means or privately."

(U) Despite these efforts, however, both NVN and the NLF refused to observe the Geneva Convention provisions. They did not agree to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners. Their claims of humanitarian treatment of prisoners could not be verified. Neutral government or humanitarian agencies were not allowed to visit the prisoners or to inspect their places of detention. The great majority of US prisoners were isolated from every contact with the outside world.

(U) In the past two years several incidents of abuse of US PWs occurred, including the reprisal murder of three US servicemen captured by the VC in 1965 and the parade of US pilots through the streets of Hanoi in 1966. Recently indications have been that other US personnel detained by the enemy were not being treated humanely. Early in 1967 several US PWs, in an apparently dazed condition, were publically displayed in Hanoi, and a number of alleged "confessions" were broadcast. In RVN more US soldiers captured by the enemy were murdered.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The USG formally protested the atrocities committed against US personnel detained by the enemy, and many governments and statesmen intervened on behalf of US prisoners. A US protest, sent through the ICRC on 24 March 1967, conveyed the strong feelings of the American people on this matter. It stated:<sup>93</sup>

For some time the NVN authorities have made statements both public and private to the effect that their policy regarding treatment of US PWs is a humane one. Because of NVN's refusal to permit representatives of a neutral country of the ICRC to visit the US PWs, as required by the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and because of the restrictions that NVN has imposed upon the rights of the US PWs under international law to correspond with their families, it has not been possible to verify the NVN claims of humane treatment.

In recent weeks information has come to our attention which casts the most serious doubts upon the NVN statements that US PWs are being treated in a humane fashion. We have reluctantly come to the conclusion that some of the US airmen are being subjected to emotional or physical duress, which is a flagrant violation of the Geneva Conventions. . . .

#### US PWs in VC/NVN Captivity

(C) A total of 260 US military personnel were known to be prisoners in SEASIA at the end of 1967, a further 679 were missing and could be presumed to be detained.<sup>94</sup>

	RVN		Laos		NVN		CHICOM		Total
	Miss	Capt	Miss	Capt	Miss	Capt	Miss	Capt	
USA	72	14	9	0	3	0	0	0	98
USN	1	0	1	1	104	114	1	1	223
USAF	27	5	70	2	330	112	1	1	549
USMC	47	7	0	0	12	3	0	0	69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

## VC Policy on the Capture of US Personnel

(C) In early 1966, captured enemy documents stated that the VC had inaugurated a three-phase campaign aimed at capturing more Americans. Phase 1 of this campaign was designed to indoctrinate the VC soldier on the importance of taking prisoners. Phase 2 was entitled "Emulation for Capturing Americans" and included dissemination of slogans ("A Live US Prisoner is Equal to Ten Dead American Aggressors"), formulation of operation plans for the capture of Americans, and provisions for equipping VC soldiers with special ropes to be used in securing captured US soldiers. The third phase consisted of a recapitulation of successes and presentation of rewards and congratulations to outstanding units.

(C) Intelligence reports and captured enemy documents indicated throughout 1967 that there was a marked increase in the value placed by the VC on taking of US prisoners. This drive for US prisoners was illustrated in reports and observations that VC were carrying US wounded from the battlefield. VC soldiers were subjected to a comprehensive indoctrination on the importance of and techniques involved in taking and holding US prisoners, disposition of US KIAs, and collection of documents and personal effects.

(C) A VC propaganda campaign was launched to convince the individual VC soldier of the ease with which he could capture US personnel. He was told the US soldier would surrender when he became separated from his unit; when separated from his leaders; when alone in the jungle; that he would cease to resist when his equipment failed; and that he really didn't want to fight for the "unjust cause" in Vietnam, and would surrender when given the opportunity. The VC were also told that the US fighting man was proud to be an American and had been thoroughly conditioned to attempt escape when captured. For this reason, the VC were cautioned to use extreme care and to exercise great vigilance when escorting or guarding US prisoners. They were informed that the US soldier would cease to actively resist when he learned that there would be no "torture, maiming, beating, or killing of prisoners." Even so, the VC were enjoined not to lessen or relax their control of US prisoners until the American had been thoroughly indoctrinated in and had accepted the Communist line. The VC doctrine required US PWs to be held in secure areas, the location of which, together with the prisoner's identity, should never be revealed without

# CONFIDENTIAL

proper authority. However, the VC had on occasion placed US prisoners on public display in villages for propaganda purposes.

(C) The Viet Cong were instructed to identify dead US personnel, strip the body of all identification, and then bury them in unmarked graves. The location of the grave site, along with the identification of all personnel effects taken from them, were to be sent to higher headquarters. Captured VC documents continually stressed the importance of taking US prisoners and burying the US dead in unmarked graves as a political tactic to bring pressure to bear on the US at the "proper time."

(C) The VC placed great emphasis on the collection of personal effects of US wounded. Collected items were to be used for "international propaganda," as evidenced by a VC claim that "anti-Vietnam war" factions in the US had requested that this type of material be sent to the US to add impetus to their charges and campaigns. A good indication of the importance placed on the collection of the personal effects of US wounded and KIA was the requirement that seized material be forwarded to COSVN Troop Proselyting Section through Province Troop Proselyting Section, and not retained at local or district level.<sup>95</sup>

## VC Policies for the Handling of US PWs

(C) An analysis of captured VC documents revealed that the VC stressed careful handling and treatment of US personnel. Harsh measures were kept to a minimum and used only as a last resort. The twofold purpose of this policy was to increase the possibility of enticing PWs into collaboration for propaganda purposes, and to gain favorable public opinion in the United States and other countries for possible future negotiations. In addition, it was assumed that the VC believed that decent treatment would make a prisoner more amenable to imparting information of a tactical nature.

(C) Immediately after capture, the prisoner was normally separated from other friendly personnel and not allowed to speak, except to his captors. He was stripped of all military identification. Personal effects were taken, allegedly for safekeeping, but actually to be closely examined for intelligence information and possible propaganda value.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Some of the items were used during interrogation and indoctrination. They might be returned to the prisoner as a reward for collaborating, or as a means of softening the attitude of the prisoner towards his captors.

(C) Prisoners were usually moved as quickly as possible away from the immediate combat area to preliminary interrogation areas or special areas for treatment of wounds. Subsequent movement was frequently accomplished at night. Prisoners, often with hands tied behind the back and a rope around the neck held by a guard, were usually marched in the center of a single file. During daylight hours, to preclude recognition of passing landmarks and terrain features, prisoners were blindfolded completely or to the extent they could see only the ground to the immediate front. During the journey to the first detention camp, which may take from several days to several weeks, prisoners were divided into small groups and passed to various groups of guards. Deceptive measures were employed during movement to confuse captives. These measures included traveling in circles and moving over the same route several times. On occasion, the prisoner was dressed to resemble his captors to hide his identity as an American from the local populace. During halts prisoners were well concealed from aerial observation, and holes were sometimes dug for protection from air strikes.

(C) Initial interrogation occurred as soon as the prisoner was moved from the immediate battle area. He was asked order of battle data and questions of immediate tactical value. Force was seldom used to extract information. The VC played on the prisoner's fear of the unknown, his initial fright at finding himself a prisoner, and, in the case of the wounded, threat of withholding needed medical treatment until certain questions were answered.

(C) The first formal VC attempt at interrogation and indoctrination occurred soon after the arrival of the prisoner at the first camp of confinement where he was given a questionnaire to complete. Questions pertained to his civilian and military background and particularly to the unit he belonged to when captured. Penalties for refusing to answer questions included withholding of certain privileges, confinement, or being tied or chained to a tree or pole in an uncomfortable position. Records did not indicate any harsher treatment having been meted out for refusing to answer this questionnaire or other questions. Interrogations were conducted by English-speaking VC interpreters. No high

# CONFIDENTIAL

degree of skill on the part of the interrogators was evidenced; interrogation sessions were infrequent and not usually harsh. One source stated he was interrogated only intermittently over a three-day period. Enlisted men and NCOs were usually interrogated prior to officers.

(C) Statements contained in captured documents indicated that a prisoner's ration should not exceed that of the VC. However, it was generally considered that US personnel required more food than the average Vietnamese, and exceptions were made depending on the local economic situation. These documents also stated that care should be exercised in feeding US personnel to insure that healthy prisoners did not become ill and that sick prisoners be given a fortified diet. Rice was the staple food for prisoners and captor alike. It was often mixed with maize or made into a rice gruel to give it more bulk. Salt, fish, and meats were served when available.

(C) The VC objective in the field of medical care was to keep the prisoner as healthy as possible within the limitations imposed by lack of medical supplies and/or facilities. Almost all prisoners became ill with either malaria, dysentery, stomach ailments, or skin infections. Medicines were usually in scarce supply, especially antibiotics, which were given only to those who were seriously ill. Both male and female nurses were employed to give shots and to treat minor wounds.

(C) Upon arrival at the prison camp, prisoners were usually stripped of any remaining US clothing (except underwear) and issued a set of peasant clothing consisting of "black pajamas" and rubber sandals or wooden shoes. Occasionally, captives were issued a mosquito net and two strips of canvas cloth for use as blankets or mats.

(C) At the beginning of internment, security was often quite stringent. Measures included chaining prisoners to trees or poles, at least during hours of darkness. However, prisoners were usually placed in a cage constructed of bamboo poles, or of bamboo and clay. Cages were normally constructed to hold two prisoners; the floor sometimes several feet off the ground or over a swamp or stream. US-type barbed wire was frequently strung around on bamboo poles.

(C) Further physical security measures included the use of natural barriers (jungle growth) or a punji stake perimeter; the camp perimeter was sometimes surrounded by mines and boobytraps. These camps were most often located in areas affording good concealment and where

# CONFIDENTIAL

limited civilian or military traffic existed. Seldom of a fixed nature, they were moved at least monthly for short distances. Generally a roving guard or guards were in the immediate area. During the hours of darkness they would conduct inspections of the prisoners at irregular intervals. The living area for the guards, however, was most likely to be some distance from the camp. Surprise inspections were conducted from time to time to preclude prisoners from stocking items needed for escape.

(C) Seldom were more than two officers, three noncommissioned officers or five enlisted men detained together. Although these small groups had contact with each other, they were not allowed to intermingle. Several repatriated US personnel stated that the only means of communication with other prisoners was through the use of secret hiding places located in areas to which the prisoners would normally have access during the course of their camp duties and exercise periods. Only occasionally during indoctrination or propaganda classes could prisoners converse with each other. The camp guards were normally not permitted to carry on idle conversation with the prisoner. Generally speaking, prisoners were authorized to send and receive letters. However, to preclude disclosure of the identity and the number of prisoners whose names had not been made public, prisoner's mail was often not forwarded. Prisoners were sometimes told that since they are in custody of "Liberation Forces," they must abide by regulations and discipline of the "Liberation Forces" and were not required to observe US regulations.

(C) Several hours a day were sometimes devoted to prisoner indoctrination. Various political propaganda techniques were used, i. e., reading matter, political broadcasts, and seminars followed by discussion groups. A technique sometimes used to place the prisoner at ease for the purpose of conversation was to offer the prisoner a drink of tea or beer. Topics were often based on such themes as:

1) US "imperialism" was the basic cause of the war of aggression in RVN.

2) Serious crimes were committed by US "imperialists" against the Vietnamese people, who had never threatened the peace or security of the US.

# CONFIDENTIAL

3) US "imperialism" was being defeated in RVN, and the South Vietnamese people would achieve their national sovereignty and independence.

4) The tolerance and the humanitarian policy of the "National Liberation Front" toward US prisoners.

5) Prisoners would most certainly see the truth of these topics and desire to reform themselves spiritually and ideologically.

(C) In the indirect method, distorted information or rumors sometimes spread by using a whispering campaign. Examples were:

1) Most of the US aircraft attacking NVN were being shot down.

2) A neutralist and peaceful regime had been established in SVN.

3) The American people were demanding an immediate US withdrawal from SVN.

4) The US and ARVN forces were suffering major defeats on the battlefield.

(C) Other attempts to "bring around" prisoners were to mention that certain fellow prisoners had adopted a "progressive attitude" and were rewarded by favored treatment. Another ploy was to give statements to prisoners allegedly prepared and signed by other prisoners condemning US policy in SVN and praising the "National Liberation Front" for their humane treatment of US prisoners.

(C) Occasionally prisoners were taken to villages for propaganda purposes and to show the people a "live example" of US aggression and imperialism. Any speech or statement made by an American was translated by an interpreter as "the illegal US involvement in South Vietnam" type of speech. It was not known if those translations were of the exact words or meaning of the prisoners or propaganda distortions. There were no reports of anyone ever hearing one of these alleged speeches who could understand both English and Vietnamese.

# CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Various printed documents were distributed by the VC containing statements credited to certain US prisoners expressing an anti-war sentiment of opposition to American involvement in the war in Vietnam. Some of the documents contained the recognized signature of an American believed to have been held prisoner by the VC. It was not known whether the prisoner actually signed the document or if his signature was forged.<sup>96</sup>

(C) During 1967 seven US personnel were released from VC/NVN captivity--five military and two US civilians. This was an exceedingly small number in relation to the efforts that the USG had expended through all available channels to set up a system of prisoner exchange and the efforts that the ICRC had made for exchanging prisoner lists and requests to inspect VC/NVN prison facilities. As of the end of 1967 very little, if any, progress was being made. Maximum propaganda was made of the release of the seven prisoners. One was released in conjunction with the first general elections in NVN; two were released in connection with Tet; and the last three were released only after they had been turned over to a member of a US progressive organization who had traveled twice to NVN and had publicly identified himself with strong opposition to US policy in Vietnam.

(C) In order to encourage further release of US prisoners and establish a favorable environment for possible future negotiations or prisoner releases, a policy was established regarding the handling of personnel released in the future. SECSTATE determined that publicity on the release of prisoners would be handled in a manner calculated to encourage release and good treatment of others. Also, released prisoners should not return to active duty in RVN. Since the VC/NVN desired a propaganda gain in the release of prisoners, delayed and controlled publicity would tend to discourage them from making further releases. These policies, however, could not be legally applied to civilian prisoners released.<sup>97</sup>

(C) The NVN refused to accept ICRC observation, to honor designation protecting power, to provide lists of names and numbers of prisoners held, and to permit prisoners to correspond with their families, it was more and more evident that their claims of humane treatment of US prisoners was specious. This was evidenced by a Life Magazine article wherein US PWs were interviewed. This prompted Ambassador Harriman to state:<sup>98</sup>

# CONFIDENTIAL

From the photographs, video-tapes and descriptions by eyewitnesses that I have seen of the so-called "news" conference at which Commander Stratton was exhibited, it would appear that the North Vietnamese authorities are using mental or physical pressure on American prisoners of war. We all remember the ugly record of "brainwashing" during the Korean War. It would be a matter of the gravest concern if North Viet-Nam were using similar means against the prisoners. Hanoi has said its' policy is to treat the prisoners humanely. However, it has refused to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross, or any other neutral intermediary, to visit the prisoners, a right required by the Geneva Conventions to which Hanoi has adhered. With such independent verification, North Vietnam's professions of "humane treatment" cannot be accepted.

(C) In another instance a Viet Cong broadcast threatened reprisal against US PWs if three terrorists sentenced to death in Saigon were executed. An even more flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention was in the case of Lt. Grammar and Sgt Frits who were captured and murdered by VC or NVN troops. An official protest, that was delivered to the ICRC with the request that it be conveyed to NVN and VC authorities, was as follows: 99

The USG calls the attention of the ICRC to the torture and murder of two American prisoners of war, Marine First Lieutenant William M. Grammar and Army Sergeant Orville B. Frits, by North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers at a church at Ngo Xa Dong, three miles from the city of Quang Tri in South Vietnam, on May 20, 1967.

Lt. Grammar and Sgt Frits were captured early in the morning of May 20 in the course of military action against North Vietnamese or Viet Cong forces. U.S. military personnel drove off the enemy forces at 5:30 in the afternoon, at which time they found the bodies of the two men in the churchyard. The body of Lt. Grammar was found with arms tied, and a bullet wound entering the right temple and exiting over the left eye. His throat was cut and his

~~SECRET~~

legs burned. The body of Sgt Frits was found with large holes in the palms of his hands, his throat slashed and mutilated, and his back and legs containing numerous stab wounds. He had apparently been fastened to the ground by bamboo stakes driven through his hands.

These acts of cruelty against helpless prisoners outrage the sense of decency of all civilized people, and are grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. The USG requests the ICRC to take all possible action within its competence with respect to these violations of the Convention.

#### Joint Personnel Recovery Center

(S) The Blood Chit program, adapted from the Korean Conflict and implemented in NVN, was considered by CINCPACFLT to have outlived its usefulness. Therefore, an extension of the program was proposed that would establish a uniform policy regarding payment of rewards for assistance provided to downed airmen, and implement a well publicized system of prompt and appropriate rewards. The program, originally to be implemented in Laos and NVN and later extended to include Cambodia, was to include all military personnel that found themselves in the position of attempting to evade or escape. In view of the reprisal action that could be taken, the scale of payment had to be sufficient to induce assistance on the part of the local population. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was assigned supervision of this program (see 1966 USMACV Command History for basic information).

(S) The program envisioned immediate monetary rewards to any person in Laos, NVN, or Cambodia who in any way helped US airmen or other missing personnel. The help could range from actually returning US airmen to friendly control to providing information or returning equipment or other evidence which revealed the status or disposition of US missing persons. The monetary amount to be offered would be determined by the JPRC after a review of facts in each recovery instance, but a maximum of \$5,000 was to be paid to Vietnamese. The approved reward scales were:

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

- 1) \$2,000/\$5,000 for returning a missing US person to friendly control.
- 2) \$250/\$500 for providing information leading to the recovery of missing US personnel by US forces.
- 3) \$200/\$400 for returning a deceased US missing person to friendly control.
- 4) \$160/\$250 for providing information which leads to recovery of a deceased US missing person.
- 5) \$100/\$150 for providing information or returning equipment or other evidence which reveals the disposition or status of missing US personnel.

The first amounts specified were for payment in Laos and the second amounts were for payment in NVN and other locations.

(S) US civilian personnel were excluded from the provisions of the essentially military sponsored program because it was felt that such extension would cast doubt over the bona fides of civilians and would risk jeopardizing the cover arrangements that had been taken. It was decided that civilians would be handled on an ad hoc basis as had been done in the past.

(S) Ambassador Bunker gave publicity to the program in the Saigon Post, and it was further enlarged in several CONUS newspapers. Information on the program was widely disseminated by radio broadcasts from the Voice of Freedom and the Voice of America. Two million leaflets were dropped over NVN in July 1967 bearing the following text: 100

## How to Save Anti-Communist Fighters

If you see an anti-communist soldier parachuting down from the sky or evading capture, remain calm and have no fear. Walk up to him and raise your hands to show him your friendly intentions. Take him to a safe place where he will not be captured by the security agents.

Help him if he is wounded.

If you carry him by boat or ox-cart, hide him carefully. Provided you bring him to a safe place, he

~~TOP SECRET~~

will be rescued immediately. Your efforts will be amply rewarded. You and your family will receive help to allow you to live a safe and comfortable life in the south. Or if you prefer to remain in the North, your efforts will be abundantly rewarded with a present of \$15,000 (NVN) in bank notes.

As Well as the NVN People

The great sum of money that we expend to save our pilots who have been shot down is an indication of the high respect for human life in our society. In the same manner, we are extremely careful to choose only military targets for bombing, so as to protect the material possessions and lives of the people.

We believe that the great cause we are serving is the freedom of the South Vietnamese people-- which is certainly a just cause. Many of our soldiers have fallen because of their limitless belief in this cause. Thus we want to do everything possible to recover our soldiers in a safe manner.

Your government has accused us of holding the belief that money can buy anything. But your government, on the other hand, never thinks of the thousands of your people's lives that have been sacrificed in a meaningless manner.

We hope that this message will inspire you to help our military men in North Vietnam territory for humanitarian reasons.

Selected Areas for Evasion (SAFE) Area Program

REVIEW DATE: ~~10/14/55~~  
CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED BY: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~10/14/55~~

PAGE 982 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

8-8-06-24

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: 04 1983  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED BY: DEA  
CR/OACR

PAGE 983 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### Enemy PWs in RVN

(C) At the end of 1966 the PW program was still in its infancy. Three camps had been constructed and were in operation, although two had been in operation for less than three months. Although the total camp capacity was 3,000 prisoners, only 1,652 PWs were in the camps. The general objectives of the PW program established for 1967 were for RVNAF to: (1) identify and transfer the PWs held in civilian jails and prisons into the ARVN PW camps, (2) establish a systematic procedure for repatriation of PWs, (3) promulgate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, (4) establish effective PW accountability procedures and maintain efficient records for identification and handling of PWs, (5) construct additional PW camps as required, (6) establish effective PW labor and educational programs, (7) adhere to the Geneva PW Convention (GPW) as closely as possible with respect to mail, medical attention, ICRC inspection visits, visiting privileges, and health and welfare items. <sup>102</sup>

#### Release of PWs-VC/NVA

(C) The year 1967 saw a continuation of the US and the GVN policy to repatriate NVA personnel. Releases usually coincided with national or religious holidays and were generally given heavy press coverage. The rationale behind the repatriation was an attempt to get the DVR to acknowledge that NVA personnel were in the RVN and to influence world public opinion as a result of our humane efforts. The NVN, although accepting the PWs, continued to maintain their public denial or participation in the war with the south. They refused to acknowledge that these personnel were from their own armed forces and merely offered to let these "compatriots" remain in NVN. <sup>103</sup>

(C) As the result of the release of two US civilians and one Filipino by the VC on 4 January 1967, the USG directed that action be taken to release three US captured VC PWs. Representatives of the AMEMB Saigon and MACV (J15) coordinated with the GVN in arranging the release of the three US captured PWs. Each of the PWs signed voluntary statements affirming their desire to be freed. The release was made in Tay Ninh on 23 January 1967 with the three PWs returning

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

to their families. In preparation for Tet, GVN selected for release 28 NVN sick and wounded PWs from the ARVN PW camps in RVN. As part of the pre-repatriation program conducted in January, the group participated in controlled tours of designated GVN installations and facilities including selected US facilities. The purpose of these tours was to impress the PWs with the determination of GVN, US, and FWMAF to establish a free society for the people of the RVN. Two additional VC PWs were added to the group at Da Nang, raising the total to 30. At the release ceremony on 3 February the two VC PWs chose to become Chieu Hoi's rather than be repatriated to NVN. The 28 NVN PWs were repatriated across the Ban Hai bridge, where they were met by NVN officers and accepted into NVN.

(C) Three separate PW repatriations occurred during March 1967. The first occurred on 11 March when the GVN and US jointly released two US captured VC PWs from III Corps PW camp at Bien Hoa in direct response to the 23 February release of two US military PWs, Sgt Womack and Pfc Crafts. Next, on 20 March two NVN PT boat PWs were repatriated through Cambodia to NVN. These two were part of the original 19 PT boat captives that had been taken by the USN on 1 July 1966 during an engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin (see MACV History 1966 for basic information). The other 17 PWs remained in US custody at Da Nang. The ICRC participated in the repatriation effort which was handled by the Australian government representing US interests in Cambodia.

(C) Finally, on 22 March the GVN completed the voluntary release of 22 "repentant" VC prisoners selected from ARVN PW camps. This release was the VC portion of the NVN/VC Tet release and were made in the various provinces throughout RVN without fanfare and with low key publicity.

(C) Action was initiated during the month of April by the US, GVN, and ICRC to identify sick and wounded PWs in GVN PW camps and in US and GVN medical facilities who would possibly qualify for voluntary repatriation to NVN under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. During April and May a combined medical screening team consisting of two Swiss doctors serving with the ICRC delegation in Saigon, an ARVN doctor, and representatives of MACV and JGS visited and screened sick and wounded PWs in the ARVN I, II, and III Corps PW camps and two GVN hospitals. Two hundred and eight-six PWs were screened; of these, 135 qualified medically for repatriation under the Geneva

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Convention. Of those qualified, 39 indicated their desire to be repatriated to NVN. One female PW with infant (born 28 April in GVN hospital) was added to the group from the Da Nang PW camp. The repatriation of the 40 PWs plus the infant took place on 12 June over the Ban Hai River Bridge. The prisoners were released in accordance with articles 109 and 110 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to the treatment of PWs, which required direct repatriation of seriously sick and wounded PWs as soon as they were fit to travel.

(C) At the request of the USG, the GVN arranged for the selection of four US captured VC PWs from the Pleiku PW camp for release in SVN. This was a continuation of attempts by the US to establish a procedure for the reciprocal release or exchange of US PWs held by VC/NVN. The release took place in Qui Nhon, II CTZ on 12 June. During 1967 139 PWs were released in SVN or repatriated to NVN.<sup>104</sup>

(C) COMUSMACV on 18 August strongly recommended to Ambassador Bunker that action be taken to increase the repatriation of NVA PWs. His memorandum to the Ambassador stated:

. . . now is an opportune time for us to consider increasing both the number of prisoners of war to be repatriated to North Vietnam and the number of repatriation incidents. Such increases within the coming months would strengthen our attack on the credibility of Hanoi claims that no soldiers from North Vietnam are being sent to South Vietnam. Repeated, well publicized acts of repatriation should eventually convince even the most dedicated supporters of the Viet Cong that North Vietnam is heavily involved in the war.

Further, and most important, each time the Government of Vietnam repatriates a group of prisoners, it is proof to the world that the GVN is living up to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, while lack of reciprocation by the enemy is evidence that he is not. Repeated and ever increasing repatriation on our part should put increased pressure upon the enemy to repatriate US seriously wounded and sick prisoners of war or risk losing the support of many humanitarians who have been sympathetic to his cause.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

An additional benefit may be derived from the hope we may stir in the NVA troops when they learn of the many PWs being sent back home. It is not sound psychologically to promise repatriation to NVA troops as an inducement to surrender; however, by publicizing an increasing number of acts of repatriation, we can imply that there is a possibility NVA captives may be sent home and, certainly, the possibility makes capture preferable to death. <sup>105</sup>

## Construction of PW Camps

(C) On 17 January 1967, COMUSMACV considered the situation in the RVN to be reaching a critical stage and in a memorandum to the Deputy Ambassador he voiced the urgency of the problem:

The increasing shortage of detention facilities in the Republic of Vietnam has reached an alarming stage. . . .

Military operations by friendly forces often result in the detention of large numbers of persons. After screening, the PWs are transferred to PW camps. The capacity of the PW camps is being increased and additional facilities are being constructed or are programmed. However, there are inadequate facilities for detainees who are classified as civil defendants. . . .

There is an urgent need for the immediate construction of additional facilities for civil defendants. Camps, similar to PW camps can be constructed much faster and at much less cost than regular prisons. This construction would relieve over-crowded prison conditions and provide facilities for civil defendants detained in future military operations. . . . The vast majority of the civil defendants could be accommodated in camps where the emphasis would be on reeducation rather than punishment. At an appropriate time the majority

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in this category could be released to settle in cleared areas. . . .

COMUSMACV recommended that the civilian element of the U. S. Mission undertake to work with the GVN to alleviate the critical situation as soon as possible.<sup>106</sup>

(C) MACV monitored the PW camp construction and camp operations. The PW population at the ARVN I Corps camp on 31 January 1967 was 392, of whom 135 were US captured. Concerning construction of Phase II Da Nang, shipment of materials had begun, the site plan had been submitted, and releases had been signed making funds available for contractors. The PW population of the ARVN II Corps PW camp at Pleiku on 31 January 1967 was 987, of whom 648 were US captured. Shipment of materials for Phase II construction at Pleiku had begun, releases had been signed making funds available for contractors, contractors had been appointed, and grading of the site had begun. The site for Phase I of Qui Nhon camp had been selected and approved, site plan approved, releases signed making funds available for contractors and shipment of materials begun. Ground breaking began on 31 January 1967. The PW population at the ARVN III Corps PW camp at Bien Hoa on 31 January 1967 was 592, of whom 305 were US captured. Phase II expansion of the Bien Hoa camp was approximately 85 percent completed. Construction of Phase I of the ARVN IV Corps camp was approximately 30 percent completed on 31 January 1967. Dredging for Phase II at Can Tho PW camp was completed, site plan submitted, and releases signed making funds available for contractors.

(C) In early March 1967, COMUSMACV directed that a study be conducted for the purpose of selecting an island site for a PW camp. A joint JGS/MACV team visited Cu Lao Thu Island, 60 miles east of Phan Thiet and Phu Quoc Island, south of Cambodia. Con Son Island was considered but discarded in order to retain it as a penal colony. Engineer ground surveys were subsequently conducted by joint JGS/MACV teams. Based on their studies and recommendations, a joint JGS/MACV decision was reached on 28 March to select Phu Quoc Island (An Thoi area) as the site for the camp. Action was initiated jointly to provide for the construction of an initial 1,000 capacity camp using US and ARVN engineer resources. Upon movement of PWs from mainland camps onto the island, the camp facilities would be expanded to provide for up to 10,000 PWs utilizing PWs as a labor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

force. Construction of the first increment was begun on 22 Apr 67. Engineer rated capacity of the first increment was 1,000, actual capacity 2,000.

(C) Construction of phase II at Da Dang and construction of Phase II at Pleiku was completed in May 1967. Construction of Phase I of the Qui Nhon camp was completed in May 1967 with the camp becoming operational 1 July 1967. Construction of Phase II of the ARVN IV Corps camp was completed on 23 May 1967. Expecting Phase I of the camp on Phu Quoc Island to be completed in mid-June, plans were developed for the transfer of PWs from mainland camps starting with the Pleiku camp initially. This decision was based on the VC threat to the security of the overall camp at that time. Actually the camp became operational 17 June when Phase I was completed. On 18 June, 300 prisoners, 224 of whom were US captured, were transferred from Pleiku.

(C) Phase II was finished on 30 June bringing the capacity of the Phu Quoc Island camp to 2,000. A second enclosure was completed 31 December 1967, and construction had begun on a third enclosure with a programmed completion date of 29 February 1968. As of 5 December 67, the PW camps had the following internment capacities:

	<u>I Corps</u> <u>(Da Nang)</u>	<u>II Corps</u> <u>(Pleiku-Qui Nhon)</u>	<u>III Corps</u> <u>(Bien Hoa)</u>
Rated	2,000	2,000 1,000	2,000
Minor in-camp Modifications	2,500	2,500 1,500	2,500

	<u>IV Corps</u> <u>(Can Tho)</u>	<u>Phy Quoc Island</u>	<u>Total</u>
Rated	2,000	4,000	13,000
Minor in-camp Modifications	2,500	5,000	16,000

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) In August 1966 a joint US/RVNAF screening committee was established to identify PWs who had been interned in province jails and national prisons prior to construction of camps. The membership of this committee consisted of representatives from MACV (J1), MACV (J2), MACV (J4), and their RVNAF counterparts. The committee screened the four national prisons and 37 provincial jails to identify PWs who should be interred in RVNAF PW camps. As a result 1,202 out of a total of 1,709 were identified as PWs. During 1967 all but 27 of these PWs were transferred to PW camps. As of year's end the screening was still in process. 107

(C) As of 31 December 1967 the breakout of PWs being held in RVN was:

Force Level	III MAF Camp (Da Nang)	ARVN	ARVN		ARVN
		I Corps	(Pleiky)(Qui Nhon)		III Corps
NVN	17	317	30	94	174
Regroupee	0	38	31	30	35
VC	0	846	611	644	1,562
Unk	0	237	193	0	181

ARVN IV Corps	ARVN (Phu Quoc)	Total
44	430	1,656
4	115	253
1,686	1,872	7,221
2	0	613

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prison population by capturing force is shown below: 108

<u>Cpt Force</u>	<u>III MAF Camp (Da Nang)</u>	<u>ARVN I Corps</u>	<u>ARVN II Corps</u> (Pleiku)(Qui Nhon)		<u>ARVN III Corps</u>
US	17	1,022	738	555	1,288
RVNAF	0	412	139	78	628
ROK	0	4	36	128	26
AUS	0	0	0	7	10
TOTAL	17	1,438	915	768	1,932

<u>Cpt Force</u>	<u>ARVN (Phu Quoc)</u>	<u>Total</u>
US	1,488	5,487
RVNAF	1,102	3,566
ROK	323	699
AUS	4	21
TOTAL	2,917	9,743

## Discipline

(C) On 22 August 1967, prisoners at the Phu Quoc Island PW camp staged a silent rebellion because 18 PWs who refused to work had been punished by the camp commander. Five hundred PWs in one compound refused to enter their barracks after roll call or respond to any command. The JGS, RVNAF dispatched a board of officers headed by OPMG/JGS to investigate the incident. On 23 August 1967, a QC Company consisting of 120 trainees and instructors from the QC school at Vung Tau were moved to Phu Quoc by air to assist in maintaining camp

# SECRET

discipline. A representative of the Central Polwar Agency ordered the PWs to assemble in the recreation yard and then entered the enclosure to be given a briefing on the Geneva Convention and the Chieu Hoi Program. At the close of his briefing, 17 Chieu Hoi's left the enclosure. Order was restored in the compound without loss of life or property.

(C) Because of the lack of emphasis placed on PW work programs at the PW camps in VN, a PW Work Advisory Detachment consisting of J1 representatives was established by MACV on 23 August 1967. The Advisory Detachment's mission was to travel to the various PW camps, JGS and other headquarters recommending the work program and encouraging imaginative approaches to solutions. A part of their efforts was devoted to obtaining raw material, tools and resources.

(C) On 26 August 1967, a MACV Task Force was established with the primary mission of considering the impact of the Phu Quoc PW camp and its expansion in the area of responsibility of the individual members. The Task Force was also to assist ARVN counterparts in resolving the problems of accelerated construction and to develop a plan for long-range base development and logistical support for the island camp. JGS responded also forming a Task Force. On 15 September 1967 the combined task forces made several important PW policy decisions which would remove obstacles to accelerated expansion plans as well as provide personnel and resources for its continued efficient operation. 109

(S) On 30 August an enemy force attacked the MACV Compound and the city powerhouse in Quang Ngai City. While the attack was in progress the enemy released 1,479 prisoners (30 civilian criminals, 1,353 VC political cadre and 96 ARVN military prisoners) from the provincial jail. Having expressed great concern in the past about ample security for these types of installations, COMUSMACV again stressed the urgency of safeguarding VC prisoners. 110

The attack . . . on the Quang Ngai City Jail resulted in the release by the VC of over 1,400 prisoners. It has been reported that approximately 1,300 of these were VC political cadre. Only a few hundred have been recaptured. This is the third successful jail release within the last few months.

At a time when the apprehension and detention of VC infrastructure is of urgent importance, this

~~SECRET~~

one VC action resulted in undoing many months of concerted effort by the US and the GVN. It is vital that proper security measures be provided against enemy attack for prisons and detention centers in which large numbers of VC are held. Members of the infrastructure are particularly important because of the length of time it takes the VC to train and replace them in comparison with armed guerrillas. Commanders and advisors at all levels should re-examine the security of jails and detention centers in their areas of interest to assure that protection plans are adequate. Advisors particularly should urge their counterparts to give priority attention to this matter.

(C) On 31 March 1967, the GVN promulgated by National Decree the provisions established by the four Geneva Conventions on 12 August 1949. This resulted in certain improvements in the PW care and treatment programs at the RVNAF camps throughout RVN. On 19 December 1967, the GVN approved PW pay at an established rate of 8 piasters per man per working day effective 1 April 1968 in accordance with the GPW. A pilot education program was also started in an attempt to teach illiterate PWs basic reading and writing. Mail privileges and visitation rights for PW families were instituted; gratuitous issue of health and comfort items was continued; and a medical dispensary within each camp was established with a medical doctor and staff. <sup>111</sup>

(U) Throughout the year the Saigon Delegation of the ICRC made periodic visits to RVNAF PW camps and hospitals where PWs were being treated or held. Their reports were generally favorable. Also, subsequent to the issuance of the Decree Law, RVNAF allowed the international press to visit two camps during April 1967. <sup>112</sup>

(U) During November 1967 a feasibility study was conducted on the automation of PW records. As a result of the study, a format was devised for submission to ADPS for programming of information to be maintained on the prisoners. At the close of the year, four of the six RVNAF PW camps' records had been included into the automated system. <sup>113</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

## SECURITY

### Logistics Facilities

(U) MACV Directive 380-8, which was republished in April, defined physical security as measures designed to safeguard personnel and prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents and safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Within the context of this MACV Directive J3 had staff responsibility for the overall command security, which included active defense measures of the US troop units, advisory detachments, and air base and port facilities. Component and Service commanders monitored physical security programs within their commands, while each area, zone, sub-zone, and installations coordinator established physical security programs within his own area of responsibility. The concept of the security program and structure was directed toward maintaining maximum security by realistic application of physical security measures and available security forces.<sup>114</sup>

(C) As is inherent in the counterinsurgency environment, the threat of VC/NVA attack was always imminent in Vietnam. The jungle provided the guerrilla cover and concealment for his clandestine operations; the many waterways provided him an extensive transportation network; and the indigenous population was not always in full support of the government. In Vietnam military LOCs and installations were located totally within the combat zone, and completely exposed to enemy attack; there was no conventional front line. The VC/NVA forces had a definite advantage of being on the offensive. They were organized and trained in small units and were well skilled in guerrilla tactics and operations. Their favorite targets were attacks against fixed installations which resulted in some of their most successful actions. These actions were well rehearsed and were characterized by surprise, stealth, aggressiveness, speed of execution, and security.<sup>115</sup>

(C) In 1967 the security of base camps and support facilities throughout RVN became increasingly difficult as the enemy obtained longer range weapons. In countering this increased threat, it was important that US/FWMA combat power not be dissipated by beefing-up the security

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

forces already employed. It was important that the US/FWMA forces retain the initiative by not allowing the enemy forces any respite from continuous attack. In this regard COMUSMACV directed on 10 May that:

Tactical units will be used primarily to conduct offensive operations of increasing tempo into enemy bases, sanctuaries and operating areas. Combat forces utilized in defense of base camps and support installations must be held to the absolute minimum. Maneuver battalions will occupy their base camps only the minimum amount of time required for battle, maintenance and unavoidable administrative actions. There must be increased vigilance and participation in self-defense by every unit and every individual as well as forces of all services. . . They must be organized, trained and experienced to perform defensive and security functions appropriate to the bases and installations. Passive measures are important but an active defense is essential, to include the manning of outer perimeters; external aggressive patrolling; establishment of outposts, listening posts, and ambushes; and provisions for reaction forces. Vigorous command emphasis and follow-up is required to keep security forces alert, vigilant, and prepared to defeat the efforts of a clever and determined enemy. 116

(C) On 12 June COMUSMACV stressed the importance of installation layouts to insure optimum dispersion, segregation, and utilization of protective storage revetments to the maximum extent practical. This was particularly important for explosives, ammunitions, pyrotechnics, POL, and other combustible materials. COMUSMACV's guidance to subordinate commands for the establishment and organization of logistics facilities included the examination of the following:

- 1) Proximity to villages or huts which could conceal a potential saboteur or weapons which would be fired into the installation.
- 2) Denial of enemy observation of activities at the installations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3) Presence of man-made features which would serve as a convenient aiming point for hostile fire.
- 4) Construction of observation towers from which enemy activity can be detected.
- 5) Avoidance of extreme stockage in forward support areas.
- 6) Forward support areas should be utilized for essential supply support only, limiting the congestion by other activities.
- 7) Storage or packing of operational equipment and vehicles, including aircraft in vicinity of POL and ammunition storage or supply routes will be avoided.

COMUSMACV emphasized that "the physical layout of a supply activity or installation is directly related to the enemy threat and corresponding defense plans. Defense plans and availability of security personnel may preclude maximum dispersion, however, a carefully developed physical layout will prevent or minimize a loss in event that fire does result."<sup>117</sup>

(C) On 21 July COMUSMACV pointed out that the attack on Da Nang AB on 13 July reemphasized the urgent need to reduce to the absolute minimum those munitions located in primary target areas, especially air bases, which do not meet the quantity distance criteria. Priority in dispersion would be given to Class 6 and Class 7 mass detonating items. In line with the MACV policy of dispersion of explosives and munitions, DEPCOMUSMACV recommended to General Vien that a reduction and relocation of munitions be considered at Nha Trang AB. DEPCOMUSMACV pointed out that the storage of excess munitions was a potential hazard that might inflict casualties and damage to property and equipment similar to the situation that occurred at Da Nang in July. In reaction to DEPCOMUSMACV's recommendation RVNAF agreed to reduce stocks on base from 4,000 to 1,500 tons. Pending the construction of a new munitions storage area north of Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay was to be used to back up storage area for 1,000 tons of munitions.<sup>118</sup>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Saigon Electric Power Loop System

(C) In March and April MACV conducted a comprehensive security study of the Saigon Electric Power Loop System (SEPLS) with particular attention and emphasis on vulnerability to sabotage and adequacy of counter-sabotage measures. The assessments covered ground forces, alarm system, pass and badge system, perimeter lighting, physical barriers, emergency sources of electricity, water supply, and fire-fighting equipment. The overall security was found to be fairly good; however, a number of vulnerable areas were found to exist throughout the system's 4 major power plants and 11 substations:

1) In several cases civilian housing was located too close to the walls or fences of the facilities, and in two cases the walls of installations actually formed part of the walls of the houses. In these instances it would have been an easy matter to place an explosive inside the house against the wall or to tunnel under the wall without arousing any suspicion on the part of the guards at the power facilities concerned.

2) In certain cases background checks had not been run on personnel employed by the power facilities.

3) In several instances the fences around the facilities were not high enough to preclude unauthorized personnel from climbing over them.

4) At some of the facilities employees were allowed to bring their vehicles into the compounds and to park them at random. In these cases the vehicles were not checked prior to entry.

5) At several facilities communication between guard posts was very poor. The Cho Quan Power Plant and Substation and the Thu Duc Power Plant provided only whistles for the guards to use in communicating.

6) Both the Cho Quan and Thu Duc Power Plants, as well as the Jeffre Substation, had pumps which were unprotected and were extremely vulnerable to sabotage.

7) In certain instances there were families living within the compounds. Movement of these families was not controlled in any way.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8) Some of the facilities needed additional lighting, or to have existing lighting repaired.

9) In most instances counter-sabotage contingency plans were nonexistent. In cases where such plans were mentioned, they were very fragmentary and not clearly defined. 119

(C) In May COMUSMACV stated that: "The security of Vietnamese power facilities should be a matter of major concern to the US Mission. The recent commencement of US bombing of North Vietnam power plants makes it imperative that we take adequate preventive measures to protect ourselves against the possibility of local retaliatory action by the Viet Cong." In order to improve the existing security COMUSMACV recommended the following actions to AMB Bunker:

1) That the Public Safety Division of USAID be given the responsibility for insuring the physical security of the SEPLS facilities.

2) That a committee consisting of representatives from Mission/MACV/GVN be established to monitor the security of the electric power facilities in RVN.

3) That the committee discuss the conduct of joint US/GVN physical security of the principal electric power facilities with particular emphasis on security clearance programs, pass systems, guard, perimeter lighting, communications, physical barriers, and preparation of realistic and workable contingency plans.

SEPLS Action Committee was established on 27 May and assumed responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of existing security at the strategic thermal power plant and substations in the Saigon/Gia Dinh areas. 120

(C) To further implement security plans for the GVN public power facilities and improve overall security of the power facilities throughout the country COMUSMACV directed that III MAF and FFORCEVs consider organizing a committee similar to the Saigon joint committee. He suggested that these be established in each province to design and implement security measures at each strategic electrical power generating facility. 121

# ~~SECRET~~

## Defense Against Rocket, Mortar and Artillery Fire

(S) During the latter part of 1966 VC/NVA forces resorted increasingly to the use of mortar and RR fire against friendly installations, particularly airfields. These enemy strikes resulted in numerous casualties and a high loss of aircraft. In late 1966 intelligence indicated that the number and intensity of VC attacks by high-angle weapons would be increased. COMUSMACV thus directed that countermeasures be taken against VC mortar attacks. COMUSMACV was particularly interested in the development of an improved warning system, and Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) was asked to develop and provide a seismic detection system, using equipment such as the Sandia detection device, in order to provide longer warning periods for protective action and countermeasures. 122

(C) The magnitude of the problem of providing security to friendly installations from attacks by high-angle weapons was vastly increased on 27 February when the VC/NVA launched their first attack with the Soviet 140mm rocket against Da Nang AB. In a short one-minute attack, the enemy hit the air base with approximately 66 rounds of 140mm rockets, killing 13 US personnel, wounding over 100 others, and damaging 13 aircraft. Other damage was considerable in this attack, and there was a high number of Vietnamese casualties. During March Da Nang was again attacked by 140mm rocket fire and Gio Linh, and Camp Carroll in the DMZ area were struck by rockets in addition to the usual artillery fire.

(C) The enemy again revealed an expanded capability by introducing the 122mm rocket into RVN in an attack on Camp Carroll in March 1967. With this new weapon, a warhead with greater lethality, increased rocket ranges to 11,000 meters. On 12 May Dien Hoa AB near Saigon was attacked with approximately 47 rounds of 122mm rockets along with 82mm mortars and 75mm RR fire. This attack resulted in 8 US personnel killed and 31 wounded. Sixteen aircraft were destroyed or sustained major damage, and a number of vehicles and structures were destroyed or damaged. Again using 122mm rockets, on 15 July, the enemy struck Da Nang AB with 50 to 60 rockets. The attack lasted about 20 minutes and resulted in 8 deaths, 140 wounded, 10 aircraft destroyed, 37 other aircraft damaged, and numerous vehicles and structures destroyed or damaged.

~~SECRET~~

(S) Following these rocket attacks along the DMZ, at Da Nang, and as far south as Bien Hoa in the III CTZ, there were intelligence indications that the VC/NVA had established rocket positions in the Cambodian border area adjacent to Pleiku in the II CTZ. COMUSMACV informed I FFORCEV Commander of this possible threat to key positions in the Highlands. To insure that all possible efforts were taken to counter rocket attacks, COMUSMACV directed that reviews be made of friendly dispositions, the intelligence collection effort, alert procedures, and reaction plans. 123

(C) By mid-July it was clear that the capability of the enemy to inflict damage on US installations by rocket and mortar fire had become a serious threat. On 16 July GEN Abrams, DEPCOMUSMACV, meeting with GEN Kerwin (CofS), GEN Davidson (J2), GEN Brownfield (Dep J3), and GEN Chaisson (COC), stated that he was concerned about the effectiveness of VC rocket and mortar attacks against friendly installations and the possibility of an increase in the number of such attacks in the I, II, and III CTZs. GEN Abrams pointed out that the 15 July attack against the Marines at Da Nang was launched from positions very close to a Marine outpost position, an RF position, and a hamlet and that the enemy appeared to have been well informed of friendly strengths and weaknesses including the lack of coordination, the daily routine, and patrol patterns of the Marine and RF outposts. He then directed that a Project Manager be established in HQ MACV with the mission of initiating and coordinating a massive and detailed study of the threat posed by enemy rocket and mortar attacks. Similar Project Managers were quickly established at USARV and in each of the four CTZs. Project officers were appointed in each division. On 25 July a meeting of the Project Managers and representatives of the components and other appropriate agencies was held to initiate a rocket and mortar defense program. A Project Manager Team was established to conduct rapid on-the-spot investigations and to present pertinent findings to subordinate Project Managers and their teams. The MACV Project Manager also began to review and refine rocket defense plans and to draw up checklists for installation defense. Attention was also focused on increasing PSYWAR countermeasures, reviewing RD efforts in areas adjacent to friendly installations, and assuring that equipment and resources necessary for rocket defense were made available. 124

(C) In late July the enemy again struck installations in III CTZ with 122mm rockets and mortars. On 27 and 28 July, Tan Uyen, Lai Khe, and the base camps at Phuoc Vinh and Phu Loi were attacked by enemy forces employing mortars and 122mm rockets. During the 20 minute

PAGE 1000 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

attack against Phuoc Vinh, 35 miles N of Saigon, approximately 80 122mm rockets and some 72 rounds of 82mm mortars caused 12 US KIA and 65 wounded. In the attack against Phu Loi approximately 49 122mm rockets and 150 82mm mortar rounds resulted in 2 US deaths, 31 injuries, destruction of 3 helicopters, and damage to 3 others. During July the enemy continued to employ rockets against US positions and installations in the northern province of Quang Tri. 125

(C) COMUSMACV became increasingly concerned with the complex problem of effective rocket defense. Since the situation and, consequently, the problems faced by each installation varied, COMUSMACV directed that all commanders continue to analyze past and possible future attack techniques in order to clearly define the threat and develop more effective countermeasures. He further directed that checklists be drawn up, installation defense plans be reexamined, and information be forwarded regarding situations which required additional resources, new techniques, or devices. Commanders were also directed to immediately disseminate information concerning successful utilization of resources and defense techniques. In addition, COMUSMACV required that each CTZ provide a listing of major installations in order of priority for rocket defense. From these lists, MACV drew up countrywide priorities for the allocation of the resources available to counter the rocket threat. 126

(S) In August COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC on the extensive nature of the threat posed by enemy use of mortars, RR, artillery, and rockets and requested assistance in the development and procurement of improved detection devices. In his report COMUSMACV noted that, due to the nature of the conflict in Vietnam, tactical positions, base camps, and fixed installations of all types were subject to attack from any direction at any time, and that even attacks of short duration could inflict heavy casualties and damage. The enemy had demonstrated the capability to deliver mortar fire at rates of fire as high as 30 rounds per minute, employing both 122mm and 140mm rockets from widely scattered locations almost simultaneously. Counter measures being used included countermortar and counterbattery radars (AN/MPQ-4A and the AN/TPQ-10A), the employment by some units of individuals specially trained to locate the source of fire by unaided listening, countermortar fire plans, and air surveillance

(C) COMUSMACV contended that an improved 360° detection system was required that would be effective against incoming enemy mortar, RR,

~~SECRET~~

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

artillery, and rocket rounds. The required system should be capable of providing immediate location of the enemy firing site by direct coordinate readout. A multiple target intercept and destruction capability was also desired for employment against incoming rockets. And a system or technique was needed to neutralize protected enemy weapons sites as rapidly as the location was determined. 127

(C) Meanwhile in August and early September the enemy continued to carry out successful attacks with high-angle weapons. On 2 August the civilian POL terminal at Nha Be in III CTZ was struck by VC mortar fire and approximately 700 55-gal drums of POL were destroyed. On 19 August an apparent VC attempt to launch a mortar attack against Tan Son Nhut AB was disrupted by the actions of an alert RF patrol. In the II CTZ the Le Thanh FSB east of Pleiku, near the Cambodian border, was attacked on 23 August with an estimated 50 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. On 27 August an enemy force struck Can Tho City in IV CTZ with mortars and RR fire. The fire was directed at the RAG base, MACV compound, the civilian hospital, and the Province Chief's residence and resulted in a high number of civilian casualties. On 28 August VC/NVA forces in I CTZ reinitiated heavy attacks by mortar, artillery, and rockets against positions in the area of the DMZ as well as against Dong Ha, the Marble Mountain air facility, and Da Nang. Employing 140mm rockets, the enemy struck Dong Ha twice on the same day. In August intelligence determined that during April, May, and June two enemy 122mm rocket battalions and one 140mm rocket battalion had infiltrated S through the A Shau Valley into Quang Nam Province, with the objective of attacking Da Nang and other I CTZ installations. 128

(C) During September the rocket and mortar attacks continued. In I CTZ on 2 September Da Nang AB was struck with 122mm as well as 140mm rocket fire. During the attack on 2 September, the enemy employed a new technique of striking three installations simultaneously from three different launch sites: Da Nang was hit with 6 140mm rockets; the USMC Logistical Command Base, located 8 miles NW of Da Nang, received 13 122mm rocket rounds; and an artillery base camp a mile and a half W of the logistic base was struck by 9 122mm rockets. These attacks resulted in 2 deaths, over 100 injuries, and moderate damage to aircraft, vehicles, supplies, and structures. In September the enemy attacks in the DMZ area were particularly heavy reaching a peak on 25 September when Con Thien was hit with approximately 1,115 rounds of artillery, mortar, and rocket fire. Mortar attacks continued

~~SECRET~~

in other areas: in IV CTZ the US base camp at Dong Tam was struck on 30 September by approximately 35 82mm mortar rounds. 129

(C) As the enemy continued to carry out damaging rocket and mortar attacks COMUSMACV took steps to increase monetary payments to Vietnamese civilians who provided early warning information on enemy rocket, mortar, and artillery activity against US, FWMAF, and RVNAF installations. Change 1 to MACV Dir 381-2, published on 26 August, provided rewards up to 100,000\$VN to voluntary informants. It was hoped that these larger rewards would motivate Vietnamese individuals to volunteer information on movement of enemy personnel and weapons and the preparation of firing positions, which would afford friendly forces time and opportunity to take special security precautions.

(S) On 29 August CG III MAF provided COMUSMACV with an assessment of rocket activity including evidence of changes in the enemy's tactical deployment of rockets. Noting the increased use of 140mm rockets, he observed that Main Force VC units were equipped with the 140mm and that US forces may have underestimated the size of the 140mm stockpile. He expected that the weapon would be employed more frequently, against more varied targets and from launch sites outside established rocket belts. He felt that the enemy might employ even longer range rockets along with better coordination of his attacks and that the use of maneuver elements in coordination with rocket attacks could be expected. CG III MAF also noted some indicators of impending attacks for which commanders should be alert. These included a reduction in mining and booby trap activity and the neutralization of friendly sources of information in specific areas. 130

(C) By 9 September the ongoing study and analysis of enemy mortar, RR, and rocket tactics had revealed to COMUSMACV that increased emphasis was required to coordinate area defenses and to expedite clearance for counter-fire. COMUSMACV directed that US/RVN/FWMA forces tactical commanders and subordinate zone and installation commanders improve coordination and develop complementary arrangements for the defense of those installations that were threatened from more than one TAOR or AO. Noting that installation security was primarily based on perimeters, COMUSMACV pointed out that as the range of enemy weapons increased, the area of threat also increased. Thus patrols, search-and-destroy operations, surveillance, and ambush programs within 12 km or less of fixed installations must be well coordinated, particularly when more than one AO was involved. COMUSMACV also

PAGE 1003 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# CONFIDENTIAL

ordered the establishment of Specialized Strike Zone (SSZ) in those areas of RVN where the normal "clearance to fire" procedures were too slow. Once a SSZ was approved, coordinated with the GVN, and curfews established, then fast and effective counterbattery fire could be fired into it without awaiting specific GVN approval. <sup>131</sup>

(C) On 13 September COMUSMACV briefed CINCPAC on the series of VC/NVA rocket attacks during the summer of 1967, in which he clearly defined the problem, the key to the solution, and actions being taken to effect resolution:

The series of VC/NVA rocket attacks during the summer of 1967 underlines the enemy capability to employ successfully this weapon at places and times of his own choosing. The key to successful neutralization of this enemy capability is the detection of his intentions and preparations before the fact. A maximum effort is being made to uncover evidence of an impending VC/NVA rocket attack prior to its initiation. Operationally, a MACV Project Manager has been established to take a massive in-depth look at the problem and to coordinate the counter-rocket effort throughout the command. A functional organization has been developed which includes the establishment of Project Managers at USARV, the four CTZs, and the designation of project officers at division level. Actions to date include briefings to subordinate commands and dissemination of publications and current studies pertaining to the enemy equipment, tactics, logistics, attack patterns, probable infiltration routes, and probable launch sites. Rocket belts (8,000 to 12,000 meter radius) surrounding some major installations have been established with particular emphasis placed on the reconnaissance and observation within these belts to deny the enemy the opportunity to set up launch sites. Realignment of TAORs has resulted in clearer definition of responsibilities and more rapid reaction to rocket attacks. Passive defense measures included greater dispersion where possible and accelerated revetment programs. Detection devices are being explored as

# SECRET

countermeasures for rockets as well as installation defense in general.

(S) DEPCOMUSMACV and the MACV Rocket Defense Project Manager visited I and II FFORCEVs and III MAF on 22 September for rocket defense briefings and to investigate such major rocket attacks as the 23 August attack against Le Thanh and the 28 August attack against the Marble Mountain air facility. By the end of September the monetary rewards paid for information concerning enemy rocket activities were increased. Rocket defense lists and after-action report procedures were further refined and progress was made in accumulating a data bank. MACJ2 stated that there was an urgent requirement for all information concerning possible enemy efforts to attack major US installations, particularly the Tan Son Nhut-new MACV complex and the Bien Hoa-Long Binh areas. A maximum intelligence collection effort was ordered with information to be sent promptly and directly to the Rocket Project Manager. <sup>132</sup>

(S) At the MACV Commander's Conference of 24 September the CG 1st Mar Div gave a detailed briefing of anti-rocket operations in defense of the vital area of Da Nang. The rocket defense program included a two-fold effort of prevention and reaction, with primary emphasis on prevention. The salient points of this defense effort were as follows:

1) To prevent rocket attacks vulnerable areas were delineated by "rocket belts" which encompassed the area between 8,000 and 12,000 meters measured from points at the N and S ends of the Da Nang airfield. Within these rocket belts Marine defense battalions were assigned tactical responsibility for specific main enemy avenues of approach. Ground surveillance by patrols was a key part of the prevention plan. Patrols were supplemented by the use of seismic intrusion devices (AN-TPS-21), Xenon and white searchlights, starlight scopes, and observer towers. Three aerial observer flights were flown over the rocket belt during the day and four visual reconnaissance flights were flown each night. ARC LIGHT flights were employed when available, and H&I artillery fire was integrated into the prevention plan.

2) Since all but one rocket against Da Nang was launched from positions adjacent to a river, a plan to control waterways was implemented jointly with the ARVN. This plan included surveillance and the imposition of a daily curfew on all waterways in the TOAR between 1800H and 0600H. Surveillance of coastal waters was also increased.

# SECRET

3) The reaction phase was a secondary though important part of the rocket defense of Da Nang. Blocking positions were established on probable withdrawal routes and to cordon launch positions. When possible, air and naval gunfire were used to interdict enemy withdrawal routes. After each attack a comprehensive analysis was made with the objective of improving methods of countering the rocket threat.

4) During the 2 September attack against Da Nang the enemy introduced a new complication to the defense problem by launching multiple attacks from three positions simultaneously and with two of the 122mm launch sites located beyond the limits of the rocket belt. In this attack the enemy demonstrated his willingness to employ the 122mm rocket against lesser targets. Since it was impossible to extend the high-density anti-rocket preventive coverage to greater ranges, it appeared that there would be times when this threat to lesser targets would have to be accepted.

5) The CG 1st Mar Div concluded the briefing by noting that three rocket attacks launched since the destructive 15 July attack had inflicted only light damage, and there were indications that the enemy had encountered problems in launching these attacks. In addition, it was noted that on 27 August a successful ambush against an enemy group attempting to penetrate the rocket belt resulted in the capture of 11 140mm rockets.<sup>133</sup>

(C) On 29 September the CG II FFORCEV reported on action taken to increase the effectiveness of rocket and mortar defenses. The major changes included improved fire coordination and communications. Closer coordination of the defenses of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa ABs was effected between CG III CTZ and the US Senior Advisor. A quick fire support channel was established between the CMD and the TOC of II FFORCEV. In addition, active countermeasures, including tactical operations, aggressive armed air reconnaissance, and H&I artillery fire were initiated to cover areas of greatest threat near key airfields and installations.<sup>134</sup>

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: 06/1988  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED BY: [Signature]  
APPROVED ON: 05/CADR

**CONFIDENTIAL**

PAGE 1007 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By IAG per  
830624

~~SECRET~~

(C) During most rocket attacks friendly forces were not able to bring accurate counterbattery fire on the launch site, and there was limited evidence that counter-fire was responsible for causing the enemy to break off an attack before the planned firing program was completed. Addressing the problem of friendly casualties the study noted that many casualties were sustained by personnel attempting to make their way to bunkers after the attack had commenced. The study suggested that personnel caught in the open should drop to the ground and roll to the nearest ditch.

(S) At the end of the year COMUSMACV continued with urgency to improve on US and FW defenses against rocket and mortar attacks. COMUSMACV's concern with the problems was reflected in a report to CINCPAC in December, in which he reiterated the nature of the rocket defense problem as discussed with CINCPAC in September, restating the continuing requirements to counter the threat. In addition, he reported that patrolling and ambush activity in and around probable firing sites and routes leading thereto had been increased. Aircraft equipped with SLR and infrared devices had been used with fair results when it had been possible to designate specific areas for search.<sup>136</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Chapter X

### Footnotes

1. Ltr (U), HQ 25 DIV AVDCCH to MACCLT, 12 Nov 67, Subj: Command History.
2. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ1, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Awards and Decorations.
3. J1 Monthly Historical Input, Mar 67.
4. J1 Monthly Historical Input, Aug 67.
5. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ1, 12 Apr 67, Subj: Meritorious Awards to Third Country Officers.
6. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 260125Z Nov 67, Subj: US awards and Decorations to Foreign Military Personnel for Valorous Acts.
7. Msg (S), USARMA Vientiane Laos to CINCPAC, 170945Z Oct 67, Subj: Awards and Decorations (U).
8. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ1, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Awards and Decorations.
9. Briefing (C), J41 for GEN Rasmussen, 28 Sep 67, Subj: MOOSE Briefing (U).
10. Ltr (U), USAHAC (AUCB-CB, 28 Oct 67, Subj: Project MOOSE Progress Report (U).
11. Cong Chung newspaper editorial, 19 Oct 67.
12. Memo (C), J. A. Calhoun (Pol Con) to MG Kerwin, 27 Oct 67, Subj: Downtown Hotels.
13. MFR (U), MACJ43-LM, 30 Dec 67, Subj: Downtown Hotels: DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS MAC342-MS, 23 Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
14. DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS, 29 Oct 66, Subj: Study of US Forces Messes in RVN.

# UNCLASSIFIED

15. Ltr (U), MACJ42-MS, 15 Dec 66, Subj: Conversion of NAF Messes to Field Ration Messes in RVN; DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS, 1 Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.; DF (U), ACofS J4 to CofS, 30 Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.
16. DF (U), CM&S Div to M&S Div, 19 Jan 68, Subj: Conversion of NAF Messes to Field Ration Messes.
17. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ13, 10 Jan 68 (as of 31 Dec 67), Subj: USO Participation.
18. Rpt (C), 1st Qtr 67, Chu Lai USO.
19. Fact Sheet (U), MACJ13, 10 Jan 68 (as of 31 Dec 67), Subj: Professional Entertainment and Command Military Touring Shows.
20. Report of Postal Operations (MACV Form 430), Jan - Dec 67 (U).
21. Ibid.
22. MACAS Log No. 10-600 (U), 9 Oct 67, Subj: Appointment of Committee; Minutes of Conference on In-Country Movement of Mail (U), MACAG-SP, 30 Oct 67.
23. Minutes of Conference on In-Country Movement of Mail (U), MACAG-SP, 7 Nov 67.
24. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151147Z Jul 67.
25. Memo (U), MACAG-SP, 19 Jun 67, Subj: Summary of Christmas Postal Conference-1967; Ltr (U), MACJ00, 15 Jan 68, Subj: Christmas Mail Program 1967 "SILVER STAR".
26. Ltr (U), ARC SEA to Dir of OPNS APO 96243, 29 Jun 67, Subj: Red Cross Shop Early VN 1967.
27. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 041052Z Jul 67, Subj: Explosives in Mail.
28. Msg (C), DA to COMUSMACV, 062024Z Aug 64, DA 981160, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 181708Z Jan 67, Subj: Involuntary Extension of PCS Tours (U); Msg (C), CNO to COMUSMACV, 011942Z Jan 67, Subj: Authority for Extension of Overseas Service Tours.

PAGE 1010 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

29. Msg (C), SECDEF to JCS, 201931Z Dec 66, DEF 1830, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 090405Z Jan 67, Subj: Tour Extensions for Key MACV Officers (U).
30. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 292337Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.
31. Msg (C), BG McGovern (ACofS J1) to BG Winton (JCS), 20 May 67 Ibid., 26 May 67.
32. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 161717Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.
33. Msg (C), AMEMB Manila to SECSTATE, 240409Z Jun 67, Subj: MACV Dependents at Clark; Msg (C), AMEMB Manila to CINCPAC, 260715Z Jun 67, Subj: MACV Housing.
34. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 121224Z Jul 67, Subj: Concurrent Travel Plan for Selected Key MACV Officers (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 210213Z Jul 67, Subj: Proposed Concurrent Travel Plan for Key MACV Officers (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 161151Z Aug 67, Subj: Tour Extension (U).
35. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to SA 1 CTZ, 250420Z Aug 67, Subj: Voluntary Extensions (U).
36. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 230418Z Sep 67, Subj: Concurrent Travel to Clark AFB (U); Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 262151Z Sep 67, Subj: Plan for Tour Extension for Selected Key MACV Officers (U).
37. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 290312Z Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.  
Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 021714Z Dec 67, Subj: Ibid.
38. Ltr (FOUO), DA to ACofS, J1, Subject Not stated with Incl 1, Extract portions of the Chief of Staff, Army, approved program plan.
39. Msg (FOUO), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 100253Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
40. MACV Dir 28-2, 23 Jan 67 (MACJ13), Subj: R&R Activities Out-of-Country.
41. Monthly Fact Sheet, (R&R Activity) MACJ13, Jan thru Dec 67.
42. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 141540Z Feb 67, Subj: R&R Guam.

# CONFIDENTIAL

43. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 120855Z Mar 67, Subj: Not Stated: Ltr (U), DAF, 28 May 67, Subj: Hawaii R&R; Msg (U), MAC to CINCPAC, 011557Z Jun 67, Subj: Reduced Fare West Coast to Honolulu for Wives joining Husbands on R&R Leave to Hawaii; Msg (U), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 120437Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (U), MAC to FMFPAC, 200744Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051126Z Dec 67, Subj: Hawaii R&R Participation.
44. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 251305Z Feb 67, Subj: Establishment of Australia as an R&R Site (C); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160317Z Mar 67, Subj: Survey Team Visit to Australia (C); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC 170520/ Apr 67, Subj: R&R Australia (C); Msg (FOUO), COMUSMACV to CINCPACREP Australia, 231308Z May 67, Subj: USO Facilities for use of R&R Troops in Australia; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 040958Z Jul 67, Subj: R&R to Australia; Msg (U), AMEMB Canberra 527 to CINCPAC, 030707Z Aug 67, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051445/ Apr 67, Subj: R&R to Australia; Msg (U), AMEMB Canberra to COMUSMACV, 150705Z Apr 67, Subj: R&R Australia; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to AMCONGEN, Sydney, Australia, 020302Z Oct 67, Subj: Not Stated.
45. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 2502545Z Aug 67, Subj: R&R Thailand Based Personnel (U); Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 3000272Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 030655Z Sep 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (S), COMUSMAC-THAI to CINCPAC, 190740Z Sep 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 092240Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid; Msg (S), CINCPACAF to 7AF, 152356Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
46. Msg (S), AMCONSUL Hong Kong to SECSTATE, 170954Z Feb 67, Subj: Hong Kong 5775; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Seoul, 010258Z Feb 67, Subj: Korean and Philippine Req for R&R to Hong Kong; Msg (S), AMEMB Manila to SECSTATE, 020400Z Mar 67, Subj: PHIL R&R Hong Kong; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Seoul, 110251Z Mar 67, Subj: Hong Kong R&R; Msg (S), AMEMB Seoul to SECSTATE, 210920Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051059Z Jul 67, Subj: Manila R&R (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to 13AF, 090217Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.
48. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to MAC, 041154Z Jun 67, Subj: Commercial Contract Aircraft for Manila R&R (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051059Z Jul 67, Subj: Manila R&R (U); Msg (C), 13 AF to CINCPACAF, 110612Z Sep 67, Subj: 13AF Support of Manila R&R Flights; Msg Flights (C), CINCPACAF to 13AF, 122141Z Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.
49. Msg (S), AMCONSUL Hong Kong 8031 to SECSTATE, 190843Z May 67, Subj: Not Stated; Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 26173 to AMEMB Bangkok, 161015Z May 67, Subj: Not Stated; Ltr (U): COMUSMACV (MACJ1) to Ambassador Bunker, 19 May 67, Subj: Increase of On-Ground Strength at Bangkok for R&R Purposes; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 201100Z May 67, Subj: R&R to Hong Kong (U); Embtel (C), AMEMB Bangkok 5-2365-B to AMEMB Saigon, 200725Z May 67, Subj: Not Stated.
50. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to COMUSKOREA, 230909Z Sep 67, Subj: USFK Environmental and Morale Program for US Troops Stationed in Southeast Asia; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 160459Z Oct 67, Subj: Survey of US Military Personnel (CS: MACJ1(OT)45), CINCPAC to COMUSKOREA, 201924Z Nov 67, Subj: Environmental and Morale Team Program (E&M).
51. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 230644Z Nov 67, Subj: R&R Transportation Costs for Royal Thai Forces Vietnam.
52. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 132133Z Oct 67, Subj: Reimbursement from Australia and New Zealand for R&R Transportation Costs (C); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 310101Z Aug 67, Subj: R&R Transportation Costs (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160249Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 151013Z Apr 67, Subj: Transportation for FWMAF R&R (U).
53. Fact Sheet, MACJ1, 9 Nov 67, Subj: R&R Activities Out-of-Country.

# UNCLASSIFIED

54. RVNR Historical Input (U), 1967.
55. Ltr (U), Gov Hanh to AMB Bunker, 2 Aug 67, Subj: Not Stated.
56. Memo (C), AMB Bunker to DEPAMB, 30 Aug 67, Subj: Establishment of the "Irregular Practices Committee."
57. Memo (C), DEP/EW to AMEMB, 29 Sep 67, Subj: Initial Report of the "Irregular Practices Committee."
58. Memo (C), AMB Bunker to DEPAMB, 19 Oct 67, Subj: Irregular Practices.
59. Ltr (U), AMB Bunker to Misister for Economy and Finance, RVN, 25 Oct 67, Subj: Not Stated.
60. Ltr (U), HQ AAFRES to RVNR Exchange, 23 Oct 67, Subj: Distinctive Marking of Exchange Merchandise.
61. RVNR Dir 75-3 (U), 26 Sep 67, Subj: Control of Imported Merchandise.
62. 2d Ind (RVNRP), 2 Dec 67, to Ltr (C), CG USARV to CO RVNR, 21 Nov 67, Subj: Irregular Practices Committee.
63. CMT #2 (SJA) (C), to DF (MACJ31) (C), dtd 13 Dec 67, Subj: Irregular Practices.
64. Ltr (U), US Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 to HQ USMACCH, 20 Nov 67, Subj: Historical Information, Request for.
65. Historical Report 1 Jan 67 - 1 Oct 67 (U), HQ 7AF (CH) Command History, 17 Nov 67, 1st Log Cmd Staff Chaplain.
66. Ltr (U), HQ 1st Air Cav Div (AV Det), 14 Nov 67, Subj: Command History.
67. Ltr (U), HQ USARHAC (AVCB-CH), 20 Aug 67, Subj: Command History.
68. Memo (U), MACVCH, 22 May 1968, Subj: Not Stated.
69. 1967 Annual Report ARC, SEASIA (U).

PAGE 1014 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

70. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; MACV Directive 27-2 (U), 5 Oct 67; MACV Directive 27-3 (U), 27 Oct 67; MACV Directive 22-1 (U), 4 Dec 66.
71. DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr CT67.
72. Embtel (C), Saigon 19902, 9 Mar 67, Subj: Court-Martial of Civilians in Vietnam; US Mission In Vietnam Press Release, 13 Mar 67; DF (S), MACJA, 4 May 67, Subj: Historical Report 1st Qtr CY67; DF (S), MACJA, 20 Jul 67, Subj: Historical Report 2nd Qtr CY68;
73. DF (S), MACJA, 4 May 67, Subj: Historical Report 1st Qtr CY67.
74. Ltr (U), Jim G Lucas to Rep. Basil L. Whitener, 28 Mar 67 (copy from Rep. Whitener to COMUSMACV).
75. DF (U), MACJA, 19 Oct 67, Subj: Historical Report 3d Qtr CY67; DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr Cy67.
76. DF (S), MACJA, 20 Jul 67, Subj: Historical Report 2d Qtr CY67; DF (U), MACJA, 19 Oct 67, Subj: Historical Report 3d Qtr CY67; Dir (U), DOD Directive No. 5515-8, 4 Dec 63; Dir (U), AR No. 27-28, 20 May 66.
77. Ibid.; DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr CY67; American Embassy Note 218 (U), 31 Mar 1967; GVN Note 1809 (U), 3 May 1967.
78. DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr CY67; Ltr (U), MACJA to Chairman Interministerial Real Estate Committee Saigon, 27 Dec 67, Subj: Ambassador Hotel and Tax Building (U).
79. DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr CY67, Memo (U), AMB Bunker to GEN Westmoreland, 28 Aug 67, Subj: Establishment of Irregular Practices Committee.
80. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ15, 8 Apr 67, Subj: Black-Market Activity, Marihuana and Narcotics Control.
81. Ibid.; DF (U), MACJA, 20 Jul 67, Subj: Historical Report 2d Qtr CY67; Fact Sheet (U), MACJ13, 24 Jan 68, Subj: Marihuana Use by US Forces

PAGE 1015 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

82. DF (C), MACJA, 26 Jan 68, Subj: Historical Report 4th Qtr CY67.
83. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 090250Z Nov 67, Subj: Improving the Image of ARVN Among the US Public (U).
84. MACOI-I Quarterly Historical Report (U), 20 Jan 68.
85. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to SECDEF, 120652Z Oct 67, Subj: Newsweek Article "Their Lions--Our Rabbits," 9 Oct Issue.
86. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to SECDEF, 160958Z Nov 67, Subj: UPI Breach of Embargo on Death of General Hochmuth; Msg (C), SECDEF to CINCPAC, 212352Z Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.
87. Msg (U), SECSTATE to AMEMB Vientiane, 300103Z Nov 67.
88. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to John W. Finney, 301142Z Nov 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CMC, 301140Z Nov 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CMC, 291155Z Nov 67.
89. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to OSD; 271151Z Dec 67.
90. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG USARV, 190206Z Oct 67.
91. DF (C), MACJ343, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Everybody count Survey Report (U); DF (C), MACJ343, 21 Nov 67, Subj: Press Witnessing Body Count (C); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 240158Z Nov 67, Subj: Press Witnessing and Examining Body Count Procedures (C).
92. Dailey News, (U), 9 Dec 67, Stan Carter, Staff Correspondent of the Los Angeles Daily News, Subj: Reporter on Scene Finds We Are Winning the War.
93. Info Notes No. 9 (U), Aug 67, Officers of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dept of State.
94. Dept of State Briefing Chart (C), as of 31 Dec 67, J211, Subj: Missing/Captured Personnel in SEASIA.
95. USMACV Intelligence Bulletin No. 7-67 (C), 1 Jul 67.

# ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

96. Booklet (C), ST67-043, Subj: VC policies for the Handling of US Prisoners, 18 May 67.
97. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB Beirut, 121744Z Nov 67; Msg (C), AMEMB Saigon to SECSTATE, 091100Z Feb 67, Subj: Publicity on US Personnel Released by VC/NVN.
98. Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 080640Z Apr 67, Subj: Treatment of US PWs in NVN.
99. Msg (C), SECSTATE 5741 to US Mission Geneva, 13 Jul 67, Subj: Mistreatment and murder of PWs Grammer and Frits (U).
100. Msg (C), CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 260359Z Oct 66, Subj: Blood Chits (U); Msg (S), CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, 250340Z Oct 66, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U); Msg (S), AMEMB Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 310530Z Mar 67, Subj: Reward Program for SEASIA; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071148Z Apr 67, Subj: Reward Program for SEASIA (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 060313Z Jun 67, Subj: Reward Program for Recovery/Return of Missing Personnel (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 021852Z Jun 67, Subj: Reward Program for Recovery and Return for Missing US personnel from Laos and NVN (C); Saigon Post, 16 Jul 67.
101. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 080425Z Jul 66, Subj: E&E Support (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPACAF, 190210Z Aug 66, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPACAF 190235Z Oct 66, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 070249Z Jul 67, Subj: SAFE Areas (U); Msg (S), CINCPACFLT to COMSEVENTHFLT, 150053Z Jul 67, Subj: Selected Areas for Evasion (U); Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 221952Z Sep 67, Subj: SAFE Areas (U).
102. DF (C), MACJ15 to MACJ12, 10 Jan 68, Subj: Year End Wrap-Up Report.
103. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 17740 to SECSTATE, 9 Feb 67, Subj: NVN Reply to ICRC Communication on Repatriation of Sic and Wounded (U).

# UNCLASSIFIED

104. Command History Program Monthly inputs (C), MACJ1, Jan-Jun 67; Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 16180, 22 Jan 67, Subj: Not Stated; Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 28005, 12 Jun 67, Subj: Repatriation of Sick and Wounded PWs (U).
105. Memo (C), COMUSMACV to Ambassador Bunker, MACPD, 18 Aug 67, Subj: Increasing Repatriation of NVA Prisoners (U).
106. Memo (C), COMUSMACV to Hon W. J. Porter, MACJA, 17 Jan 67, Subj: Detention Facilities in RVN (U).
107. Command History Program Monthly Inputs (C), MACJ1, Jan-Jul 67.
108. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 110252Z Jan 68, Subj: Vietnam PWs (U); DF (C), MACJ15 to MACJ12, 10 Jan 68, Subj: Year End Wrap-Up Report (U).
109. Command History Program Monthly Input (C), MACJ1, Aug 67.
110. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to NMCC, MACCOC3, 302215Z Aug 67, Subj: Not Stated; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 311001Z Aug 67, Subj: Security of Prisoners.
111. DF (C), MACJ15 to MACJ12, 10 Jan 68, Subj: Year End Wrap-Up Report.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. MACV Directive 380-8 (U), 13 Apr 67, Subj: Physical Security.
115. Study (C), CICV, 6 Jan 67, Subj: VC/NVA Attacks on Fixed Installations (U).
116. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 101212Z May 67, Subj: Employment of Tactical Troop Units for Installation Security (U).
117. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 121257Z Jun 67, Subj: Security of Installations (U).
118. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to III MAF and FFORCES, 210212Z Jul 67, Subj: Dispersal of Ammunition and Explosives (U).

PAGE 1018 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

119. Ltr (C), COMUSMACV to AMB Bunker, 11 May 67, Subj: Physical Security of the Saigon Electric Power Loop System (U).
120. Ibid.; Memo (U), MACJ222, 26 May 67, Subj: Ibid.
121. Ltr (C), MACCORDS, 20 Jul 67, Subj: Physical Security of the Provincial Electric Power Facilities (U).
122. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to DDR&E, 010205Z Jan 67, Subj: Anti-Intrusion Devices (U).
123. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to I FFORCEV, 161055Z Jul 67.
124. Memo (C), MACJ02, 17 Jul 67, Subj: Rocket Attacks (U).
125. MACV MONEVAL (C), Jul 67.
126. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 071430Z Aug 67, Subj: Rocket Attacks (U).
127. Booklet (S), MACJ342 to CINCPAC, Aug 67, Subj: Significant Problem Areas (U).
128. MACV MONEVAL (C), Aug 67.
129. Booklet (C), Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned No. 66, 10 Nov 67, Subj: Countermeasures for 102mm, 122mm and 140mm Rockets (U); MACV MONEVAL (C), Sep 67.
130. Msg (S), III MAF to COMUSMACV, 291252Z Aug 67.
131. Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 090520Z Sep 67, Subj: Rocket Defense Coordination (U).
132. MACV Intelligence Bulletin (S), Sep 67.
133. Briefing (S), Nha Trang Commanders' Conference, 24 Sep 67, Subj: Anti-Rocket Operations (U).
134. Msg (C), II FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 290500Z Sep 67.

# UNCLASSIFIED

135. Rpt (TS), MACVSA 1st Interim Report, 4 Oct 67.
136. Ltr (S), MACJ342 to CINCPAC, 5 Dec 67, Subj: Significant Problem Areas (U).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHAPTER XI

CONTINGENCY PLANS AND MACJ5 STUDIES

CONTINGENCY PLANS

---

REVIEW DATE: 06 1983  
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED BY: [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFY ON: [REDACTED]

PAGE 1021 OF 1340 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army by TAG per

830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: 04/1983

CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED BY: DA

DECLASSIFICATION: BY: [unclear] OF: [unclear]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1022 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Apply By TAG per

-----830624-----

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1023 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order See Army Br and per

830624

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

REVIEW DATE: ~~10/1/1981~~  
CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~NOFORN~~

---

MACJ5 STUDIES

(U) The office of the ACofS, J5, during 1967 prepared or made contribution to a number of special studies, both of immediate or long-range nature. The substance of the most important of these studies is summarized below.<sup>2</sup>

Control and Collection of Firearms (U)

(U) This study aimed to determine the ways and means of keeping the large assortment and quantity of firearms in the custody of RVN nationals and paramilitary units away from lawless elements after the cessation of hostilities. Addressed was an evaluation of GVN laws

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1024 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per

-----830624-----

~~SECRET~~

for controlling the possession of firearms by the populace and to recommend action directed at collecting and/or controlling the possession of firearms upon the cessation of hostilities. This study is included in the overall concept of Project CRYSTAL BALL.

Project CRYSTAL BALL (U)

(C) A study directed at identifying problem areas existing in RVN, the solution or reduction of which would have the greatest beneficial impact on the development of the individual South Vietnamese and the growth and stability of the nation. The study generated twenty problem areas within this context.

Project SHAPE-UP (U)

(S) This study was the Internal Security section of Project CRYSTAL BALL. It set out to: (1) determine the means for developing a better appreciation for law and order; (2) prescribe methods for reducing widespread banditry, and thievery; and (3) develop an effective internal security system together with the types of force required for that system.

Casualty Estimate Study (U)

(S) A study to provide an estimate of the probable increase in friendly casualties in RVN which could result in the event that the bombing of NVN was halted. Two conditions for the halt of bombing were considered: no bombing north of the DMZ and no bombing north of 20°N latitude.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Negotiations Posture Study (U)

(S) A study conducted to determine the optimum RVNAF force structure and posture desired at the onset of negotiations and to identify actions necessary to attain such a posture. In December this material was incorporated with a new study, 2-Year Program for Transfer of Responsibility to Vietnamese, for presentation to COMUSMACV in January 1968.

Project TWIST (U)

(TS) A study to determine the composition and number of US forces to be withdrawn in the event a token withdrawal from RVN is directed.

Strategic Study, Sep 67-Sep 68 (U)

(S) A comprehensive study to identify and examine possible strategy and tactical operations which the VC/NVA might use during the period Sep 67 through Sep 68. The study also advanced proposals which could counter and exploit the anticipated changes in the VC/NVA strategy.

JSOP FY 1970-1977 (U)

(C) Known previously as Annex J to the JSOP and now as Volume III (Vietnam). Staff recommendations provided rationale and developed a force structure for the RVNAF in support of US strategic objectives in the time frame 1970-1977. Forwarded to CINCPAC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Project 640 (U)

(U) This study explored the MACV Advisory and Military Assistance Resources to determine the requirement for the feasibility and desirability of (1) reestablishing a MAAG and/or (2) identifying changes in current organization and responsibilities of appropriate elements of the command in order to improve the provision, management, control, supervision, and effective use of critical US advisory and military assistance resources.

Study SOFT SOAP (U)

(TS) This study recommended limited operations in Cambodia of a limited scale in the military, psychological, and economic areas against VC/NVA forces in Cambodia. Concurrently, it developed a program for an expanded intelligence gathering capability in Cambodia.

Opportunities to Exploit Present Enemy Strategy (U)

(S) In respect to the area of PSYOP this study analyzed the current enemy strategy with a view to determining the effect to which it offers opportunities for friendly exploitation and gains incident to a supposed enemy annexation of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Also included within the study was the possibility of thwarting projected enemy offensives and designing friendly operations to take advantage of known boundaries and command relationships between major enemy tactical groups.

Alternative Strategic In-Country Courses of Action (U)

(S) This study analyzed US/FW/GVN strategy with a view towards formulation of alternative in-country strategic courses of action. Three

PAGE 1027 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

courses of action were studied: (1) the present course of massed US/ FW combat power to destroy VC/NVA main force units, neutralize enemy base areas so as to curtail VC/NVA strategic mobility, systematically destroy local guerrilla elements, and assist RVNAF with RD in national priority areas; (2) entice the enemy from his out-in-country sanctuaries (DMZ, Laos, Cambodia); (3) containment of the enemy outside RVN.

Project OVERLOOK (U)

(S) An in-house exercise to analyze enemy capabilities and possible courses of action in FY68 time frame based on the enemy's apparent capability to maneuver additional forces southward while keeping pressure on friendly forces in the northern I CTZ. Parameters for the play placed the exercise into the context of the then current real situation (May 1967). The exercise provided a fruitful forum for the expression of views on future operations and in analyzing the tactical and logistical implications of possible future actions.

Contingency Plan for a Territorial Security Police Force (S)

(S) J5 developed a contingency plan to organize an effective police force capable of providing security and maintaining GVN control in rural areas. The plan recommended that the National Police Field Force (NPF) be used as the basic structure for an expanded Rural Constabulary (RC) force in the event of the cessation of hostilities. The RC was to be placed under the administration and control of the Ministry of National Security in such a case.

(S) This plan was designed in broad conceptual terms. Converting the NPF into an expanded RC was seen as taking 3 1/4 years to effect. Accelerated conversion was considered possible if selected RF companies were converted to a NPF or RC base to fulfill the 70,000 man police force increase of the plan. Under this latter proposal 1 1/2 years was considered necessary for completion.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Project DRAG HUNT (U)

(TS) A politico-military study which developed a rationale for the ultimate purpose of putting US forces into Laos. Overt deployment of US forces into the Lao panhandle by late 1968 or early 1969 was the time frame and basic assumption of this study. Psychological, political, and military programs, together with appropriate scenarios, were developed.

Project CHOP STICK (U)

(TS) A study which explored the feasibility of the overt and/or covert purchase of Cambodian rice as an economic measure affecting Cambodia, NVN and the VC. It was judged feasible to reduce the amount of Cambodian rice available to the VC if the GVN relaxed restrictions on the entry of rice from Cambodia into RVN, where prices were higher. Thus the legitimate, overt sale of Cambodian rice in RVN, it was believed, would lead to reducing the amount of Cambodian rice available for purchase in Cambodia by the VC and subsequent smuggling into RVN by them.

PRACTICE NINE (U)

(TS) A study on the establishment of an Anti-Infiltration Barrier across RVN and eastern Laos to deter infiltration into RVN and eastern Laos. This study included the feasibility of internationalizing Route 9 and all or part of the forces supporting such an obstacle system.

(TS) Explored were the military and other advantages and disadvantages of such a system. Also, to increase overall effectiveness, a combined force under a single commander with a combined staff, supported by in-country resources was envisioned. The line was seen as a conventional obstacle in RVN and in Laos air delivered mines and sensing devices were to detect and impede personnel and vehicle infiltration.

PAGE 1029 OF 1340 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(TS) As a side issue, the effect on the construction of a barrier a cessation of the bombing of NVN would have was looked at. The conclusion drawn was that such an action would allow the emplacement of more SAMs near the DMZ and thus a greater likelihood of interference with barrier seeding plans. Continued bombing of NVN or at least an "extended battle area" was considered a necessity.

#### RVNAF Training Contribution to Nation Building (U)

(S) This study examined the inadequate preparation of RVNAF discharges to contribute to Nation Building. The study set out to determine the best training program to be provided by the RVNAF to train individuals in skills and trades which would contribute significantly to Nation Building upon an individual's discharge from the service and means by which such training programs could be implemented.

(C) The study concluded that the RVNAF had a limited capability for pre-discharge training in low skills. The main debilitating factor was the high illiteracy rate in RVN. Recommended was the use of the ROKF Training and National Development programs as a model. Also recommended was the establishment of central RVNAF discharge points so that efforts could be concentrated and thus more likely to be effective.

#### Identification of Major "Choke Points" Along Infiltration Routes into RVN (S)--Project 200 (U)

(S) This study looked at enemy infiltration routes into RVN with a view toward identifying major "choke points" that would need to be kept under constant surveillance in the event negotiations were commenced. Assuming fruitful negotiations, the study also addressed itself to the determination of control points necessary to verify Communist withdrawals from NVN. "Choke points" identified included those along infiltration routes: i.e., NVN into Laos, Laos into RVN, and through the DMZ into RVN. Fifty-one possible points were selected, twelve of which were considered as control points at which to verify possible


~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

VC/NVA withdrawals. This study was made an annex to Project 76 (U) (Military Implication of the Termination of Hostilities (TS)).

(C) A follow-on study was conducted on the size and organization of forces that would be needed to man the 12 control points, surveillance forces (border) and to provide support needed by these units.



~~TOP SECRET~~  
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~TOP SECRET~~

Project STEAM BATH (U)

(U) The STEAM BATH study was initiated in September 1966, and updating actions continued through 1967.

(TS) STEAM BATH analyzed the psychological, economic, political, and military factors affecting Cambodia with a view to determining US courses of action to eliminate VC/NVN sanctuaries and LOCs with Cambodia.

THIS PAGE REGRATED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By 143 per  
820624

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal of US/FW Forces in Accordance with the Provisions  
of the Manila Conference Communique--Project 88 (U)

(TS) This post-hostilities planning study determined the feasibility of the actions necessary and the timing thereof in order to effect a withdrawal within the six month time frame requirement of the communique. Areas explored were withdrawal of troops, equipments and supplies, residual rights, outside military and economic assistance required by RVN after US/FW forces are withdrawn and establishment of a JUSMAAG and continuation of MAP.

~~TOP SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

## Footnotes

1. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Memo (C), MACJ52  
Subj: Status of COMUSMACV/SEASLA/SFF Oplans as of 1 Aug  
67, 4 Aug 67. Interview of CDR Ankrum, USN, J52 section,  
MACV conducted by LCDR Frommer, USN, MHB, 20 Jan 68.
2. All MACJ5 studies summarized are derived from DF (TS-LD),  
MACJ5 to Chief MHB, Subj: Monthly Historical Report, 20 Feb 67,  
20 Mar 67, 20 Apr 67, 20 May 67, 20 Jun 67, 21 Jul 67, 21 Aug 67,  
20 Sep 67, 21 Oct 67, 20 Nov 67, 21 Dec 67, 20 Jan 68.

UNCLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE NOT USED

PAGE 1034 OF 1340 PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER XII

ECONOMIC AND FISCAL DEVELOPMENTS

COUNTRY MISSION STABILIZATION PROGRAM

Stabilization Efforts

(S) The year of 1966 was decisive in a number of aspects that directly affected economic developments in 1967. The increase in US forces from 184,000 to 389,000 during 1966 and the \$60 million per month peak in military construction effort brought a large and rapid inflow of US dollars which resulted in a potentially dangerous inflationary trend in the RVN economy. To offset this trend the US Mission set in motion a vigorous and ongoing anti-inflation program. By early 1967 the US Mission had undertaken four primary measures to deal with the inflation problem in Vietnam. These were a massive import program, an effort to improve the tax system, an effort to increase domestic production, and the imposition of spending restraints on both US agencies and the GVN.<sup>1</sup>

The Import Program

(S) The massive importation of consumer items financed by the US and the GVN, provided goods to match the increased consumer demands, and more important, provided substitutes for goods which could not be produced domestically because of full employment and the war's disruption of the GVN economy. The import program was well underway by early 1967. It was successful from the economic standpoint, despite some undesirable side effects such as the accretion of wealth by individuals making the least contribution to the war effort, the creation of luxury amidst war born squalor and disruption of some traditional social values.

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

## Improvement of the GVN Tax System

(S) The effort to increase GVN taxation met with limited success. Tax revenues were increased but not sufficiently to make a major contribution toward control of inflation. Moreover, it was not possible to bring about any major reform of the tax system or to tax heavily those elements of the population who were profiting most heavily from inflation. A major obstacle to be an effective direct taxation system was the absence of any overall GVN organization capable of assessing and collecting taxes or of enforcing tax laws.

## Increase of Domestic Production

(S) The effort of the US Mission to set up a framework for the Vietnamese to increase domestic production continued and held the most promise for long-term political and economic independence.

## Plaster Control

(S) During the 1966 Fall Economic Review by the Joint Economic Office of the US Embassy, the major concern was to examine the anticipated 1967 economic situation in light of increased US operations and the continuing threat of inflation. Problems addressed were the GVN budget, improvement of GVN taxation, and efforts to reduce plaster expenditures in Vietnam. COMUSMACV played a major role in helping to formulate solutions. During the 1966 Fall Review the US Mission deliberated on the adoption of a plaster budget ceiling for all US agencies in Vietnam. After considerable discussion, during which time COMUSMACV elaborated some objections, the US Ambassador recommended a 58 billion \$VN ceiling with 42 billion to be allocated to DOD activities. In November 1966 SECSTATE approved the 1967 plaster budget but at the same time recognized the possibility of future increases in MACV and USAID plaster allocations. Upward revisions were to be provided for in the event the 1967 Spring Economic Review should indicate such a need.<sup>2</sup>

(S) By 1967 the GVN had generated considerable foreign exchange dollars from the increased expenditures which attended the expansion of US operations in Vietnam. The US Mission desired that the GVN support FWMAF rather than permit these dollar credits to be spent in various countries. For example, out of the approximately \$225 million credits accumulated in 1966, the RVN spent only \$6.2 million

~~SECRET~~

in the US. In contrast, RVN expenditures of dollars in other countries during 1966 were as follows: \$112.4 million in Japan, \$27.2 million in Italy, \$16.4 million in Germany, and \$15.4 million in France. Other problems that annoyed the US Mission were the slowness of the GVN to suspend shady importers, a reluctance to return to the US those dollars and MPC that were confiscated from illegal money changers, and the wavering GVN control of the black-market.

(S) Early in 1967 US officials met with Premier Ky and Mr. Hanh, Governor of the GVN National Bank, in an effort to achieve accord on critical points of an economic stabilization agreement with the GVN. The US wanted the GVN to contribute eight billion \$VN for the support of FWMAF and to reduce the amount of dollar credits accumulated. Governor Hanh was willing to make only a token contribution of one billion \$VN for the support of military forces, the timing of which was to be dependent on tax receipts. Governor Hanh also wanted counterpart revenues to be allocated entirely to the military budget. The US position was to insist that, in line with commitments made to the US Congress, counterpart funds should be used to support both military and civil budgets. Governor Hanh's willingness to smooth over disagreements with words and not deeds was evident during these discussions. The GVN maintained its position and the prospects for a stabilization agreement incorporating US objectives remained poor during the year.<sup>3</sup>

(S) A US/GVN Joint Economic Committee was formed in April with Governor Hanh presiding and the US represented by the Director of USAID. The Committee established ten joint subcommittees each with a GVN chairman. The subcommittees were to form joint working groups to gather data and prepare analysis of their respective interest areas. Progress was slow, however, in August the Joint Economic Committee arrived at several agreements aimed at regularizing the commercial import program. Changes in personnel in the GVN and the uncertainties which attended the election in September made it difficult for the GVN to make important decisions concerning the economy and the budget.<sup>4</sup>

(C) On the US side a major effort was targeted at holding inflation to tolerable levels by restraining piaster spending. By early 1967 this effort was well under way and the program had contributed appreciably to containing the threat of inflation. This major program was of keen interest to COMUSMACV because of the large contribution that US military forces could make in the piaster expenditure reduction effort.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COMUSMACV was also interested in assuring that the reduced expenditures would not have the adverse effect of limiting the effectiveness of US operations in RVN. In April the US Embassy informed COMUSMACV that a number of pressing proposals had been received including manpower and wage increases which may cause piaster ceilings to be exceeded. The Embassy stated that the Economic Counselor had been asked to conduct an intensive review of additional spending proposals not included in the November program. COMUSMACV was asked to submit such proposals as US and RVN force augmentation, any envisioned or future new spending programs such as wage increases for US direct hire or contractor local personnel, and RVN ration augmentation programs. In his reply COMUSMACV called attention to the contingency provisions provided for in the November 1966 ceilings, but assured the Embassy that, based on experience during the preceding nine months and particularly during the 1st Qtr of 1967, he was confident that he could stay within the limits of the ceilings. Noting the new costing factors, COMUSMACV stated that projected added requirements could also be absorbed within the ceilings.<sup>5</sup>

(S) The important management and planning vehicle of the anti-inflation program was the series of semiannual (Spring and Fall) US Mission Economic Reviews. In May 1967 the Joint Embassy/USAID Economic Office completed the Spring Stabilization Review of anti-inflation policies of the GVN and the US for the balance of 1967. The review concluded that a monetary gap for 1967 of about 26 billion \$VN was foreseen with an increase in money supply of from 40 to 50 percent, depending on price levels and add-on programs. The review concluded that the inflationary pressures would tend to mount during the last half of the year, and that this pressure was about at the limit of safe tolerance. Threats of accelerated pressure from labor unrest and loss of confidence in the currency were noted. The review concluded that GVN civil and military services, fixed income groups and employees of US agencies would suffer losses in real income for which compensation could be made only with further inflation. The Spring Review revealed that success had been achieved in the piaster control program in that no US agency exceeded its piaster ceiling. The DOD was particularly successful in restraining piaster expenditures. In recognition of COMUSMACV's role in controlling piaster expenditures the US Mission Economic Counselor sent a letter to COMUSMACV. The letter noted the imposition of ceilings that were substantially less than the original 1966 MACV estimate requirements. The Counselor stated that despite these ceilings:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The performance of your Command since the implementation of these ceilings can only be regarded as one of the great victories which you have achieved here in Vietnam. Today there is hardly a person in Vietnam who is not aware of the need to limit expenditures and to promote the stability of the Vietnamese economy. The programs which your Command devised were successful not only in meeting our military objectives, but doing so with piaster expenditures which were below the piaster ceilings adopted. This accomplishment is factual demonstration of the awareness of all components of the United States Military Forces of the complex interrelationship between political, economic and military factors which exist here in Vietnam. The creation of this awareness alone represents a substantial accomplishment.<sup>6</sup>

(S) Addressing the broader problem of inflation in Vietnam, a joint message from Washington expressed reservations about the conclusions of the Spring Stabilization Review. The predicted rate of inflation was seen by Washington as dangerously high and it was questioned whether the late 1967 add-on programs could be absorbed within the piaster budget. Washington suggested that low priority items be identified in order to accomplish a reduction of spending which may be necessary. Also the possibility was raised of invoking the US/GVN Stabilization Agreement in order to elicit greater coordination and cooperation from the GVN. Following this message there was considerable discussion among COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and the JCS concerning piaster ceilings for the last half of 1967. COMUSMACV submitted a review of projected piaster expenditures during the last half of the year and SECDEF stated in August that firm ceilings should be established and provided guidance regarding the amounts.<sup>7</sup>

(C) A draft of the Fall Stabilization Review was received by MACV from the Joint Economic Office in mid-October. The review summarized the RVN economic situation during the last half of 1967 and made projections for CY68 to determine those spending restrictions necessary in the continuing effort to control inflation. The Economic Counselor pointed out to COMUSMACV that the recommended 42 billion SVN ceiling was austere but would permit a 40 percent increase in spending on CORDS and USAID programs and an approximate eight percent increase in MACV spending. The Office of the Economic Counselor and the MACV Comptroller worked in close coordination in October

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

prior to forwarding of the Review to Washington in mid-November. In discussions it developed that the costs associated with many programmed actions were conditional. For example, the Program 5 (force structure) contained the basic premise that certain military positions would be civilianized. However, the implementation of this program was uncertain and costs were difficult to quantify. The impact of new contract procedures on piaster expenditures could only be estimated. It was also evident that continued pressure was needed to insure the maximum utilization and effectiveness of local national employees since the civilian payroll constituted a major piaster cost. The Economic Counselor and MACV Comptroller agreed that the proposed ceilings ruled out provisions for contingencies and included only certainties and programmed changes in spending, and that it was expected that a mid-1968 Review would be accomplished to verify spending rates and make adjustments as necessary. In November COMUSMACV provided the Economic Counselor with comments on the Fall Stabilization Review and the Embassy forwarded the Review to Washington.<sup>8</sup>

## Force Levels and DOD Piaster Ceiling

(S) COMUSMACV recommended in late 1966 that personnel who were out of country, such as those on R&R should not be included in the force ceilings of Program 4. In a similar vein, the JCS thereafter recommended to SECDEF that the Program 4 force levels be modified to take into account those forces whose spending did not contribute to the piaster expenditure problem in Vietnam. The SECDEF did not approve this recommendation. At CINCPAC's request, COMUSMACV forwarded additional proposals concerning force levels and piaster savings. COMUSMACV explored the possibility of reducing piaster expenses by using military instead of civilian construction personnel. COMUSMACV pointed out, however, that the military construction units authorized under Program 4 would be hard-pressed to accomplish the construction programmed for 1967 because of increased combat support requirements. COMUSMACV noted that progress had been made in reducing contractor piaster expenditures by the elimination of a number of contractor work sites and the almost complete cessation of local procurement of construction materials. MACV stated that forces deployed to Vietnam that remained embarked, quartered, and supported on offshore vessels and craft should not be charged against the DOD piaster ceilings. In addition, MACV considered that personnel in hospitals and on R&R should not be included in strength ceilings that

~~SECRET~~

were associated with piaster expenditures. In summary, COMUSMACV again recommended that Program 4 ceilings be increased to accommodate those forces that did not affect piaster spending in Vietnam.<sup>9</sup>

(S) In February CINCPAC noted the successes achieved by COMUSMACV in reducing piaster expenditures for construction, operation, and maintenance and suggested that by repricing Program 4 under the reduced piaster expenditure rates the new Program 5 force levels could be accommodated within the 42 billion SVN ceiling. CINCPAC also urged that the overall Program 4 strength authorization be increased by approximately 13,000 spaces based on offshore supported forces and non-effective troops assigned in Vietnam. CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV on these proposals and suggested that attention be directed to possible force requirements in excess of Program 4 and additional piaster expenditure requirements. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC discussed these problems in considerable detail during the early months of 1967 and COMUSMACV provided additional justification and data.<sup>10</sup>

(S) In March COMUSMACV received instructions originated by OSD to provide a detailed capabilities assessment, including force lists and justification of the Program 5 two and one-third division force package, which he had proposed. MACV Comptroller initiated further action to assess the impact of Program 5 on the Vietnamese economy. Meanwhile, action was taken by SECDEF to approve an increase of 3,500 Marine spaces in Program 4 troop ceilings. This increase was based on the number of Marine personnel out of country. At CINCPAC's request additional data was submitted to support a proposal that the same principle be applied to the forces of the other Services in Vietnam and that an additional 21,405 spaces be approved under Program 4 ceilings. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV considered that the piaster expenditure ceiling was adequate to accommodate these extra spaces. In midyear interest shifted from these efforts to gain approval for additional spaces to the general planning for Program 5.<sup>11</sup>

(S) In August the SECDEF tentatively approved the troop increases of Program 5 which had been requested by COMUSMACV. MACV Comptroller prepared piaster expenditure projections for the Program 5 force augmentation. These piaster expenditure projections were presented at the Force Development and Capabilities Conference which was held at CINCPAC between 20 August and 7 September. The Fall Stabilization Review which was submitted to Washington in November retained the 42 billion SVN ceiling. COMUSMACV pointed out that possible additional piasters required by the increased force structure

PAGE 1041 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

was considered in the Fall Review as a contingency which exceeded the recommended ceiling. However, in discussions with the Joint Economic Office agreement was reached to disregard this contingency for the time and to reexamine the situation and requirements during the mid-1968 Economic Review.<sup>12</sup>

## DOD Activities Cost Index

(U) The DOD Activities Cost Index was established in July 1966 at the direction of the SECDEF and the JCS. Guidelines for the preparation of the Index were furnished in August. The Index was established in order to keep the SECDEF informed of the impact of rising wages and prices on the piaster cost of DOD activities in Vietnam.<sup>13</sup>

(C) Early in 1967 MACV became aware of limitations in the DOD Activities Cost Index and began to study possible changes in the items included. It was desired that possible revisions should be made without disrupting the continuity of the Index. In March COMUSMACV informed the component commanders that the DOD Activities Cost Index contained many items that were no longer purchased locally, thus some revision was required. The components were requested to furnish information required by MACV to develop an Index list composed of current and valid items with weighted factors. By May the MACV Comptroller had completed a detailed assessment of the Index, including the applicability of items included and the validity of weighting factors. The Comptroller concluded that due to the effectiveness of the Piaster Reduction Program such items as labor and contract services had become the major piaster expenditure items in Vietnam. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC of these findings and stated that the prices and future trends in these items could be followed without the DOD Activities Cost Index and that the Index should be eliminated. CINCPAC replied with the suggestion that the Index be retained but modified to reflect the changed buying habits and that sampling procedures be simplified. COMUSMACV thereafter furnished additional information and rationale supporting the view that the DOD Index should be abolished rather than revised. The basis of this recommendation were: (1) the Index had become dominated by payroll items; (2) there was a failure to establish a relationship between DOD purchasing and local prices; (3) there was a lack of discernible usefulness for the Index; and (4) there was a lack of justification for the workload associated with the Index. CINCPAC concurred in this recommendation and forwarded it to JCS with the

~~SECRET~~

suggestion that the USAID/Vietnam Retail Price Index, supplemented by the monthly analysis of piaster expenditures, could serve as an acceptable substitute for the Index.<sup>14</sup>

(C) OSD reviewed MACV's study and recommendation and concluded that the DOD Activities Cost Index was sufficiently useful to warrant its continuation. OSD considered that the Index could be revised to continue to measure the impact of DOD expenditures on the RVN economy and that properly revised the Index could be used to forecast piaster expenditures and establish future ceilings. In addition, OSD directed that detailed expenditure data be gathered to facilitate a revision of the Index. The additional data requested by OSD included a full record of expenditures by commodity or service for a sample time period. These data were requested by item, component element including contractors, and by geographic or CTZ area. In order to follow through on this requirement COMUSMACV informed the component commanders and other relevant agencies of the additional data required. At the end of the year MACV Comptroller was engaged in consolidating and summarizing data submitted by the components in preparation for completing the revision of the Index.<sup>15</sup>

(U) During the 1st Qtr of 1967 the DOD Activities of Cost Index rose from 118.4 to 120.3. This 1.9 percent increase was attributed to increases in wages for permanent local hire. During the last half of 1967 the Index rose as follows: (15 May 1966 as the base of 100)

<u>15 Jun</u>	<u>15 Jul</u>	<u>15 Aug</u>	<u>15 Sep</u>	<u>15 Oct</u>	<u>15 Nov</u>	<u>15 Dec</u>
123.7	123.6	123.9	124.0	129.1	136.3	139.1

The October rise of 5.1 percent was the largest monthly upswing since the inception of the Index. The primary cause of the rise was the increase in wages which followed the 13 percent wage adjustment granted Vietnamese employees on 10 September. The sharp November rise was a further reflection of wage increases and increases in truck transportation.<sup>16</sup>

#### Change in Piaster Exchange Rate

(S) A series of letters was exchanged between the American Ambassador and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam in August and September. A portion of this correspondence addressed the problem of

PAGE 1043 OF 1340 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

establishing a uniform, effective piaster exchange rate, and abolishing the discriminatory rate for US official purchases of piasters from the GVN for the support of the operations of FWF. Included in this correspondence was an agreement by the GVN to grant a subsidy of 38\$VN to the US \$1.00.<sup>17</sup>

(C) On 11 October the US Mission Economic Counselor informed MACV Comptroller that, in accordance with GVN Decree Law 035/SLU of 29 August 1967, the effective rate of exchange for purchase of official use piasters was changed from \$1.00:80\$VN to \$1.00:118\$VN effective 1 October 1967. COMUSMACV informed all subordinate commands and agencies of this development. Meanwhile, the MACV Comptroller considered the longer term impact of this change on DOD spending in Vietnam. The Comptroller conceded that dollar savings may result from the change; however, an increase in piaster spending from price reactions may also be a problem. It was pointed out that there were significant potential problems in the matter of contracts written in dollar terms and that already crowded piaster ceilings may be affected along with the related problems of inflation and force ceilings.<sup>18</sup>

(C) Of immediate concern, and the subject of a number of messages exchanged during October, was the problem of reevaluation of piasters held by military disbursing officers at the time that the new rate went into effect. A joint message, concurred in by OSD, DA, CNO, and CSAF was prepared by SECSTATE. This message provided guidance on fiscal procedures to effect the adjustments without recording a loss in official exchange accounts.<sup>19</sup>

(C) In November CG USARV expressed concern about contracts, the terms of which were expressed in US dollars with a clause which provided for payment in \$VN based on the rate of exchange recognized by the USG at the time of payment. USARV pointed out that to automatically increase the amount of piasters paid as a result of the GVN decree providing for the 38\$VN subsidy of official US piaster purchases would increase the cost to the USG and provide an unintended windfall to a select group of contractors and lessors. USARV further stated that it was not the intent of the subsidy to devalue the piaster and that it was not in the best interest of either the USG or the GVN to make increased piaster payments. USARV requested an advance decision on the problem from Washington.<sup>20</sup>

(C) The problem of the effect of the new effective rate of exchange on contracts in Vietnam was taken up by the MACV Comptroller in

~~SECRET~~

coordination with the US Mission Economic Counselor. After discussions with MACV Comptroller the Economic Counselor stated on 12 December that the purpose of the consolidated exchange rate implemented by the GVN was to grant relief to the USG on dollar costs incurred in the war effort and that such action had no effect on prices of the Vietnamese economy and should in no way be allowed as a premise in argumentation for renegotiation of existing piaster contracts. The Mission Economic Counselor stated that all piaster contracts, including those stated in dollars with clauses for piaster payments, should continue to be paid on the basis of the amount of piasters in which they were negotiated. The Counselor added that in order to avoid future confusion, piaster contracts should be stated in piasters only and that dollar equivalents or exchange rates should not be cited in piaster contracts.<sup>21</sup>

(C) These views were consistent with those of the MACV Comptroller; however, differences existed between the Services in the problem of writing contracts with local Vietnamese vendors. COMUSMACV pointed out to CINCPAC the essential elements of two approaches being taken. US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USARPAV) and the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC) considered that contracts in dollars payable in piasters were valid with payment made in piasters at the rate of exchange recognized by the USG. NAVFORV and 7AF tended to follow the method of stating the amount of the contract in piasters only. COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC assist in obtaining an interpretation from higher headquarters in order to further the MACV Comptroller's effort to establish uniform procedures to be used by all components in writing contracts with local vendors.<sup>22</sup>

(S) On 30 December the US Embassy informed SECSTATE of these questions concerning the number of piasters to be paid to contractors whose contracts are denominated in dollars for payment in piasters at the exchange rate officially recognized by the USG. The Embassy stated that the Embassy USAID Joint Economic Office position was that the 80:1 equivalent should continue to be paid on existing contracts. The Embassy stated that the official exchange rate recognized by the USG was 80:1 and that it was not the intent of the GVN subsidy provisions to increase piaster expenditures. The SECSTATE concurred in the view that contracts denominated in dollars for piaster payments should be paid at the rate of 80:1 and the special GVN subsidy should not result in a subsidy to individual contractors. The State Department stated that fully documented piaster costs should be paid without reference to exchange rates.<sup>23</sup>

~~SECRET~~

# SECRET

## MACV PIASTER EXPENDITURE REDUCTION PROGRAM

### General

(S) Early in 1967 MACV Comptroller reviewed the accomplishments of the MACV Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program during the last half of 1966 and the prospects of the program during 1967. This review showed that the program had been extremely successful and highlighted aspects of the piaster reduction effort which were to take on new dimensions and vitality during 1967. An essential part of this review process was the Midyear Review Conference which was held on 30 January. The Comptrollers of the component commands, III MAF and the MACV Construction Directorate presented summaries of their programs including solutions to various problems encountered. MACV Comptroller published the results of this review conference as a brochure entitled "Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program--Midyear Review--FY 1967."

(C) With the accumulation of piaster expenditure data MACV Comptroller continued analysis which resulted in a revision of basic piaster expenditures costing factors. Using these revised factors, the original Program 4 force package, which had been costed at the October 1966 capabilities conference, could be recosted with the substantial reduction of 5.8 billion SVN. These new cost factors were subsequently used to determine the piaster impact on '68 force requirements.

(C) Command interest in the piaster reduction program remained high and in January the Mission Council was briefed on the MACV piaster reduction program. The briefing stressed measures being taken in the two areas of personal and official spending. To reduce personal spending the following efforts were described: (1) increased on-post recreational facilities; (2) indoctrination of new personnel; (3) improvement of PX stocks; (4) expansion of the R&R program; (5) new savings programs; and (6) increased emphasis on pay allotments. Measures described to the Mission Council on efforts to reduce official spending were: the adoption of austere construction design; decrease in leased billets in urban areas; and a reduction of locally purchased commodities to nine items, including perishable foods. Following the briefing the US Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the great effort made by COMUSMACV to abide by the

# CONFIDENTIAL

November 1966 plaster ceilings. The Economic Counselor also commented favorably on achievements made by COMUSMACV in the face of rising costs and increased troop strengths. The Counselor noted that the resolute approach to plaster reduction that had been taken by MACV constituted one of the most important elements in the overall economic policy for Vietnam.<sup>24</sup>

(U) The Economic Counselor also suggested to COMUSMACV that an economic briefing of top officers of the MACV staff and field commanders by Embassy officials would be beneficial in revealing how the ongoing military efforts concerning the plaster budget contributed to the overall economic program in Vietnam. COMUSMACV agreed that such briefings would be timely and appropriate. Arrangements were made and during the first months of the year economic policy briefings were presented to approximately 200 key staff personnel of MACV and the subordinate commands.<sup>25</sup>

(U) For the purposes of control and administration the MACV plaster expenditure reduction program was divided into the following three major categories: (1) operation and maintenance and other expenditures; (2) construction expenditures; and (3) personal expenditures:

1) Operation and maintenance and other expenditures included official and quasi-official expenditures for goods and services. In order to reduce expenditures in-country procurement was restricted to nine authorized items including brick and clay products, rock, sand, gravel, laterite, fresh fruit and vegetables, bakery products, ice, potable water, and industrial bottled gas. Other reduction efforts included the establishment of single service procurement, providing materials directly to local contractors, the acquisition of ice machines, establishment of laundry units and curtailment of local hiring.

2) Construction expenditures included those made for goods and services necessary to the construction effort. Actions similar to those noted above were taken to reduce plaster expenditures for construction. In addition, standards of construction were reviewed to assure austerity. Other effective actions taken were to develop an in-house capability for rock crushing and operation of asphalt plants.

3) The personal plaster expenditure part of the MACV program was not readily subject to regulatory type of controls. In February MACV Comptroller initiated a project to develop a briefing to be given to all incoming personnel at the Koepler Compound. The

# UNCLASSIFIED

purpose of the briefing was to inform the new arrivals of the local economic situation, and to emphasize the importance of the individual's role in the success of MACV's piaster expenditure reduction program. This continuing series of briefings began in March and was well received and assisted in furthering the MACV command emphasis on reducing individual spending. Personnel were solicited to voluntarily reduce their piaster expenditures, encouraged to save their money, and encouraged to spend only MPC. Lucrative savings programs were in effect, an attractive R&R program expanded, and the PXs were increasingly well stocked to draw money away from the local market.

(U) In order to further command emphasis on the importance of reducing and controlling the impact of US forces on Vietnamese society, particularly in economic aspects, COMUSMACV forwarded a letter to the component commanders in February. COMUSMACV noted that the excellent programs and studies being carried out by the component commands revealed that no simple or centrally controlled solution was possible to overcome the growing problem of US troop impact. Commanders in Vietnam were again reminded of their heavy and all-encompassing responsibility in these matters beyond pure military effectiveness. The cooperative exchange of ideas and responsiveness of the component commanders was exemplified in a letter forwarded by USARV which included the results of a survey conducted by a battalion commander in Vietnam. The findings of the survey were very useful in the identification of areas which needed added attention and emphasis in furthering the piaster expenditure reduction program. (see Figure XII-I entitled "The GI Dollar").

(U) In April COMUSMACV advised the Mission Council that military forces in Vietnam had bettered his goal of \$20 personal spending on the economy of each individual per month, and that a new goal of \$10 per month per individual was established. At the June Commanders' Conference COMUSMACV noted that many individuals were already below the new \$10 goal but that there were still some big spenders in and near Saigon and other populated areas. COMUSMACV stated that moving out of Saigon would assist in achieving the new expenditure goal and reduce the pressure of US military presence. The Economic Counselor of the US Embassy took cognizance of the MACV piaster expenditure reduction efforts in a letter addressed to the SECDEF. The Economic Counselor commended GEN Westmoreland and his command for vigorously implementing the program to restrain piaster spending by US military personnel in Vietnam, and for thus contributing in a significant manner to the relative price stability that had been maintained since mid-1966.<sup>26</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

## THE GI DOLLAR

WHERE IT GOES




Figure XII-1

~~SECRET~~

(U) COMUSMACV continued to monitor personal piaster spending as in the midyear period it appeared that the expenditure trend was on the upswing. In August COMUSMACV informed the component commanders that little progress had been made in achieving the command-wide goal of \$10 per individual per month as established in April. It was noted that individual spending in July was higher than spending in June and that it was imperative to encourage reduced personal spending.<sup>27</sup>

(S) At the suggestion of CINCPAC a conference was held in Washington between 2 and 6 October to discuss piaster reduction and related matters. It was concluded at the conference that the upward trend in piaster expenditures was a reflection of the support required for an expanded force level coupled with the fact that areas for further reductions were increasingly difficult to find.<sup>28</sup>

(U) Toward the end of the year MACV Comptroller was engaged in planning for a piaster expenditure ceiling for CY68. By November an agreement had been reached between representatives of the Comptroller's office and the Joint Economic Office to set the ceiling at the same level as that of 1967. MACV Comptroller considered that this ceiling could be met unless certain contingencies occurred. These contingencies were concerned with payroll costs and uncertainties in dollar contract conversions.<sup>29</sup>

(S) The success of COMUSMACV's piaster expenditures reduction program was evident in performance data for the year in 1967. In personal spending the per capita piaster spending in the command during the July to September quarter averaged \$18.41 with a low during August of \$17.63 per person. During the last quarter of the year personal spending averaged \$17.07 per month with a low during December of \$15.62 per person. During the last quarter procedures were devised to separate military and civilian expenditure data. The average per capita piaster expenditures for military personnel during the last quarter was \$13.91 and the average per capita civilian expenditure was \$230.57. Official expenditures for the period from January to March were 8.53 billion \$VN which was 1.97 billion \$VN below the ceiling for the quarter. Significant reductions in personal spending contributed to this low expenditure level, despite some increases in operation, maintenance, and construction spending. Total piaster spending during the 3d Qtr rose to 8.9 billion \$VN, which was slightly higher than the average of 8.47 billion \$VN for the first half of the year. The total quarterly expenditure was 8.68 billion \$VN, which was up slightly from the average of 8.621 billion \$VN for the first

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

three quarters. The total piaster expenditures for the year was 34, 539 billion \$VN which was some 7. 461 billion \$VN below the 42 billion \$VN ceiling set by the Department of Defense. <sup>30</sup>

#### Piaster Expenditure Control Working Group

(U) The Piaster Expenditure Control Working Group (PECWG) was established in September 1966 under the chairmanship of MACV Comptroller. Composed of fiscal officers from the staff sections of MACV the PECWG met periodically to seek ways and means of reducing piaster expenditures and to assist in formulating expenditure allocations to the component commanders. As an outgrowth of the PECWG meetings and activities, COMUSMACV informed the component commanders in August that the MACV Comptroller would host a two-day Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program Workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to consider the further conduct of the piaster reduction effort to achieve per capita expenditure goals; to consider new developments in the determination of piaster ceilings; and to consider changes in expenditure reporting criteria. Component commanders were asked to send representatives from major elements, particularly those located in high spending urban areas. The workshop was held on 7-8 September. The representatives at the workshop focused on the two primary problems of reporting procedures and measures to counter the increase since midyear of total piaster spending. During the workshop it was recommended that several studies be made concerning piaster outflow and personal piaster spending habits; overtime pay of VN employees; the piaster spending of TDY personnel; the expenditure of piasters by those personnel living on the economy; and the separation of statistics on military and civilian personnel as they apply to COMUSMACV's per capita expenditure goal of \$10.00 each month per individual. <sup>31</sup>

#### Piaster Expenditures in Regional Exchanges

(U) In January CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF in coordination with COMUSMACV established the Vietnam Regional Exchange Council and granted to MACV the responsibility for command surveillance of the exchange activities in Vietnam. In August COMUSMACV reiterated

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

the need to further curtail personal piaster spending and requested that all possible expenditures made through such US operated facilities such as exchanges and messes be made in MPC. COMUSMACV noted that piaster sales in exchange barber shops and gift concessionaires totalled .38 billion \$VN each year, and suggested that methods be adopted which would permit the use of MPC for these activities. The reply made by USARV noted that since the great part of the cost of haircuts was returned to the barbers in the form of wages, conversion of the medium of exchange of the barber shops would not greatly affect the amount of MPC dollars converted to piasters. Regarding the concessionaire gift shops operated in conjunction with the exchanges, USARV stated that since they sold goods at a lower price than that of the local economy, the effect was to reduce the total amount of piasters spent by military personnel. USARV also pointed out that if MPC were used by the concessions the conversion rate required would be \$1.00:80\$VN. This would result in a higher cost to the customer. USARV recommended that if the Vietnam Regional Exchange rate could be changed to the \$1.00:118\$VN accommodation ratio than the barber and gift shops could convert to the use of MPC.<sup>32</sup>

## Personal Piaster Spending Habits Survey

(U) During the September workshop it was determined that a personal piaster spending habits survey would be initiated throughout Vietnam. Subsequently, questionnaires were distributed to the component commands for completion by a random selection of military personnel and DOD civilians. The questionnaires aimed at making a determination of how personal piasters were being spent so that efforts to decrease piaster spending could be better directed. The results of this survey were analyzed and it was determined that a total of 24,886 personnel were surveyed, of which 24,113 were military and 773 were civilians. The military included a cross-section of personnel by grade and service. The civilian included 567 DOD civilians many of whom were provided quarters and 206 employees of RMK-BRJ who were not provided quarters. The results of the survey were as follows:

# UNCLASSIFIED

## AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURES

<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>	
Laundry (maid)	462\$VN	Quarters	9,599\$VN
Recreation	353	Meals	3,282
Laundry (commercial)	250	Recreation	1,844
Souvenirs	209	Laundry (maid)	1,431
Meals	194	Transportation	769
Quarters	167	Souvenirs	693
Barber Shop	138	Clothes	369
Transportation	106	Barber Shop	223
Clothes	72	Laundry (commercial)	178
Civic Action	33	Civic Action	163
Other	106	Other	529
TOTAL:	2,090\$VN	TOTAL:	19,080\$VN

Per Capita		Per Capita	
Dollar Equivalent	\$17.71	Dollar Equivalent	\$161.70

Overall average expenditures: \$22.17

Average military expenditures by corps area:

I Corps	\$ 6.62	III Corps	\$15.45
II Corps	\$17.36	IV Corps	\$32.41

Capital Military District: \$37.02

The military expenditures were highest for laundry (maid) service with recreation, commercial laundry, and souvenirs, following in that order. By far the most outstanding expenditure for civilians was for quarters with meals, recreation and laundry (maid) following.<sup>33</sup>

### Comptroller Recommended Piaster Reduction Programs

(U) In August, prior to the PECWG workshop, MACV Comptroller had made a preliminary survey of the volume of TDY assignments to the Saigon area. An average of 5,000 personnel were assigned in the Saigon area during the preceding three-month period. Thirteen percent of this TDY traffic was from out of country. These TDY visits continued to be a matter of concern to MACV as they increased the

# UNCLASSIFIED

expenditure of piasters. During the Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program Workshop in September it was decided to conduct a study in greater detail of the extent of TDY assignments and the affect of TDY spending on the piaster reduction program. It was determined that approximately 5,880 persons in-country were on TDY status on a single day. The decision was made to attempt to reduce this number, shorten the length of TDY, and to provide government quarters and messing. During the month of October the weekly average of personnel on TDY to RVN from out of country was 6,300. Component and uni-Service commanders were directed to take action to reduce in-country TDY to the minimum and to make use of government mess and billeting facilities.

(U) By November participation in Uniformed Services Savings Deposits Program had improved, increased use was being made of the Military Banking Facilities, current and planned USO and Red Cross Clubmobile activities, Vietnam Regional Exchange activities, and the expanded R&R program.<sup>34</sup>

(U) Actions were underway during November to convert sales from piasters to MPC at PX barber shops, gift stores, and Stars and Stripes newsstands. Action was also being pressed to establish larger numbers of quartermaster type laundries, and billeting for TDY personnel and preclude excessive piaster payments on the economy.<sup>35</sup>

## DOD Contractor Piaster Expenditures

(U) In a letter to component commanders on 1 December COMUSMACV emphasized the need for restraint in piaster spending on the part of all DOD and related personnel. He pointed out that while considerable effort had been directed toward the reduction of piaster spending by military personnel, there had been only passive interest in the spending of DOD sponsored contractor civilians. The letter directed that a concerted program aimed at reducing the piaster spending of contractor personnel be initiated.<sup>36</sup>

~~SECRET~~

WAGE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM

General

(S) The continued lack of uniformity in wages between employees of the US civilian and military agencies was the subject of correspondence between COMUSMACV and DEPAMB Porter during the month of January 1967. COMUSMACV pointed out major differences in the compensation plans and included a detailed analysis of many jobs which showed that the civilian agencies were paying up to 50 percent more to personnel performing similar or like tasks. In an effort to alleviate such differences, the Embassy was requested to participate in the US military agencies' annual wage survey in February and subsequently to coordinate the activities of an Ad Hoc US Mission Compensation Plan and Policy Committee. This committee would be charged with developing a total compensation plan to include joint classification standards, joint schedule of benefits and joint wage schedules and policies for common application by all elements of the US sector.

Local National Wage

(S) The annual Local National wage survey commenced during February under the supervision of the component military services, together with the assistance of representatives from US civilian agencies. The survey required approximately 30 days. The results were utilized to determine that a 29 percent Local National payroll increase for US forces personnel would be required to place the US forces on a parity with the private sector.

(S) In May COMUSMACV was briefed in detail concerning the results of the annual Local National wage survey which was completed in March and which indicated that the wages of the Vietnamese private sector exceeded DOD Agencies' Vietnamese Wage schedules to the extent that a 29 percent payroll increase was required to adjust wages to the levels pertaining in the private sector if implemented immediately. The following recommendations were made to and accepted by COMUSMACV: (1) that a proposed wage adjustment be approved for implementation only after purification of the classification systems of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the US forces and their contractors has been completed (on or about 1 August 1967); (2) that the Mission Council be urged to apply no wage adjustment to the US Civilian Agencies until those agencies have taken appropriate action to achieve uniformity with the US forces, and (3) that the Ambassador urge the GVN to utilize this period of adjustment to establish wage, rent, and/or price controls within the private sector in order that overall economic stabilization might be more fully realized.

(S) On 2 September 1967 Ambassador Bunker approved the wage adjustment proposed by the military sector for their Vietnamese employees. The new wage schedules were effective 10 September 1967. COMUSMACV on 15 September 1967 announced that implementation of the new wage schedules would be limited to those employees who were correctly classified at US forces current wage rates. In a letter dated 10 September 1967, to all MACV elements, COMUSMACV restated his position on uniformity and standard wage practices applicable to Vietnamese employees. He stated also, that this headquarters would monitor adherence to the standards outlined in MACV Directive 690-9, dated 7 March 1967, Subject: Uniformity in Local National Civilian Personnel Administration. Furthermore, the wage and classification programs of contractors would be monitored on the same basis as those of direct hire and non-appropriated fund activities.

## GVN BUDGET, AUDIT AND DISBURSING ACTIVITIES

### GVN Budgetary Actions

(U) During the year substantial progress was made in numerous areas of interest to COMUSMACV in the advisory effort. Some of the more significant budgetary actions that were begun and/or completed during the year were the following:

1) On 31 January 1967, on COMUSMACV advice, Prime Minister Ky issued a decree, retroactive to 1 January 1967, which authorized a Popular Force pay raise. It raised base salaries from 1,820\$VN to 2,200\$VN in the southern sectors of Vietnam and 2,400\$VN in the northern sectors.

~~SECRET~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

2) The GVN issued an edict on 7 February 1967 which authorized the payment of a Tet bonus to all GVN military and civil service personnel. The estimated cost of this bonus, which was not repayable by the recipients, was 700 million \$VN; joint support funds would not be used in this program.

3) On 21 February 1967, the GVN reinstated a Regular Force reenlistment bonus system which had previously been cancelled even though sufficient funds had been programmed in the CY67 GVN Defense Budget.

4) A revision to the CY66 Project Agreement between the GVN and the US was signed on 25 February. This revision added 1.5 billion \$VN in joint support funds to the CY66 GVN Defense Budget to compensate for a funding deficiency brought about by the June 1966 GVN pay raise.

5) The original Project Agreement pertaining to the 1967 Defense Budget which stipulated the manner in which the GVN Defense Budget would be executed, including the use of joint support funds, was signed on 6 April 1967.

6) On 19 April 1967 the GVN Director General for Finance and Audit informed the Advisory Division of a new procedure through which a local fund would be made available to local Post Engineers to enable accomplishment of new construction and major rehabilitation projects of less than 2.0 million \$VN. With this authority, construction contracts could be approved at local level without need of being forwarded to the Central level for processing.

7) On 17 May 1967 a decree was signed by Premier Ky which authorized a rice allowance of 200\$VN for heads of families for RVNAF and DOD civilians. This measure provided 200\$VN per month to dependents of Regular and Regional Forces, but not to dependents of the Popular Forces.

8) On 2 June 1967 US Budget Project Officers (BPO) were furnished with copies of the procedural instructions to be used by the GVN BPOs and were requested to participate actively with their counterpart BPOs in developing the GVN Defense Budget submission.

9) On 7 June it was recommended that the GVN Director General for Finance and Audit allocate sufficient per diem funds to pay for Revolutionary Development Mobile Training Teams performing TDY.

# UNCLASSIFIED

10) On 10 July 1967 the Mission Council-approved guidelines for preparation of the CY68 GVN Defense Budget were forwarded to the Director General for Finance and Audit (DGFA), Ministry of National Defense, GVN.

11) On 24 August 1967 the MACV Budget Advisory Committee was requested to approve the reprogramming of 350 million \$VN joint support credits within Chapter 12 (Quartermaster). Based on a recommendation from USARV, on 21 September 1967, 319 million \$VN was withdrawn as excess. Ten million \$VN joint support credits were approved for use in an experimental farming project and 21 million \$VN was approved for use in procurement of low quarter shoes.

12) On 28 August 1967 a RF/PF Pay Study which COMUSMACV approved recommended increases ranging from 200\$VN to 1,500\$VN per man/month. The study was forwarded to the GVN for consideration on 28 August 1967.

13) On 4 September 1967 the last chapter of the proposed GVN CY68 Defense Budget was received from DGFA, and on 14 September all translated chapters were transmitted to the US BPOs for their analyses and recommendations.

14) The CY68 Budget was approved by COMUSMACV on 9 November 1967, and by the Mission Council on 13 November. On 15 November COMUSMACV informed the Minister of National Defense, GVN, that the US Mission Council had approved the CY68 GVN Defense Budget at a funding level of 62.6 billion \$VN, of which 17.5 billion \$VN is joint support. On 25 November the US Mission Council-approved GVN Defense Budget was forwarded to the DGFA.

15) On 20 December 1967 Popular Force personnel were authorized a rice allowance of 200\$VN per month for each dependent retroactive to 1 June 1967. Previously the allowance was payable only for the member.

## Appendix, Inspections and Field Trips

(U) One hundred seventy-two (172) field trips were made to the RVNAF military units and US Advisory Detachments. Vietnamese military auditors from the office of the DGFA were accompanied by US

# CONFIDENTIAL

advisory personnel. Audits and field trips concentrated on the following items: military pay and allowances, death gratuity payments, safekeeping of military funds, implementation of revised accounting procedures, payments of longevity, MILCAP claims, and detection of graft and corruption. Some significant type errors discovered during the inspections were: journals and ledgers were not posted correctly or maintained on a current basis, and PF members in MIP training were not receiving their daily food allowance of 33.5\$VN or 26.5\$VN per man/day. Major items of interest noted during trips: RF/PF death gratuity claims; shortage of trained finance personnel and office equipment; advance funds to finance daily operations; and Vietnamese publication/distribution system.

## New Disbursing System

(U) A Ministry of Defense Disbursing Center came into being on 31 March 1967, and began operations on 1 April 1967. The development project was initiated in February 1967. Payment of all contracts entered into by the Central Procurement Agency were made through the Disbursing Center. It had the capacity of processing 2,000 commercial vouchers per month; however, the present volume of business had not reached the peak capacity. For the first time, all contracts were centrally audited and centrally paid. Payments to contractors were made within 20 days after receipt of goods and services, rather than the 6-9 months under the previous system. 38

## MILITARY BANKING FACILITIES

### General

(C) Prior to the establishment of Military Banking Facilities (MBF) in Vietnam, COMUSMACV had long favored the creation of a banking program which would provide a repository for appropriated and non-appropriated funds and ease currency conversion problems of military personnel. COMUSMACV also desired to provide normal banking service to military personnel and thus encourage savings and reduce

# CONFIDENTIAL

troop spending. Action was initiated by the MACV Comptroller in late 1965 to establish military banking facilities. Arrangements were made to gain GVN approval of applications made by The Chase Manhattan Bank and The Bank of America to establish commercial branches in Vietnam, and MACV initiated action through DA to determine Federal Reserve Board requirements for the operation of these branches. During the first half of 1966 the MACV Comptroller worked closely, through the US Embassy, with GVN officials to overcome problems associated with the establishment of the US banks. In early August 1966 the SECDEF clarified Federal Reserve Board requirements by designating The Chase Manhattan Bank and The Bank of America as Depositories of the Treasury of the US. Commercial branches of Chase Manhattan and Bank of America were opened in downtown Saigon on 18 July and 1 August, respectively. After the establishment of these commercial branches, GVN representatives raised questions concerning the manner and scope of these operations. The GVN was concerned about bypassing Vietnamese banks, the outflow of the US military payroll, and the ultimate control and supervision of US banking operations. Discussions with the GVN continued and on 23 September the MACV Comptroller was able to inform the managers of the US banks by letter that they were authorized to begin operation of MBFs. These MBFs were authorized by the US Treasury Department to handle a special type of personal and quasi-official account with checks that were payable in MPC within Vietnam and US dollars outside Vietnam. Arrangements were also made to grant APO privileges to the MEFs in order that US dollar or dollar instruments were not sent through Vietnamese mail in contravention of Vietnamese law. <sup>39</sup>

## Administration and Control

(C) During late 1966 and early 1967 the problems of handling the MPC convertible accounts and the supervision of the MBFs continued to be the subject of meetings with GVN officials and messages exchanged among officials of the US Embassy, USAID, COMUSMACV, and Washington. For a period of time the MBFs operated under conflicting instructions from the GVN and COMUSMACV. COMUSMACV held the position that the MBFs should be operated under US control. MACV Comptroller personnel continued to work with the US Embassy in order to clarify and strengthen US supervision of the MBFs. By the end of 1966 the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments indicated support of the position COMUSMACV had taken, i. e., that the GVN not

# CONFIDENTIAL

be allowed to prescribe regulations for the operation of the MBFs. In January COMUSMACV updated Directive 37-6, concerning financial administration, and added a section on MBFs. The directive provided that COMUSMACV, upon consultation with the GVN and with the concurrence of the US Embassy, exercised authority and supervision over the MBFs. The directive elaborated guidelines for the operation, support and inspection of the MBFs; designated authorized users of the facilities; named MACV Comptroller as the liaison representative of COMUSMACV to the US banks; and directed component commanders to furnish adequate quarters and logistical support to the fullest extent authorized in applicable service regulations and directives. To further clarify fiscal aspects of MBF operations in Vietnam a conference was held in Bangkok in March which was attended by representatives of the Treasury and Defense Departments and the Comptrollers of CINCPAC, MACV, and 7AF.<sup>40</sup>

(C) During the first few months of 1967 GVN representatives continued to indicate dissatisfaction with some aspects of the operation of the MBFs. The GVN desired that the MBFs be separated from the downtown commercial offices of the banks and moved to offices located on military compounds. The GVN also urged that tighter controls be established over possible misuse of the MBFs, and that arrangements be made for joint inspection of the MBFs. US Embassy representatives and the MACV Comptroller met with the bank managers to plan for the expeditious movement of the MBFs out of the downtown Saigon commercial branch offices and to tighten controls over alleged misuse of the MBFs. Discussions with the GVN continued, and in April a general agreement was reached with the GVN on MBF operations. It was determined that retired members of the US Armed Forces and civilian employees of US contractors would not be authorized to use the MBFs, and that in accordance with the desires of the GVN, efforts would be made to move the MBFs to military-controlled compounds. In June COMUSMACV revised that portion of his Directive Number 37-6 to reflect the more restrictive use of the MBFs by official and quasi-official activities, active duty military personnel, and US civilians in direct employment of the US Government.<sup>41</sup>

(C) CINCPAC directed that COMUSMACV move the MBFs to quarters under military control by the 15 April deadline that had been set earlier by the GVN. COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that the time frame had been extended by the GVN and that the move would be completed as quickly as on-base facilities could be provided. The Chase Manhattan MBF moved to a temporary location at the Plaza BEQ on 26 April and The Bank of America facility moved to Tan Son Nhut on 16 May.<sup>42</sup>

# UNCLASSIFIED

(U) During the remainder of the year requests from the component commanders for the establishment of additional MBF branches of the two US banks were forwarded to the US Treasury Department for approval. Two additional branches were established during the year including a Chase Manhattan facility at Long Binh on 30 June and a Bank of America facility at Bien Hoa on 31 August. Five additional MBFs had been approved for future operations at Da Nang (2), Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and An Khe.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## CHAPTER XII

### Footnotes

1. Briefing (S), SECDEF, Jul 67.
2. Embtel (S), Saigon to State, 010348Z Oct 66; Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 051330Z Oct 66; Msg (C), State to AMEMB Saigon, 262206Z Nov 66; Memo (C), DEPAMB to COMUSMACV, 11 Apr 67, Subj: Stabilization Program.
3. US Mission Weekly Report (S), 171104Z Jan 67.
4. Ibid., 181215Z Apr 67, 091245Z May 67, and US Mission Weekly Report (C), 281230Z Aug 67; Mission Council Action Memo No. 202 (S), 19 Jun 67; US Mission Weekly Report (S), 141235Z Mar 67.
5. Memo (C), DEPAMB to COMUSMACV, 11 Apr 67, Subj: Stabilization Program; Memo (S), COMUSMACV to DEPAMB, 16 Apr 67, Subj: Ibid.
6. US Mission Weekly Report (S), 291220Z May 67; Spring Stabilization Review (C), Joint Economic Office, US Embassy, May 67; Ltr (U), Economic Counselor to GEN Westmoreland, 29 May 67.
7. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 210058Z Jun 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 101345Z Jun 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 211235Z Jun 67; Msg (S), JCS, 102139Z Aug 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC, 201900Z Sep 67; Msg (S), JCS, 020147Z Dec 67.
8. Ltr (C), Economic Counselor to COMUSMACV, 12 Oct 67; Position Paper (C), Oct 67, Subj: Joint Economic Office and MACV Comptroller CY68 Piaster Ceiling; Memo (C), COMUSMACV to Counselor for Economic Affairs, 8 Nov 67; Embtel (C), Saigon to State, 181245Z Nov 67, Subj: Stabilization Review; DF (C), MACV Comptroller to CofS, 4 Nov 67.
9. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV, 280940Z Nov 66; Memo (S), JCSM 729-66, 2 Dec 66, Subj: Deployment to Southeast Asia and Other PACOM Areas; Memo (S), SECDEF to JCS, 9 Dec 66; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 280510Z Dec 66; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 050647Z Jan 67, Subj: Proposals for Piaster Savings.

# UNCLASSIFIED

10. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 261930Z Feb 67, Subj: Proposal for Adjusting Program 4 Troop Ceilings and for Piaster Savings; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 210412Z Feb 67, Subj: Annual Piaster Requirements; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 060406Z Jan 67, Subj: Combined COMUSMACV and CINCPAC Comments on Piaster Savings Program; Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 290314Z Mar 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 270225Z Mar 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 311254Z Mar 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071203Z Jun 67, Subj: Proposals for Adjusting Program 4 Troop Ceilings and for Piaster Savings.
11. Memo (S), SECDEF for CJCS, 12 Apr 67; Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 071203Z Jun 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 170350Z Jun 67.
12. Memo (TS), SECDEF for CJCS, 10 Aug 67, Subj: FY68 Force Requirements for SVN (Program 5); Historical Summary (FOUO), MACCOC, 19 Oct 67; Memo (C), COMUSMACV to Counselor for Economic Affairs, 8 Nov 67.
13. Memo (U), SECDEF for CJCS, 13 Jul 66, Subj: Establishing Limits on DOD Piaster Spending in Vietnam; Msg (U), JCS, 151820Z Jul 67; Memo (U), ASD/SA to CJCS, 20 Aug 66, Subj: The DOD Activities Cost Index.
14. Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 111510Z Mar 67, Subj: Revised DOD Activities Cost Index; Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 25 May 67, Subj: DOD Activities Cost Index Study; Ltr (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, Ser 2132, 13 Jun 67, Subj: DOD Activities Cost Index; Fact Sheet (U), MACV Comptroller, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Ibid.; Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 27 Jun 67; Ltr (U), CINCPAC to JCS, Ser 3185, 29 Aug 67.
15. DF (U), MACV Comptroller to CofS, 2 Nov 67; Fact Sheet (U), MACV Comptroller, 9 Nov 67, Subj: DOD Activities Cost Index; Ltr (U), MACV Comptroller, 4 Nov 67, Subj: Revised DOD Activities Cost Index.
16. DF (FOUO), MACV Comptroller to CofS, 20 Nov 67; Ltr (FOUO), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 10 Oct 67, Subj: DOD Activities Cost Index; Historical Summary (U), MACV Comptroller, 20 Jan 68.
17. Ltr (S), American Ambassador to the Prime Minister, 29 Aug 67.

# UNCLASSIFIED

18. Memo (U), Economic Counselor to MACV Comptroller, 11 Oct 67, Subj: The Piaster Exchange Rate; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 130040Z Oct 67; DF (U), MACV Comptroller, 13 Oct 67, Subj: Contracts and Leases with Local Vendors.
19. Msg (U), CG USARV to DA, 140810Z Oct 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 261050Z Oct 67; Msg (U), DA, 100014Z Nov 67; Msg (U), SECSTATE, 012006Z Nov 67.
20. Ltr (U), USARV to DA, 10 Nov 67, Subj: Request for Advance Decision; Msg (U), USARV to DA, 202353Z Nov 67, Subj: Contract Payment in Piasters.
21. Memo (U), Counselor for Economic Affairs to MACV Comptroller, 12 Dec 67.
22. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 150135Z Dec 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 180423Z Dec 67; Ltr (U), USARPAV to CG USARV, 23 Dec 67, Subj: MACV Message Pertaining to Contracting in Vietnam; [see Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 230754Z Dec 67, for additional discussion of the legalities and implications of imposing provisions in contracts for payment in piasters only and without regard for the established exchange rate].
23. Embtel (FOUO), Saigon to State, 30 Dec 67, Subj: Vietnam Exchange Rate Applicable in Contracts Denominated in US Dollars; Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 160328Z Jan 68, Subj: Ibid.
24. Embtel (C), Saigon to State, 280515Z Jan 67, Subj: US Military Piaster Spending Reduction Program.
25. Memo (U), Economic Counselor to COMUSMACV, 24 Jan 67, Subj: Economic Policy; Memo (U), COMUSMACV to Economic Counselor, 28 Jan 67; Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Component Commanders, 14 Feb 67, Subj: Impact of US Presence on Vietnamese Society; Ltr (U), USARV, 14 Mar 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program.
26. Briefing (C), Comptroller, 23 Jul 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program; Memo (U), MACV Comptroller, 24 Apr 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Control Working Group Meeting No. 6; MACV Commanders' Conference (TS), 11 Jun 67, MACCOC, 24 Jun 67; Ltr (C), Economic Counselor, AMEMB Saigon to SECDEF, 25 May 67.

PAGE 1065 OF 1340 PAGES

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

27. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 300303Z Aug 67, Subj: Personal Piaster Spending.
28. Memo (S), JCS, 18 Oct 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program and Related Matters.
29. Fact Sheet (U), Comptroller, 9 Nov 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditures Reduction Program.
30. Historical Summaries (S), MACV Comptroller, 12 Apr 67, 19 Oct 67 and 20 Jan 68.
31. MACV Dir No. 37-15, 3 Sep 66; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 290031Z Aug 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program Workshop; Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Component Commanders, 14 Sep 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program Workshop, 7-8 Sep 1967.
32. Msg (U), USARPAC/PACAF to COMUSMACV, 180613Z Jan 67, Subj: Vietnam Regional Exchange; Ltr (U), MACV (CofS) to CG USARV, 2 Sep 67, Subj: Personal Piaster Expenditures in Vietnam Regional Exchanges; Ltr (U), USARV to COMUSMACV, AVHGA-SF, 24 Sep 67, Subj: Ibid.
33. DF (U), Comptroller to CofS, 4 Nov 67, Subj: Personal Piaster Spending Habits Survey.
34. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV, 14 Sep 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program Workshop, 7-8 Sep 67; DF (U), MACV Comptroller to CofS, 20 Nov 67, Subj: Report on Status of Anti-Inflation Actions.
35. Fact Sheet (U), MACV Comptroller, 2 Nov 67, Subj: Piaster Expenditures Reduction Program.
36. Ltr (U), MACV (CofS), 1 Dec 67, Subj: DOD Contractor Personnel Piaster Expenditures.
37. DF (S), Command Historical Program from MACJ1 for Jan, Feb, Mar and Sep 67.
38. DF (S), Quarterly Historical Report from Comptroller for 1967 dtd 12 Apr, 20 Jul and 19 Oct 67, and 20 Jan 68.

# UNCLASSIFIED

39. Ltr (U), MACV Comptroller to Chief of Finance, DA, 10 Dec 65, Subj: Military Banking Facilities in Vietnam; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to DA, 111355Z Mar 66, Subj: Banking Facilities; Msg (C), SECDEF, 021336Z Aug 66; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 181507Z Jul 66, Subj: Opening of US Commercial Banks and Branches in Saigon (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 190105Z Aug 66, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 230949Z Sep 66.
40. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140610Z Dec 66, Subj: MBFs; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 091250Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (C), State to AMEMB Saigon, 12-2900-B, 24 Dec 66; MACV Dir No. 37-6, 24 Jan 67 (U).
41. MFR (U), MACCO-FAA, 17 Mar 67, Subj: Meeting at USAID Pertaining to MBFs; Embtel (C), Saigon to State, 291201Z Mar 67, Subj: Military Banking Facilities; Embtel (C), Saigon to State, 101210Z Apr 67; Embtel (C), Saigon to State, 130429Z Apr 67; Msg (U), COMUSMACV to VMAC, 141247Z Apr 67; MACV Dir No. 37-6, Ch 3, 12 Jun 67 (U).
42. Msg (C), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 122047Z Apr 67; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 141020Z Apr 67.